State of Tennessee v. Crystal L. Gregoire
The Defendant, Crystal L. Gregoire, pled guilty in the Lawrence County Circuit Court to tampering with evidence and was convicted following a jury trial of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to an effective term of life imprisonment. On appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of a retired Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agent of the facts surrounding the victim’s 1982 kidnapping convictions and the victim’s having put out an “open contract” on the agent and the agent’s family, by granting the State’s request for a special jury instruction pertaining to the victim’s having become “disarmed or helpless” during the killing, and by admitting prejudicial crime scene and autopsy photographs. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeffery Smith, et al. v. Methodist Hospitals of Memphis, et al.
This appeal stems from a healthcare liability action filed nearly two decades ago. The defendant hospital filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that neither of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses was competent to testify and, therefore, the plaintiffs could not establish their claim. After the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment along with a new affidavit of one of the previous experts, which purported to establish the expert’s competency to testify. The trial court, however, denied the motion to alter or amend, and the plaintiffs specifically appealed the trial court’s order denying their motion. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Audra Snapp Olinger v. Travis Jackson Olinger
In this divorce case, the trial court decreed that husband, Travis Jackson Olinger, would be liable for the attorney’s fees and expenses of, his spouse, Audra Snapp Olinger. The court treated the assessing of fees to husband as alimony in solido to wife. A portion of those fees were to be satisfied by transfering to wife husband’s interest in the parties’ equity in the martial residence. The remainder is to be paid over time with a monthly payment of $370 until husband’s obligation is paid in full. The sole issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it assessed the subject fees to husband. He appeals. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Audra Snapp Olinger v. Travis Jackson Olinger - Concurring and Dissenting
D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., concurring and dissenting. I concur with the majority in its affirmance of that portion of the Trial Court’s award to Wife which can be classified distinctly as discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04.1 Wife was granted a divorce based upon Husband’s stipulated adultery and inappropriate marital conduct. To that extent, Wife prevailed, and I agree with the majority that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in granting her an award of discretionary costs in the amount of $2,270. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Sammie L. Brookins, et al. v. Saint Francis Hospital Foundation, et al.
After husband’s health care liability complaint was dismissed without prejudice for lack of prosecution, husband and wife re-filed in reliance on the savings statute. The intended defendant, who had neither been served nor named in connection with the first complaint, was eventually named in an amended complaint after the second complaint had been filed. The trial court later dismissed the action against the intended defendant, holding, among other things, that the case was barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Marilyn Lynn James v. City of Dyersburg
This appeal arises from injuries the plaintiff sustained from a fall while descending the exterior sidewalk steps of property owned and managed by the City of Dyersburg. The plaintiff contends she fell because, inter alia, the city was negligent in the design and maintenance of the stairway and in failing to correct the defect in the steps. Following a bench trial, the court found the proof failed to establish that there was a dangerous or defective condition that was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s fall, and if there was a defective condition, the City of Dyersburg had no prior notice. The trial court also found that if there was a defective condition, the plaintiff was more than 50% at fault which bars any recovery. For these and other reasons, the trial court dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed. Having determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact, and discerning no error with its conclusions of law, we affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Roy Jordan
On December 9, 2008, the defendant pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, fourth offense driving under the influence, and simple possession. The trial court imposed an effective 12-year sentence, ordering the defendant to serve 365 days in confinement with the balance suspended to supervised probation. On June 6, 2011, the trial court found the defendant had violated the terms of his probation by, among other things, failing to report, testing positive for the use of illegal drugs, failing to verify his employment and address, and failing to pay fees and restitution, and the court ordered the defendant to serve one year in confinement followed by completion of the Steps House program and a return to supervised probation. On January 14, 2014, the trial court found that the defendant again violated the terms of his probation by providing a fraudulent address and by failing to report as instructed and sentenced the defendant to time served and returned him to supervised probation. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation a third time, and, on September 23, 2014, the trial court ordered him to serve 60 days in confinement and to undergo an alcohol and drug assessment and intensive outpatient treatment. On October 3, 2016, the defendant again admitted to violating the terms of his probation, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to time served and returned him to supervised probation with a requirement that he return to treatment at Steps House. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Demarcus Williams
The Defendant, Kenneth Demarcus Williams, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of facilitation of aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, two counts of aggravated assault, a Class B felony, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony, and unlawful possession of a firearm while being a convicted felon, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-403 (2018) (aggravated burglary); 39-11-403 (2018) (facilitation of a felony); 39-13-102 (2018) (aggravated assault); 39-12-302 (2018) (felony classification when acting in concert); 39-17-1324 (2018) (possession of a firearm during dangerous felony); 39-17-1307 (2018) (unlawful firearm possession). After the appropriate merger, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to terms of confinement of four years for facilitation of aggravated burglary, twelve years for aggravated burglary, twelve years for aggravated assault, five years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and ten years for unlawful possession of a firearm. The court imposed partial consecutive service, for an effective sentence of twenty-one years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his facilitation of aggravated burglary convictions and (2) the trial court erred by admitting photograph evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Francisco Gomez
Defendant, Francisco Gomez, was convicted of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery by a Rutherford County jury. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve a total effective sentence of twenty-five years with release eligibility after service of 100% of the sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding his testimony that he was living in Kentucky during the time period when the offenses occurred because Defendant failed to give the State the notice required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 for alibi evidence. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we conclude that Defendant’s proffered testimony was not alibi evidence, and thus, the trial court erred in excluding it on the ground that Defendant failed to provide notice to the State. However, we also conclude that the error was harmless, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Jake Reynolds v. Kevin Genovese, et al.
The pro se Petitioner, Christopher Jake Reynolds, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Septian Valentine
The Defendant-Appellant, Septian Valentine, appeals from the revocation of supervised release by the Lake County Circuit Court, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kevin Fennell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Kevin Fennell, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty pleas are constitutionally infirm due to trial counsel’s failure to inform him that his sentence was required to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Brown v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Kenneth Brown, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing (1) that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to present Agent James Davis and Beatrice Vaulx as witnesses at trial and in failing to request an instruction on proximate cause of death; and (2) that he is entitled to a second post-conviction hearing based on post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v.Shawn Gibson Delosh
The Defendant-Appellant, Shawn Gibson Delosh, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-433(a)(1), for which he received a sentence of twelve years, to be served consecutively to his prior sentences and parole revocations. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court improperly ordered his sentence to be served consecutively to “all prior sentences and/or parole revocations.” Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Troy Lee Springfield
Defendant, Troy Lee Springfield, was found guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He was sentenced to eight years for attempted voluntary manslaughter, ten years for aggravated assault, four years for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, and ten years for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court ordered the sentences for aggravated assault and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony to be served consecutively to each other and concurrently with the remaining counts for an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and the State did not prove his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tavares Dewayne Buchanan, AKA Tavarea Dewayne Buchanan
The Defendant, Tavares Dewayne Buchanan, aka Tavarea Dewayne Buchanan, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; two counts of rape, Class B felonies; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; felon in possession of a firearm, a Class D felony; and unlawful photography, a Class A misdemeanor, and he was sentenced to an effective term of ten years in incarceration followed by ten years on probation. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of his prior felony convictions in its case-in-chief; (2) the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the State’s vouching for the reliability of the victim in its closing argument; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Harold Joe Rittenhouse
Petitioner, Harold Joe Rittenhouse, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the parties’ briefs and applicable law, we dismiss the appeal. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carl David Roe
The defendant, Carl David Roe, appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his 2003 guilty plea to attempted aggravated sexual battery, arguing that the entry of an amended judgment in 2007 that added a requirement that the defendant be subject to community supervision for life invalidated the plea. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of relief. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Siranthony Williams
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Siranthony Williams, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed a sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction, specifically his identity as the perpetrator of the offense. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lazette Sanders v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Lazette Sanders, was indicted by the Hardeman County Grand Jury for one count of attempted first degree murder. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the amended charge of attempted second degree murder and received a sentence as a Range I offender of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Petitioner filed a petition seeking postconviction relief, in which she alleged that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that her guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied her petition. Petitioner appeals and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Arthur McKinnie
The Defendant, Arthur McKinnie, was indicted for attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony; and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-102, -13-103, -13-202, -16-503, -17-1324. The Defendant proceeded to a jury trial. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the tampering with evidence charge. The jury convicted the Defendant of the lesser-included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony, and the charged offenses of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-211. The jury acquitted the Defendant of the employment of a firearm charge. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in setting the length of his sentences; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing partial consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wayne Luster Boykin, Sr.
A Madison County Jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Wayne Luster Boykin, Sr., of possession with intent to sell more than one-half ounce of marijuana (Count 1), possession with intent to deliver more than one-half ounce of marijuana, (Count 2), both Class E felonies, and possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia (Count 3), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417, -425(a)(1). He received an effective sentence of four years in confinement. Prior to trial, Boykin filed a motion to suppress arguing that the search warrant and supporting affidavit were based on “stale” information. The trial judge, who was the issuing magistrate for the search warrant, transferred the motion to suppress to be heard by another judge. Following the denial of the motion to suppress, the case was transferred back to the original trial judge to conduct the trial. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court that heard the motion to suppress erred in denying his motion to suppress the search and his subsequent statement; (2) the trial court that conducted the trial and the motion for new trial erred in its review of the motion to suppress; and (3) that he received an excessive sentence. Upon our review, we remand Count 3 for entry of an amended judgment. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bruce A. Smiley v. State of Tennessee, Et Al.
This appeal arises from a Petition for Declaratory Judgment filed by an incarcerated sex offender in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. Petitioner challenged what he claimed to be the illegal, arbitrary, and capricious application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-235, the Sex Offender Treatment Program (the “SOTP”), contending he is eligible for a parole hearing but will be denied parole because the State of Tennessee has failed to enroll him in the program. This contention is based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-235(b), which expressly states, as to sex offenders, “Successful participation and completion of the treatment program shall be a consideration for parole from a correctional institution.” Respondents moved for summary judgment on several grounds including the undisputed fact that the challenged provision is unenforceable due to a consent decree issued by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee in Dean v. McWherter, No. 1-90-0027 (M.D. Tenn. filed Aug. 18, 1994), and the Tennessee Board of Parole does not consider participation in the SOTP, or lack thereof, as a factor in deciding whether to grant parole. Respondents also filed a motion to dismiss the individual respondents as well as the State for failure to state a claim based Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss the individual respondents and summarily dismissed all remaining claims. In pertinent part, the court found it was undisputed that by the terms of the consent decree and the affidavit of the Executive Director of the Board of Parole that the Board cannot and does not consider an inmate’s participation in the SOTP in reaching its parole decision. This appeal followed. We affirm in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re L.T.
In this child custody case, father petitioned the court to modify a prior custody order designating mother as the primary residential parent of their child, L.T. Father alleged that there had been a material change in circumstance in that mother refused to adhere to the court’s visitation order on numerous occasions. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36–6–101(a)(2)(B) (2018). After a hearing, the court agreed. It held that it was in the best interest of the child to award joint custody to mother and father, with father designated as the primary residential parent. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John Glen Renken v. Jennifer Marie Renken
In this post-divorce dispute, the father filed a criminal contempt petition against his exwife for alleged violations of a permanent parenting plan. In response, the mother filed a counter-petition for criminal contempt, modification of custody, and permission to relocate. The trial court denied the mother’s petition to relocate and the father’s petition for criminal contempt. The court determined that there was not a material change sufficient to modify custody but there was material change that met the lower threshold required for modification of the residential parenting schedule. The court adopted the position of the guardian ad litem that equal parenting time would serve the children’s best interest and modified the parenting plan accordingly. The court also found the father in criminal contempt. We conclude that the court erred in adopting the modified residential parenting schedule without conducting a best interest analysis. So we vacate and remand for further proceedings on this issue. In all other respects, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |