State of Tennessee v. Wesley Clayton Nightwine and Ruby Michelle Bush
The Defendants, Wesley Clayton Nightwine and Ruby Michelle Bush, were indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for various drug and firearms offenses following the execution of a search warrant at Mr. Nightwine’s residence. The Defendants filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized, and the trial court granted that motion and dismissed the case as to each defendant. The State appeals, asserting that the search warrant was valid and the evidence was admissible. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Marvin Sutton
The plaintiff, who is the decedent’s daughter, filed this will contest action regarding the estate of the decedent on April 24, 2012. A previous will contest proceeding brought by another daughter of the decedent had been dismissed by the trial court through an order entered February 7, 2012. The trial court dismissed the instant will contest as barred by the final judgment in the previous in rem proceeding. The plaintiff appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Webb v. Mark Thomas Webb
Father appeals the trial court’s amended judgment in this divorce action. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Dunlap
The Defendant-Appellant, Mark Dunlap, appeals from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence. The Defendant previously entered guilty pleas to kidnapping, aggravated assault, attempted aggravated burglary, and vandalism. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of six years, which was suspended to time served with the balance of his sentence to be served in the community corrections program. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to serve his sentences in confinement after revoking his community corrections and erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wal-Mart Stores East, L. P. v. North Edgefield Organized Neighbors, Inc.
This appeal arises from a Complaint to Quiet Title and for Declaratory Relief filed by WalMart Stores East, L.P. Pursuant to a 2008 Quitclaim Deed, Wal-Mart conveyed, subject to a reversion clause, a one-quarter acre parcel to the defendant upon which stood a 1930’s era Fire Hall. The reversion clause states, in pertinent part, that fee-simple ownership of the property shall revert to Wal-Mart in the event the improvements are subject to any casualty. “Casualty” is defined in the deed to include a fire that results in damage to all or substantially all of the Fire Hall or damage that is not repaired within 180 days after the occurrence of such casualty. It is undisputed that substantially all of the Fire Hall was damaged following a fire that occurred on December 1, 2011. This action ensued, and Wal-Mart subsequently filed a motion for summary judgement contending fee-simple title reverted to Wal-Mart due to the December 2011 casualty. The defendant did not dispute the fact that substantially all of the Fire Hall was damaged by the fire; nevertheless, the defendant opposed the motion on the basis that the term “casualty,” as defined in the deed, is ambiguous. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that the term “casualty” was clear and unambiguous, that the damage resulting from the December 2011 fire constituted a casualty, and that the property reverted back to Wal-Mart. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the petitioner. The defendant appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Charles W. McGinnis
George E. Copple, Jr., and Suzette Peyton, attorneys who represented the administrator of the decedent’s probate estate, appeal from an order of the trial court holding them personally liable for expenses incurred by a non-party in responding to a subpoena duces tecum. One year after the subpoena was issued and the expenses were incurred by non-party Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., to comply with the subpoena, the attorneys for the administrator of the estate filed a motion to withdraw. Merrill Lynch did not object to the motion to withdraw, but did file a response requesting that its expenses to comply with the subpoena be assessed against the attorneys personally. The trial court granted leave to withdraw; however, the court did not relieve the attorneys as sureties for “costs to date including and limited to $776.00 incurred by Merrill Lynch in the reproduction of materials produced by Merrill Lynch to counsel for the Administrator.” In its order, the trial court stated that its ruling was based upon the record as a whole, including, but not limited to, Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 45. No other authority was cited in the order. The attorneys appeal. Being unable to identify any authority upon which to hold the attorneys personally liable for the expense of a non-party to comply with a subpoena duces tecum, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kristina Morris v. Jimmy Phillips, et al.
A multi-vehicle accident occurred in August 2010. The plaintiff initially named only one of the drivers involved in the accident along with the record owner of the driver’s vehicle. The record owner filed an answer identifying three other drivers/tortfeasors involved in the accident in December 2011,and the driver identified the same three individuals as tortfeasors in his answer that was filed seven months later, in July 2012. The plaintiff did not file an amended complaint adding the individuals identified as defendants until August2012, which was more than 90 days after the first answer was filed. One of the individuals named as a defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the plaintiff waited too late to add her as a defendant. The trial court denied the motion. The late-added defendant appealed, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Gilliam v. Bridgestone North American Tire, LLC
This appeal involves an employee’s eligibility to seek reconsideration of a workers’ compensation settlement. An employee who sustained a compensable shoulder injury returned to work and settled his workers’ compensation claim. He was later laid off after his physician modified the restrictions for an earlier unrelated injury to his foot. Thereafter, the employee filed suit in the Chancery Court for Coffee County seeking reconsideration of the settlement of his shoulder injury. While this suit was pending,the employee returned to work as the result of a confidential settlement between his employer and the EEOC. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the employee could seek reconsideration of the settlement for his injured shoulder and awarded the employee additional disability benefits. The employer appealed and asserted that the employee was not entitled to seek reconsideration because, despite the layoff, he had never been “subsequently no longer employed by the pre-injury employer” as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6241(d)(1)(B)(ii)(2008). The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Coffee | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Allan Pope
A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Allan Pope, of one count of using public equipment for private purposes, one count of official misconduct, and one count of theft of services over $10,000 but less than $60,000. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Defendant’s conviction for theft of services and reversed and dismissed the Defendant’s convictions for official misconduct and private use of public property. State v. Pope, No. E2011-01410-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 4760724, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 5, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. March 5, 2013). On remand, the Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, requesting that the trial court reconsider its previous denial of the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion; the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we dismiss the Defendant’s appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Heather McMurray
The defendant, Heather McMurray, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of three counts of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone, three counts of the delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone, possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell within 1000 feet of a school zone, and possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone, all Class B felonies. The trial court merged the convictions based on the same incidents and sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of twelve years for each conviction, with a mandatory eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction due to the fact that the offenses were committed in a drug-free school zone. The defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain her convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to testify as an expert witness; and (3) whether the trial court erred by denying her motion for a mistrial after the State played a redacted version of her statement to police. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tammy Kay Scott
The defendant, Tammy Kay Scott, alias, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of possession of less than 200 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell and possession of less than 200 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver, Class C felonies. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant to five years of probation after service of thirty days. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress her statement as it was obtained in violation of her right to counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Lane Lanier v. Corie J. Dizol (F/K/A Lanier)
Court in post-divorce modification of custody action dismissed Mother’s motion to alter or amend the order adopting parenting plan proposed by Father, holding that the motion was unsigned and not promptly corrected as allowed by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11.01. Having determined that the motion was properly signed, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand the case for consideration of the motion. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tommie Phillips
The defendant, Tommie Phillips, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of four counts of first degree felony murder, one count of reckless homicide, two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated sexual battery, six counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of especially aggravated burglary. The trial court merged the four counts of felony murder and one count of reckless homicide into one felony murder conviction and merged the aggravated sexual battery conviction with the aggravated rape conviction. The trial court also merged the six counts of especially aggravated kidnapping into three convictions – one per victim – and merged the two especially aggravated burglary convictions into one conviction. He was sentenced to an effective term of life imprisonment plus sixty years. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress his statement to police and the photographic and subsequent identifications of him as the perpetrator; (2) the trial court’s erroneous jury charge on especially aggravated kidnapping deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 14 to reflect the sentence length of twenty years, which was omitted, and we vacate the judgment for especially aggravated burglary in Count 16 and remand for resentencing for the modified conviction of aggravated burglary in that count. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, on Relation of the Commissioner of Transportation v. E.G. Meek, et al
This appeal arises from a condemnation action. The State of Tennessee (“the State”) acquired real property owned by E. G. Meek (“Meek”) and Shirley T. Meek. The acquisition of the property is not at issue. Rather, the dispute is over the amount of money Meek is entitled to receive from the State. This case was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Meek and the State’s expert witness testified. The jury reached, and the Trial Court approved, a verdict for $15,250. Meek had sought considerably more money at trial for his property than the $15,250 awarded by the jury. On appeal, Meek alleges numerous errors, such as that the Trial Court erroneously allowed certain evidence to be admitted and that the Trial Judge failed to properly exercise his responsibility as thirteenth juror. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Renae Aleo v. Joe Weyant
Client sued her former attorney for legal malpractice, breach of contract, and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from the attorney’s failure to include in the marital dissolution agreement, prepared for the client and incorporated into Final Divorce Decree, provisions that would permit the client to receive one-half of her husband’s military pension and to be listed as the beneficiary of his Survivor Benefit Plan following their divorce. The trial court granted summary judgment to the attorney on the grounds that the statute of limitations had passed on the malpractice and the breach of contract claims and that the evidence did not support a finding of serious mental injurysufficient to support the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim; client appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Troy Lloyd
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Troy Lloyd, of one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Hong Samouth (Sam) Rajvongs v. Dr. Anthony Wright
The plaintiff filed his initial health care liability action against the defendant prior to the enactment of the pre-suit notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his original action. More than one year later, the plaintiff refiled his action after the effective date of section 29-26-121. The defendant moved for summary judgment, alleging that the plaintiff’s second action was barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff countered that his pre-suit notice commenced his new action prior to the expiration of the one-year saving statute. Alternatively, the plaintiff argued that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 extended the saving statute by 120 days. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment but granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals granted the application for permission to appeal and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion for summary judgment. We hold that the plaintiff’s action was commenced by the filing of a second health care liability complaint rather than by providing pre-suit notice. We further hold that a plaintiff who files his initialaction prior to the effective date of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121, dismisses his original action, properly provides pre-suit notice, and refiles his action after the effective date of the statute, is entitled to the 120-day extension. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Rebecca J.R.M.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Christopher W.C. (“Father”) to the minor child Rebecca J.R.M. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence was proven that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113 (g)(2) and (g)(9)(A), and that clear and convincing evidence was proven that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights to the Child. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Aretha Moss v. Shelby County Division of Corrections, et al.
Petitioner/Appellant was terminated from her position with the Shelby County Division of Corrections for violating the Division’s Standards of Conduct and for untruthfulness. The Civil Service Merit Board affirmed. On appeal, the Chancery Court for Shelby County affirmed the Board’s decision. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Johnson v. Zeledyne, LLC et al.
This appeal takes issue with an award of permanent partial disability benefits in a workers’ compensation case. After sustaining a compensable knee injury, the employee filed suit seeking workers’ compensation benefits in the Circuit Court for Wilson County. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the employee the maximum disability award permitted by the circumstances. On this appeal, the employer takes issue with the trial court’s exclusion of the testimony of an evaluating physician on the ground that he had not personally examined the employee and with the amount of the disability award. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We find that the trial court erred by excluding the physician’s testimony but that this error was harmless. We also find that the evidence supports the trial court’s disability award. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. |
Wilson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Michael D. Green v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Michael D. Green, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of multiple crimes, including first degree felony murder, and received a sentence of life plus twenty-four years. That sentence was ordered to be served concurrently to a federal sentence of life plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to request sequestration of the jury; (2) failing to utilize all available preemptory challenges or to challenge potential jurors for cause; and (3) failing to limit testimony concerning the prior federal trial. Following review of the record, we conclude no error occurred and affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Lee Polk v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Robert Lee Polk, appeals the Circuit Court for Lake County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dearaysun Wright
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Dearaysun Wright, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keeanna Luellan
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Keeanna Luellan, guilty of forgery over $500 and fraudulent use of a credit card over $500. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range III, persistent offender to six years for each conviction and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of other bad acts or crimes and that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain her convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frederick Parks v. Cherry Lindamood, Warden
Petitioner, Frederick Parks, appeals from the trial court’s order summarily dismissing Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals |