George Goff v. City of Decherd v. Dina Tobin, Director 01S01-9611-CH-00232
Authoring Judge: William Michael Maloan, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jeffrey F. Stewart,
This workers' compensation appeal from the Franklin County Chancery Court has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendant, City of Decherd, appeals the ju dgment of the trial court findin g the plaintiff, George Goff, suffered an occupational disease; awarding the plaintiff eighty- five percent (85%) permanent partial disability to th e body as a who le; and requiring the defen dant to pay certain medical expenses. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the trial court, as modified. George Goff wa s 41 at the time of this trial. He dropped out of high schoo l in the ninth grade to work on the farm, and he has been unable to pass his G ED on three or four attem pts. His work history is composed of manual labor. The City of Decherd hired him as a laborer in 1984 and made him a crew foreman in 1987. On May 11, 199 , during the course of his employment he was exposed to chlo rine gas and missed ap proximately one w eek of work. He wa s treated by his family physician, Dr. Dewey Hood, for complaints of shortness of breath, coughing and fatigue on 11 or 12 occas ions throu gh Septem ber, 1993 . Dr. Hood re ferred plaintiff to Dr. Eric Dye r, a pulmonologist, who first treated plaintiff on May 18, 1993. Dr. Dyer told plaintiff he became asthmatic due to the 199 chlorine exposure and advised him to avoid asthma triggers, such as chemicals, humidity , and temperature extremes . He continued to w ork for the City of Dech erd without significant pro blems until January 2 8, 1994, when he was exposed to paint fumes and h is condition deteriorated. After the 1994 exposure, Dr. Dyer added paint fumes to his list of asthma triggers to avoid. Dr. Dyer assessed his permanent impairment at forty percent (4%) to the body as a whole, described h is prognosis as poo r, and advised the plaintiff he sh ould not return to wo rk for the City of Decherd. Dr. Hood stated "he is somewhat limited with his education and things he can do, and it may be that he just could not find a job--a sedentary job or a light working condition that he could return to." Plaintiff has not worked since January 28, 1994. Betty Morris, a vocational expert for the plaintiff, testified plaintiff had a ninety-six percent (96%) loss of access to jobs and should be limited to sedentary work. The defendant presented Charles Randolph Thomas, also a vocational expert, who testified plaintiff suffered a sixty-two and one half percent (62.5%) loss of access to jobs due to the 199 and 1994 chemical exposures, but only a one and one half percent (1.5%) loss of access due to the January 28, 1994, paint fumes 2
Franklin
Workers Compensation Panel
Margaret Henry v. Cedar Creek Home Health Agency 01S01-9707-CV-00150
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. John A. Turnbull,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial judge dismissed the plaintiff's case and held there was no evidence that two vaginal prolapses suffered by the plaintiff were caused by her work. We affirm the judgment.
Henry
Workers Compensation Panel
Anthony Johnson v. The Travelers Ins. Co . 01S01-9706-CH-00125
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Anthony Johnson,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue in this case is whether the plaintiff forfeited the right to have the defendant pay for future medical expenses, if any are required, for a compensable injury for failure to have an annual physical examination as provided for in the settlement of the plaintiff's compensation claim against the defendant. Under the circumstances in this case, we find the plaintiff has not forfeited this right. The relevant part of the settlement order, which was entered on December 7, 1993 in the trial court provided: "The defendant has paid all of the plaintiff's medical bills to date, which total $63,298.23. In addition to the medical benefits heretofore provided to the plaintiff, the defendant shall continue to pay all reasonable and necessary medical and hospital expenses for medical care and treatment, which is directly related to the aforesaid work related accidental injury provided such medical treatment is performed by or prescribed by Dr. Thornton Perkins, an orthopaedic specialist in Chattanooga, Tennessee, or another physician mutually selected by the parties under the procedure set forth in the W orkers' Compensation Act. The duty of the defendant to continue to provide the aforesaid medical benefits to the plaintiff shall be contingent upon the plaintiff being examined at least one (1) time annually by Dr. Thornton Perkins or such other mutually selected physician. The failure of the plaintiff to undergo the annual examination by Dr. Perkins or such other physician as the parties may select under the procedure set forth in the W orkers' Compensation Act shall result in the plaintiff forfeiting his rights to receive such future medical treatment and shall terminate the defendant's obligation to provide the same." On December 9, 1995, the plaintiff filed a "petition to enforce settlement agreement" in which he alleged the defendant had refused to pay for medical treatment as required by the order of December 7, 1993. The trial court held a hearing on the petition on September 1, 1996 at which no testimony was taken. The matter was presented to the court on statement of counsel. The record is necessarily sparse on the proceeding and the relevant matters are contained in the pleadings. From this we find the order of settlement was filed December 7, 1993, that the petition to enforce the settlement agreement was filed on December 9, 1995, and that the trial judge held a hearing on the petition on September 1, 1996 and entered an order thereon on February 4, 1997. Further, we 2
Teresa M. Mccarley Johnson v. Maury Regional Hospital, M1999-00291-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Loser, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Johnson, filed this civil action on April 2, 1998 to recover benefits for injuries which she alleged resulted from an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment by the employer. By its answer, the employer denied the occurrence of a compensable work related injury. Following a trial, the trial judge found that the claimant suffered a ruptured disc arising out of and in the course of employment and awarded, among other things, permanent partial disability benefits based on fifty-four percent to the bodyas a whole. As discussed below, this tribunal has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). This standard requires the panel to examine in depth a trial court's factual findings and conclusions. We are not bound by the trial court's factual findings, but must instead conduct an independent examination to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
State vs. Charles Allen M2002-03144-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.
The Defendant, Charles Ray Allen, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter. The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief alleging, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief, and the Defendant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
William Kirk Riley, Pro Se vs. State M2002-02302-CCA-OT-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Cheryl A. Blackburn
The Petitioner, William Kirk Riley, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
