State of Tennessee v. Damarcus C. Nelson
The Defendant, Damarcus C. Nelson, appeals as of right from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of the remainder of his four-year sentence for solicitation of aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion because the State failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he violated the law or participated in gang-related activity, and he maintains that the remaining “technical” violations did not warrant incarceration. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Early Reynolds
A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Early Reynolds, of unlawful possession of a firearm after a prior felony conviction involving use, or attempted use, of force, violence, or a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to serve fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress statements made to the police after he invoked his right to remain silent; (2) the trial court improperly admitted a photograph of the Defendant holding a gun; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Milburn Levon Edwards v. State of Tennessee
In this, his sixth petition for habeas corpus relief, the Petitioner, Milburn Levon Edwards, contends that his burglary, rape and assault convictions are illegal because his sentences were ordered to be served at forty percent instead of thirty-five percent. The trial court summarily dismissed his petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it denied his habeas corpus petition and then it erred when it denied his subsequently filed motion to correct clerical errors pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 because his judgments were not file-stamped. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul Brent Baxter v. State of Tennessee
In 2014, the Petitioner, Paul Brent Baxter, was convicted of aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him to serve thirty-five years. The Defendant appealed his convictions to this court, and we affirmed the judgments. State v. Paul Brent Baxter, No. M2015-00939-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 2928266 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 16, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016). Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Clarence D. Schreane v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Clarence D. Schreane, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery convictions, for which he received an effective sentence of life plus sixty years. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mario Marquette McAdoo
The Defendant, Mario Marquette McAdoo, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation for his convictions for four counts of felony theft, misdemeanor assault, and misdemeanor resisting arrest and its order that he serve the remainder of his effective ten-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at the revocation hearing and that, as a result, he is entitled to a new revocation hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Asata D. Lowe v. Mike Parris Et Al.
This case involves a prisoner’s appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint, wherein he raised numerous claims relating back to his seizure, arrest, prosecution, and conviction, all of which occurred from 1998 to 2000. The trial court dismissed all of the prisoner’s claims on numerous grounds, including that they were time-barred by various statutes of limitations and that many of the defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity. Concluding that because certain defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity and that all of the prisoner’s claims are either time-barred or do not comply with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Mason v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jeffrey Mason, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2017 |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shaleen Fowler Et Al. v. Morristown-Hamblen Hospital Association, Et Al.
The plaintiffs, individually and as a proposed class action, alleged violations of Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-11-262.1 The defendants asserted as a defense that Tennessee Code Annotated section 1-3-119 precludes any private right of action under section 68-11-262. Pursuant to Rule 24.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs submitted a notice of claim that the statute was unconstitutional and violated Article I, section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution. The State of Tennessee was allowed to intervene in a limited capacity to defend the constitutionality of that statute. In its consideration of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the trial court held that the statute did not violate the “Open Courts” Clause of Article I, section 17. This holding necessitated a finding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-11-262 did not give a private right of action and, therefore, the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was granted and the plaintiffs’ complaint was dismissed with prejudice in its entirety. The plaintiffs now appeal the finding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 1-3-119 does not violate Article I, section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution. The defendants challenge the trial court’s decision that Plaintiffs fell within the meaning of “uninsured patient” in Tennessee Code Annotated section 68- 11-262. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Billy Joe Kerby
This appeal concerns the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of the petitioner’s claim against the estate of the decedent. We affirm. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Scott Trent Et Al. v. Mountain Commerce Bank Et AL.
In this action requesting declaratory relief, the appellants filed a petition seeking to reform a deed to add an additional grantor and requesting the Trial Court declare that the appellants hold all rights and interest to the property at issue. The Trial Court determined that no mutual mistake existed to support reformation of the original deed and denied the appellants’ petition. The Trial Court also declined to declare the appellants to be the only parties holding any interest in the property. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
John Willie Stone v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, John Willie Stone, appeals from the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his burglary of an automobile, misdemeanor theft, and aggravated assault convictions, for which he is serving a twenty-one-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Estate of Herbert Ross Shelton v. Greeneville Urgent Care and Occupational Medicine Clinic Et Al.
The Estate of Herbert Ross Shelton (“Plaintiff”) appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Greeneville Urgent Care and Occupational Medicine Clinic and Takoma Regional Hospital in this healthcare liability action after finding and holding that Plaintiff’s sole expert witness was not qualified to testify in this case. We find and hold that Plaintiff’s expert did not practice in a profession or specialty during the relevant time period which would make his testimony relevant to the issues in this case, and thus, was not qualified to testify pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115. We, therefore, affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Jeanette Currie v. Farmers Insurance Company
Due to the deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we conclude that she waived consideration of any issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kristin Marie Miclaus v. Andrei Miclaus
Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion, which sought relief from the final decree of divorce entered against him on the ground that he did not receive notice of the trial setting. Because Appellant did not receive proper notice, relief under Rule 60.02(1) should have been granted by the trial court. As such, we vacate the final decree of divorce and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Marble v. Jaimee Underwood
This appeal concerns a legal malpractice action filed by the father of a minor child for his attorney’s alleged negligence in her representation of him. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the attorney. We affirm. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
David William Lowery v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, David William Lowery, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for three counts of aggravated child abuse. On appeal he contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner also appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis based upon newly discovered evidence. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cathryn Helrigel Pierce v. Sherman Lane Pierce
In this divorce action, the Domestic Relations Court of Meigs County (“trial court”) entered a “Final Judgment of Divorce” on June 21, 2018. In this judgment, the trial court awarded to the wife, inter alia, possession of a parcel of marital real property improved with a mobile home, along with its associated mortgage indebtedness, and fifty percent of the marital portion of the husband’s military retirement, or $481.11 per month. The trial court awarded to the husband, inter alia, a different parcel of marital real property improved with a mobile home and further ordered the husband to pay the wife’s automobile loan obligation in the total amount of $22,192.86. The trial court denied the wife’s request for alimony of any type. The wife timely appealed. Following our thorough review of the record, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s judgment denying an award of alimony and attorney’s fees to the wife. Based upon our review of the evidence and the applicable statutory factors, we conclude that the wife is entitled to an award of alimony in futuro in the amount of $1,600.00 per month. We further determine that the wife is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred at the trial court level as alimony in solido. We remand the issue of the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded to the wife to the trial court for entry of an appropriate award. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. Regarding the wife’s request for an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal, we determine that such request has been waived. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darryl Ray Wilson
The Defendant, Darryl Ray Wilson, appeals as of right from the Anderson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on alleged violations that he was not provided notice of prior to the revocation hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Matthew Howard Norris
The Defendant, Matthew Howard Norris, pleaded guilty to two counts of theft of property valued at more than $2,500 and one count of burglary in exchange for an effective eight-year sentence. At a subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the eight-year sentence be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his request for judicial diversion and for alternative sentencing. After review, we conclude that the trial court failed to consider the appropriate factors in determining the issue of judicial diversion; therefore, we reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Washington County Education Association Et Al. v. Washington County Board of Education Et Al.
Kimber Halliburton, the director of the Washington County Board of Education, notified Stacia Howard, a non-tenured teacher, that her employment contract would not be renewed. The Washington County board did not review the director’s decision because the board’s attorney believed that the board lacked the legal authority to do so. Ms. Howard and the Washington County Education Association (WCEA) filed a complaint against the board and the director. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment regarding the authority of the board to review and modify the director’s personnel decisions, including the director’s decision to non-renew Ms. Howard’s contract. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs lacked standing. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Trey S. Et Al.
A trial court terminated a mother’s and father’s parental rights to three children on the grounds of wanton disregard for the children’s welfare, substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, and persistence of conditions. Both parents appealed the termination. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Credit Union v. Wanda Powell, Et Al.
This is an appeal of an employer’s Petition for Judicial Review, which challenged a ruling by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development that the employer’s former employee was entitled to unemployment benefits. The employer contended the employee was ineligible for benefits because she was terminated for “misconduct,” as defined in the Tennessee Employment Security Act, for violating a policy known to the employee by using the employer’s property for a non-businessrelated purpose. The Department found that the employee’s frequent use of the employer’s internal instant message system to “chat” with co-workers was an error in judgment or discretion but did not rise to the level of “misconduct,” which Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-303(b)(3) defines as excluding “good faith errors in judgment or discretion.” The chancery court affirmed the agency’s decision. The employer appeals, contending the “good faith exception” never applies when an employee is discharged for violating an employer’s policy or rule. The Department counters, insisting the good faith exception applies regardless of the employer’s reason for termination. Construing the statute according to the natural, ordinary meaning of the language chosen by the legislature, we have determined that an employee’s violation of an employer’s policy that is due to good faith errors in judgment or discretion does not constitute “misconduct” as that term is defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-303. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Benjamin Shea Cotten, As Personal Representative For The Estate Of Christina Marie Cotten, Deceased, Et Al. v. Jerry Scott Wilson
In this wrongful death action, the plaintiff estate seeks to hold the defendant liable for negligently facilitating the decedent’s suicide. While staying alone in the defendant’s home, the adult decedent committed suicide by shooting herself with a gun that was unsecured in the defendant’s home. The decedent’s estate sued the defendant, alleging that he should have known the decedent was potentially suicidal and that he negligently facilitated the suicide by failing to secure the gun while the decedent was in his home. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the evidence is insufficient for a trier of fact to find that the decedent’s suicide was a reasonably foreseeable probability; consequently, the decedent’s suicide constitutes a superseding intervening event that breaks the chain of proximate causation. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Benjamin Shea Cotten, As Personal Representative For The Estate Of Christina Marie Cotten, Deceased, Et Al. v. Jerry Scott Wilson - Dissenting
The Estate of Christina Marie Cotten should have its day in court. Summary judgment for Dr. Jerry Wilson is not appropriate because the issue of whether Christina Marie Cotten’s suicide was a reasonably foreseeable result of Dr. Wilson’s negligent conduct involves disputed questions of material fact. The majority, in lengthy footnotes, attempts to defend its decision in favor of Dr. Wilson. The reasoning in this dissent is clearly stated. I decline the invitation to debate in a series of footnotes. See Borne v. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc., 532 S.W.3d 274, 319 (Tenn. 2017) (Lee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). |
Williamson | Supreme Court |