State of Tennessee v. Ernest W. Mays
The defendant, Ernest W. Mays, pled guilty, in two separate cases, in the Dickson County Circuit Court to: (1) two counts of selling cocaine less than .5 grams, a Class C felony; (2) conspiracy to commit aggravated kidnapping, a Class C felony; (3) simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor; and (4) retaliation for past action, a Class E felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant was to receive an effective sentence of ten years, as a Range II offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends that the court erred in denying him an alternative sentence. Following review of the record before us, we conclude no error occurred and affirm the sentences as imposed. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenard P. Wallace v. Commissioner of Labor & Workforce Development et al.
Truck driver was discharged for having too many accidents pursuant to employer’s policy on preventable accidents. He was denied unemployment benefits and the denial was upheld by the Appeals Tribunal, the Board of Review and the Chancery Court. We affirm. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Household Financial Center, Inc. v. Darrell Kirby
Lender appeals the trial court’s decision awarding judgment in its favor for only part of the debt it claims to be owed by borrower. Finding no error in the trial court’s factual findings and conclusions, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Andrea A. R.
Father appeals an order of the juvenile court requiring Father to pay private school tuition as an upward deviation from the presumptive child support amount, which more than doubled his child support obligation. We have determined that the trial court erred by ordering an upward deviation for private school tuition without first determining whether the extraordinary educational expense was appropriate based upon the parents’ financial abilities and the lifestyle of the child and by failing to make the requisite findings of fact to establish that Father has the abilityto payall of the tuition in addition to the presumptive child support. Therefore, we reverse the upward deviation for private tuition and remand the issue of the extraordinary educational expense to the trial court to make the requisite findings to determine, inter alia, whether private schooling is appropriate based upon the facts of this case and, if so, to determine which parent pays what portion of the private school tuition and costs. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Arthur Lee Taylor v. State of Tennessee
Arthur Lee Taylor (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and/or deliver and possession of dihydrocodeinone and his resulting effective thirty-year sentence as a career offender. He alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his jury trial. After a hearing, the postconviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our careful review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny Coffey
The defendant, Johnny Coffey, appeals his Bradley County Circuit Court jury conviction of second degree murder, claiming that the trial court erred by denying him funds to procure additional expert assistance, by denying his request to play witness statements in their entireties, by refusing to grant his motion for a mistrial, by denying his request for a jury instruction on self-defense, and by failing to apply certain mitigating factors to reduce his sentence. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jessica Birkhead
Appellant, Jessica Birkhead, appeals under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 after the trial court’s grant of judicial diversion on a charge of vandalism under $500. On appeal |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gary Wayne Calhoun v. David Mills, Warden
The Criminal Court of Morgan County granted habeas corpus relief to the Petitioner, Gary Wayne Calhoun, for convictions in the Criminal Court of Sullivan County for “bringing stolen property into the State valued in excess of $200.00” in case number 21,478 and for “simple robbery” in case number 22,532. The Respondent, David Mills, Warden, has appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles F. "Frank" Holland and Mary Lou Holland, et al. v. City of Memphis
Upon determining that the order appealed in this matter is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
David Hammond v. State of Tennessee
A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the petitioner, David Hammond, of rape, and he was sentenced to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lorenzo McLemore, III and Melissa Denise Gaines
The Defendant-Appellant, Lorenzo McLemore, III, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated burglary, and one count of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. During the first phase of McLemore’s bifurcated trial, he was convicted of three counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony, and the trial court declared a mistrial on the especially aggravated burglary count. During the second phase, the jury found McLemore guilty of employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of four years at thirty percent for the three convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and a consecutive sentence of six years at one hundred percent for the conviction for employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, for an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, McLemore argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony and that the trial court committed plain error in bifurcating his trial. The other Defendant Appellant, Melissa Denise Gaines, McLemore’s mother, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of attempted first degree murder and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. She was subsequently found guilty of three counts of reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court dismissed the firearm charge because the reckless endangerment convictions did not qualify as a dangerous felony for the firearm charge. Gaines argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions for reckless endangerment. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Neal Lovlace and Norma Jean Lovlace v. Timothy Kevin Copley and Beth Copley
This is a modification of child visitation case, involving grandparent visitation. The Appellant grandparents appeal the trial court’s order, denying their request for more visitation with the minor child, as well as the failure of the trial court to find the Appellee Mother guilty of all alleged incidents of civil contempt. In the posture of Appellees, the mother and her husband (the child’s adoptive father) argue that the Appellants are not entitled to any visitation. We conclude that in modification of grandparent visitation cases, if the parent is the movant, his or her burden is to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there has been a material change in circumstance affecting the child’s best interest. However, where the movant is the non-parent, we hold that the grandparent visitation statute provides that the burden is on the non-parent to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there has been a material change in circumstance that would present a substantial risk of harm to the child if modification is denied. Because the trial court incorrectly applied the best interest standard, we vacate its order modifying the visitation arrangement. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the mother in civil contempt on five counts; however, we conclude that the award of attorney’s fees for that contempt is not clear as to what portion, if any, of those fees was expended for prosecution of the contempts, and what portion, if any, was expended in pursuit of the Appellees’ attempt to modify the visitation order. Therefore, we also vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand for an award of those fees associated only with the prosecution of the contempts. Vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Neal Lovlace and Norma Jean Lovlace v. Timothy Kevin Copley and Beth Copley - Concur and Partial Dissent
I concur with the result reached in this case, but I disagree with some of the reasoning and therefore write separately. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Neal Lovlace and Norma Jean Lovlace v. Timothy Kevin Copley and Beth Copley - Concur and Partial Dissent
I agree with much of the majority’s well reasoned analysis in this case. However, in some respects, I would use different reasoning to reach the same result, and so must file this separate concurrence. In some other respects, I disagree with the result reached by the majority and so must partially dissent. These are discussed below. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Fusco
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Robert Fusco, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, which were merged, and one count of each of the following offenses: conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. See Tenn. Code Ann.§§ 39-12-101,-12-103,-13-202,-13-304,-13-305, -13-402, -13-403, & -14-403. The trial court determined that the Defendant was a Range II, multiple offender for sentencing purposes and imposed an effective 65-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to charge the lesser-included offense of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping; (2) whether the assistant district attorney general committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; (3) whether the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for especiallyaggravated kidnapping,conspiracyto commit aggravated robbery,and conspiracy to commitaggravated kidnapping;(4) whether his dual convictions for especiallyaggravated kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery violate due process concerns because the restraint of the victim was not beyond that necessary to complete the robbery; (5) whether the trial court erred bynot merging his two conspiracy convictions because the offenses were the object of the same agreement; (6) whether the trial court erred by using certain out-ofstate convictions to enhance his sentencing range; and (7) whether his sentence was excessive.Following our review, we remand this case to the Montgomery County Circuit Court for the entry of corrected judgments to reflect merger of the Defendant’s conspiracy convictions. In all other respects, we conclude that there is no reversible error in the judgments of the trial court and affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lynn Gary Fryer
The appellant, Lynn Gary Fryer, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to aggravated assault, for which he was given a seven-year probationary sentence. Thereafter, he trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s revocation of his probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Criss Williams v. State of Tennessee
After his conviction for second degree murder was upheld on appeal, Petitioner, Criss Williams, sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court’s alleged improper jury instructions, and the trial court’s alleged misapplication of enhancement factors. See State v. Criss Williams, No. W1999-00823-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 278111, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 9, 2001), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. June 18, 2001). The parties waived a hearing on the post-conviction petition and submitted the petition on the record. The post-conviction court determined that Petitioner failed to prove that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and, therefore, denied post-conviction relief. On appeal, we determine that the issue of whether the trial court should have charged lesser included offenses has been waived because it was not raised on direct appeal. We further determine Petitioner has failed to prove that trial counsel’s failure to object to the absence of instructions on lesser included offenses and appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue on appeal was prejudicial to his case or amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mike Settle v. David Osborne, Warden
Petitioner, Mike Settle, appeals the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief in which he claimed that he was entitled to habeas corpus relief because his plea agreement and sentences for crimes committed in 1999 in Madison County are void because his sentence for escape was ordered to be served concurrently to a federal sentence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3). Petitioner failed to follow the mandatory procedural requirements for the valid filing of a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, we affirm the judgment dismissing the habeas petition. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Edward Graham v. State of Tennessee
A Knox County jury convicted Petitioner, Charles Edward Graham, of reckless aggravated assault, tampering with evidence, possession of marijuana, and failure to provide proof of financial responsibility, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twentyseven years. State v. Charles Edward Graham, No. E2005-02937-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 199851, at *1, *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 24, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Sep. 15, 2008). Petitioner was unsuccessful on appeal to this Court. Id. at *1. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner now appeals this denial. We determine that the post-conviction court’s denial was proper because trial counsel did not coerce or unduly influence Petitioner with regard to his decision not to testify at trial; trial counsel was employing a reasonable trial tactic by not requesting jury instructions on any lesser included offenses; and trial counsel was not deficient with regard to attempting to obtain a plea bargain. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Robert Sadler Bailey
This appeal arises from an action for criminal contempt. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion upon determining Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated. The State appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brian Douglas Spivey v. David N. King et al.
The plaintiff Brian Douglas Spivey (“the Plaintiff”) alleges that the defendants, his former business partners, David N. King and Anthony G. Brown (collectively “the Defendants’), engaged in a conspiracy, and, pursuant to that conspiracy, took actions that include forcing him into bankruptcy and harassing him in the bankruptcy case, expelling him from a business entity, defaming him, and initiating unwarranted criminal charges that were dismissed. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss asserting that this was simply an attempt to relitigate issues that had been determined in the Plaintiff’s bankruptcy and in a chancery court case the Defendants had pursued. They also filed a motion for sanctions. It turns out that the bankruptcy court did not issue its opinion until after the complaint in this case was filed and that the chancery court action was stayed as to the Plaintiff as a result of his bankruptcy filing. The trial court dismissed the complaint in an order that states that the dismissal was for “failure to state a claim.” The trial court also awarded sanctions against the Plaintiff and his attorney. The Plaintiff appeals. We affirm that part of the judgment dismissing the claims related to forcing the Plaintiff into bankruptcy and harassing him in bankruptcy as well as the claims related to expelling him from the business entity. We vacate that part of the judgment dismissing claims related to defamation and the allegedly unwarranted criminal prosecution. We also vacate that part of the judgment sanctioning the Plaintiff and his attorney. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antwan Deemeek Hudson
Appellant, Antwan Deemeek Hudson, was convicted by a Sullivan County Jury of two counts of rape of a child. The trial court sentenced him to two, concurrent sentences of twenty-five years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the trial court erred in allowing a doctor to testify as to a statement made to him by the victim’s parents, and the trial court erred in excluding Appellant’s testimony regarding the results of a medical test. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Appellant’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is actually a plea for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we are precluded from doing. In addition, we conclude that the evidence is more than sufficient to support his convictions. We also conclude that the statement made by the parents to the doctor was erroneously allowed into evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule, but the error was harmless. Due to errors on the judgment forms, we remand for the correction of the judgment forms to reflect that Count 1 and Count 3 will run concurrently to each other. In all other respects, the judgments are affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gary Paul v. Dennis Watson and Darlene Watson d/b/a Double D Lawn Care and Landscaping
This case involves an alleged oral contract for landscaping work. The homeowner paid a |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bethany Jean O'Donnell
The defendant, Bethany Jean O’Donnell, appeals the Sullivan County Circuit Court’s revocation of her probationary sentence. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to multiple charges, the defendant was sentenced to five consecutive terms of eleven months and twentynine days, to be served on supervised probation. A violation warrant was subsequently issued and, at the following hearing, the defendant acknowledged that she had committed the violation. The trial court then found the defendant to be in violation of the terms and conditions of her probation and ordered that the remainder of her sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends that the decision was error and, further, that the court erroneously concluded that she would not be entitled to good conduct credits when serving her misdemeanor sentences at seventy-five percent. Because we conclude no error has occurred and because the case holds no precedential value, we affirm the ruling of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eagles Landing Development, LLC v. Eagles Landing Apartments, LP, et al.
This is a breach of contract case. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded Appellee Developer the remaining balance due under a Development Agreement that was entered by and between Appellee and the Appellants, a partnership and its limited liability partners, for construction of an apartment complex. Appellants contend that Appellee was not entitled to final payment because the general partner, who is not a party to this appeal, had not funded the development fees that were contemplated under a Partnership Agreement, to which Appellee was not a party. Specifically, Appellants argue that the payment under the Development Agreement is contingent upon satisfaction of the funding requirements specified in the Partnership Agreement. We conclude that the conditions precedent under the Development Agreement were met, and that the Appellee was, therefore, entitled to its full fee under the Development Agreement. The trial court assessed judgment against the limited liability partners and the partnership. Under the Tennessee Revised Uniform Partnership Act, Appellants’ status as limited partners protects them from liability for the debts of the partnership. Appellee contends that it is a third-party beneficiary under the Partnership Agreement and may, therefore, have judgment against the limited partners who were parties to that agreement. We conclude that the third-party beneficiary issue is waived and that the trial court erred in entering judgment against the limited partners. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |