Charles O. Mix and wife, Marilyn V. Mix, and Charles Alan Mix, v. Ray Miller and wife, Cleao Miller, Sandra Miller Scott, and Sherrell Mille Cole v. Ray Miller
02A01-9804-CH-00104
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J. Walton West

The Mixes and the Millers are owners of adjacent pieces of real property. In this boundary line dispute, the trial court (1) determined the boundary line that divides the parties’ properties, (2) awarded damages to the Millers for certain timber that had been removed from the disputed property by the Mixes, (3) denied the parties’ motions to alter, modify, or amend its judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial, (4) denied the Millers’ motion for discretionary costs, and (5) denied the Mixes’ motion to re-open the proof. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

Decatur Court of Appeals

Catherine Edmundson v. Jimmy C.Grisham, d/b/a Germantown Pest Control, Germantown Termite & Pest Conrol, Inc., et al., - Concurring
02A01-9810-CV-00298
Authoring Judge: Judge Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Karen R. Williams

Defendants Jimmy C. Grisham, d/b/a Germantown Pest Control, Germantown Termite and Pest Control, Inc., and Christopher D. Alexander appeal the trial court’s judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of  Plaintiff/Appellee Catherine Edmundson in the amount of $50,000. We  affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Steven Cobb v. Charles Wilson, et al.
02A01-9811-CV-00308
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

Steven Cobb appeals from the dismissal of his pro se complaint against Charles Wilson, Evelyn Scallions, and Steve Vaughn. The complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged violations of Cobb’s rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Lauderdale Court of Appeals

Kevin Kathleen Stacey v. Donald Ray Stacey
02A01-9802-CV-00050
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge F. Lloyd Tatum
Trial Court Judge: Judge D'Army Bailey

Donald Ray Stacey (Husband) appeals an order modifying the terms of the parties’ final decree of divorce. After almost twenty-eight years of marriage, the parties were divorced on July 6, 1995. The final decree was subsequently amended on July 14, 1995, to require Husband to pay attorney’s fees to Kevin Kathleen Stacey (Wife). Three children were born during the course of the marriage, but only one child, Zachary, was still a minor at the time of the couple’s divorce. Pursuant to the Amended Final Decree of Divorce (amended final decree), Wife was granted sole custody of the minor child with Husband having reasonable visitation. Husband was ordered to pay $1,300.00 in child support per month plus the Child Support Guidelines amount of 21% of his annual bonus up to a total gross income of $9,900.00 (bonus and base salary).

Shelby Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. Mark M. Gesner
01C01-9902-CC-00033
Authoring Judge: Judge John H. Peay
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald P. Harris

The defendant was found guilty by a jury of delivery of one-half ounce or more of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to a term of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This sentence was suspended and the defendant was to serve four years on supervised probation and a term of ninety days in the county jail. The defendant’s subsequent motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court. The defendant now appeals and contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. After a review of the record and applicable law, we find no merit to the defendant’s contentions and thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Hickman Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. Ruth Stanford
02C01-9812-CC-00365
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, JR.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Whit Lafon

The defendant, Ruth Stanford, stands convicted of sale of a Schedule III controlled substance and delivery of a Schedule III controlled substance. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417 (1991) (amended 1996, 1997) (proscriptive statute); § 39-17-410 (1991) (amended 1996) (scheduled drugs). Stanford received her convictions at a jury trial in the Henderson County Circuit Court. She was sentenced to serve concurrent two-year sentences1 for these Class D felonies, with the first 90 days to be served in the county facility and the balance to be served on probation. In this  appeal, she raises three issues for our consideration:


1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the
witness who purchased drugs from Stanford without qualifying
the basis of knowledge and reliability of the witness's
testimony.
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying a continuance of the
hearing on the motion for new trial and ruling on the merits of
the motion.
3. Whether the trial court properly sentenced the defendant.
Upon review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the law, we find no
reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Henderson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. James Tyrone Harbison
03C01-9808-CR-00271
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer

The defendant, James Tyrone Harbison, was convicted in 1997 of aggravated assault and sentenced as a Range III persistent offender to fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102. In this appeal, the defendant presents the following issues: (1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of “serious bodily injury” as an aggravating factor of the defendant’s convicted offense; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting testimony that the defendant had been released from prison immediately preceeding the instant offense; (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on reckless endangerment as a lesser offense; (4) whether the defendant’s sentence is excessive; and (5) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant as a Range III persistent offender. We AFFIRM the judgment from the trial court.

Hamilton Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. Jason Burns
01C01-9809-CC-00371
Authoring Judge: Judge John H. Peay
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald P. Harris

A jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated child abuse and neglect, and he received an eighteen year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He now appeals, raising the following issues:

I. Whether the convicting evidence is sufficient;
II. Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony from a Department of Child Services investigator that the victim cried at the mention of the defendant’s name;
III. Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress his statements to the police on the basis his mental incompetence prevented a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights; and
IV. Whether the trial court erred in not allowing educators to testify about the defendant’s mental abilities unless the defendant first testified.

Finding no merit to the defendant’s arguments, we affirm his conviction.

Williamson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee, ex rel, William L. Gibbons, v. Sherrod Jackson, Robert Williams, Nathaniel Williams, Mike Williams, Shirley Blalock, and Steven Craig Cooper
02A01-9710-CH-00247
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Floyd Peete, Jr.

Sherrod Jackson, Robert Williams, Nathaniel Williams, Mike Williams, Shirley Blalock, and Steven Craig Cooper (collectively “Appellants”) appeal from the Chancery Court of Shelby County, which granted a temporary injunction, enjoining the Appellants from permitting “lap dancing” and from permitting employees or independent contractors from engaging in “lewd and obscene exhibition of genitals.”

Shelby Court of Appeals

Jacques Bennett vs. State of Tennessee
03C01-9809-CR-00338
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer

The petitioner, Jacques B. Bennett, appeals the summary dismissal of his “Motion to Vacate/Set Aside Judgment/Plea: and, to Declare Said Judgment/Plea Void” by the Hamilton County Criminal Court on January 9, 1998. Following a thorough review of the record, we conclude that this is an appropriate case for affirmance pursuant to Ct. of Crim. App. Rule 20.

Hamilton Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Johnny Leach
03C01-9810-CR-00373
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Lee Asbury

The defendant, Johnny Leach, appeals the order of the Criminal Court of Campbell County denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea to two counts of aggravated sexual battery. On July 2, 1998, the defendant entered his plea and received two ten-year sentences to be served concurrently. Because the defendant’s plea became final on the date of entry of the plea pursuant to the plea agreement, we conclude that his motion to withdraw was untimely.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.

Campbell Court of Criminal Appeals

Tony Morris v. Malone Freight Line, Inc.
03S01-9808-CH-00097
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. R. Vann Owens,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff filed an action under the Workers' Compensation Act to recover for injuries he allegedly suffered while employed by the defendant. The defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment averring and showing by proper pleadings that it was a common carrier operating under a certificate of convenience and that the plaintiff was a leased-operator or owner-operator. The trial judge found the plaintiff was a leased-operator or owner-operator and that the defendant was operating under a certificate of convenience. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-16, in those parts applicable to this case, provides: "no common carrier by motor vehicle operating pursuant to a certificate of public convenience and necessity shall be deemed the `employer' of a leased-operator or owner-operator of a motor vehicle or vehicles under a contract to such a common carrier." Based upon this record, we find the evidence does not preponderate against the judgment of the trial judge. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the plaintiff. _____________________________ John K. Byers, Senior Judge CONCUR: ________________________________ Frank F. Drowota, III, Justice ________________________________ Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge 2

Knox Workers Compensation Panel

Melanie v. Dillender
02S01-9902-CH-00013
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. C. Creed Mcginley,
This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special W orkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) (Supp. 1998) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The standard of review of factual issues in workers' compensation cases is de novo upon the record of the trial court with a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (1991 & Supp. 1998); Henson v. City of Lawrenceburg, 851 S.W.2d 89, 812 (Tenn. 1993). Under this standard, we are required to conduct an in-depth examination of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

Benton Workers Compensation Panel

In re: Brittany Swanson, a Minor, Tennessee Baptist Children's Homes, Inc., v. Harry Lee Swanson
02S01-9810-CV-00103
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe H. Walker

This case concerns the termination of appellant Harry Swanson’s parental rights over his biological child, Brittany Swanson, who is now nine years old and in the custody of the appellee Tennessee Baptist Children’s Homes, Inc. (Baptist Children’s Home). Although Mr. Swanson’s parental rights were originally terminated by the Tipton County Juvenile Court, the circuit court of Tipton County denied the petition to terminate parental rights on an appeal by Mr. Swanson. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court and found that Mr. Swanson had “abandoned” Brittany because he had “willfully failed to support” her or “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward [her] support” within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(D) (1996). We hold that the statutory definition of “willfully failed to support” and “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward such child’s support” is unconstitutional because it creates an irrebuttable presumption that the failure to provide monetary support for the four months preceding the petition to terminate parental rights constitutes abandonment, irrespective of whether that failure was intentional. This presumption violated Mr. Swanson’s federal and state constitutional right to the care and custody of his daughter. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed below, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the circuit court for entry of an order returning custody to Mr. Swanson.

Tipton Supreme Court

Town of Huntsville, Tennessee, a Municipal Corporation of the State of Tennessee, and Stanlodge, LLC., v. William I. Duncan, Richard Smith, Luke Coffey, James R. Potter
E1999-01571-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Billy Joe White

This litigation originated when the Town of Huntsville (“Huntsville”) and Stanlodge, LLC (“Stanlodge”), filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Chapter 1101 of the Public Acts of 1998. The plaintiffs specifically contest Section 9(f)(3)1 of Chapter 1101, which permits certain territoriesto hold incorporation elections even though these territories do not satisfy the minimum requirements for such elections as set forth in the general law. See T.C.A. § 6-1-201 (1998). On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that Section 9(f)(3) is constitutional. Huntsville and Stanlodge appeal, raising   five issues:

Scott Court of Appeals

01C01-9806-CR-00265
01C01-9806-CR-00265
Trial Court Judge: Jane W. Wheatcraft

Sumner Court of Criminal Appeals

State vs. Jackie Dean Mayes, Jr.
01C01-9812-CC-00494

Williamson Court of Criminal Appeals

Charles Gaylor vs. State
03C01-9702-CR-00066
Trial Court Judge: James W Itt

Campbell Court of Criminal Appeals

Virginia Byrd v. Cookeville General Hospital
01S01-9805-CV-00097
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. John Turnbull, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Cookeville General Hospital, insists (1) the trial judge erred in awarding permanent disability benefits for the employee's right leg injury and (2) the award of seventy percent permanent partial disability to the left foot is excessive. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Because the extent of an injured worker's permanent vocational

Putnam Workers Compensation Panel

Eldridge vs. Eldridge
01A01-9808-CV-00451

Sumner Court of Appeals

Lattimer vs. TDOC
01A01-9804-CH-00200
Trial Court Judge: Carol McCoy

Davidson Court of Appeals

Wagner vs. Gaston
01A01-9804-CV-00215
Trial Court Judge: Patricia J. Cottrell

Sequatchie Court of Appeals

In re: The Adoption of female child, E.N.R.
01A01-9806-CH-00316
Trial Court Judge: Patricia J. Cottrell

Lawrence Court of Appeals

Hulshof vs. Hulshof
01A01-9806-CH-00339
Trial Court Judge: Patricia J. Cottrell

Marshall Court of Appeals

Sherlock vs. Kwik Sak, et al
01A01-9807-CV-00346
Trial Court Judge: Patricia J. Cottrell

Rutherford Court of Appeals