Richard Crowe vs. First American W2001-00800-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
Owner of a pickup truck sued the bank that financed the purchase for conversion after the bank repossessed the truck. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $250,000.00. Bank appeals. We affirm in part reverse in part and remand.
McNairy
Court of Appeals
Thomas Wynns III vs. Rae Cummings W2000-02156-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
This case involves a dispute between Thomas Clinton Wynns, III ("Thomas") and Rae Ann Cummings ("Rae Ann"), the son and granddaughter of Mrs. Leola Wynns ("Leola"), concerning Leola's mental capacity and ability to manage her own affairs. Plaintiff, Thomas, holder of a power of attorney from his mother, filed a complaint against the defendant, Rae Ann, seeking to have Rae Ann turn over to him all of Leola's assets in possession of Rae Ann. Rae Ann filed an answer to the complaint and a petition for appointment of a conservator for Leola and for an injunction against Thomas from removing any more of her assets. After a nonjury trial, the trial court found that the court had jurisdiction to appoint a conservator for Leola; that the facts warranted the appointment of a conservator; that the power of attorney held by Thomas and a will executed by Leola in 1998 were void, and that the quit claim deed executed on April 22, 1999, in favor of Thomas, was also void. Thomas appeals. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Guy Varnadoe vs. Shelton McGhee Jr. W2001-00075-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
This appeal arises from a breach of contract claim brought by the Appellee against the Appellants in the Chancery Court of Shelby County. The trial court entered a consent order, referring the case to a special master. Pursuant to the consent order, the trial court directed the special master to conduct an investigation and report his findings to the trial court. The special master conducted an investigation and submitted his report to the trial court. The special master concluded that the Appellee was entitled to full payment under the contract but that the Appellants were entitled to a set-off. The trial court entered a judgment in the Appellee's favor and gave the Appellants a set-off. The trial court ordered that the fees approved by the special master be divided equally between the Appellants and the Appellee.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Lonnie Wilder vs. Leslie Wilder E2000-03184-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: John D. Mcafee
In this divorce case, the Trial Court awarded husband attorney's fees against wife. On appeal, we reverse.
Claiborne
Court of Appeals
Myron Hubbard vs. Sandi Hubbard E2001-00110-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young
The Trial Court granted appellee Judgement before the 30 days to answer process provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure had expired. On appeal, we vacate and remand.
Denise Frazier vs. Robert Frazier E2000-02929-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
Appellant ask the Court to void portions of the marital settlement agreement incorporated in the parties' Divorce Decree in the State of Illinois. The Trial Court refused and granted appellee summary judgment. We affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
New Covenant Baptist Church vs. Panther Sark E2000-02930-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Thomas R. Frierson, II
In this suit New Covenant Baptist Church seeks a declaration that certain restrictions applicable to Technology Park West subdivision do not preclude New Covenant from using one of the lots for driveway purposes to other unrestricted property owned by New Covenant outside the subdivision. Panther Sark, a partnership, and certain other owners of lots in the subdivision were named as Defendants and they filed a counter-complaint seeking a declaration to the contrary. The Trial Court found in favor of New Covenant. We reverse and hold in favor of the partnership and other owners of lots in the subdivision.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Rouse Construction Co. vs. Interstate Steel Corp. E2001-00242-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
This is a case wherein the Plaintiff/Appellant, Rouse Construction Company, seeks damages for breach of contract from the Defendant/Appellee, Interstate Steel Corporation. The Chancellor found that there was no meeting of minds between the parties as to essential contract terms and, therefore, ordered that Rouse's claim be denied. The Chancellor further determined that Interstate should be allowed a judgment in the amount of $19,090.00 for materials and plans delivered to Rouse. We concur in the determination of the Chancellor and affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
CH-00-1207-2 CH-00-1207-2
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
David Miller vs. State E1998-00247-SC-R11-PD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Ray L. Jenkins
We granted petitioner, David Earl Miller's application for permission to appeal to determine whether this Court's decision in State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. 1992) created a new state constitutional rule regarding the elements of deliberation and premeditation. Petitioner claims that Brown created a new state constitutional rule and that the jury instructions given at his initial trial violated this rule by relieving the prosecution of its burden to prove the elements of premeditation and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the petitioner argues that his conviction of first-degree murder was not supported by sufficient proof. After due consideration, we conclude that Brown did not announce a new state constitutional rule, did not implicate any constitutional right, is not retroactive, and may not serve as the basis for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we conclude that the petitioner's complaint about the jury instructions given at his initial trial has been waived because it was not raised on direct appeal and that his complaint about the sufficiency of the evidence to support premeditation and deliberation was previously determined by this Court on direct appeal. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
Knox
Supreme Court
Paul Seaton, et al vs. Richard Rowe, et al E2000-02304-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: John B. Hagler, Jr.
Monroe County -This is an action for specific performance of an option agreement for the sale of some farmland acreage, from which a 60-acre tract was excepted. The trial court dismissed the action, holding that the option agreement did not satisfy the statute of frauds because the description of the excepted property was inadequate and that the deficiency could not be remedied by parol evidence. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a motion to "reopen the proof" to introduce evidence to support reformation of the description of the excepted property. The motion was denied. The plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) finding that the option agreement did not satisfy the statute of frauds; (2) refusing to consider parol evidence of the location of the excepted property; and (3) refusing to "reopen the proof" on the issue of reformation. The defendants argue that the appeal is frivolous. We find that the option agreement is sufficiently definite to satisfy the statute of frauds and that parol evidence should have been admitted to locate the excepted property. We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Sullivan County grand jury issued presentments against the defendant on one count of operating a motor vehicle without a face shield; two counts of speeding; three counts of driving under the influence; three counts of driving on a revoked license; two counts of driving on revoked license after second or subsequent conviction for driving while intoxicated; one count of driving on revoked license after second or subsequent conviction for driving under the influence; one count of driving while intoxicated, fourth offense; and one count of driving under the influence, fourth offense. The charges resulted from three separate cases. The defendant pled to all of the crimes in two different plea hearings and the defendant was sentenced as a career offender to a total of eighteen years, with a minimum jail time of 585 days, and with his last six years to be served on probation. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender and did not apprise the defendant of the possibility that he could be sentenced as a persistent offender, as opposed to a career offender. He moved to withdraw his guilty pleas on this ground. The trial court denied his motion, and he appeals the denial. Furthermore, the defendant waived his right to request probation or alternative sentencing in one case, and the state agreed to allow the defendant to serve probation in one case. In the third case, the defendant requested probation or alternative sentencing. The trial court denied his request, citing his extensive criminal history in support of its denial. The defendant also appeals this denial. After reviewing the record and applicable case law, we find these issues to be without merit and therefore affirm the lower court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and its denial of probation or alternative sentencing.
Jeffrey Miller appeals the Meigs County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petitions for writ of error coram nobis and writ of habeas corpus. Both petitions seek redress for Miller's grievance that he has been required to serve felony sentences in the Department of Correction, although his plea agreements designated the location of confinement to be the Meigs County Jail. Because neither coram nobis nor habeas corpus relief is available to address a concern of this nature and because the petitioner's claims are factually unfounded, we affirm.
Meigs
Court of Criminal Appeals
Carl O. Koella, Jr. vs. Fred McHargue, et ux E2001-00544-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith
Defendants have right of first refusal on tract of real property. The Trial Court held that the giving of a quitclaim deed did not trigger the right of first refusal. Defendants appealed, we affirm.
Blount
Court of Appeals
Linda Greene vs. Dr. Woody Stinson E2001-00628-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: William M. Dender
Jefferson
Court of Appeals
Linda Greene vs. Dr. Woody Stinson E2001-00628-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: William M. Dender
State vs. Edward Coffee M1998-00472-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: J. O. Bond
Edward D. Coffee was indicted for possession of certain controlled substances with intent to sell and possession of drug paraphernalia. Because the judicial commissioner failed to make and retain an exact copy of the original search warrant as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), the trial court suppressed the evidence recovered in the search and dismissed the indictment. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, and we now also affirm.
In this appeal, Mark A. Doolen, Jr. challenges the order of the Dickson County Circuit Court requiring the appellant's payment of restitution in the amount of $6,611.76 for his vandalism of two antique automobiles. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the appellant should have filed his appeal with the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
Dickson
Court of Criminal Appeals
State v. Mark Doolen M2000-01953-COA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace
A thirteen-year-old boy was convicted of vandalism in juvenile court, and was ordered to pay restitution of over $6,600. He claimed that the amount of restitution was excessive, and appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the juvenile court's determination. We affirm the order of restitution, but modify the amount, for the reasons set out below.
Dickson
Court of Appeals
Southwest Williamson County Community Assoc. et al vs. Bruce Saltsman M2001-00943-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: J. Russ Heldman
Being dissatisfied with the State's concept of, and planning for, the extension of State Route 840 through southwest Williamson County, three residents in the County, two nonprofit corporations, and a partnership that owns property in the County, sued J. Bruce Saltsman, Sr. ("the Commissioner"), in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Transportation ("TDOT"). Following a bench trial, the court below entered a final judgment including (1) a writ of mandamus ordering the Commissioner to perform a number of "duties" in connection with Route 840; and (2) a permanent injunction enjoining him from moving forward with the planning and construction of Route 840 through Williamson County until he complies with the trial court's order. The Commissioner appeals. In addition to other bases for reversal, he asserts that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of this controversy. We agree with the appellant that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below in its entirety and dismiss the petition.
Williamson
Court of Appeals
Natalya Mazor vs. Kenneth Isaacman W2000-01485-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Kay S. Robilio
This is a dental malpractice case. The patient visited the defendant dentist in August 1997 for routine root canal surgery. After the surgery, the patient began experiencing "constant" pain in the tooth in which the root canal was performed. She was told by the defendant dentist that this was pain ordinarily felt after root canal surgery. In February 1999, the patient visited another dentist who discovered that a piece of a drill bit had been left inside patient's tooth during the previous root canal. In December 1999, the patient filed a lawsuit against the defendant dentist for dental malpractice. The defendant dentist filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the patient did not bring the claim within the one year statute of limitations. This motion was granted and the patient now appeals. We reverse, finding that the patient had one year from the time she discovered or should have discovered the foreign object in which to file her lawsuit.
