Rita Grace Tidwell Hickman v. Bobby Spencer Hickman
In this post-divorce case, Rita Grace Tidwell Hickman (“wife”) appeals the trial court’s reduction of her transitional alimony and its refusal to grant her attorney’s fees, expenses and discretionary costs. The trial court granted the petition of Bobby Spencer Hickman (“husband”) to reduce alimony based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(g)(2)(C) (2010), which allows a suspension of transitional alimony when the recipient lives with a third person and the recipient fails to rebut the statutory presumption that the third person is either contributing to, or receiving contribution from, the alimony recipient, and, therefore, the alimony recipient does not need the amount of alimony previously awarded. The third person was the parties’ son, Ethan, who had turned eighteen shortly before husband filed his petition. Wife continued to allow Ethan to live with her, and provided food and other necessities to him, after he turned eighteen. We hold that wife rebutted the statutory presumption by showing that her financial situation had not significantly changed, and actually had deteriorated, since the award of transitional alimony. Wife demonstrated a continuing need for alimony notwithstanding her willingness to allow her son to continue living with her and to support him after his eighteenth birthday. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. This case is remanded to the trial court for the court to determine wife’s fees and expenses at the trial court level and her discretionary costs. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jack E. Miller v. Boyd Wyatt
Jack E. Miller, a former City Manager of Crossville, filed this defamation action against Councilman Boyd Wyatt, based on Wyatt’s statement during a City Council meeting that Miller had been “discharged from City Manager up here because of misappropriating funds and not following procedures.” Wyatt moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that he was protected by legislative privilege under the common law and Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(b)(2) (2012), which statute provides that “[a]ll members of boards, commissions, agencies, authorities, and other governing bodies of any governmental entity . . . shall be immune from suit arising from the conduct of the affairs of such board, commission, agency, authority, or other governing body.” The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground that Wyatt had immunity under § 29-20-201(b) because the alleged defamatory statement arose “from the conduct of the affairs of” the Crossville City Council. We agree with the trial court that Wyatt’s statement was made in the course of conducting the affairs of the City Council and, therefore, was protected by legislative privilege. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Yogonda Abdula Corley
Defendant, Yogonda Corley, was charged with five counts of aggravated sexual battery, with three counts being against the victim T.S. and two counts against the victim M.M., and seven counts of rape of a child, with three counts being against T.S. and four counts being against M.M. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of six counts of rape of a child, four counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. Following a sentencing hearing, Defendant was ordered to serve a total effective sentence of 75 years incarceration. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that it was plain error for the trial court: 1) to admit into evidence a recording and transcript of statements by Defendant obtained by the use of a body wire worn by the mother of one of the victims; 2) to admit into evidence Defendant’s statements to the police following his arrest; 3) to admit into evidence the opinion testimony by a nurse practitioner that the victims’ statements were consistent with their medical examinations; and 4) not to sever the offenses against the two victims. Defendant asserts that the cumulative effect of these errors entitles him to a reversal of his convictions. Lastly, Defendant categorizes another section of his brief as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but then acknowledges that he chooses not to argue the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. With regard to the evidentiary issues, we conclude that the Defendant has waived consideration of the issues by his failure to contemporaneously object at trial. Also, Defendant failed to request severance of the charges as to each victim pre-trial. Because the alleged evidentiary issues and severance issue do not rise to the level of plain error, we decline review. We further conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Yogonda Abdula Corley - Concurring
I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority pertaining to the Defendant’s failure to demonstrate plain error relief on the evidentiary issues in this case. Notwithstanding the Defendant’s waiver of his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, I write separately because the record provides ample evidence supporting each of the convictions in this case. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marvin Norfolk v. Tennessee Civil Service Commission
State trooper challenges his termination for the good of the service. We find substantial and material evidence to support the decision of the Civil Service Commission and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Director, TVHS, Murfreesboro Campus v. Lawrence Hartman
The trial court ordered a sixty-eight year old army veteran to be involuntarily hospitalized because it found that he suffered from a mental illness that rendered him “unable to avoid severe impairment or injury from specific risks.” See Tenn.Code Ann. § 33-6-501. The only evidence of actual risk, however, was that others might easily be able to take financial advantage of his confusion or his trusting nature. We reverse the trial court and order the defendant’s release, because it is not constitutionally or statutorily permissible to deprive an individual of liberty when he poses no danger to others, and when the only danger he poses to himself is danger to his own property or potential for financial loss. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Jacqueline Wall Farthing, Dickson County Register of Deeds v. Dickson County, Tennessee by and Through Bob Rial, Mayor for Dickson County, Tennessee
Register of Deeds filed petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq. seeking an increase in compensation for her three deputy clerks and seeking an award of her costs, including attorney’s fees. The trial court denied Register the relief she sought, and she appealed. Based on the evidence presented and the language of the statute, we hold the trial court was required to determine the appropriate salary for Register’s assistants. Register is entitled under the applicable statute to have her costs, including her attorney’s fees, paid out of the fees collected by her office. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Keenan, Sr. and Debra B. Keenan v. Barry C. Fodor and Deborah A. Fodor
The Keenans and the Fodors are neighbors who share access to their respective properties through an elaborate stone and metal gate that had been constructed on an easement of way over the Keenans’ property by the prior owner of the Fodors’ property. After a period of relative harmony, a dispute over the ownership of the gate led to a lawsuit. The trial court and this court ruled that the gate was personalty, not a fixture, and belonged to the Fodors, who were given authority to move it. The trial court’s order also set out some ground rules for the shared use of the gate pending its removal. Disagreements over the gate continued, resulting in two additional legal actions. The first was a motion for civil contempt filed by the Fodors alleging that the Keenans had violated the judicially-ordered ground rules for the use of the gate. For their part, the Keenans filed a motion to compel the Fodors to remove the gate from the easement and place it on their own property. In one proceeding, the court found that the Keenans were in contempt of its orders. In the other, it declined to order that the gate be removed. We reverse the finding of contempt, but we affirm the trial court’s determination that the Fodors are not obligated to remove the gate. We also hold, however, that the Fodors are not entitled to exclude the Keenans from the free use of their own property by keeping the gate locked. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Keenan, Sr. and Debra B. Keenan v. Barry C. Fodor and Deborah A. Fodor
The Keenans and the Fodors are neighbors who share access to their respective properties through an elaborate stone and metal gate that had been constructed on an easement of way over the Keenans’ property by the prior owner of the Fodors’ property. After a period of relative harmony, a dispute over the ownership of the gate led to a lawsuit. The trial court and this court ruled that the gate was personalty, not a fixture, and belonged to the Fodors, who were given authority to move it. The trial court’s order also set out some ground rules for the shared use of the gate pending its removal. Disagreements over the gate continued, resulting in two additional legal actions. The first was a motion for civil contempt filed by the Fodors alleging that the Keenans had violated the judicially-ordered ground rules for the use of the gate. For their part, the Keenans filed a motion to compel the Fodors to remove the gate from the easement and place it on their own property. In one proceeding, the court found that the Keenans were in contempt of its orders. In the other, it declined to order that the gate be removed. We reverse the finding of contempt, but we affirm the trial court’s determination that the Fodors are not obligated to remove the gate. We also hold, however, that the Fodors are not entitled to exclude the Keenans from the free use of their own property by keeping the gate locked. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ramon E.A.V., et al
This is a termination of parental rights case. Following a hearing, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of the father’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of (1) abandonment due to failure to visit and (2) failure to comply substantially with the permanency plan. The trial court further concluded that clear and convincing evidence revealed that termination was in the best interest of the children. The father appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James M. Smith
A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, James M. Smith, of driving under the influence (“DUI”), driving on a suspended, cancelled or revoked license, two counts of leaving the scene of an accident, and reckless endangerment. The trial court Defendant stipulated that he had been convicted of DUI on at least three previous occasions, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender, to six years in confinement followed by four years on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his pretrial motion to continue his case; (2) the prosecutor made improper comments during opening and closing arguments; (3) a distraction during the jury deliberation likely caused a hurried and potentially incorrect verdict; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude no error exists in the judgment of the trial court. The trial court’s judgments are, therefore, affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Vernon Lavone Roberts
Defendant, Vernon Lavone Roberts, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for two counts of the sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone and two counts of the sale of more than 26 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone. Subsequently, Defendant entered a guilty plea to four counts of the sale of cocaine outside of a school zone. He received a sentence of twenty-years for each conviction, with three sentences to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to the fourth conviction for an effective forty-year sentence as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas based on his assertion that the pleas were not voluntarily or knowingly entered. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dejuan Koshief Roberts
A Bedford County jury found the Defendant, Dejuan Koshief Roberts, guilty of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and being a felon in possession of a handgun. The trial court imposed an effective Range II thirteen-year sentence. The Defendant appeals claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the State violated the rules of discovery. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we conclude that no error exists. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Brandon J. G. et al.
The mother of six children and the father of one of the children appeal the termination of their parental rights. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights on three grounds, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistence of conditions, and willful abandonment by incarceration,and upon the determination that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The court terminated the father’s parental rights on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, willful abandonment by failure to support and failure to visit, and the determination that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother and father appeal. We affirm. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Moreno v. City of Clarksville
Plaintiff filed a timely claim with the Division of Claims Administration, which did not resolve the claim within the statutory period. The claim was transferred to the Claims Commission, and Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to the Claims Commission Rules. Much later, the State amended its answer to allege fault by the City of Clarksville. Plaintiff filed suit against the City. The suit was dismissed because the trial court found that the “original complaint” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 was not filed within a year of the alleged injury. Plaintiff appealed. We reverse. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Rheatta F. Wilson, et al. v. Americare Systems, Inc., et al.
A defendant appeals the award of punitive damages arising from the death of a patient at an assisted living facility, which the defendant managed. We affirm the trial court’s review of the Hodges factors and the due process analysis relating to the punitive damage award. We also affirm the trial court’s directed verdict making the defendant liable for the actions of the assisted living facility’s employees. We must modify the amount of the punitive damage award by reducing it to comply with the amount the plaintiff requested in the ad damnum clause of their complaint. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tenneseee v. Marcus Smith
Appellant, Marcus Smith, was convicted of one count of criminal attempt to commit rape of a child, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced appellant to nine years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm appellant’s conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leonel Lopez, aka Leonel Lopez Ramos
The defendant, Leonel Lopez, also known as Leonel Lopez Ramos, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty years as a violent offender in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, and (2) the service of a convicted felon as the grand jury foreman invalidated the indictment against him as a matter of law. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daniel Eduardo Gonzalez v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Daniel Eduardo Gonzalez, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. He argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to advise him of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea as required by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), and that due process considerations should operate to toll the statute of limitations. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Destiny M.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother/Appellant appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(1) as defined at Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), and persistence of conditions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(3). Mother also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court’s decision, we affirm and remand. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Juan A. Hill v. David Sexton, Warden
The Petitioner, Juan A. Hill, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that his judgment of conviction is void because it fails to reflect pretrial jail credit. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth J. Meyer v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Kenneth J. Meyer, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2008 Bledsoe County Circuit Court conviction of voluntary manslaughter, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
George Ernest Skouteris, Jr. v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
This is a direct appeal of an attorney disciplinary proceeding involving six complaints of professional misconduct. The trial court affirmed the hearing panel’s decision that the attorney had violated multiple Rules of Professional Conduct and should be disbarred from the practice of law. After review of the evidence presented and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Thomas A.H.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother to the Child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of persistence of conditions and mental incompetence and that termination of her rights was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cameron Cook
The Defendant, Cameron Cook, was convicted by a Knox County jury of attempted first degree murder and employing a firearm during an attempt to commit a dangerous felony for which he received an effective sentence of thirty years confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain either conviction and that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on voluntary intoxication. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |