Kanbi vs. Sousa
M1999-00025-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Soloman

Bomar vs. TN Dept. of Mental Health
M1999-00951-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Ground For a Petition To Rehear. See Nashville v. State Board of Equalization, 210 Tenn. 587, 618,
E1999-01964-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Rex H. Ogle

Christopher Scott Wells, v. Betty Sue Wells
M1998-00748-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge John Rollins

Christopher Scott Wells (“Father”) and Betty Sue Wells (“Mother”) divorced in October 1997. By the terms of their Marital Dissolution Agreement (MDA), the parties had joint custody of the two children with Mother as primary custodian. Shortly after the MDA was accepted by the court, Father changed his mind. He sought custody of the children based on Mother’s relationships with men. The trial court found no change in circumstances and left custody with Mother. Because of evidence of the children’s altered behavior during their visit with Father, we find it necessary to remand the case to the trial court for a determination of the best interests of the children, including the comparative fitness of the parents at the time of the hearing on remand.

Charlotte Brown, v. Birman Managed Care, David N. Birman, Sue d. Birman, William F. Barenkamp, II, and Kathy Barenkamp
M1999-02551-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge John A. Turnbull

The divorced mother of a minor child claimed that her former husband and his employer conspired to fraudulently understate the husband’s income, in order to defeat her attempts to have his child support obligation increased to an appropriate amount. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. We reverse.

State vs. Janie Cousett
W1999-01256-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley

State vs. Brandon Bills
W1999-01468-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley

State vs. Wanda Bledsoe
W1999-00072-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: John Franklin Murchison

Also State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2D 661, 668-71 (Tenn. 1999). As a Result, The Trial Court
W1999-00241-CCA-R3-CD

State vs. Billy Moore
W1998-00029-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley

W1999-1977-CCA-R3-CD
W1999-1977-CCA-R3-CD
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey

State vs. Frank Massengill
W1999-02434-CCA-R3-CD

State vs. John M. Johnson
W1999-00679-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III

03C01-9906-CR-00227
03C01-9906-CR-00227
Trial Court Judge: Phyllis H. Miller

03C01-9905-CR-00200
03C01-9905-CR-00200

State vs. Wayne Leroy Evans
E1999-00384-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Phyllis H. Miller

Judy Lynn Patterson Conner, v. Billy Ray Conner
E1999–03A01-9903-CV-00095
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jacqueline E. Schulten

In this divorce action the wife has appealed and raises issues as to the amount of the alimony award and the division of marital property. The husband objects to an aw ard o f alimony in futuro and the Order requiring him to pay $2,047.20for the w ife’s atto rney’s fees.

Wayna Shadwick v. Shirley Young and Betty Thompson and F.H. Showmaker Distributors, Inc.
02607-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Billy Joe White

The essence of this appeal is whether a judgment creditor of an estate should be permitted to intervene in a marital/familial matter.

Leslie A. Lewis, v. John S. Muchmore and Virginia L. Muchmore
W1998-00794-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: John R. McCarroll, Jr.

Leslie A. Lewis filed a detainer warrant in the General Sessions Court of Shelby County against John S. Muchmore and Virginia Muchmore alleging forcible entry and detainer (FED)1 or unlawful detainer. The court entered judgment for possession only and the Muchmores appealed to circuit court where the Muchmores brought a counter-complaint for specific performance of a real estate contract. Following a bench trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff, Leslie A. Lewis, restoring her to possession of the subject premises and dismissing the countercomplaint. This appeal resulted.

Robert Eugene Lamb, James Morris Lofton, et al. v. MegaFlight Inc., a Florida Corp., Ronald Rosenburg, et al., - Concurring
W1998-00797-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Dewey C. Whitenton

Lamb, Lee, Lofton, and Bailey (“Plaintiffs” or “Phoenix”) brought suit alleging breach of contract and fraudulent inducement in the Chancery Court of McNairy County, Tennessee. MegaFlight, Rosenberg, and Noel (“MegaFlight”) filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because a forum selection clause in the contract specified that any action must be brought in the courts of Orange County, Florida. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal. Based upon the following, we reverse the lower court’s grant of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

David Chenault, v. Jeff L. Walker, Jo Bursey, Jack L. Moore, Ocean Inn, Inc., and Dimension III Financial Inc.
W1998-00769-COA-RM-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge John R. McCarroll, Jr.

This case deals with in personam jurisdiction under the Tennessee Long Arm 1 This Court originally denied the application for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted the appellant’s T.R.A.P. 11 application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this Court for a review on the merits. 2 Also named as a defendant is Jeff L. Walker, but he is not involved in this interlocutory appeal. 2 Statute and comes to this Court as a T.R.A.P. interlocutory appeal.1 Defendants, Jo Bursey (Bursey), Jack L. Moore (Moore), Ocean Inn, Inc. (Ocean Inn), and Dimension III Financial, Inc. (Dimension III)2, appeal the order of the trial court denying their motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

David . LeFemine, and David Sanders, v. Phillips & Jordan, Incorporated
03A01-9904-CH-00136
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor G. Richard Johnson

This is a suit by Plaintiffs David LeFemine and David Sanders seeking damages for breach of contract against Defendant Phillips & Jordan, Incorporated, which alleges that Defendant  Phillips & Jordan failed to provide the Plaintiffs an access road as it had by written contract agreed to do. The Trial Court dismissed the Plaintiff's proof resulting in this appeal which insists the evidence preponderates against the action of the Trial Court. We vacate the Trial Court'sjudgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

Gerald W. Smith, v. Roane County Circuit Court Harriman Utility Board, Richard A. Hall and the City Harriman, Tennessee
E1999-02456-COA-
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell E. Simmons, Jr.

'This is an appeal by Gerald W. Smith (“Plaintiff”) under T.R.A.P. Rule 3 alleging error in the Trial Court’s granting Summary Judgment to Defendants/Appellees, Harriman Utility Board (“HUB”), HUB General Manager Richard A. Hall (“Hall”), and the City of Harriman, Tennessee (“Harriman”). Plaintiff was an employee of HUB, and after his employment was terminated filed suit for breach of contract, procurement of breach of contract in violation of T.C.A. 2 § 47-50-109, retaliatory discharge, and promissory estoppel. The Circuit Court for Roane County entered summary judgment for Defendants on all claims. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

In the Matter of The Liquidation for United American Bank of Knoxville, TN Security Pacific Equipment Leasing, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance
E1999-00270-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Daryl E. Fansler

Appellant leased equipment to United American Bank (“UAB”) for a seven year term. Three years into the lease, UAB was closed by the Tennessee Commissioner of Banking and FDIC FILED February 9, 2000 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk 2 was appointed as receiver. Appellant filed a claim with FDIC seeking recovery of the full amount due on the lease. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to FDIC, thus upholding the constitutionality and applicability of T.C.A. § 45-2-1504(b), which provides that lessors can recover a maximum of two months’ lease payments after a Tennessee bank fails and is closed. In this appeal, lessor contends that T.C.A. § 45-2-1504(b) violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions by treating lessors differently from other contract claimants and that the application of the statute results in an unconstitutional taking of its property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 21 of the Tennessee Constitution. For the reasons herein stated, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Shyun S. Hamlett v. Heilig-Meyers Furniture Co. and Lumberman's Mutual Insurance Company
W1998-00117-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris
This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special W orkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 1998) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This is an appeal by the employee, Shyun S. Hamlett, from a judgment of the Chancery Court of Madison County in favor of the defendants. The chancellor found that the appellant "was outside the course and scope of her employment" at the time of the accidental injury. In her only issue, the plaintiff states that the trial court was in error in its conclusion. We find that the preponderance of the evidence supports the finding of the chancellor and affirm his judgment. The standard of review of factual issues in workers' compensation cases is de novo upon the record of the trial court with a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (1991 and Supp. 1998); Henson v. Lawrenceburg, 851 S.W.2d 89, 812 (Tenn. 1993). Under this standard, we are required to conduct an in-depth examination of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.