In Re Jaydin A. Et Al.
Father appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights on grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody. The evidence at trial showed that due to Father’s repeated criminal conduct, including two instances where Father fled the State to escape justice, he has had no contact with his daughter for approximately 95% of the child’s life. Because we conclude that the evidence was clear and convincing as to both grounds for termination and best interest, we affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennesseans For Sensible Election Laws v. Tennessee Bureau Of Ethics And Campaign Finance, Registry Of Election Finance, And Davidson County District Attorney General
This appeal involves a constitutional challenge to two Tennessee statutes that are part of Tennessee’s campaign finance law. Prior to trial, the chancery court granted several motions in limine that effectively excluded all of the testimonial and documentary evidence proffered by the State in defense of the statutes. With no evidence presented by the State, the trial court concluded that the State failed to meet its burden of proof as to the constitutionality of the two statutes. Consequently, the trial court held that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 2-10-117 and 2-10-121 violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution. The State appeals. The State first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the State’s evidence. Additionally, the State argues that the constitutional challenge to one of the statutes has become moot due to a statutory amendment. Finally, the State argues that the remaining statute is constitutional. For the following reasons, we affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
J. Philip Harber v. Marquerita Annette Dixon, Et Al.
This appeal arises from an acrimonious dispute between former friends over real property. William M. Pruitt and his wife Shirley J. Pruitt (“the Pruitts,” or “Mr. Pruitt” and “Mrs. Pruitt”) live in a house next to three parcels of land once owned variously by Mr. Pruitt’s stepfather and mother, both of whom died intestate. J. Philip Harber (“Mr. Harber”), former attorney for the Pruitts, paid Mr. Pruitt’s fellow heirs for quitclaim deeds with the aim of acquiring their interests in the subject parcels. Mr. Harber then filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) to determine the interests of the parties and sell the three parcels. The Trial Court found in favor of Mr. Harber and ordered a partition by sale for division. The Pruitts appealed to this Court. On appeal, the Pruitts rely on several theories to argue that Mr. Harber never acquired an interest in the land. The Pruitts argue further that, even if Mr. Harber acquired an interest, the Trial Court should have applied the doctrine of unclean hands to deny him his requested relief because he sued them out of spite. We find and hold, inter alia, that Mr. Pruitt is but one of many heirs to his deceased parents’ land; that the other heirs never lost their interests in the land; and, that the other heirs were at liberty to sell their interests in the land to Mr. Harber, which they did. Although there is considerable evidence that Mr. Harber was motivated by spite in bringing this action, that alone does not compel application of the unclean hands doctrine, particularly as fraud is not alleged. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kelley Hufford
A jury convicted the Defendant, Kelley Hufford, of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated kidnapping, and tampering with evidence for the abduction and homicide of her boyfriend. On appeal, the Defendant raises only a challenge to the territorial jurisdiction of the court, alleging that the evidence did not establish that the crimes occurred in Tennessee. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence established that the trial court had territorial jurisdiction, and we affirm the convictions, remanding for merger of the kidnapping offenses. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Ray McElroy Et Al. v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company Et Al.
An insured sued for breach of contract after his insurance company denied payment for a surgical procedure. The insurance company moved for summary judgment, arguing that the insured could not establish a breach of contract because the procedure was excluded from coverage in the medical benefits plan. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurance company and dismissed the complaint. Because the insurance company was entitled to a judgment of dismissal as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Kelly Colvard Parsons v. Richard Jearl Parsons
Wife/Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of relief on her post-divorce petition for contempt and breach of contract. The parties’ MDA awarded Wife 50% of Husband/Appellee’s FERS Supplement, which was subsequently terminated due to Husband’s yearly earned income being in excess of the FERS cap of $15,120.00. Because the parties’ MDA did not preclude Husband from earning income in excess of the cap, and did not include a provision for such occurrence, the trial court properly denied Wife’s petition. Although the trial court sua sponte modified child support to award an additional amount equal to the lost FERS Supplement, it did so in error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of Husband’s motion to alter or amend the award of additional child support. Because the MDA allows the prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees and expenses, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Husband’s reasonable fees and expenses, and remand for determination of same, and for entry of judgment thereon. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John J. Hasenbein v. Katherine J. Hasenbein
This is an appeal in a divorce proceeding, wherein the mother contends that the trial court erred in awarding the father the divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and in its holdings as to the factors at Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106 in naming the father the primary residential parent. Father appeals the court’s ruling on a motion he filed seeking to further specify the parents’ responsibilities relative to the transportation of the children. Upon consideration of the record, we vacate that portion of the judgment that holds that factors (11) and (12) at section 36-6-106(a) are not applicable and remand the case for further consideration in that regard and, if necessary, to reconsider the designation of the primary residential parent; in all other respects we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jonathan S.
This is the second appeal of a case involving a father’s petition to modify the parties’ parenting plan, wherein he requested that he be named the primary residential parent. At the close of father’s proof during the initial trial, mother moved for a directed verdict. Finding that father’s evidence was insufficient to establish a material change in circumstances, the trial court granted mother’s motion and dismissed father’s petition. Father then appealed to this Court. We concluded that father did present sufficient evidence to establish a material change. Accordingly, we reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case so that mother could present her evidence. Following the entry of this Court’s decision—but prior to the remand trial on father’s first petition—father filed a second petition to modify the parenting plan, raising new allegations. The parties agreed to consolidate the two matters and further agreed to a bifurcated trial in which the remand trial on father’s first petition would be conducted first, followed by a trial on father’s second petition. Additionally, the parties agreed to a timeframe regarding the presentation of evidence, whereby mother, during the remand trial on father’s first petition, would be limited to evidence that arose prior to the date of the initial trial; all evidence arising after that date would be covered in the trial on father’s second petition. Ultimately, the trial court found that father proved a material change in circumstances and that it was in the best interest of the child that he be named the primary residential parent. Consequently, the trial court mooted father’s second petition. Mother appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Hallysah Ibsen as Administrator of the Estate of Elaine Kelly, and Robert Kelly v. Summit View of Farragut, LLC et al.
In this healthcare liability action, the defendants filed a motion for a qualified protective order allowing them to conduct ex parte interviews with some of the plaintiffs’ treating healthcare providers pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(f). After the trial court granted the qualified protective order allowing the interviews, plaintiffs’ counsel wrote a letter to plaintiffs’ treating providers concerning the interviews. The defendants then filed a joint motion for sanctions asserting that the letters sent by plaintiffs’ counsel violated the trial court’s order by attempting to prevent the treating providers from participating in the interviews. The trial court granted monetary sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel and ordered plaintiffs’ counsel to send retraction letters to plaintiffs’ treating providers. The plaintiffs appeal. We have determined that the order on appeal is not a final order and, therefore, dismiss the appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Loring Justice v. Kim Nelson Et Al.
Loring Justice and Kim Nelson are the divorced parents of a minor child. They have been in litigation over the child since 2004. This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by Mr. Justice (plaintiff) against Ms. Nelson, Robert Bodine, and two unidentified coconspirators (defendants). In his original complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants were liable for: conspiracy to commit the crime of extortion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with parental rights. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the trial court granted. Exactly thirty days later, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. He alleged additional facts and new causes of action, including: fraud, coercion, attempted tortious interference with parental rights, and violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act. Defendants filed a “response” to the amended complaint. They argued that the court should deny plaintiff leave to amend his original complaint. The court treated defendants’ “response” as a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, which the court then granted. We hold that the court erred when it treated defendants’ “response” as a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. We also hold that the court failed to provide adequate justification for dismissing the amended complaint sua sponte. Accordingly, we vacate the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. United States Department Of Justice, Et Al.
Plaintiff Wilmington Savings Fund Society brought this action for foreclosure on property owned by defendants Reginald Hall and Rhonda Hall, requesting that the trial court declare its debt from a loan secured by deed of trust to have priority over debts allegedly owed by the Halls to other named defendants. The trial court granted plaintiff summary judgment and Reginald Hall appealed. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court’s judgment was not final and therefore this Court does not have jurisdiction. We hold that the trial court did not adjudicate all of the claims raised by the parties. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of a final judgment. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Erdman v. Mark Erdman
This is a divorce case. For most of the parties’ marriage, the wife was a homemaker and the husband worked as a pharmaceutical sales representative. After husband was granted a divorce, the wife filed an appeal with this Court raising several issues for our review. Among other things, the wife takes issue with the trial court’s classification and division of property and its decision to deny her alimony. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for such further proceedings as are necessary and consistent with this Opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
C & C North America Inc. d/b/a Consentino v. Natural Stone Distributors LLC et al
Appellant appeals the trial court’s order quashing its attachment and garnishments, whereby Appellant sought payment of its judgment from interpleaded funds that were owed to Appellee. Affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brijesh Mukesh Desai
After a trial, a Davidson County jury found Defendant, Brijesh Mukesh Desai, guilty of theft of services valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I standard offender to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction with a release eligibility of thirty percent. On appeal, Defendant argues that his conviction violates his constitutional right not to be imprisoned for a civil debt, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the indictment was fatally flawed, and that the trial court improperly admitted evidence at trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jennifer Moore-Pitts Et Al. v. Carl A. Bradley, DDA, MAGD
This appeal concerns a healthcare liability action filed by Jennifer Moore-Pitts and David Pitts ("Plaintiffs") in the Knox County Circuit Court ("Trial Court") against Carl A. Bradley, DDS, MAGD ("Defendant"). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' action on the basis of noncompliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26- 121(a)(2)(E), which requires that pre-suit notice include a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization allowing the healthcare provider receiving the notice to obtain complete medical records from every other provider that is sent a notice.' Approximately forty healthcare providers, including Defendant, received pre-suit notice from Plaintiffs. On the medical authorization provided to Defendant, Plaintiffs left blank the name of the individual or entity authorized to make the disclosure of medical records to Defendant but provided an attachment of the names and addresses of the other providers receiving notice. The Trial Court found that Plaintiffs' medical authorization provided to Defendant was not sufficient to allow Defendant to obtain Ms. Moore-Pitts' s medical records from the other providers who received the pre-suit notice. As such, the Trial Court found that Plaintiffs could not rely on Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(c) to extend the statute of limitations for 120 days. Because Plaintiffs' action was filed one year and 118 days after the cause of action accrued, the Trial Court determined that Plaintiffs' action was untimely. The Trial Court, therefore, granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Roy Anthony Haley v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Roy Anthony Haley, was convicted of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, and he was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years in confinement. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition. The Petitioner appeals, contending that he was denied due process at his post-conviction hearing because he was not afforded the opportunity to call critical witnesses and because the post-conviction court was so biased and prejudiced toward him as to render the hearing unfair. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Becky Jo Burlison
In June 2015, a Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant, Becky Jo Burlison, of two counts of aggravated rape of a child, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of aggravated child neglect. Later, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion for new trial on grounds that she had been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Prior to the new trial, the Defendant provided notice that she intended to offer expert testimony of her diminished capacity at the time of the offenses. The State moved to exclude the testimony, arguing that the testimony was not admissible because it did not satisfy the requirements established in State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1997). Following a hearing, the trial court denied the State’s motion and deemed the testimony admissible. The trial court and this court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s denial of its motion to exclude expert testimony regarding the Defendant’s mental state at the time of the alleged offenses, reiterating the claim that the evidence does not satisfy the requirements for admission. Because we agree that the proffered evidence does not satisfy the requirements for admission established by Hall and its progeny, we reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roger Joiner v. United Parcel Services, Inc., Et Al.
Roger Joiner (“Employee”) sustained an injury to his neck while lifting a mailbag in the course of his employment with United Parcel Service, Inc. (“Employer”) on February 26, 2016. Employer provided medical benefits, but subsequently limited those benefits to treatment of the injury at the C6-7 level of Employee’s cervical spine. Employer refused to authorize treatment and denied benefits for injury at the C5-6 level of Employee’s cervical spine based on the opinion of his treating physician. After a compensation hearing, the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims (the “trial court”) concluded that the causation opinion of Employee’s medical evaluator overcame the statutory presumption afforded the causation opinion of his treating physician. The trial court determined that Employee was entitled to medical benefits for treatment of his injures at the C5-6 and C6-7 levels and to permanent partial disability benefits based on medical impairment attributable to both levels. Employer appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, which reversed the trial court’s decision, with one judge concurring in part and dissenting in part. Employee has appealed that ruling. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Blake Hart
A Henderson County jury convicted the Defendant, Jonathan Blake Hart, of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to fifty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it: (1) barred his father from testifying; (2) denied his motion to exclude the medical expert’s conclusion that child sexual abuse had occurred; (3) admitted drawings from the forensic interview; and (4) limited his cross-examination of an investigator. The Defendant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that his motion for new trial should have been granted on these same grounds. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Adarion C. Morris
The defendant, Adarion C. Morris, appeals the 48-year sentence imposed following the revocation of his community corrections placement, arguing that the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose the new sentence and that the sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the revocation of the defendant’s community corrections placement and the sentences imposed following the resentencing. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tommy Leroy Bryant v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Tommy Leroy Bryant, appeals from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his three rape of a child convictions, for which he is serving a twenty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kayla Danielle Skillern
The Defendant, Kayla Danielle Skillern, was convicted by a Wayne County Circuit Court jury of the sale of 0.5 gram or more of methamphetamine. See T.C.A. § 39-17-434 (2018). She received a sentence of ten and one-half years’ confinement. On appeal, she contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction, (2) the trial court erred in denying her motions for a judgment of acquittal, and (3) the trial court erred in admitting video evidence depicting the Defendant arguing with her codefendant in front of a child. We affirm the Defendant’s conviction but remand the case to the trial court for the entry of a corrected judgment. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeffery Todd Burke v. Sparta Newspapers, Inc.
This appeal requires us to determine whether the fair report privilege applies to a nonpublic, one-on-one conversation between a newspaper reporter and a detective of a county sheriff’s department, who also served as the public information officer for the sheriff’s department. The plaintiff sued the newspaper alleging that it had published defamatory statements the detective made about the plaintiff during the nonpublic, one-on-one conversation with the reporter. The newspaper moved for summary judgment based on the fair report privilege. The trial court granted the newspaper summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the fair report privilege applies only to public proceedings or official actions of government that have been made public and does not apply to the nonpublic, one-on-one conversation at issue here. On this basis alone we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court’s decision granting the defendant summary judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
White | Supreme Court | |
Angela Dotson v. State of Tennessee
Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting a health care liability claim against the state and attached a certificate of good faith. The Tennessee Claims Commission found that the certificate of good faith failed to satisfy the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26- 122 because it was not specific as to the state health care provider. Despite this finding, the court concluded that the statute was satisfied because the complaint contained the certificate of good faith language and identified the state health care provider. The state then filed this interlocutory appeal. We reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joan Odell
The Defendant, Joan Odell, appeals from her felony conviction for failure to appear, which resulted in a sentence of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction and challenges the jury instructions. She also contends that the State engaged in purposeful discrimination in striking a prospective juror in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that there was no reversible error in the instructions. However, the trial court failed to comply with the procedure set forth in Batson by denying the Defendant’s Batson claim based upon the Defendant’s race, and we remand for a hearing on the issue. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals |