Ziberia Marico Carero v. State of Tennessee
A jury convicted the Petitioner, Ziberia Marico Carero, of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a school zone with intent to sell, possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a school zone with intent to deliver, sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, and delivery of over 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, and on appeal, his convictions were merged into a single conviction for possession of 0.5 grams or more cocaine in a school zone with intent to sell. This court affirmed the convictions and sentence of twenty-three years in confinement. The Petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to: (1) move for a mistrial based upon the State’s presentation of “surprise” witnesses; (2) object to hearsay testimony; (3) object to a multiplicitous indictment; (4) adequately investigate; and (5) request a facilitation instruction. Under a heading of “cumulative error,” the Petitioner also asserts that trial counsel failed to: (6) secure sequestration of the witnesses; (7) present witness testimony; and (8) protect the Petitioner’s right to testify. The Petitioner also raises various trial errors and contends he is entitled to relief pursuant to cumulative error. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner’s claims fail to establish ineffective assistance of counsel or have been previously determined or waived, and we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Provectus Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Peter R. Culpepper
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether an amended pleading that seeks to vacate an arbitration award that was delivered to the parties more than 90 days earlier relates back to the date of the original pleading pursuant to Rule 15.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure when the original pleading only sought to modify the arbitration award. A dispute arose when an employer terminated the employment contract of its chief financial officer. The parties submitted the dispute to arbitration pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act (“the Act”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-301 to -320. After the arbitrator issued a monetary award in favor of the corporation, the employer filed a petition to confirm the award in chancery court. Within 90 days of the delivery of a copy of the award to the employee, which is the limitation period set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-314(a) of the Act, the employee timely filed an answer to the petition in which he sought modification of the award with respect to prejudgment interest only. Otherwise, the employee admitted all material allegations in the petition. Significantly, the employee did not seek to vacate the award. After waiving any claim to prejudgment interest, the employer filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings to confirm the arbitration award in all other respects. Before the hearing on the motion, but more than 90 days after a copy of the award was delivered to the employee, the employee filed a Rule 15 motion to amend his answer to assert a counterclaim to vacate the award on grounds not previously raised. The trial court denied the employee’s Rule 15 motion to amend the answer as futile on the ground that it was not a timely application to vacate the final award and awarded the employer judgment on the pleadings. The employee appeals, contending the court erred because an amended pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading pursuant to Rule 15.03. We have determined that strict adherence to the 90-day limitation furthers the primary objectives of the Act, which is to bring the arbitration process to a speedy and final resolution. Furthermore, the limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-5-312 and -313(b) are more specific than the general relation-back provision of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to amend the answer as futile on the ground that the employee did not file a timely application to vacate the final award, and we affirm the entry of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the employer. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Trendell Brady
The Knox County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Trendell Brady, on four counts rape of a child. Following a trial, the jury acquitted Defendant of counts one and two and convicted Defendant as charged in counts three and four. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I standard offender to forty years on each count and ran the sentences consecutively. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, and, after a hearing, the trial court amended the judgments of conviction to reflect twenty-five-year sentences on each count, running consecutively. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that the trial court improperly sentenced Defendant to consecutive twenty-five-year sentences. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William J. Wagner aka William Justin Wagner
The Appellant, William J. Wagner, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to driving under the influence (DUI), third offense, and reserved a certified question of law concerning whether the State had jurisdiction to prosecute him for the offense because the offense was committed on federal property. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the certified question is not dispositive of the case. Therefore, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal, and the appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jorrel Brown v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jorrel Brown, appeals the Franklin County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his three convictions of passing a forged check, Class E felonies, and resulting effective three-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and, therefore, that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Ryan Steele
The Appellant, Joshua Ryan Steele, was convicted of domestic assault and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on probation. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State’s proof and the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jonathan Alajemba v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jonathan Alajemba, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of facilitation of conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery, attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, reckless aggravated assault, and aggravated burglary. The Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by persuading the Petitioner not to testify and failing to present proof of an insanity defense. He further alleged that newly discovered evidence in the form of recanted testimony established he did not intend to commit robbery. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
IN RE ELI S.
In this termination of parental rights case, both parents appeal the trial court’s termination of their parental rights to their son upon numerous statutory grounds and upon its finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. Upon our review, we conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s determinations with respect to certain grounds though not others and that termination was in the best interest of the child. Accordingly, we reverse portions of the court’s order finding that certain grounds for termination were established, affirm the remainder of the grounds and the best interest determination, and affirm the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
John Michael Singer v. Jessica Jo Singer
In this divorce proceeding, the Father appeals the designation of Mother as the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment. |
Robertson | Circuit, Criminal & Chancery Courts | |
State of Tennessee v. Barenton Barnett
Defendant, Barenton Barnett, was indicted by the Polk County Grand Jury for theft of property valued at $60,000 or more, a Class B felony. Defendant pleaded no contest to vandalism of more than $2,500, a Class D felony, in exchange for a sentence of three years to be suspended on probation, and Defendant was ordered to pay $8,207 in restitution. Defendant sought to withdraw his plea. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant appeals. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Polk | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Strange
Defendant, Gary Strange, was convicted of three counts of rape of a child and one count of incest following a jury trial. The trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty years for each count of rape of a child and eight years for incest. The trial court ordered two of the thirty-year sentences to run consecutively with each other and concurrently to the remaining sentences for an effective sixty-year sentence as a Range II offender. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by admitting the victim’s forensic interview; (2) the trial court erred by failing to require the State to make an election of offenses; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (4) there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the evidence; and (5) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the briefs and the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Samantha Beau Ballard v. Casey John Ballard
A father filed a petition to modify a parenting plan in which he sought to change the primary residential parent or modify the residential schedule. The trial court denied his petition, and he appealed. We hold that the father failed to establish a material change of circumstances to justify any change to the parties’ parenting plan and affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Zaylee W.
A father appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights based on the grounds of (1) abandonment by willful failure to support, (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child. He further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s termination of the father’s parental rights but vacate the court’s judgment regarding two of the grounds for termination. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
Steven J. Strange Et Al. v. Hank E. Roberts, Et Al.
The owners of the dominant estate sued the owners of the servient estate of an easement to Tanner’s Bar, a piece of land near a river. The trial court ruled that the easement was an easement appurtenant for ingress and egress only and did not entitle the dominant estate owners to engage in recreational activities at Tanner’s Bar. The trial court further ruled that a member of the dominant estate family had to accompany all invitees to the easement. Having concluded that the intent of the easement was for the dominant estate owners to have the right to enjoy the river at Tanner’s Bar, we reverse the decision of the trial court prohibiting recreational use. We have further determined that the trial court erred in requiring that a dominant estate family member be present with invitees. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Shirley Collins et al. v. John D. Carter et al.
Four family members sued their former employer and eight individual defendants after their employment was terminated amid allegations of malfeasance. The complaint alleged nine causes of action. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the former employer and six of the eight individual defendants on summary judgment. The plaintiffs and the remaining two defendants then became embroiled in an extended discovery battle. The battle ended with the trial court dismissing the remaining claims with prejudice based on the plaintiffs’ failure to cooperate in discovery. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the contract claims because the contract at issue was not ultra vires. Because we reverse that portion of the trial court’s decision, we also reverse the award of attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-113(a). We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tyshon Booker
During a botched robbery, sixteen-year-old Tyshon Booker, the Defendant-Appellant, shot and killed the victim, G’Metrick Caldwell. Following extensive hearings in juvenile court, the Defendant was transferred to criminal court to be tried as an adult. At trial, the Defendant admitted that he shot the victim several times in the back while seated in the backseat of the victim’s car; however, he claimed self-defense. A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant of two counts of first-degree felony murder and two counts of especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the process of transferring a juvenile to criminal court after a finding of three statutory factors by the juvenile court judge violates the Defendant’s rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); (2) whether the State’s suppression of alleged eyewitness identifications prior to the juvenile transfer hearing constitutes a Brady violation, requiring remand for a new juvenile transfer hearing; (3) whether the juvenile court erred in transferring the Defendant to criminal court given defense expert testimony that the Defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and was amenable to treatment; (4) whether the trial court erred in finding that the Defendant was engaged in unlawful activity at the time of the offense and in instructing the jury that the Defendant had a duty to retreat before engaging in self-defense; (5) whether an improper argument by the State in closing arguments constitutes prosecutorial misconduct requiring a new trial; (6) whether evidence of juror misconduct warrants a new trial and whether the trial court erred in refusing to subpoena an additional juror; and (7) whether a sentence of life imprisonment for a Tennessee juvenile violates the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Wallace
Anthony Wallace (“Defendant”), pro se, appeals the summary dismissal of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion to correct what he claims were errors in his judgments of conviction. Defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal. Because we can find no errors in the judgments of conviction, the interest of justice does not warrant waiver of timely filing. The appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John David Hudson
A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, John D. Hudson, of evading arrest (motor vehicle flight) (count one), criminal impersonation (count two), driving with a revoked license (count three), a first offense seat-belt infraction (count four), and failure to obey a traffic control device (count five). Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to four years for evading arrest, six months for criminal impersonation, six months for driving on a revoked license, thirty days for the seat belt infraction, and thirty days for the failure to obey a traffic control device. The trial court ordered counts one, two, and three to be served consecutively, and a concurrent term of thirty days for the remaining counts, for an effective sentence of five years imprisonment. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing partial consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Langston v. State of Tennessee
William Langston, Petitioner, was initially indicted for voluntary manslaughter. The State obtained a superseding indictment charging Petitioner with first degree murder. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder. This court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied further review. State v. William Langston, No. W2015-02359-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1968827, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2017), perm app denied (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017). Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of his first retained counsel (“trial counsel”). Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel failed to convey to him a four-year settlement offer before the State obtained the superseding indictment. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen Damian Ledet
Stephen Damian Ledet, Defendant, was convicted by a jury of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance for resale and tampering with evidence. On appeal, Defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions. After review of the record and briefs, we affirm the convictions. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shonique Nechelle Smith
Shonique Nechelle Smith, Defendant, appeals from the trial court’s judgment revoking community corrections and requiring her to serve the balance of her sentence in incarceration. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Latoya Ledford, ex rel. Nayeli Roriguez v. State of Tennessee
This appeal is from the Claims Commission’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 9-8-402, 29-26-121, and 29-26- 122. We must affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Caydan T.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, which the trial court granted on the grounds of persistent conditions, severe child abuse, and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to parent. Mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that the termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Benjamin Scott Brewer
Benjamin Scott Brewer, Defendant, was convicted after a jury trial of six counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, four counts of reckless aggravated assault, driving under the influence, violation of motor carrier regulations, and speeding. As a result, Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of 55 years in incarceration. Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences, arguing on appeal that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); that the trial court improperly certified a witness as a drug recognition expert; that the evidence was insufficient to show intoxication; and that the trial court improperly sentenced Defendant to consecutive sentences. Following our review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Leonard Edward Smith v. State of Tennessee
In 1985, a Hamblen County jury convicted the Petitioner, Leonard Edward Smith, of the first degree felony murder of victim Pierce and the first degree premeditated murder of victim Webb. Multiple appeals and remands ensued, following which the Petitioner was ultimately sentenced to two consecutive life terms. In 2017, the Petitioner filed a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings and a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The trial court held a hearing and denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his motion to reopen should have been granted based on newly discovered evidence, which deprived him of a fair trial, and that he is entitled to coram nobis relief based upon the newly discovered evidence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals |