State of Tennessee v. Tina B. Carroll
Appellant, Tina B. Carroll, pleaded guilty to promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony, and received a two-year sentence, suspended to supervised probation. A violation of probation warrant was subsequently filed, alleging that she had violated her probation by testing positive for narcotic drugs and marijuana. Appellant now argues that one of the laboratory reports was admitted in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-311(c)(1) and that there is not substantial evidence to support the trial court’s ruling. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Derrick Johnson v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Derrick Johnson, of first degree murder and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed a life sentence for the first degree murder conviction, with a consecutive six-year sentence for the aggravated assault conviction, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. Derrick Johnson, No. W2008-02070-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3623619, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Sept. 20, 2010) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 17, 2011). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bruce Reliford v. State of Tennessee
After his previous guilty-pleaded convictions were vacated, petitioner, Bruce Reliford, pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery charges and was found guilty by a jury of felony murder. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal and denial of discretionary review by our supreme court, he filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal follows, in which petitioner alleges the following: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to properly communicate with him; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel by advising him to plead guilty to the aggravated robbery charges; and (3) the post-conviction court’s error in denying his motion to recuse. Following our thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anita Kay Broughton v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Anita Kay Broughton, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and received a sentence of life with the possibility of parole. On appeal, she contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, she contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to pursue a defense of diminished capacity despite ample proof that the petitioner suffered from a mental condition. She also challenges the accuracy of the post-conviction court’s order denying relief. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Claiborne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lewis - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s holdings that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of second degree murder. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Bevels, Sr. v. Alma Tubbs and Danny Tubbs, et al.
This appeal involves removal from general sessions court to circuit court. The defendant tenants rented residential property from the plaintiff property owner. The owner filed a civil warrant in general sessions court against the tenants for unpaid rent. The tenants filed an application in the general sessions court to remove the case to circuit court; they asserted that the counterclaim they anticipated filing would exceed the jurisdictional limits of the general sessions court. The general sessions court granted the application for removal, the tenants filed their counterclaim in the circuit court, and the case proceeded in the circuit court for over two years. The circuit court then issued a sua sponte order directing the parties to show cause why the case should not be remanded to the general sessions court, because the removal statute does not apply in that county and because the tenants did not file a cost bond when the case was removed. The tenants objected to the remand on several grounds and alternatively asked the circuit court to retain jurisdiction over the counterclaim even if it remanded the original claim to general sessions court. The circuit court remanded the original claim to general sessions court holding, inter alia, that the tenants failed to file a proper cost bond in connection with the removal. It then held that the counterclaim and all other pleadings filed in the case were “null and void” and dismissed the counterclaim on that basis. The tenants now appeal. We reverse the circuit court’s decision that the tenants failed to file a proper bond, vacate that portion of the circuit court’s order declaring that all proceedings other than the original claim were a nullity, and remand for reconsideration in light of Rules 13.09 and Rule 42.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jack Stevens v. Karns Volunteer Fire Department
This is a declaratory judgment action in which Plaintiffs sought the return of property that had been donated to the Karns Volunteer Fire Department (“Fire Department”). Plaintiffs alleged that a reversionary clause in the warranty deed had been triggered when Fire Department began paying firefighters and charging subscription fees for its services. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The trial court determined that the reversionary clause had not been triggered and granted Fire Department’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lewis
A Putnam County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Lewis, of second degree murder, and the trial court imposed a fifteen-year prison sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to sequester the jury; (3) the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the body of the deceased; and (4) the trial court erred by allowing certain witness testimony. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Anthony Graham
The Defendant-Appellant, Kevin Anthony Graham, entered a guilty plea in the Hawkins County Criminal Court to the charged offense of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, and requested that the trial court grant him judicial diversion or an alternative sentence. The trial court subsequently sentenced Graham to three years’ incarceration. On appeal, Graham argued that the trial court erred in denying (1) judicial diversion and (2) an alternative sentence. After reviewing the record on appeal, we reversed the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter an order sentencing Graham to serve ninety days’ confinement in the Hawkins County Jail with the remainder of his three-year sentence to be served on supervised probation. See State v. Kevin Anthony Graham, No. E2011-01382-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3594361, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2012). The State filed a Rule 11 application, pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, requesting permission to appeal the case to the Tennessee Supreme Court. On January 8, 2013, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the application and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012), and State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273 (Tenn. 2012). Upon reconsideration, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Patsy R. Cowart, et al v. Linda M. Hammontree
Patsy Reba Cowart, Debbie Buff, and David Buff (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sued Linda M. Hammontree to establish a boundary line and quiet title on a parcel of real property located in McMinn County, Tennessee. Ms. Hammontree answered and filed a counterclaim for trespass and slander of title, among other things. After trial, the Trial Court entered judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs had superior title to the disputed real property. Ms. Hammontree appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding that Plaintiffs rebutted Ms. Hammontree’s presumption of ownership pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-109, and whether the Trial Court erred in dismissing Ms. Hammontree’s claim for slander of title. We find and hold that the evidence preponderates against the finding that Plaintiffs rebutted Ms. Hammontree’s presumption of ownership, but that the Trial Court did not err in dismissing Ms. Hammontree’s claim for slander of title. We reverse, in part, and affirm, in part. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
James Everett Ferrell v. State of Tennessee
This is an appeal from a decision of the Tennessee Claims Commission dismissing a claim filed by James Ferrell alleging that his pickup truck was unlawfully taken from him. The State of Tennessee has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to file a timely notice of appeal. Claims Commissioner Hibbett entered an order dismissing Mr. Ferrell’s claim on September 24, 2012. Mr. Ferrell filed a Motion to Reconsider that was denied on November 21, 2012. On December 3, 2013, Mr.Ferrell filed a Petition for En Banc Hearing. The Claims Commission denied the Petition for En Banc Hearing on February 26, 2013. Mr. Ferrell then filed a Motion to Reconsider En Banc Denial. The Claims Commission denied the Motion to Reconsider En Banc Denial on March 26, 2013. Mr. Ferrell filed his notice of appeal on April 24, 2013. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Jason Ferrell v. Robert Miller and Kayla Ivey
While the defendant spouses were separated and living in separate counties, the defendant driver fatally shot himself during a police pursuit while driving a Toyota 4Runner vehicle which was to be awarded to him in the defendants’ pending divorce. Said vehicle struck the plaintiff, allegedly causing serious injuries. The plaintiff sued the defendant driver alleging negligence, and he sued the defendant spouse on claims of imputed negligence. Much later, the plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to assert a negligent entrustment claim against the defendant spouse. Because the plaintiff failed to have appointed, to substitute, and to serve an administrator ad litem prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the trial court dismissed the negligence claims against the deceased defendant driver and the imputed negligence claims against the defendant spouse. It implicitly denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend. We affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of the claims against the deceased defendant driver and its dismissal of the imputed negligence claims against the defendant spouse; however, we remand for consideration of the request to add a negligent entrustment claim against the defendant spouse and for express findings. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
William David Russell v. Mary Beth Russell
In this action, the trial court granted Wife a divorce on fault-based grounds against Husband and awarded $1,500.00 monthly in transitional alimony to Wife for a period of thirty-six months. Husband appeals. Determining the amount of alimony to be beyond Husband’s ability to pay, we modify the transitional alimony award to $1,000.00 monthly to Wife for thirty-six months. We affirm the judgment in all other respects. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jesse J. C., et al.
Father appeals the trial court’s holding that termination of his parental rights to two children was in the best interest of the children. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Brandon W. Martin and Amy Martin v. W. B. Melton and Peggy Melton
An apprentice lineman agreed to help a neighbor by climbing a utility pole on the neighbor’s land and disconnecting an electrical wire at the top. After he disconnected the wire, the pole fell over, causing the lineman himself to fall and to suffer severe injuries. He filed a negligence complaint, alleging that the neighbor had not set the pole deeply enough into the ground, thereby rendering it unreasonably dangerous. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that because of the plaintiff’s expertise in electrical matters, it was his duty alone to make sure the pole was safe before climbing it. We reverse. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Renitra Harlen
A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Renitra Harlen, of two counts of theft of property valued at more than $1,000.00. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to concurrent terms of two years, to be served on probation following the service of fourteen days in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce a handwritten list of stolen items prepared by store employees immediately after the shoplifting incident occurred; (2) the State failed to disclose a victim questionnaire in violation of the rules of discovery; (3) the trial court erred by failing to merge the two theft convictions; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we remand to the trial court for the entry of modified judgments reflecting the merger of the Defendant’s two convictions and affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Milton G. Humberd, Jr. v. Wanda N. Fitzsimmons
This is a boundary line dispute involving the placement of a new fence and the location of a corner. The suit involves a small triangular piece of property approximately two-tenths of an acre out of two adjoining 40-acre tracts owned by the parties. The value of the land in dispute is approximately $200. The trial court found the boundary line runs along a tree line essentially synonymous with the agreed upon old fence line as indicated on the Lawson survey. The court then located the corner as a car axle in the southwest corner of the plaintiff and the southeast corner of the defendant. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm the findings of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Bruce Elliot v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Bruce Elliot, challenges the post-conviction court’s finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and its denial of post-conviction relief from his jury convictions for conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, conspiracy to possess 300 grams or more of cocaine, possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine, all Class A felonies; money laundering, a Class B felony; possession of over one-half ounce of marijuana and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, both Class E felonies. The Petitioner contends that his trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress the wiretaps on his telephone, which provided the basis for all evidence subsequently obtained against him, was deficient and that he was prejudiced by this deficiency. Upon consideration of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Aldrick Lillard v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Aldrick Lillard, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that both his trial attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel in their failure to raise in the motion for new trial or on direct appeal the trial court’s denial of the Petitioner’s motion for mistrial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shaun Anthony Davidson and Deedra Lynette Kizer
Following a traffic stop premised on a possible violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-107 (the window tint statute), appellees were charged with several drug offenses. Appellee Shaun Anthony Davidson was indicted for possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone. Appellee Deedra Lynette Kizer was indicted for possession or casual exchange of hydrocodone. Both appellees were indicted for possession or casual exchange of marijuana. The trial court granted the appellees’ motion to suppress evidence, ruling that Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-107(c) was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. As a result, the case was dismissed. The State now appeals, arguing that Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-107(c) is constitutional. We reverse the ruling of the trial court, reinstate the indictment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shaun Anthony Davidson and Deedra Lynette Kizer - Concurring
I agree that Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-107(c) is not vague or overbroad, but such does not mean it is flawless. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James M. Roberts, II v. Jacqueline R. Roberts
Plaintiff/Appellant appeals the trial court’s division of property and award of alimony in this divorce action. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lymus Levar Brown III
A Haywood County jury convicted appellant, Lymus Levar Brown, III, of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III offender to serve thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with a release eligibility of eighty-five percent. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(k)(1) (release eligibility for aggravated robbery conviction). On appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence supporting his conviction was insufficient; (2) the trial court erred by allowing a witness to testify despite a violation of the rule of sequestration; (3) the trial court erred by not granting him a mistrial or some other remedy for the State’s failure to provide previously requested discovery; (4) his right to a speedy trial was violated; (5) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear that appellant was a convicted criminal; (6) the State failed to provide a sufficient chain of custody for the cellular telephone found at the crime scene; and (7) the trial court erred by considering his prior convictions during the sentencing hearing despite not having certified copies of said convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Haywood | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frances Ward v. Wilkinson Real Estate Advisors, Inc, et al
This is a negligence case in which Plaintiff filed suit against the wrong party but sought to amend the complaint to add Defendant once the statute of limitations had passed. Defendant objected to the amendment and filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the applicable statute of limitations had passed because Rule 15.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure did not allow for the amendment of the complaint. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Frances Ward v. Wilkinson Real Estate Advisors, Inc, et al - Concurring
I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment of the trial court. I write separately to express the reasons for my concurrence. Since the proposed amendment adding the Wilkinson defendants was filed well beyond the applicable one-year statute of limitations, an allowance of the amendment would be futile unless it relates back, under the provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 (1995), to the date of filing of the original complaint against the Glazer defendants. It is clear under Rule 15.03 that we are dealing in this case with an amendment “changing the party . . . against whom a claim is asserted.” Id. The new parties – the Wilkinson defendants – are totally different entities from the Glazer defendants. There can be no doubt that the plaintiff wants to change parties. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals |