State of Tennessee v. James Hall
Defendant, James Hall, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to modify his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider Defendant’s rehabilitation efforts. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. However, the judgment for case 2015-C-1974 contains an error that warrants remand for correction. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven Anderson v. Russell Washburn, Warden
The petitioner, Steven Anderson, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 1994 convictions of aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, and second degree murder. Because the petitioner has stated entitlement to habeas corpus relief in the form of the application of pretrial jail credit, we reverse and vacate the order of the habeas corpus court summarily dismissing the petition. The cause is remanded to the habeas corpus court so that that court may transfer the case to the trial court for the entry of an amended judgment reflecting the appropriate award of pretrial jail credit. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Aaron Charles Garland
A Washington County jury convicted the Defendant, Aaron Charles Garland, of first degree felony murder and robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress his statements to police and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree felony murder. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Barbara Mae Potter
Following a trial, a Washington County jury found Defendant, Barbara Mae Potter, guilty of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and one count of tampering with evidence. At sentencing, the trial court merged Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder into the two convictions for first degree premeditated murder and imposed concurrent life sentences for those offenses. The trial court imposed a three-year sentence for tampering with evidence and ordered the sentence to run concurrently with Defendant’s life sentences. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in changing the venue of the trial to Washington County; (2) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for the lead prosecutor to withdraw from the case; (3) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s “motion to |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Katherine Mae Pruitt v. Travis Pruitt
Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside a final judgment obligating him to pay child support. The record shows that Appellant voluntarily executed a document placing his name on the child’s birth certificate and thereafter entered into a marital dissolution agreement and parenting plan obligating him to pay child support with full knowledge that he was not the biological parent of the child. Because Appellant has failed to present sufficient evidence of a ground for relief under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we affirm the decision of the trial court to deny Appellant’s request to set aside the judgment. We reverse, however, the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees based on the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lonny Lavar Bardin
Lonny Lavar Bardin, Defendant, was convicted following a jury trial of Class B felony rape and Class E felony sexual battery and sentenced to eight years’ incarceration. Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerimyah Sherrell Shutt v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jerimyah Sherrell Shutt, pleaded guilty to especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The post-conviction court appointed counsel and, after a hearing, denied relief. After review, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Shane Frazier
A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Richard Shane Frazier, of aggravated assault and violating an Order of Protection. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of fifteen years to be served consecutively to previous sentences for other convictions. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Wayne Woodard
In 2016, the Defendant, Timothy Wayne Woodard, was indicted for nine counts of removal of government records and nine counts of theft of property. The Hamblen County District Attorney’s Office denied the Defendant’s application for pre-trial diversion. The Defendant filed a motion to disqualify the district attorney’s office from the case, alleging that its response to his application revealed a conflict of interest. After a hearing, the trial court found that the District Attorney’s Office was not disqualified from considering the Defendant’s application for pre-trial diversion. The Defendant filed application for extraordinary appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State Ex Rel. Candice McQueen v. Metropolitan Nashville Board of Public Education Et Al.
A metropolitan board of education adopted a policy preventing the provision of student information to the State of Tennessee in its role as the administrator of an achievement school district pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-13-132. The State filed a petition for writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment, and the chancery court granted the writ of mandamus. The board of education appeals. We affirm the decision of the chancery court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate Of Mary Ruth Davis Hudson
In this estate proceeding, the appellants, three of the five adult children of the decedent, appeal the probate court’s interpretation of the decedent’s last will and testament as demonstrating the decedent’s intent to have her real property administered as part of her estate by her personal representative. Having determined that the probate court’s order was premature due to ongoing proceedings in the decedent’s conservatorship case, we vacate the probate court’s order interpreting the last will and testament. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathan George Carter v. Elizabeth Jo Browne
Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce in which it determined that Appellant/Wife was not entitled to an award of alimony in futuro, but awarded Wife alimony in solido and transitional alimony. The trial court further determined that the parties’ marital residence was Wife’s separate property. On appeal, Wife argues that the trial court erred in denying her alimony in futuro, while Appellee/Husband appeals the classification of the parties’ home as Wife’s separate property. With respect to the trial court’s decision that alimony in futuro is inappropriate in this case, we affirm. However, because we conclude that the trial court erred in classifying the parties’ home as Wife’s separate property, we reverse in part and remand for further proceedings |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. William S. Lockett, Jr., ET Al.
The mortgagors sought to rescind the foreclosure sale of their property, claiming that the sale was invalid because it had been conducted improperly. A jury found the sale process was properly followed and the verdict was approved by the trial court. The mortgagors appeal. We affirm |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Whelchel Randall Hogan
Following the denial of a suppression motion, the defendant, Whelchel Randall Hogan, entered a guilty plea in Dickson County Circuit Court to possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine and reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law relating to the initial seizure of the defendant and the validity of the search warrant issued in this case. The defendant asserts the police did not have reasonable suspicion for the initial seizure of the defendant and the search warrant issued in this case lacked probable cause. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Hugh A. Niceley
In 1994, the petitioner, Hugh A. Niceley, was convicted of eight counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated sexual battery, occurring over the course of several years from 1988 until 1992. For his crimes, the petitioner received an effective sentence of fifty-three years, to be served at 30 percent. In 1999, the trial court entered a new judgment as to Count 9, requiring the sentence be served at 100 percent, as required by the applicable statute. As a result, the petitioner asserts the 1999 judgment created an illegal sentence, arguing his sentence in Count 9 should be served at 30 percent, as originally ordered. The trial court disagreed, as do we. Accordingly, the order of the trial court requiring service of Count 9 at 100 percent is affirmed. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Victor Eugene McConnell v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Victor Eugene McConnell, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Davidson County Criminal Court, arguing the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition. The petitioner asserts the State breached the plea agreement in this case, entitling the petitioner to habeas corpus relief. After our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Elvis Louis Marsh
The Defendant, Elvis Louis Marsh, was convicted of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, delivery of less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, conspiracy to sell or deliver less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He received an effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his convictions. Upon reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Henry
The defendant, Eric Henry, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his two-year sentence for reckless endangerment in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronna Lyn Ueber v. Anthony James Ueber
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because the record contains insufficient evidence of bias requiring recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re J'Khari F.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of the mother, Alexis F. (“Mother”), to her minor child, J’Khari F. (“the Child”), who was five years old at the time of trial. On April 10, 2015, the Warren County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) entered an order removing the Child from Mother’s custody and placing the Child into the temporary legal custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), effective April 9, 2015. The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where he remained at the time of trial. The trial court subsequently entered an order on September 24, 2015, finding that the Child was dependent and neglected due to Mother’s insufficient housing, Mother’s insufficient means to support the Child, and the Child’s positive drug test result for methamphetamine. On April 18, 2017, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child upon determining by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to support him, (2) Mother had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit him, (3) Mother had abandoned the Child by engaging in conduct prior to her incarceration that exhibited wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare, (4) Mother had not substantially complied with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plans, (5) the conditions leading to the Child’s removal from Mother’s custody persisted, and (6) Mother had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Mother has appealed. Upon a determination that the evidence presented at trial did not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to support him during the four months prior to her incarceration, we reverse as to that statutory ground. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher L. Shaw v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Christopher L. Shaw, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 2012 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone, possession of drug paraphernalia, and felony evading arrest. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of relief. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kimberly J. Smith v. Gregory A. Smith Et Al.
Judgment creditor appeals the trial court’s decision to set aside a conditional judgment, to dismiss her claims of bad faith, civil contempt, and conversion against the garnishee, and to deny certain requests for discovery and sanctions. We affirm the trial court’s decision to set aside the conditional judgment, as well as the dismissal of the judgment creditor’s conversion claim. We reverse, however, the trial court’s dismissal of the judgment creditor’s claims of bad faith and civil contempt. We also vacate the trial court’s decisions with regard to sanctions and discovery, except to the extent that the trial court allowed withdrawal of certain requests for admission, which is affirmed. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Katherine D. Chaney v. Team Technologies, Inc.
The issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether an employer, who did not use an automated external defibrillator (AED) to assist an employee who suffered a non-work related medical emergency, can be liable for workers’ compensation benefits. An employee collapsed at work because of a medical condition unrelated to her employment. The employer knew of the employee’s need for immediate medical assistance. The employer had acquired an AED but did not use it to assist the employee while awaiting the arrival of emergency medical responders. Medical responders assisted the employee, but she suffered a brain injury because of oxygen deprivation. We hold that an injury that is caused by an employer’s failure to provide reasonable medical assistance arises out of and in the course of employment when an employee becomes helpless at work because of illness or other cause unrelated to her employment, the employee needs medical assistance to prevent further injury, the employer knows of the employee’s helplessness, and the employer can provide reasonable medical assistance but does not do so. Here, the employee’s claim did not arise out of her employment because her employer provided reasonable medical assistance and had no statutory or common law duty to use its AED to assist the employee. Therefore, the employer is not liable for workers’ compensation benefits. We reverse the trial court’s denial of the employer’s motion to dismiss and remand to the trial court for an order of dismissal. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
Richard Alan Ellis v. Donica Ann Woods Ellis
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $9,000 per month. In addition, the trial court awarded Wife her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido in the amount of $121,873.81. We vacate the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro and, for the reasons stated herein, remand the issue of Wife’s alimony for reconsideration. Additionally, we vacate the trial court’s award of Wife’s attorney’s fees and remand for the trial court to reconsider whether or not to award Wife her attorney’s fees and, if so, to award a reasonable attorney’s fee and state the basis for its decision. We also vacate the trial court’s order denying Wife’s motion for discretionary costs, and remand the issue to the trial court for a reconsideration of Wife’s motion on its merits. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antoine Dewayne Clark
A jury convicted the Defendant, Antoine Dewayne Clark, of aggravated arson, and he was sentenced to serve thirty years in prison. On appeal, he alleges that the trial court erred in limiting defense counsel’s questions during voir dire; in allowing testimony regarding the injuries suffered by the victims; in denying a mistrial based on the introduction of evidence that the Defendant was wearing an ankle monitor; and in permitting hearsay testimony. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |