State vs. Carl McKissack W1999-01136-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Roy B. Morgan, Jr.
Madison
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Clyde Turner W1999-00797-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Chris B. Craft
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
Dotson vs. Blake, et al W1998-00710-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: William B. Acree
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Weakley County, which refused to permit the jury in a personal injury case to allocate fault to tortfeasors who successfully asserted a statute of repose defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. We granted review to decide whether fault may be attributed to tortfeasors who cannot be held liable because of a statute of repose. After examining the record, considering the arguments of the parties, and analyzing the applicable law, we conclude that the courts below erred in not allowing fault to be assigned to the tortfeasors who successfully asserted a statute of repose to the claims against them. Accordingly, for the reasons explained hereafter, the lower courts are reversed.
Weakley
Supreme Court
Dotson vs. Blake, et al W1998-00710-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: William B. Acree
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Weakley County, which refused to permit the jury in a personal injury case to allocate fault to tortfeasors who successfully asserted a statute of repose defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. We granted review to decide whether fault may be attributed to tortfeasors who cannot be held liable because of a statute of repose. After examining the record, considering the arguments of the parties, and analyzing the applicable law, we conclude that the courts below erred in not allowing fault to be assigned to the tortfeasors who successfully asserted a statute of repose to the claims against them. Accordingly, for the reasons explained hereafter, the lower courts are reversed.
A petition for rehearing has been filed on behalf of the Beckom appellants pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 39. After consideration of the same, the Court is of the opinion that the petition should be and the same hereby is denied at the cost of the Beckom appellants. Enter this 24th day of May, 2000.
Davidson
Supreme Court
Landstar Poole, Inc. v. George Hugh Rhoades, Jr. M1999-00040-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Samuel L. Lewis, Sp. J.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225 (e)(3) (1999) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellate review of factual issues in workers' compensation cases is de novo with a presumption that the trial court's findings are correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225(e)(2) (1999); Hill v. Eagle Bend Mfg., Inc., 942 S.W. 2d 483, 487 (Tenn. 1997). When a trial court has seen and heard witnesses and issues of credibility and weight of testimonyare involved, considerable deference is afforded the trial court's findings of fact. See Humphrey v. David Witherspoon, Inc., 734 S.W. 2d 315, 315-16 (Tenn. 1987). Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed SAMUEL L. LEWIS, SP. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, J., and TOM E. GRAY, SP. J., joined. Kent. E. Krause, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Landstar Poole, Inc. Alan Wise, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, George Hugh Rhoades, Jr. OPINION This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225 (e)(3) (1999) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellate review of factual issues in workers' compensation cases is de novo with a presumption that the trial court's findings are correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225(e)(2) (1999); Hill v. Eagle Bend Mfg., Inc., 942 S.W. 2d 483, 487 (Tenn. 1997). When a trial court has -2-
Davidson
Workers Compensation Panel
Linda Liles v. The Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance M1999-00016-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Samuel L. Lewis, Sp. J.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225 (e)(3)(1999) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellate review of factual issues in workers' compensation cases is de novo with a presumption that the trail court's findings are correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6- 225(e)(2)(1999); Hill v. Eagle Bend Mfg., Inc., 942 S.W. 2d 483, 487 (Tenn. 1997). When a trial court has seen and heard witnesses and issues of credibility and weight of testimony are involved, considerable deference is afforded the trial court's findings of fact. See Humphrey v. David Witherspoon, Inc., 734 S.W. 2d 315, 315-16 (Tenn.1987). Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed SAMUEL L. LEWIS, SP. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, J., and TOM E. GRAY, SP. J., joined. A. Gregory Ramos, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, The Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Company of America, Inc. Christina Henley Duncan, Manchester, Tennessee, for the appellee, Linda Liles. OPINION This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225 (e)(3)(1999) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellate review of factual issues in workers' compensation cases is de novo with a presumption that the trail court's findings are correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6- -2-
Franklin
Workers Compensation Panel
Harris vs. Chern M1998-00250-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Brothers
We granted this appeal to determine the standard to be applied in ruling upon a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 motion to revise a grant of partial summary judgment based upon evidence beyond that which was before the court when the motion was initially granted. For the reasons stated below, we reject the newly discovered evidence rule applied by the trial court and set forth in Bradley v. McLeod, 984 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). We adopt a test requiring the trial court to consider, when applicable: 1) the movant's efforts to obtain evidence to respond to the motion for summary judgment; 2) the importance of the newly submitted evidence to the movant's case; 3) the explanation offered by the movant for its failure to offer the newly submitted evidence in its initial response to the motion for summary judgment; 4) the likelihood that the nonmoving party will suffer unfair prejudice; and 5) any other relevant factor. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for application of this standard.
Davidson
Supreme Court
State vs. Harris M1998-00325-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Bobby H. Capers
We grant permission to appeal as requested by Kenneth Bryan Harris in order to review the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the trial court had erred in making the following rulings: (1) overruling the State's motion to enter a nolle prosequi on an indictment for aggravated assault; (2) dismissing a superseding indictment for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault; and (3) reversing the district attorney general pro tempore's rejection of the defendant's application for pretrial diversion on the original indictment. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed each ruling and remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. After careful consideration, we conclude that the trial court erred in overruling the State's motion for a nolle prosequi on the original indictment. We conclude also that the trial court erred in dismissing the superseding indictment for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. Moreover, because the superseding indictment contains a count charging Harris with an offense for which pretrial diversion is not available, we need not consider the question of pretrial diversion. Based on these conclusions, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the cause to the trial court for proceedings on the superseding indictment.
State vs. Henry Daniels W2002-00193-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey
The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and aggravated rape, a Class A felony. He was sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to fifteen years for the aggravated burglary conviction and as a violent offender to forty years for the aggravated rape conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of fifty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises the sole issue of whether the trial court committed reversible error by denying his request to represent himself at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment as to the aggravated burglary conviction to reflect the defendant's conviction offense which was omitted from the judgment form.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Stevie Smith E1999-00386-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Baumgartner
Knox
Court of Criminal Appeals
Ronald E. Walton vs. State E1999-01165-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer
After a hearing, the petitioner appeals the criminal court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. Convicted in 1968 of assault and battery with intent to rape, the petitioner was sentenced to incarceration for ten years. The petitioner has fully served his sentence in Tennessee. However, his Tennessee conviction was used to enhance his 1980 conviction of rape in Indiana. The petitioner proceeds to challenge his Tennessee conviction, in hope of a sentence reduction in Indiana. After careful review, we affirm the criminal court's dismissal.
