McKayla Taylor v. Miriam's Promise Et Al.
This action arises from an agreed-upon adoption that the birth mother revoked within 30 days of the child’s birth. The defendants include three adoption agencies, three social workers, two attorneys, a hospital, and the prospective adoptive parents. Generally stated, the complaint alleges that the defendants acted in concert to abduct the mother’s child by inducing the mother to surrender her parental rights, consent to the adoption, and waive her right of revocation. The articulated claims include conspiracy to commit fraud and tortious civil kidnapping, negligence, professional negligence, healthcare liability, and conversion of her child. All defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 for some or all of the following reasons: (1) the adoption documents were valid under Tennessee law and not fraudulent; (2) Tennessee does not recognize the torts of civil kidnapping and conversion of a child; (3) the claims are time-barred; (4) the mother’s first certificate of good faith was non-compliant because it did not disclose a prior violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122; (5) the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act barred the mother’s intentional tort claims against the hospital; and (6) the mother released some of the defendants from liability by signing a release agreement. Additionally, the healthcare providers contended the complaint should be dismissed because the mother failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirement of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. The trial court granted the motions on various grounds and dismissed the complaint with prejudice for all defendants. Having determined that Tennessee does not recognize a tort of conversion of a child or tortious civil kidnapping and that conspiracy to commit fraud is not a standalone claim, we affirm the dismissal of these claims. We also affirm the dismissal of all remaining claims as time-barred. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nathan Todd Cooke
The Defendant, Nathan Todd Cooke, was convicted by a Van Buren County Circuit Court jury of two counts of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2017). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with ten days to be served in jail and the balance on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that the admission of the blood alcohol test result was plain error. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Van Buren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nathan Todd Cooke - concurring
While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the officer’s actions were a proper exercise of the community caretaking function, I disagree with the majority’s holding that the Defendant was not seized when the officer approached the Defendant with activated blue lights. Without a seizure, there would be no need for the officer’s actions to be deemed the exercise of the community caretaking function. |
Van Buren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary Beth Harcrow v. Clyde Harcrow
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal pursued pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Because Appellant admits that no order has been entered by the trial court with respect to her motion to recuse, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Steven L. McCullough v. Dan Rawls D/B/A Cleveland Performance Center
In this breach of contract action, the trial court entered a judgment against the individual defendant for the plaintiff’s damages and attorney’s fees. The defendant subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, asserting that he could not be held personally liable for damages because the work he had performed for the plaintiff was conducted through his business, which was a limited liability company. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend, determining that there were no facts presented at trial to support the defendant’s contention that he was operating his business as a limited liability company. The defendant timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Henry Lee Jones
In this capital case, a Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Henry Lee Jones, of alternative counts of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder of Clarence James and alternative counts of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder of Lillian James. The jury sentenced the Defendant to death on all four counts. As for the two counts related to Mr. James, the jury found the evidence sufficient to support six aggravating circumstances. As for the two counts related to Mrs. James, the jury found the evidence sufficient to support five aggravating circumstances. The trial court merged each of the felony murder convictions into the corresponding premeditated murder convictions and imposed two sentences of death. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the Defendant’s convictions and sentences. On automatic review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 39-13-206(a)(1), we now address the following issues: (1) Whether the Defendant was unconstitutionally denied the right to counsel; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence the former testimony of Tevarus Young; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying the appointment of a mitigation expert. We also conduct our mandatory review of the Defendant’s death sentences. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and death sentences. As to the remaining issues raised by the Defendant, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions and attach as an appendix to this opinion the relevant portions of that court’s decision. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Sherry Smith Ex Rel Lauren Taylor Agee v. Hannah Nicole Palmer
The mother of a woman whose body was discovered in Center Hill Lake, where she had been camping with several friends, brought this wrongful death action against those friends, alleging that they caused her daughter’s death and conspired to cover it up. One of the defendants asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in her answer to the complaint and in response to discovery requests; in due course, the defendant moved for summary judgment. The mother filed several affidavits and declarations in response, as to which the defendant filed motions in limine and motions to strike in total or in part. The defendant also asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege as to additional statements of disputed facts filed by the mother in response to the summary judgment motion. The trial court granted or denied, in whole or in part, each motion in limine and to strike; held that the mother was not entitled to an adverse inference as to the defendant’s invocation of the privilege in response to discovery and mother’s statement of disputed facts in opposition to the summary judgment motion; and granted summary judgment to the defendant. Mother appeals. Upon a thorough review of the record, we reverse the grant of summary judgment, vacate the rulings on the motions in limine that are at issue in this appeal, vacate the holdings relative to defendant’s invocation of her Fifth Amendment privilege, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Sherry Smith Ex Rel Lauren Taylor Agee v. Hannah Nicole Palmer - Concurring
I concur in the reversal of the grant of summary judgment. But, because the basis of the reversal is Hannah Nicole Palmer’s failure to “satisfy her initial burden to produce evidence showing there was not a genuine issue of fact for trial,” I conclude it is unnecessary to reach the merits of the rulings on the motions in limine. I would vacate those rulings without further comment as, in my view, they were premised on the mistaken assumption that Ms. Palmer had shifted the burden to Sherry Smith. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Mohammad Hamad v. Real Time Staffing Services, LLC, Et Al.
In April 2011, Mohammad Hamad (“Employee”) was working at a Pillsbury factory through the defendant agency, Real Time Staffing Services (“Employer”), when he slipped on a wet floor and tore his left meniscus. After undergoing knee surgery, he returned to work at the factory. In September 2012, Employee once again was injured while lifting a heavy box. He sustained an injury to his left shoulder and an inguinal hernia. Employee has not returned to work since this second injury. Employee filed suit, arguing that he was totally and permanently disabled. The trial court found Employee only permanently partially disabled. Employee timely appealed, arguing that this Court should: (1) reverse and remand to the trial court to reconsider his contention that he is permanently and totally disabled under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(B); (2) increase his disability award under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242 (“the Escape Clause”); or (3) increase his disability award under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Henry Lee Jones - Concurring
I concur in the Court’s opinion except for the analysis regarding the proportionality review. In 1997, this Court narrowed the scope of the proportionality review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39 13 206(c)(1)(D) by limiting consideration to only those cases in which the death penalty had been sought. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 666 (Tenn. 1997). A majority of this Court reaffirmed this truncated approach in State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 217 (Tenn. 2013). In Pruitt, I joined Justice William C. Koch, Jr. in dissenting from the Court’s decision to continue following the Bland approach, as it improperly narrowed the proportionality review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39 13 206(c)(1)(D). Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d at 230 (Koch and Lee, JJ., concurring and dissenting). We determined that the Court should return to its pre-Bland proportionality analysis by considering “all first degree murder cases in which life imprisonment or a sentence of death has been imposed” and focusing on whether the case under review more closely resembles cases that have resulted in the imposition of the death penalty than those that have not. Id. at 230–31 (Koch and Lee, JJ., concurring and dissenting). |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Home Builders Association Of Middle Tennessee v. Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County
Plaintiff challenged a zoning ordinance on the grounds that it violated the Federal and State Constitutions, that it was preempted by a state law, and that it was ultra vires and thus void. The trial court dismissed this challenge on the grounds of ripeness, lack of standing, and because no private right of action was conferred by the statute that Plaintiff contended preempted the ordinance at issue. While the appeal was pending, the Tennessee Legislature enacted Public Chapter 685, which Defendant contended made the case moot and accordingly moved to dismiss the appeal. After a thorough consideration of the arguments, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal as moot; we vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Roger D. Moore v. Kimberly N. Wright Oden
This appeal involves the trial court’s entry of a 2005 child support order nunc pro tunc. After it became apparent that a certain decade-old child support order, which was the basis for several subsequent support orders, was missing from the record, the mother filed a motion requesting that the trial court enter the order nunc pro tunc. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the missing order was not included in the record by mistake of the court or clerk. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kelvin Anthony Lee
The Appellant, Kelvin Anthony Lee, filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, and the Lauderdale County Circuit Court summarily denied the motion. On appeal, the Appellant contends that his sentence of life without parole violates Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Moten v. State, 935 S.W.2d 416 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); and Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(j). Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Royalton Woods Homeowner Association, Inc. v. Phillip Soholt, Et Al.
This appeal arises from a dispute between a residential homeowner association and the owners of a lot in the subdivision. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the association upon the determination that the subject property was encumbered by the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (“CCRs”), due in part to the fact that the CCRs were expressly referenced and incorporated into the Special Warranty Deed conveyed to the homeowners. The court also granted summary judgment upon the finding it was undisputed that the challenged improvements made to the property by the homeowners, the parking of commercial vehicles on the street in front of the house, and operating a business out of the home were in violation of the CCRs. Following a hearing on damages and injunctive relief, the trial court issued an injunction ordering the homeowners to remove the unauthorized improvements, stop parking commercial vehicles on the street in front of the home, and cease conducting their business out of the home, and awarded unpaid assessments and attorney’s fees to the association. On appeal, the homeowners argue that their lot is not encumbered by the restrictive covenants, the association did not have standing or authority to enforce the restrictions, and the homeowners did not violate the restrictions. Additionally, the homeowners take issue with the court’s failure to apply the doctrine of laches, its decision to summarily dismiss their slander of title claim against the homeowner association, and the award of attorney’s fees. We have determined there is a genuine dispute of fact concerning whether the homeowners were conducting their business out of the home in violation of the CCRs which precludes summary judgment; therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on that claim. We affirm the trial court’s rulings in all other respects. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Clyde Jason Stambaugh v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Et Al
The benefit board of a metropolitan government denied injured-on-duty benefits to a police officer with post-traumatic stress disorder. On a petition for writ of certiorari, the trial court upheld the benefit board’s decision. Finding material evidence to support the action of the benefit board, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Batey v. Deliver This, Inc., Et Al.
In this workers’ compensation case, Christopher Batey (“Employee”) filed a Petition for Benefit Determination after he sustained a back injury while working for Deliver This, Inc. (“Employer”). The trial court determined that Employee was entitled to 275 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242(a)(2). On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the trial court erred in “defining an employee’s burden of proof under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242(a)(2) and in defining the phrase ‘employee’s pre-injury occupation’ as used in subsection 242(a)(2)(B)” but concluding that the errors were harmless under the circumstances presented. Batey v. Deliver This, Inc., No. 2016-05-0666, 2018 WL 805490, at *7 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Feb. 6, 2018). Employer and its insurer, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, have appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, section 2, this Court directed that the appeal not be referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board and adopt its opinion in its entirety as set forth in the attached Appendix. |
Supreme Court | ||
Martha Renner v. Takoma Regional Hospital, Et Al.
This is a health care liability action in which the defendants filed a motion to dismiss based upon the plaintiff’s failure to file a certificate of good faith with the complaint. The plaintiff then filed the required certificate. The defendants responded with motions for summary judgment with attached affidavits, attesting that a certificate of good faith was not attached to the original complaint. The plaintiff moved for voluntary dismissal. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion and filed an order of voluntary dismissal. The defendants appeal, claiming that Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure1 prohibits the taking a voluntary nonsuit when a summary judgment motion is pending. We affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Sima Aryan v. Nicolas Aryan
In this post-divorce proceeding, the Mother appeals the trial court’s rulings on several motions; finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment in all respects, except the award of child support, which is not final and is subject to further review by the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Vanessa Berlanga, Et Al. v. Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security
Claimants to cash seized by the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Office moved to dismiss the related administrative forfeiture proceeding. They also requested an award of attorney’s fees. An administrative law judge granted the motion to dismiss but did not address the request for attorney’s fees. Claimants later filed a separate motion for attorney’s fees, which the ALJ denied. Claimants then filed a petition for judicial review. Claimants filed their petition within sixty days of the denial of the motion for attorney’s fees but over sixty days from the day the order granting the motion to dismiss became final. The chancery court reversed, awarding claimants part of the attorney’s fees requested. Because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition, we vacate the decision of the chancery court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Heather Montgomery
On August 26, 2016, the Defendant, Heather Montgomery, was convicted of two counts of sale of less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a park and two counts of delivery of less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a park. Counts 2 and 4 were merged into Counts 1 and 3, and the Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an effective 8-year term, to be served at 100% in the Department of Correction. The Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion is neither excluding the testimony of a confidential informant or granting a continuance and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions. After thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Ethan M.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to support and to visit. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We reverse the trial court on its finding that the mother abandoned the child by failing to visit. We affirm the trial court on all other rulings. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy Heard v. Randy Lee, Warden
The Petitioner, Jimmy Heard, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, contesting his transfer from Tennessee to Kentucky for trial. On appeal, he contends that the habeas corpus court was without jurisdiction to order his transfer because he was not served with an arrest warrant. On appeal, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly denied the petition. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
H Group Construction, LLC v. City of Lafollette
The unsuccessful bidder for certain municipal construction projects filed this action against the municipality, alleging, inter alia, that the municipality had violated its own competitive bidding ordinances and engaged in unlawful restraint of trade. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the municipality with regard to all claims except the bidder’s claim for damages for violation of the municipal ordinances and common law restraint of trade. In this interlocutory appeal, we have been asked to determine whether a cause of action exists against a governmental entity for common law restraint of trade and whether a bidder has a private right of action for damages against the municipality for alleged violations of municipal bidding ordinances. We determine that the municipality maintains sovereign immunity concerning any purported claim of common law restraint of trade. We further determine that because a petition for writ of certiorari would be the sole method of review of the City’s contract award, unsuccessful bidders are not authorized to bring a private cause of action for monetary damages for an alleged violation of the municipality’s competitive bidding ordinances. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the municipality’s motion for summary judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for entry of summary judgment in favor of the municipality. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of William T. Miller
The administrator of an estate appeals the trial court’s grant of a claim against the estate for the payment of funeral expenses. We affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Savannah M.
This is a parental termination case. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate mother and father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by conduct exhibiting wanton disregard and persistence of conditions. The trial court further found that termination was in the best interests of the child. On appeal, however, the Department of Children’s Services did not defend the trial court’s ruling as to the ground of abandonment. Although we accordingly reverse as to that ground, we affirm as to the ground of persistence of conditions and with respect to the trial court’s determination that the termination of mother’s and father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |