State of Tennessee v. Joshua Derek Tweedy
The Defendant, Joshua Tweedy, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and possession of a firearm by a convicted violent felon, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-101 (assault) (Supp. 2016) (subsequently amended), 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 2017) (subsequently amended) (possession of a firearm by a convicted violent felon). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in imposing an effective eighteen-year sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Coy J. Cotham, Jr., AKA Cory J. Cotham v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Coy J. Cotham, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective. Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his pro se motion to relieve post-conviction counsel, or in the alternative, his motion to continue the post-conviction hearing; that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately present his claims for post-conviction relief; and that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael D. Fykes
The defendant, Michael D. Fykes, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of especially aggravated burglary and aggravated assault, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and imposing a sentence greater than necessary and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Because dual convictions of especially aggravated burglary and aggravated assault in this case are prohibited by statute, we modify the conviction of especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary and remand to the trial court for resentencing. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
TWB Architects, Inc. v. The Braxton, LLC Et Al.
We granted review to determine whether summary judgment was properly granted to an architect firm seeking to recover its design fees from a development company. The architect firm designed a condominium project for the development company. The development company ran short of funds and was not able to pay the architect firm under their design contract. As a result, the architect firm’s president agreed to accept a condominium in the project instead of the fee. But the development company did not fulfill that agreement because the development company had pledged the condominium as collateral for a construction loan. The architect firm filed a mechanic’s lien for its unpaid fee under the parties’ design contract, and then filed this suit to enforce the lien. The trial court granted summary judgment to the architect firm, holding that the firm was entitled to its fee under the design contract, and there was insufficient evidence that the parties intended a novation by substituting the agreement to convey a condominium for the design contract. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We find that disputed questions of material fact exist about whether the architect firm and the development company intended a novation when they entered into the agreement for the condominium. Thus, the trial court should not have granted summary judgment to the architect firm. We reverse and remand to the trial court. |
Cheatham | Supreme Court | |
William Henry Smith, Jr v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, William Henry Smith, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2015 conviction of conspiracy to sell and deliver one-half grams or more of a Schedule II drug,1 alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Claiborne County v. Delinquent Taxpayer, Albertano Alvarez Et Al.
This appeal arises from the redemption of a parcel of real property purchased at a delinquent taxpayer sale. The appellants were lienholders on a parcel of real property sold to a third party purchaser at a delinquent tax sale. Within days after the tax sale, the lienholders filed a petition for redemption of the property. In response, the purchaser filed a motion to protest the validity of the lien or, alternatively, a claim to recover the expenses that had been incurred to preserve the value of the property by clearing debris and personalty from the property. The lienholders then filed a cross-claim alleging conversion and trespass to chattels. After the purchaser withdrew his objection to the validity of the lien, a bench trial was conducted, and the trial court granted the lienholders’ petition for redemption upon the following conditions relevant to this appeal: that they reimburse the purchaser in the amounts of $8,579.60 for expenses incurred in cleaning up the property and an additional $600.00 for the storage of personalty. The lienholders’ conversion and trespass to chattels claims were subsequently dismissed. Having determined that the expenses were incurred to prevent permissive waste on the property—and concluding that such expenses are recoverable despite having been incurred prior to the entry of the order confirming the sale—we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. A.B. Price, Jr. and Victor Sims
In early January 2017, Defendant A. B. Price, Jr., attempted to plead nolo contendere to two counts of sexual battery, and Defendant Victor Sims attempted to plead guilty to three counts of aggravated assault. Both Defendants had reached plea bargains with the State, and each of the pleas included a term of probation. The trial court declined to accept the pleas and requested the parties to return for a later hearing to present proof and argument regarding the constitutionality of certain portions of the Public Safety Act of 2016 (“the PSA”), which has the practical effect of authorizing the Tennessee Department of Correction (“DOC”) to address at least some probation violations, a role up to this point reserved exclusively to trial courts. After the hearing, the trial court ruled portions of the PSA facially unconstitutional on grounds of separation of powers, due process, and equal protection. The trial court subsequently accepted the Defendants’ pleas and inserted in each judgment the following special condition: “The probated portion of the Defendant’s sentence is not subject to the Public Safety Act; rather, the Defendant shall be subject to the rules and regulations governing probation applicable through pre-existing law (law in effect prior to January 1, 2017).” The State appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgments. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that the constitutionality of the PSA provisions at issue was not ripe for consideration by the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals. We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Supreme Court | ||
Carolyn Coffman et al. v. Armstrong International, Inc. et al.
This consolidated appeal arises from a product liability action brought by Donald Coffman and his wife, Carolyn Coffman, after Mr. Coffman was diagnosed with mesothelioma. Plaintiffs asserted several claims against multiple defendants for their alleged involvement in Mr. Coffman’s exposure to asbestos at his workplace. The trial court dismissed their claims against some of the original defendants. The court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants. Specifically, the court found that: (1) plaintiffs’ claims against one defendant were time-barred by the four-year construction statute of repose set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2017); (2) plaintiffs’ claims against three defendants were time-barred by the ten-year statute of repose set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103 (2012); (3) ten defendants affirmatively negated their alleged duty to warn; and (4) plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence of causation with respect to seven defendants. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend certain summary judgment orders. Plaintiffs filed separate notices of appeal for each final judgment entered by the trial court. These cases were consolidated for the purpose of oral argument before the Court of Appeals. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we vacate all of the final judgments entered by the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Michael Ward
The Defendant, Joshua Michael Ward, entered a guilty plea to reckless homicide, a Class D felony, after the all-terrain vehicle (“ATV”) he was driving ran down an embankment, killing his passenger. The trial court denied the Defendant judicial diversion and sentenced him to three years, with ninety days to be served in confinement and the remainder on unsupervised probation. The Defendant appeals the denial of judicial diversion and the denial of full probation. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing, and we affirm the judgment. |
Scott | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Ray Howser
Defendant, Michael Ray Howser, pled guilty to aggravated assault, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon with an agreed effective sentence of ten years as a Range II multiple offender with the trial court to determine the manner of service. A sentencing hearing was held, and the trial court ordered Defendant’s ten-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul Hayes v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Paul Hayes, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis based on a victim recanting her identification of him as one of the perpetrators of a home invasion that took place over two decades ago. The petition was denied by the trial court both for having been untimely filed and because the new evidence was neither credible nor was likely to have changed the outcome of the trial. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court that the petition should be denied on the merits. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Adrian Delk v. State of Tennessee
Appellant inmate filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the chancery court seeking redress for various errors involving the sentence he ultimately received following a plea of guilty to two felonies. Because we conclude that Appellant failed to show he had no other equally effective means to redress these alleged errors, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s petition. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Cooperative, Et Al. v. Ted D. Rains
Defendant in a debt collection case appeals the entry of judgment against him, contending that the court erred in setting the case for trial with only two days’ notice, in granting a motion in limine on the day of trial, and in its award of attorney’s fees to the Plaintiff. We modify the judgment to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees awarded; in all other respects, we affirm the judgment. |
Perry | Court of Appeals | |
Noah Ryan Et Al. v. Laverna Soucie
This appeal arises from a dispute concerning the defendant’s conduct, which impeded the plaintiffs’ use of a state right of way for ingress to and egress from the plaintiffs’ commercial property. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs following its determination that the defendant had created a nuisance and had intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs’ business relationships. The defendant has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Save Our Fairgrounds Et Al. v. Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County, Tennessee
Appellants filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County related to the city’s decision to allow a soccer stadium to be built at the fairgrounds. The complaint alleged that the action violated several provisions of the city’s charter intended to protect the fairgrounds for fair uses. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city on the basis that the additional uses for the fairgrounds did not violate Metropolitan Charter section 11.602. Because the trial court’s order fails to adjudicate Appellants’ claims that the city’s action violated additional charter provisions, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Albert J. Ahler v. Charles Steffan Scarborough Et Al.
Plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking to declare Old Stage Road a public road. Plaintiff sought to use the disputed road to access his property; his property does not abut the road. The plaintiff, asserting that he was also there on behalf of the public, also sought to have the road declared public in order to access defendants’ private property for recreation. Defendants filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment. Defendants argued that absent a ruling related to defendants’ property rights, the plaintiff and those he represents were likely to interpret any ruling favorable to them as a declaration of their right to trespass upon defendants’ private property for recreational purposes, instead of a public road to gain access to some lawful destination. After a trial, the court held that defendants had shown that public use of the area in question had been abandoned. The disputed road was held to be the private property of defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tory Blackmon
The Defendant, Tory Blackmon, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; employing a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101(a)(1)-(3) (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-202(a) (2014) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder), 39-13-102(a) (2014) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault), 39-17-1324(b)(2) (2014) (subsequently amended) (armed dangerous felonies). The court imposed a twenty-year sentence for attempted first degree murder, a six-year sentence for the employing a firearm conviction, and a four-year sentence for aggravated assault. The court merged the aggravated assault conviction with the attempted first degree murder conviction, and it ordered the firearm conviction to be served consecutively to the attempted murder conviction as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(e)(1) (2014) (subsequently amended). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gilbert Heredia, Et Al. v. Bill Gibbons, Et Al.
The plaintiffs, some of whom had an interest in property that had been subject to forfeiture proceedings, filed a quo warranto action alleging misconduct by public officials in the administration of the proceedings. The plaintiffs also sought declaratory relief and judicial review “from each final judgment of forfeiture during the period permitted by Tennessee law.” On The defendants’ motion, the trial court dismissed the case on various grounds, including lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of standing. In the case of one plaintiff, we conclude that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a petition for judicial review. We further conclude that the plaintiffs either failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted or lacked standing to pursue the claims. So we affirm the dismissal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sherita Michelle Polk v. Frank Edward Polk
This appeal arises from a divorce between parties with no minor children. The husband appealed raising numerous issues related to property division. He also challenges the trial court’s denial of his request for alimony. The appellate record contains no transcript or statement of evidence that complies with Rule 24 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Further the husband’s brief is woefully deficient. Because of the husband’s failure to comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Rules of this Court, there is no basis upon which to conclude that the evidence preponderates against the findings of the chancery court and the rulings based thereon. We affirm the judgment of the chancery court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy Eugene Cook, Jr.
The Appellant, Billy Eugene Cook, Jr., appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation for aggravated burglary, contending that the trial court erred by denying a continuance of the revocation hearing and by revoking his probation on his first violation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
DeKalb | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ashton Montrell Jones
Defendant, Ashton Montrell Jones, appeals from the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion (“Rule 36 motion”) to correct a clerical error in a community corrections revocation order. The trial court summarily denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing on the sole basis of “lack of jurisdiction.” Under the particular circumstances of this case, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand to the trial court for proper consideration of the motion. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cedrick Dewayne Whiteside
Defendant, Cedrick Dewayne Whiteside, was found guilty of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, criminal impersonation, driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked, license, and failure to exercise due care. On appeal, he argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for the trier of fact to find him guilty of driving under the influence of an intoxicant and for failure to exercise due care. In light of the evidence presented, we uphold Defendant’s driving under the influence conviction but reverse and dismiss the jury’s finding of failure to exercise due care. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roger F. Johnson
Following a bench trial in the Grundy County Circuit Court, the Defendant, Roger F. Johnson, was convicted as charged of indecent exposure, a Class B misdemeanor. He was subsequently sentenced to a six-month sentence, with service of forty-five days in jail prior to serving the remainder of the sentence on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the indictment fails to charge an offense because it does not include the correct mens rea; (2) the indictment is duplicitous; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Nicholas C. Et Al.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father to their four children on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and failure to manifest the ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. On appeal, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence to support all three grounds as well as the trial court’s best interest determination. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
James M. Morris v. Tennessee Board of Probation & Parole
This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed in chancery court by a prisoner after he was denied parole. The chancery court concluded that the petition was timely filed but found that the issues presented were moot and lacked substantive merit. The prisoner appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal on other grounds. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |