In Re Serenity S. Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Serenity S., Hezeki S., Azaiah W., and Lyriq S., the minor children (“the Children”) of Angela W. (“Mother”) and William S. (“Father”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on March 30, 2017, upon investigation into allegations of environmental and educational neglect. The Anderson County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) subsequently adjudicated the Children dependent and neglected as to both parents on May 23, 2017. On July 11, 2018, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father to the Children. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition as to both parents in an order entered on January 18, 2019.1 As pertinent to this appeal, the trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had abandoned the Children by failing to visit them, (2) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities and requirements of the permanency plans, (3) the conditions leading to the Children’s removal from Mother’s home persisted, and (4) Mother had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Children. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
James Ivy v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Division
Employee fell onto his buttocks during the course and scope of his employment with Employer and experienced left hip and shoulder pain that later radiated to his right leg. After a course of treatment, the selected treating physician and a second-opinion physician opined Employee’s pain was attributable to a degenerative condition rather than to his work injury and assigned no impairment. Because the pain persisted, Employee’s personal physician referred him to an orthopedic surgeon who opined Employee’s fall ruptured a synovial cyst which aggravated his pre-existing spine condition. The orthopedic surgeon performed surgery and later assigned a twelve percent (12%) impairment rating. A physician who conducted an independent medical records review at Employer’s request sided with the selected physician as to causation and impairment; however, a physician who performed an independent medical examination at Employee’s request agreed with the orthopedic surgeon. Following a trial, the court awarded benefits having determined that Employee met his burden of establishing causation and overcame the statutory presumption afforded the selected physician’s causation opinion. Employer appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In Re Imerald W.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that mother’s parental rights should be terminated on the grounds of abandonment by the willful failure to support the child, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistence of conditions, severe child abuse, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the child. The trial court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the best interests of the child. Having reviewed the record on appeal, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela D. Stark v. Joe Edward Stark
This is an appeal from an order finding the appellant in civil contempt and ordering her incarcerated until she agreed to remove a social media post. The appellant was incarcerated for four hours before she purged herself of contempt by agreeing to remove the post. On appeal, the appellant challenges the civil contempt finding. Because the appellant has purged herself of civil contempt and was released from incarceration, we deem the issue moot and dismiss this appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Douglas W. Curtis v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Douglas W. Curtis, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Lewis | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jada Sue Cail v. Howard Anthony Meadows
The appellant in this parenting dispute has appealed the trial court’s order and the incorporated permanent parenting plan, both of which the trial court entered on December 6, 2018. Having determined that the permanent parenting plan at issue is incomplete, we further determine that the order incorporating the parenting plan is not a final order. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Maurice Kibbe v. Mary Carolyn Kibbe
This post-divorce appeal concerns the father’s petition to modify his spousal support obligation, to which the mother responded with her own motions concerning the father’s failure to exercise his co-parenting time with their disabled daughter as agreed. Following a hearing, the trial court reduced the father’s spousal support obligation but ordered him to remit payment to the mother for respite care in the event that he failed to exercise his co-parenting time. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Dwayne Scott Franklin v. State of Tennessee
A Marshall County jury convicted the Petitioner, Dwayne Scott Franklin, of three counts of rape of a child, for which he received an effective sentence of sixty years imprisonment. See State v. Dewayne Scott Franklin, No. M2017-00180-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 1100962 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2018). The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that lead counsel and co-counsel were ineffective in failing to call the Petitioner’s girlfriend as a witness at trial, in failing to request a bill of particulars, and in failing to request a formal election of offenses. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner now appeals. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dwight Twarn Champion
The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Dwight Twarn Champion, Defendant, and Lena Virginia Cole, Co-Defendant, for possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in counts one and two; simple possession of marijuana, a Schedule VI controlled substance, in count three; and possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia in count four. After a trial, a jury found Defendant guilty of facilitation of criminal attempt of possession of cocaine with intent to sell in count one, facilitation of criminal attempt of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver in count two, and simple possession of marijuana in count three. The jury was unable to reach a verdict in count four, and a nolle prosequi was entered on that count. The trial court merged counts one and two and, pursuant to an agreement with the State, sentenced Defendant as a Range III career offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction with a sixty percent release eligibility for merged counts one and two and to eleven months and twenty-nine days with a seventy-five percent release eligibility for count three, to be served concurrently to counts one and two, for a total effective sentence of twelve years at sixty percent. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial or verdict of acquittal, and the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions and that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Johnny Wilkerson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Johnny Wilkerson, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his two convictions for aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective forty-year sentence. In this appeal, the Petitioner alleges that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to investigate his case, in failing to explain why he could not have a suppression hearing, and in failing to call an alibi witness at trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
The Law Office of Brian T. Boyd v. Daniel Silverman
Unsatisfied with the judgment it obtained in the general sessions court, the plaintiff appealed to the circuit court. When the plaintiff failed to file a timely motion to set its appeal for trial, the circuit court adopted the judgment of the general sessions court. The plaintiff moved to set aside the judgment, claiming excusable neglect. The court denied the motion. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Demarcus Lashawn Blackman v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Demarcus Lashawn Blackmun, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of the sale and delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, which were merged by the trial court, and received a sentence twelve years’ incarceration. State v. Demarcus Lashawn Blackman, No. M2016-01098-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 3084852, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2017). He later filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, alleging that trial counsel were ineffective in failing to obtain the criminal history of the confidential informant (CI) and in failing to adequately investigate the crime scene. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kimberly J. Hill
The Defendant, Kimberly J. Hill, entered a best interest plea to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a three-year sentence with six months to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying her request for judicial diversion and in imposing a term of split confinement. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carl Allen a/k/a Artie Perkins
We granted this appeal to determine whether the criminal court had authority to grant motions filed by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) and to modify an order dismissing criminal prosecutions several years after the order became final. Carl Allen (“Mr. Allen”) was indicted in November 2010 and February 2011 for violating certain reporting provisions of the Tennessee Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act (“the Registration Act”) applicable to violent sexual offenders. By a written order filed on February 3, 2012, the criminal court granted Mr. Allen’s motion to dismiss the indictments based on its determination that Mr. Allen’s 1995 Florida sexual battery conviction required him to comply only with the Registration Act’s reporting provisions relating to sexual offenders and not those relating to violent sexual offenders. The State did not appeal the February 3, 2012 order; therefore, it became final thirty days after entry. Almost three years later, in December 2014, the TBI returned to the criminal court and filed a motion to intervene in the dismissed criminal cases, citing Rule 24.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, and a motion for relief from the February 3, 2012 order, citing Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The TBI argued that, in expressing the basis of its decision to dismiss the indictments, the criminal court exercised civil jurisdiction by ruling on Mr. Allen’s offender classification under the Registration Act. The TBI asserted that the criminal court lacked authority to determine Mr. Allen’s offender classification and that the portion of its February 3, 2012 order doing so was void and should be vacated. The criminal court agreed with the TBI’s arguments, and by a May 3, 2017 order, partially vacated its February 3, 2012 order. Mr. Allen appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed his appeal without ruling on the merits after concluding that Mr. Allen had no right of appeal in these circumstances. State v. Allen, No. W2017-01118-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 6595352, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2018), appeal granted, (Tenn. May 24, 2019). We hold, as the TBI now concedes, that Mr. Allen had a right to appeal from the criminal court’s May 3, 2017 order that partially vacated its February 3, 2012 order. We also hold that the criminal court was not exercising civil jurisdiction in its February 3, 2012 order when it granted Mr. Allen’s motion to dismiss the criminal indictments. We further conclude that the criminal court had no authority to modify or partially vacate its February 3, 2012 order, except to correct clerical errors, oversights, or omissions in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. Because the criminal court exceeded the authority Rule 36 provides, we vacate the May 3, 2017 order and confirm that the February 3, 2012 order remains intact and final. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
In Re Conservatorship Of Laylon Eugene Perry
In this conservatorship action, the trial court determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly established that the respondent had a disability but did not establish that the respondent needed a conservator. The petitioner appealed. Having reviewed the evidence presented at trial, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darcell Wright
The Defendant, Darcell Wright, was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault as lesser-included offenses of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, respectively. The trial court imposed sentences of ten years for each conviction and ordered that these terms be served consecutively to one another, as well as consecutively to prior sentences of the Defendant’s. On appeal, the Defendant, relying on principles of double jeopardy, contends that the trial court erred in failing to merge his sentences for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. However, our review of the record reveals that the Defendant failed to raise this issue in a motion for new trial; thereby, waiving full appellate review. Additionally, we conclude that plain error review of the issue is not warranted. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Freida Louise Climer v. Stephen Franklin Climer
This is a divorce action. Husband appeals the trial court’s division of marital property and award of alimony to Wife. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Romglobal, Inc. Et Al. v. Steve Miller Et Al.
The plaintiff corporation filed an action for breach of contract, claiming that the defendants had failed to recognize the plaintiff’s ownership in a limited liability company that was allegedly based on an oral agreement between the plaintiff and defendants. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, determining that the plaintiff had failed to present clear and convincing evidence establishing the parties’ agreement that the plaintiff would have an ownership interest in the company. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Balzer v. Joseph Balzer
Following a divorce, husband and wife agreed that wife was to receive monthly alimony payments from husband for eight and a half years. The last four years of payments were contingent upon husband attaining the rank of airline captain. The type of alimony awarded was never specified. Wife later remarried and cohabitated with her new husband. Husband filed for a modification alleging that the alimony was transitional alimony and therefore statutorily modifiable upon wife’s cohabitation with a third person. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36–5–121(g)(2)(C) (2019). Wife instead argued that the alimony awarded was alimony in solido and therefore not modifiable except by agreement of the parties. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36–5–121(h)(2). The trial court held that the expressly conditional nature of the alimony rendered it more properly classifiable as transitional alimony. The court terminated husband’s alimony obligation based upon wife’s remarriage and cohabitation with her new husband. Wife appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Bonnie Harmon, Et Al. v. Hickman Community Healthcare Services, Inc.
In this healthcare liability action, the trial court held that the plaintiffs’ sole expert witness was not competent to testify on causation and for that reason granted summary judgment to the defendant. The plaintiffs then filed a motion to alter or amend, proffering causation testimony from a new expert witness. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to alter or amend. This Court granted permission to appeal. A trial court’s decision on a motion to alter or amend is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; this standard of review does not permit the appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. We hold that the trial court’s decision in this case was within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions of the motion to alter or amend and was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. For this reason, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Palace R. Chandler
The Defendant, Palace R. Chandler, was charged with theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103. Following a bench trial, the Defendant was found guilty and sentenced to a three-year suspended sentence to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the Defendant contends that error exists because there was no proof showing the victim did not consent to the Defendant’s taking the property. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court; however, we remand this case to correct the judgement to reflect the full measure of the Defendant’s pre-trial jail credit. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brenda Merriweather v. UGN, INC., ET AL.
Brenda Merriweather (“Employee”) alleged she injured her left knee in the course and scope of her employment with UGN, Inc. (“Employer”). Following the trial, the trial court determined Employee did not satisfy her burden of proving causation and therefore dismissed the case. Employee appeals. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Jermaine Nelson Buford
Jermaine Nelson Buford, Defendant, appeals from his convictions for possession of .5 grams of more of cocaine with intent to sell, aggravated assault, felony evading arrest, evading arrest, vandalism of property over $500, and simple possession. On appeal, Defendant argues, among other things, that (1) the State violated State v. Ferguson by failing to preserve an audio recording of the drug transaction that formed the basis of the indictment; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to give the missing witness instruction when the confidential informant did not testify at trial; and (3) the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose witness information. After a review, we determine Defendant has waived several issues for failure to either raise them in the trial court and/or properly present argument or authority to support the issues in this Court. As to the remaining issues, we determine Defendant is not entitled to relief. However, we remand the matter to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment form for the conviction for vandalism. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Kelsea L.
This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights based on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support. The father appeals. We reverse the trial court’s finding of willful failure to support but affirm the trial court’s finding of willful failure to visit and its determination that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Accordingly, we affirm termination of the father’s parental rights. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. LaToya Ann Shelton
The Defendant, LaToya Ann Shelton, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of the sale or delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony; two counts of the sale or delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony; the possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony; simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective term of twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the twenty-year sentence of incarceration is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals |