In Re Kaliyah S. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Kaliyah S. and Jaya P. (“the Children”), the minor children of Kayla S. (“Mother”). In November 2010, the Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and placed in foster care. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Jaya’s father, Josh P., on November 30, 2010. The petition alleged severe child abuse as the sole ground for termination. DCS filed an amended petition in May 2011, which also named Kaliyah’s father, Rontez L. (“Father”), and alleged that his parental rights should be terminated on the statutory ground of abandonment by wanton disregard. Father was incarcerated at the time the amended petition was filed. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition as to Mother and Josh P. upon finding that DCS had proven the ground of severe child abuse by clear and convincing evidence. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned Kaliyah by engaging in conduct exhibiting wanton disregard for her welfare prior to his incarceration. When making its ruling, the trial court concluded that DCS was not required to make reasonable efforts to assist Father in reunification because DCS sufficiently proved the statutory ground of abandonment alleged against him. The court also found that termination of the parental rights of all three respondents was in the Children’s best interest. Father has appealed. We reverse the trial court’s determination that DCS was relieved of the requirement of making reasonable efforts of reunification with regard to Father and remand for further proceedings. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Riannah M.F.
The trial court found that Petitioners had failed to demonstrate willful abandonment in this action to terminate the parental rights of Mother. We affirm. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jackie Wayne Miller
The Defendant, Jackie Wayne Miller, pled guilty to initiation of the process of manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of the sentences. The trial court subsequently ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eight years and three months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred when it denied his request for alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Henry Bates
Appellant, Henry Bates, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, burglary of a building, and vandalism of $1,000 or more. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of forty-two years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that both issues are without merit. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shawn Christopher Sales
The Defendant, Shawn Christopher Sales, pled guilty to robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to 163 days in confinement followed by fifteen years to be served in Community Corrections. In March 2013, the Defendant’s Community Corrections officer filed a second affidavit alleging the Defendant had violated his Community Corrections sentence, and, after a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it revoked his Community Corrections sentence because the State presented insufficient evidence to support the revocation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it revoked the Defendant’s Community Corrections sentence, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Downey
Jonathan Downey (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for the felony murder and then merged the latter two convictions with the felony murder conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction of first degree felony murder. The State asks this Court to reverse the trial court’s merger of the aggravated burglary conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction of first degree felony murder. We order the trial court to reinstate the Defendant’s conviction of aggravated burglary and remand this matter for sentencing on that conviction. |
Humphreys | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re T.F.H. et al
A.F.C. (“Father”) appeals the order terminating his rights to his minor children, T.F.H. and P.F.H. (“the Children”). After a bench trial, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds exist to terminate Father’s parental rights. The court further found, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the best interest of the Children. Father appeals. He challenges the finding of grounds for termination, but not the best-interest determination. We affirm the judgment in all respects. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Lataynia Jones v. Sharp Electronics Corporation
Plaintiff filed an action alleging retaliation and interference in violation of the Tennessee Disabilities Act. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant Employer on the basis that the Act does not require employers to make “reasonable accommodations,” as were required by Plaintiff at the time she was discharged. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dwight O. Satterfield v. Margaret H. Satterfield
This appeal concerns post-divorce alimony issues. Dwight O. Satterfield (“Mr. Satterfield”) and Margaret H. Satterfield (“Ms. Satterfield”) divorced after 31 years of marriage. Mr. Satterfield some years later filed a motion to terminate alimony in the General Sessions Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that Ms. Satterfield had been cohabiting with a man. The Trial Court ruled orally that under the Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”), Ms. Satterfield’s cohabitation did not precipitate termination of alimony. Before an order was entered on his first motion, Mr. Satterfield filed another motion, this time based on the statutory rebuttable presumption that arises if there is cohabitation. The Trial Court held that res judicata resolved the issue and that alimony would not be modified. Mr. Satterfield appeals. We affirm the Trial Court as to its interpretation of the MDA. However, as Mr. Satterfield’s second motion was pending when the first order was entered, the first order was not final and the Trial Court erred in holding in its second order that res judicata resolved the alimony issue. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court and remand this matter for further proceedings. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Dwight O. Satterfield v. Margaret H. Satterfield - Concurring
I concur completely in Judge Swiney’s well-reasoned majority opinion. I write separately to stress the linchpin of the majority’s rationale in rejecting Mr. Satterfield’s first issue. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Richard A. Berent v. CMH Homes, Inc. et al.
The issue on this appeal is the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. The trial court, applying the principles promulgated in Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn. 1996), held that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it requires the plaintiff to submit to arbitration virtually all of his claims, while allowing the defendants access to a judicial forum for some of their potential claims. We agree with the trial court that the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor is controlling and that Taylor mandates a holding that theagreement is unconscionable and unenforceable. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory Traylor, by and through his parent, David Traylor, and David Traylor, Individually v. Shelby County Board of Education
This is a slip and fall case under the GTLA. The plaintiff high school student slipped on a patch of ice on the sidewalk at his public high school and sustained injuries. The student filed this action against the county board of education alleging negligence. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the defendant school board had constructive notice of the ice on the sidewalk and thus was liable under the GTLA. The school board now appeals. After carefully reviewing the record, we find insufficient evidence in the record to support the finding of constructive notice and so reverse the trial court’s decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re J.B. Jr. et al
J.B. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her rights to her minor children, J.B. Jr. and J.B. (“the Children”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) was involved with the family going back to 2006. In 2009, the Children were taken into emergency, protective custody predicated on allegations of illegal drug use, failure to protect from sexual abuse, and domestic violence. The Children were adjudicated dependent and neglected and placed in foster care. A year later, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. It alleged that Mother abandoned the Children and that she failed to resolve the issues that led to their removal. Following a bench trial, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interest of the Children. On this appeal, Mother challenges only the best interest determination. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Lamont Johnson, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Joseph Lamont Johnson, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of felony evading arrest. The trial court then reduced one of the aggravated robbery convictions to aggravated assault pursuant to State v. Franklin, 130 S.W.3d 789, 798 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) and sentenced the petitioner to an aggregate sentence of fifty-four years. The petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. State v. Johnson, No. M2007-01644-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2567729, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2009). The petitioner brings this post-conviction action alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in that: (1) trial counsel failed to convey a plea offer or inform the petitioner regarding his potential exposure; (2) trial counsel did not adequately investigate the case; (3) trial counsel performed deficiently by not moving to dismiss one of the aggravated robbery counts; (4) trial counsel performed deficiently by not moving to suppress a witness’s identification of the petitioner; (5) appellate counsel performed deficiently by failing to challenge the petitioner’s sentencing range; and (6) that the cumulative errors above resulted in the deprivation of the right to counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to prove one or both prongs of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to each claim, and we accordingly affirm the denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derrick Braxton
Defendant, Derrick Braxton, was convicted as charged for one count of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to ten years’ confinement to be served at 100 percent release eligibility. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence and asserts the following: 1) the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; 2) his sentence is excessive; 3) the trial court failed to act as thirteenth juror; and 4) the prosecutor’s comments about Defendant’s credibility during closing argument were improper. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dexter Deshaun Coleman
The Defendant, Dexter Deshun Coleman, pled guilty to three counts of facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping and one count each of especially aggravated burglary and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. The plea agreement provided that the Defendant would receive an effective sentence of twelve years as a Range I, standard offender with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for alternative sentencing and ordered that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for alternative sentencing. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgments pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kendra Kuebler Vachon v. Claude Vachon
This is a divorce appeal. Husband appeals the classification, valuation, and division of certain items in the marital estate, the award of alimony in futuro, and the requirement that he pay a portion an expert witness fee. We vacate the classification and valuation of the furniture which is at issue, vacate the valuation of the stock and the 401(k), and remand those matters for further consideration. We affirm the court’s decision to award alimony, but vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand for further consideration of the type, amount and duration of the award. We affirm the court’s ruling in all other respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Shane Powell
A Madison County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Joseph Shane Powell, charging him with promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged in the indictment. The trial court imposed a sentence of eight years as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Lee Reburn
Appellee, Donald Lee Reburn, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. At his guilty plea submission hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a persistent offender to ten years, suspended to probation. The State has appealed and argues that the trial court erred by sentencing appellee without a sentencing hearing and without a presentence report. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a sentencing hearing. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Auqeith Lashawn Byner v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Auqeith Lashawn Byner, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school with the intent to sell or deliver and one count of reckless driving. After a jury trial, he was convicted as charged. As a result, he was sentenced to a sixteen-year sentence for the possession of cocaine with intent to sell conviction and six months for reckless driving, to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the sentence in another case 2007-D-3157. Petitioner initiated a direct appeal of his convictions but dismissed the appeal voluntarily. Petitioner later sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. After a review, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Aubrey E. Givens, Administrator of the Estate of Jessica E. Givens, Deceased, et al v. The Vanderbilt University D/B/A Vanderbilt University Hospital, et al
This is a medical malpractice action arising from the death of Decedent. Defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(1). The trial court agreed and dismissed the action without prejudice. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to this court, and we vacated the dismissal order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that section 29-26-121 did not mandate dismissal for noncompliance with its terms. Givens v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. M2013-00266-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 5773431, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2013). Defendants filed an application for permission to appeal our decision. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the application for purposes of remanding the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Stevens v. Hickman Community Health Care, Inc., – S.W.3d –, 2013 WL 6158000 (Tenn. Nov. 25, 2013). Upon our reconsideration, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lyndle Curtis, et al. v. Kathy Parchman et al.
Plaintiffs appeal a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to the Tennessee Right to Farm Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 43-26-101 et seq. (“the TRFA”). Plaintiffs own an express ingress/egress easement, a gravel road, that passes through Defendants’ farm. In what Plaintiffs titled a “COMPLAINT FOR ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE AND DAMAGES”, they alleged, inter alia, that Defendants substantially destroyed the utility of their ingress/egress easement by driving heavy farming equipment across and allowing cattle to walk upon the easement. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and monetary damages. Defendants filed a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss contending that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted because the nuisance claim was barred by the TRFA. More specifically, Defendants contended that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendants violated any “generally accepted agricultural practices” or a “statute or regulation” in the use or operation of the farm upon which the easement lies. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. Plaintiffs appeal. We have determined that the TRFA pertains to nuisances alleged to arise from a farm or farm operations but not to claims of unreasonable interference with the use of an ingress and egress easement. We, therefore, affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ nuisance claim, for the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted for a nuisance arising from a farm or farm operation. However, we have determined the complaint states a separate claim for impairment of and damage to Plaintiffs’ ingress and egress easement, a claim that is not subject to the TRFA. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint for it states a separate and viable claim for impairment of and damage to Plaintiffs’ ingress/egress easement. Further, this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Stewart | Court of Appeals | |
James H. Wilkins, et al. v. GGNSC Springfield, LLC DBA Golden Living Center-Springfield, et al.
This appeal stems from a case of alleged nursing home abuse and neglect and involves a dispute as to whether a health care power of attorney executed by decedent was effective to authorize the agent to execute an optional arbitration agreement on the decedent’s behalf. The trial court denied the nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the attorney-in-fact did not have authority to sign the optional arbitration agreement on the principal’s behalf. The nursing home appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Davis H. Elliot Construction Company, Inc. v. Commisioner Of Labor and Workforce Development, et al
This appeal involves review of an administrative decision. Chattanooga‟s local utility company hired the Appellant construction company to perform preliminary work on the utility company‟s fiber-optic internet infrastructure. One of the Appellant‟s employees was injured while performing this work. The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development‟s Division of Occupational Safety and Health (“TOSHA”) conducted an investigation of the incident. Thereafter, on recommendation of the inspector, TOSHA cited the Appellant for violations of the telecommunications safety regulations. Appellant contested the citations before the Division of Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (“the Commission”), which upheld the citations. Appellant then appealed the Commission‟s decision to the Davidson County Chancery Court, which also affirmed the citations. Appellant now appeals the Chancery Court‟s decision to this Court. We conclude that TOSHA erred in applying the telecommunications regulation instead of the construction regulations. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and vacate the citations issued to Appellant construction company. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kristine Blankenship v. Anesthesiology Consultants Exchange, P.C.
Kristine Blankenship (“Plaintiff”) sued Anesthesiology Consultants Exchange, P.C. (“Defendant”) alleging, in part, that as a result of Defendant’s failure to properly treat a surgical patient Plaintiff suffered injuries including “a severe and disabling injury to her back.” Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Defendant summary judgment after finding that Plaintiff had failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 by filing her complaint less than 60 days after sending the notice letter. Plaintiff appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether Defendant waived the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted based upon Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 and whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 conflicts with Rule 18.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure as applied to this case. We hold, as did the Trial Court, that Defendant did not waive the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted based upon Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121, and that Plaintiff waived her second issue by not raising it in the Trial Court. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |