Arthur Anderson vs. Edwin Roberson W2000-01879-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown
This appeal presents the sole issue of in personam jurisdiction of a nonresident corporation and the nonresident individual owning a majority interest in the corporation by virtue of their activities, as described in the Tennessee Long Arm statute, or alternatively, as co-conspirators with defendants, subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Michael Cheslock vs. Bd. of Admin., etc . W2001-00179-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
On December 14, 1995, Memphis Police Lieutenant Michael Cheslock appeared before the Pension Board of Memphis, Tennessee, to request a line of duty disability pension as provided by the Memphis Code of Ordinances, Section 25-1(27). Mr. Cheslock had been diagnosed by two psychiatrists as disabled by job related Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. The Pension Board refused the line of disability pension, determining that Mr. Cheslock did not meet the requirements as defined by the code. Mr. Cheslock filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Shelby County. The petition was denied and this appeal followed. We affirm.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Judy Burroughs vs. Robert Magee W2001-00238-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III
This is a personal injury and wrongful death case. The plaintiff and her husband were involved in an automobile accident. The plaintiff sued the driver of the other vehicle for her husband's wrongful death as well as for injuries she sustained in the accident. The plaintiff named the driver's physician as an additional tortfeasor, alleging that the physician negligently prescribed drugs to a known drug addict, negligently prescribed two contraindicated drugs, and negligently failed to warn his patient of the risks of driving while under the influence of the drugs. The trial court granted the physician's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the physician had no duty to unidentifiable third parties such as the plaintiff. We affirm in part and reverse in part, finding that the physician owed a duty to the plaintiff and the decedent to warn his patient of the risks of driving while under the influence of the prescribed drugs.
Lauderdale
Court of Appeals
Dorothy Owen vs. George Summers W2001-00727-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Dewey C. Whitenton
This is an action to set aside a warranty deed. Plaintiff-Grantor filed suit on February 11, 1997, to set aside a deed executed July 11, 1989, on the grounds of fraud and mental incompetency. The defendant grantee denied fraud and mental incompetency and affirmatively relied upon the seven-year statute of limitations. Following a jury trial, which ended in a mistrial, the parties stipulated that the case be submitted to the chancellor who conducted the trial for a nonjury determination from the trial transcript and trial exhibits. The chancellor found that the seven-year statute of limitations had been tolled by virtue of the grantor's mental incompetence, the deed was procured by fraud, and that the grantor was mentally incompetent on the date of the execution of the deed. The chancellor rescinded the deed. Defendant-Grantee has appealed. We affirm.
Fayette
Court of Appeals
In Re: Estate of Lois Chandler E2000-03055-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: John F. Weaver
Buster Chandler, Jr. ("Chandler") was appointed administrator of the estate of his mother, Lois Chandler, who died intestate in 1998. Chandler is incarcerated in Kentucky for a murder he committed in 1990. Chandler requested the Chancery Court arrange for his transportation from prison in Kentucky to Knoxville, Tennessee, so he could be present for the hearing regarding the closing of his mother's estate and so he could meet with the Knox County Attorney General regarding his murder conviction in Kentucky. Chandler argued that the Attorney General wanted to try him for the murder in Knoxville and would assist in obtaining a pardon from the governor of Kentucky. The Chancery Court denied his request, closed his mother's estate, and assessed court costs against Chandler as administrator. Chandler appeals. We affirm the Chancery Court.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Roberts vs. Everhart Steel Const. Co. Inc. E2001-00187-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Samuel H. Payne
In this action for damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by defendant's negligence, a jury awarded damages. On appeal, we conclusively presume the Judgment is correct, because we cannot review all of the evidence heard by the jury.
James Laney vs. Evelyn Oldham E2000-02710-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown, III
Evelyn B. Oldham ("Defendant") sold to James C. R. Laney ("Plaintiff") a house and lot located next to a Chalet owned by Defendant. Defendant granted Plaintiff an easement for use of a driveway. Plaintiff later converted his residence into a business. In 1993, the Trial Court entered an Order interpreting the easement to allow Plaintiff's use of the driveway for a "normal amount of delivery." No appeal was taken from this Order. In 2000, the Trial Court, but a different trial judge, entered another Order interpreting the 1993 Order to allow for a normal amount of business deliveries using the driveway. We conclude that the 1993 Order permits only a normal amount of deliveries consistent with a residential use. We reverse the decision of the Trial Court, and remand for further proceedings.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Wanda Steinbrunner vs. Tuner Funeral Home, Inc., et al E2001-00014-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Jacqueline E. Schulten
Six years after her husband died, Wanda J. Steinbrunner sued the Chattanooga funeral home that handled his burial and the medical examiner that performed his autopsy. She made various claims based upon theories of negligence, gross negligence, and outrageous conduct. The trial court granted the funeral home and the medical examiner summary judgment. Steinbrunner appeals, challenging the grant of summary judgment. We affirm.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Patrick Reinshagen vs. PHP Companies, Inc. E2001-00025-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown, III
In this action for breach of employment contract and defamation, the Trial Court granted summary judgment to defendants. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co. vs. SA W. Jeong E2001-00246-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Lawrence H. Puckett
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company ("Tennessee Farmers") brought a declaratory judgment action against Sa W. Jeong ("the injured party"); her daughter, Hyunlan Lee; and her son-in-law, Jack Sung K. Lee (the defendants Lee are referred to herein collectively as "the Lees"), asking the trial court to "declare whether or not Tennessee Farmers is obligated to afford liability coverage to [the Lees] in connection with the lawsuit filed against them by [the injured party]." At the conclusion of a bench trial, the trial judge ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that the word "reside" and its derivatives "resident" and "residing," particularly as the latter two words are used in the policy language excluding coverage of a claim by a "covered person" or one "residing in the same household," are ambiguous, and that the language of the policy should be construed against Tennessee Farmers as the drafter of the policy. The court ordered Tennessee Farmers to provide liability coverage to the Lees with respect to the subject lawsuit. Tennessee Farmers appeals, raising issues as to whether the trial court correctly ruled that the policy is ambiguous, and whether the trial court was correct in finding that the word "resident" was susceptible to a reasonable meaning that would exclude the injured party from the ambit of the subject exclusionary language in the policy. We find that the subject policy provision is not ambiguous; however, we conclude that the injured party was not "residing in [the Lees'] household" as that language has been construed by applicable case law. Accordingly, we affirm.
Bradley
Court of Appeals
2001-00383-COA-R3-CV 2001-00383-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Phillip Ledford vs. Bradley Memorial Hospital E2001-00291-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Lawrence H. Puckett
The plaintiffs, Phillip A. Ledford ("Ledford") and his wife, Elizabeth Ledford, filed suit against the defendants, Daniel V. Johnson, M.D., Bradley Memorial Hospital ("the Hospital"), and Southeast Tennessee Orthopedics, Inc. ("Southeast"), alleging medical malpractice arising out of surgery performed by Dr. Johnson on Ledford's broken arm. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment. We affirm.
Bradley
Court of Appeals
Blake Burton, et al vs. Hardwood Pallets, Inc., et al E2001-00547-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Samuel H. Payne
This appeal involves a dispute between the sellers of a business and the bank that financed a portion of the purchase price. The plaintiffs, Blake Burton and Michael Burton, entered into an agreement with the defendant, Hardwood Pallets, Inc., to sell the Burtons' pallet manufacturing business. As partial consideration for the sale, Hardwood Pallets executed an unsecured promissory note to the Burtons in the amount of $1,000,000. Additional consideration for the sale was obtained by way of an $800,000 loan from the defendant, AmSouth Bank, to Hardwood Pallets; as a part of the bank transaction, Hardwood Pallets pledged its assets as collateral. As a condition to the making of the loan, AmSouth required the Burtons to execute a subordination agreement. When Hardwood Pallets defaulted on the bank loan, AmSouth sold the collateral at a private sale. Litigation ensued. In addition to suing Hardwood Pallets and its shareholders, the Burtons sued AmSouth, alleging procurement of breach of contract and civil conspiracy to defraud. AmSouth filed a counterclaim, alleging that the Burtons breached the subordination agreement. It also filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that it acted within its rights under the subordination agreement. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of AmSouth pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. We affirm.
The defendant, Robert Blanton, Jr., was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury on June 6, 1995, on one count of sale of marijuana and one count of delivery of marijuana, both Class E felonies. The defendant pled guilty to the indictment, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to probation. An affidavit of violation of probation was filed on April 17, 1996, and amended on September 6, 1996.
Montgomery
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Eddie McNabb M2000-01490-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Graham
The defendant appeals from his maximum sentence of six (6) years for voluntary manslaughter and the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences. After review, we hold that the trial court properly sentenced the defendant to six (6) years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction and correctly ordered the defendant's convictions for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault be served consecutive to one another. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The appellant, Marcia Lynn Williams, entered a best interest guilty plea in the Circuit Court of Marshall County to one count of obtaining drugs by false pretense, a class D felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying the appellant a sentence in the community corrections program. After a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Marshall
Court of Criminal Appeals
Tarrance Robinson vs. Neil Clement, et al M2001-00365-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
This appeal involves a state prisoner housed at the Riverbend Maximum Security Institution who was disciplined for possessing a deadly weapon. After exhausting his internal appeals, the prisoner filed a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, alleging that the disciplinary proceedings had violated his due process rights. The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss the petition. On this pro se appeal, the prisoner asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition. We have determined that the prisoner's petition does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted and, therefore, affirm the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Larico S. Ficklin W2000-01534-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Fred Axley & Judge James C. Beasley, Jr.
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to 25 years as a Violent Offender. In this appeal, the defendant alleges (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, and (2) the trial court erroneously admitted the defendant's custodial confession. We conclude that the defendant's initial arrest was without probable cause, and that the defendant's confession was obtained approximately 53 hours from his arrest without a judicial determination of probable cause. The defendant's confession was, therefore, erroneously admitted, and the error was not harmless. We reverse the defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial.
The appellant, LaQuenton Monger, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of first degree felony murder by aggravated child abuse and one count of aggravated child abuse. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the felony murder conviction and twenty years imprisonment in the Department for the aggravated child abuse conviction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction of felony murder and further challenges the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses of felony murder. Following a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the appellant's convictions of felony murder and aggravated child abuse and remand the cases to the trial court for a new trial.
Defendant challenges the denial of pretrial diversion by the District Attorney General and subsequent denial of relief by the trial court. We conclude that the defendant failed to file a petition for writ of certiorari and improperly sought to have the trial court consider matters not presented to the District Attorney General; thus, defendant has failed to establish that the District Attorney General abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant was charged in a two-count indictment with one count of the unlawful possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, and one count of the unlawful possession of more than 26 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver. A separate indictment returned the same day charged one count of the unlawful possession of marijuana. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, he subsequently pled guilty to two misdemeanor drug possession offenses in connection with the charges, and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 11 months, 29 days. The trial court refused his request for judicial diversion, but granted him probation, with the condition that he spend 90 days in a halfway house. In a timely filed appeal to this court, the defendant raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his request for judicial diversion; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to three months in the halfway house as a condition of probation. Based upon a careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment form to reflect the disposition of all charges against the defendant.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
Meloney Carr vs. Grady Carr W2000-02420-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis
This is a child custody case. The parties were separated in February 2000 and the father was awarded temporary custody of the parties' two minor children. After the trial, the mother was granted the divorce, but custody of the two children remained with the father. The father was required to pay rehabilitative alimony on the condition that the mother enroll in EMT classes. The mother appeals, asserting that the trial erred in denying a continuance when several of the mother's witnesses were unavailable to testify at the hearing, in awarding custody to the father, in making the rehabilitative alimony conditional on the mother enrolling in EMT classes and in the division of marital property. We reverse the award of custody to the father, modify the order on rehabilitative alimony, modify the division of marital property, and remand to the trial court to determine issues relating to child support.
Haywood
Court of Appeals
Suzanne Jones vs. Metro Elevator Co. W2000-02002-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Mark Agee
This appeal involves claims for injuries sustained by the plaintiff while riding in an elevator. The plaintiff brought suit against numerous parties including the company managing the building and the company under contract to service the elevators in the building. The circuit court granted a motion for summary judgment as to the company managing the building. The case proceeded to trial, however, against the company under contract to service the elevators. After the circuit court refused to instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the elevator service provider. The plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment and the refusal to instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and for the following reasons, we affirm.
Madison
Court of Appeals
James Moody vs. William Lea W2000-02916-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: R. Lee Moore Jr.
This appeal involves a dispute over an oral contract to lease farming equipment. The agreement provided that the defendant could use the plaintiff's farming equipment for an amount to be determined by a formula. The defendant began farming his land, intending to plant cotton, when the Mississippi River rose and the backwater covered his property. Because the backwater remained on the land for such a long period of time, the defendant could no longer grow cotton; he had to grow soybeans instead. Subsequently, the defendant refused to pay the plaintiff the amount the plaintiff claimed under the contract, and the plaintiff sued. The trial court held that the contract was enforceable and that the defendant's performance was not excused by the doctrine of frustration of commercial purpose. The defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court. For the reasons below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case to the trial court to modify the judgment.
