State of Tennessee v. Michael Lee Hufford
The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Lee Hufford, appeals from the order of the Sullivan County Criminal Court revoking his probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the violation of probation affidavit and arrest warrant, and (2) the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Belinda Puller Ex Rel. Darel Puller v. Judith Roney
Defendant Judith Roney hired Darel Puller as a handyman to do periodic odd jobs in maintaining her house. Mr. Puller died in an accident when he fell from defendant’s roof while clearing it of debris. No one witnessed the accident. A housekeeper found him unconscious on a patio, with an extension ladder lying on the ground next to him. Defendant testified that she had not spoken to Mr. Puller the day of the accident, and that she did not know he was going to get her ladder from a back garage and use it to get on the roof. She also said that the ladder was probably at least forty years old and that it was missing one of the extension latching hooks. Mr. Puller’s widow, Belinda Puller, brought this action alleging defendant was negligent in failing to warn him of the defective condition of the ladder. Defendant moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court on the ground that “the Plaintiff is unable to establish in any way, the cause of the injury to the Plaintiff or the relation of the Defendant to the Plaintiff’s injury.” We affirm. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Ray Oaks
The defendant, Jerry Ray Oaks, appeals his Carter County Criminal Court jury conviction of vehicular homicide, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw, that the defendant should have been permitted to argue the results of a vehicle inspection during closing argument, and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of vehicular homicide. The trial court erred by finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw. Accordingly, we reverse the defendant’s conviction of vehicular homicide and remand the case for a new trial. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Ray Oakes - dissenting opinion
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. In my opinion, based on the proof presented at the suppression hearing and at trial, the trial court correctly determined that there were exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless blood draw. For the reasons that follow, I would affirm the defendant’s conviction of vehicular homicide. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bettye Shores v. State of Tennessee
Bettye Shores (“Employee”) alleged she suffered a mental injury during the course and scope of her employment with the State of Tennessee (“Employer”) when a reprimand from her supervisor “lit up” her preexisting post-traumatic stress disorder. Employer moved to dismiss the claim, asserting Employee failed to give timely notice of her alleged injury as mandated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-201. After a hearing, the Commissioner granted Employer’s motion to dismiss. Employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the Commissioner’s judgment. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Gloria Andrews, Et Al. v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company
This appeal arises from a widow’s suit over her husband’s alleged exposure to asbestos. Raymond Andrews (“Decedent”) worked for Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk Southern”) for 24 years before retiring. He later died of lung cancer. Decedent’s wife, Gloria Andrews (“Plaintiff”), sued Norfolk Southern in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”) alleging that her late husband had been exposed to asbestos while working for Norfolk Southern. Norfolk Southern filed several evidentiary motions which the Trial Court granted. Norfolk Southern subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, which also was granted. Plaintiff appeals to this Court raising several evidentiary issues. We hold that the Trial Court did not err in excluding lay testimony regarding the presence of asbestos in areas where Decedent worked because these witnesses lacked personal knowledge about the alleged asbestos. Plaintiff was unable to produce any admissible evidence at the summary judgment stage to support her claim that Norfolk Southern failed to maintain a safe working environment. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: H. A., Et Al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, arguing that termination was not in the children’s best interest. We conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports both the grounds for termination found by the trial court and the trial court’s best interest determination. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Tina E. Hayes v. Costco and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
Tina E. Hayes (“Employee”) alleged that she sustained a compensable injury to her left knee on April 8, 2015, in the course of her work as a stocker for Costco (“Employer”). She alleged that this injury required her to undergo a left knee replacement surgery. The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims held that Employee failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence a compensable injury or aggravation arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment with Employer. Employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
State of Tennessee v. Daniel Dewayne Kincaid
The Defendant, Daniel Dewayne Kincaid, appeals as of right from the Blount County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probationary sentence and order of one hundred and eighty days of split confinement for his convictions for DUI. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve one hundred and eighty days of split confinement before being released on supervised probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Gill
After a jury trial, Gregory Gill, Defendant, was convicted of two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, two counts of possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, one count of unlawful possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony involving the attempted use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, and one count of evading arrest. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total effective sentence of thirty-eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the evidence was insufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to crossexamine a defense witness about his pending criminal charges; and (4) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason White
Jason White, Defendant, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to sell within a drug-free zone and one count of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to deliver within a drug-free zone. Co-defendant Kristina Cole and Co-defendant Montez Mullins were also convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to sell within a drug-free zone and one count of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to deliver within a drug-free zone in the same trial. See State v. Kristina Cole and Montez Mullins, No. W2017-01980-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 5810011, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2018), perm. app. filed. The trial court sentenced Defendant to sixty years as a career offender with release after service of 100% of the sentence. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing Defendant’s trial counsel to represent Defendant despite a conflict of interest; (2) the State constructively amended the indictment by obtaining a superseding indictment; (3) the trial court erred in admitting: testimony from Andrew Brown; Co-defendant Montez Mullins’ confession; text messages that Detective Mark Gaia retrieved from Co-defendant Cole’s three cell phones; and marijuana confiscated from Mr. White’s vehicle; (4) the trial court erred in admitting testimony from Detective Gaia without instructing the jury about witness credibility; (5) the State’s introduction of Co-defendant Mullins’ confession violated Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968); (6) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to sever his case from Co-defendants Cole and Mullins; (7) the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to have found Defendant guilty; and (8) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Creed Gettys Welch
Defendant, Creed Gettys Welch, was convicted after a jury trial of one count of aggravated sexual battery of a victim less than thirteen years of age and was sentenced to serve ten years at 100%. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction and the trial court’s alleged failure to fulfill its role as the thirteenth juror. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Huey Liles, Jr.
The defendant, Thomas Huey Liles, Jr., appeals his Sevier County Circuit Court jury conviction of second offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), claiming that the statute imposing a blood alcohol or drug concentration test fee violates principles of due process. Because our supreme court has specifically concluded that the statute in question does not violate due process principles, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
IN RE AUTUMN L. ET AL.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving two minor children. Appellants, who have custody of the children, appeal the trial court’s denial of their petition to terminate Mother/Appellee’s parental rights. The trial court found that Appellants met their burden to show the grounds of persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal from Appellee’s custody and abandonment by wanton disregard by an incarcerated parent. However, the trial court found that termination of Appellee’s parental rights was not in the children’s best interests. We affirm the trial court’s findings as to the grounds for termination but reverse its finding as to best interests. We remand the case for entry of an order terminating Appellee’s parental rights to the children. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Serenity W.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child. After the mother tested positive for drugs at a court hearing, the trial court awarded temporary legal and physical custody of the child to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. Over two years later, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence three statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the child. The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We conclude that the evidence was less than clear and convincing as to two of the statutory grounds but the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support one ground for termination. But because we also conclude that the evidence was less than clear and convincing that termination was in the child’s best interest, we reverse the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Serenity W. - concurring in part and dissenting in part
The majority holds, in its own words, that the evidence was less than clear and convincing as to two of the statutory grounds but the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support one ground for termination. But because we also conclude that the evidence was less than clear and convincing that termination was in the child’s best interest, we reverse the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Brasfield & Gorrie, LLC et al.
After street closures allegedly affected its business, Appellant filed suit against the construction company. The company answered the complaint denying that any street closures occurred without the permission of Appellee Metropolitan Government of Nashville. More than a year after the construct company filed its answer, Appellant filed an amended complaint against Appellee, averring nuisance, inverse condemnation, and federal taking. Appellee moved for dismissal under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion, arguing that the one-year statute of limitations barred Appellant’s claims. The trial court found that Appellant was on notice of Appellant’s involvement in the road closures based on the construction company’s answer and granted the motion to dismiss. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nikilo Conley
A Shelby County jury found the Defendant guilty of especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jacquez Russell
The Defendant, Jacquez Russell, was found guilty by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2018) (first degree murder), 39-12-101 (2018) (attempt), 39-17-1324 (2018) (employment). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive terms of sixteen years for attempted first degree murder and six years for the firearm conviction, for an effective twenty-two-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by limiting his closing argument. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
IN RE Melinda N.
Candy D. (“Mother”) appeals the August 11, 2017 order of the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) terminating her parental rights to the minor child Melinda N. (“the Child”). Mother raises issues regarding whether a petition for adoption of the Child is defective on its face, whether the Trial Court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to support pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), whether the Trial Court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to visit pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), and whether the Trial Court erred in finding that it was in the Child’s best interests for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in finding that clear and convincing evidence was shown of grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to support and for abandoment by willful failure to visit and that it was proven that it was in the Child’s best interests for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s August 11, 2017 order. As Mother’s parental rights properly have been terminated, Mother lacks standing to raise issues regarding alleged deficiencies in the petition for adoption. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Corey Gilbert v. State of Tennessee
After his convictions for felony murder and aggravated robbery were upheld on direct appeal, Petitioner, Corey Gilbert, sought post-conviction relief. In the petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel as well as prosecutorial misconduct. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Lynn Zeigler
The Defendant-Appellant, David Lynn Zeigler, appeals from a Maury County jury conviction of rape by “knowing or having reason to know [the victim] was mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-503(a)(3). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in prohibiting trial counsel’s cross-examination of an expert witness about his suspension from the practice of forensic psychology for unprofessional conduct; (2) whether the trial court’s decision to limit cross-examination of the expert witness effectively interfered with trial counsel’s right to present a defense; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Lynn Zeigler - dissenting
I respectfully dissent. I cannot find the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the cross-examination of the State’s expert witness. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rafia N. Khan, Individually, And In Her Capacity As Trustee Of The Rafia N. Khan Irrevocable Trust v. Regions Bank
This is the fourth appeal arising from a disputed arbitration award in favor of Regions Bank (the Bank) “against Rafia N. Khan, individually, and as trustee” of the Rafia N. Khan Irrevocable Trust (the Trust). Pursuant to this Court’s mandate in the first appeal, the trial court entered an order confirming the arbitration award “as to the Rafia N. Khan Irrevocable Trust and to Rafia N. Khan as Trustee of the Rafia N. Khan Irrevocable Trust.” Later, the trial court entered an order granting the Bank $72,156 in attorney’s fees and $2,094.05 in costs. Of that amount, the court assessed $45,928.92 against the Trust and assessed $28,321.13 against Ms. Khan individually. Ms. Khan’s notice of appeal states that she is appealing (1) the trial court’s order confirming the arbitration award; (2) the court’s order granting the Bank attorney’s fees and costs; and (3) the court’s order denying Ms. Khan’s motion to alter or amend. We affirm the trial court’s order confirming the arbitration award pursuant to the law of the case doctrine. We modify the court’s order awarding attorney’s fees. The award shall include attorney’s fees incurred by the Bank in the trial court and on direct appeal but not attorney’s fees incurred by the Bank in federal bankruptcy court proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Preston Jamar Shepherd v. State of Tennessee
Preston Jamar Shepherd, Petitioner, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief using the form provided in Appendix A of Rule 28 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Petitioner checked seven of the twelve “Grounds of Petition” listed in the form, including ground (2), that his convictions were “based on use of coerced confession” and (9), that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. After ground (2), Petitioner wrote “(due to mental capacity),” and after ground (9), Petitioner wrote “([f]ailed to go over facts/evidence with [Petitioner], and properly inform).” The post-conviction court found that the petition failed to state a factual basis for relief and summarily dismissed the petition for failing to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-106(d). We determine that the petition stated a colorable claim, reverse the summary dismissal, and remand for entry of a preliminary order pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-107(b). |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals |