Tracy Thomas Hepburn v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Tracy Thomas Hepburn, was convicted of twenty-four counts of burglary, three counts of attempted burglary, fourteen counts of misdemeanor vandalism, eight counts of felony vandalism, ten counts of misdemeanor theft, and three counts of felony theft. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of 100 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal on January 13, 2011. State v. Tracy Thomas Hepburn, No. M2008-01979-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2889101 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, July 23, 2010) perm. app. denied (Tenn. January 13, 2011). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that: (1) his convictions were based on a coerced confession; (2) his convictions were based on a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination; and that (3) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim. The Petitioner appealed, and, on appeal, both parties agree that the post-conviction court erred and that the case should be reversed and remanded. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we agree with the parties that the petition for post-conviction relief raises a colorable claim. We, therefore, reverse and remand to the post-conviction court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Katie J. Rountree v. Joshua Rountree
This is a divorce case involving issues related to the permanent parenting plan and the divisionofmarital property. The trial court adoptedMother’s proposedpermanent parenting plan, which provided that the child would attend preschool, against Father’s wishes, even though prior to trial Father had been the primary caregiver of the child while Mother worked. The trial court also adopted Mother’s proposed division of marital property. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Father’s desire to care for the child during the day was based on a self-serving motive. Accordingly, we vacate the parenting plan and remand for the establishment of a new permanent parenting plan. We further conclude that Mother was improperly assigned her attorney fees as a marital debt, and we reverse that award. In addition, we reverse portions of the trial court’s findings regarding the marital property, but affirm the overall division as equitable. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis Lee Rose
A Sullivan County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Dennis Lee Rose, of first degree premeditated murder and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life for the murder conviction and three years for each of the aggravated assault convictions. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior bad acts under Rule 404(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to allow the defense to use the prosecutor’s notes for impeachment and by refusing to allow the defense to make an offer of proof regarding the State’s failure to provide the notes to the defense before trial; (4) the trial court erred by refusing to allow the defense to present surrebuttal testimony; and (5) the appellant’s convictions for premeditated murder and one count of aggravated assault violate double jeopardy. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis Wayne Brewer
The defendant, Dennis Brewer, was convicted by a Madison County jury of DUI and DUI per se. He then pled guilty to DUI, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, with a minimum of nine months to serve prior to release into a rehabilitative program. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lester Paul Doyle
The defendant, Lester Paul Doyle, pled guilty in the Hardin County Circuit Court to three counts of aggravated burglary based on offenses he committed while serving a community corrections sentence for drug convictions in a prior case. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s community corrections sentence in the drug case and sentenced the defendant to serve concurrent terms of four years in the Department of Correction in the aggravated burglary case, with the aggravated burglary sentences to be served consecutively to the sentences in the drug case. The defendant now appeals the trial court’s sentencing determinations, arguing that his community corrections sentence in the drug case should not have been revoked and that the trial court should have sentenced him to some form of alternative sentencing in the aggravated burglary case. He does not challenge the trial court’s order of consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the sentencing determinations of the trial court but remand for correcting clerical errors and the entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect that the aggravated burglary sentences in case number 9354 are to be served consecutively to the drug sentences in case number 9201. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shree Krishna, LLC d/b/a Quizno's Classic Subs v. Broadmoor Investment Corp.
This case involves the breach of a commercial lease. The plaintiff leased property from the defendant for a franchise restaurant. The lease granted the plaintiff options to renew for two additional lease periods. The parties’ agreement with the franchisor provided that the lease and the options were assignable, and that the landlord’s consent to the assignment could not be unreasonably withheld. The plaintiff sought to assign the lease and the renewal options to a third party. The defendant landlord refused to consent to the assignment and attempted to negotiate a new lease with the prospective assignee on different terms. After the assignee withdrew its offer to purchase the plaintiff’s franchise, the plaintiff agreed to sell it to the assignee for a reduced price. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit against the defendant landlord for breach of contract, alleging that it unreasonably withheld consent to the original proposed assignment. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant landlord now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant landlord unreasonably withheld consent in order to extract an economic concession or improve the landlord’s economic position. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glyn Dale
The appellant, Glyn Dale, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s ordering him to serve concurrent twenty-five-year sentences for two convictions of rape of a child. On appeal, the appellant contends that his sentences are excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marie Akins v. Whirlpool Corporation
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Marie Akins (“Employee”) alleges that she developed carpal tunnel syndrome in her left wrist while employed as a factory worker by Whirlpool Corporation (“Employer”), prior to the closure of Employer’s plant in August 2008. Employer denies that Employee’s carpal tunnel syndrome in her left wrist was caused by her employment with it. The trial court found that Employee’s left-wrist carpal tunnel syndrome was not caused by her employment with Employer and that Employer therefore is not liable for this injury. Employee has appealed, contending both that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding and that Employer is estopped from denying liability based on delay in the diagnosis of Employee’s carpal tunnel syndrome in her left wrist. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Tammy L. Lee v. Dura Operating Corporation, et al
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Tammy L. Lee (“Employee”) alleges that she suffered an injury to her cervical spine while she was employed as a factory worker by Dura Operating Corporation (“Employer”). Employer denies that Employee’s cervical spine injury was caused by her employment with Employer. The trial court determined that Employee’s cervical spine condition was a work-related aggravation of her pre-existing degenerative disc disease. The trial court awarded Employee temporary total benefits from November 8, 2007, to February 8, 2008. Finding that Employee had not been able to return to work, the trial court refused to apply the statutory cap and awarded Employee permanent partial disability benefits of 69% to the body as a whole, three times her anatomical impairment rating of 23% to the body as a whole. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's determination of causation, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Lawrence | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey I. Parsons
Following the Wilson County Circuit Court’s denial of hismotion to suppress,the defendant, Jeffrey I. Parsons, pleaded guilty to one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), first offense, see T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401 (2006), seeking to reserve a certified question of law concerning the legality of the stop leading to his arrest. Because the certified question was not properly reserved for review, we dismiss the appeal. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Haven T.
Haven T. is the daughter of Clint T. (“Father”) and Jennifer G. (“Mother”). The parties were never married. Father initiated the present litigation by filing a petition for custody after Mother notified him she would be moving from Chattanooga to Johnson City to attend college. At the hearing that followed, the parties stipulated that this was the “initial” custody determination for Haven although the juvenile court had entered an order in 2003 adopting a “parenting plan” that, by agreement, gave the parties equal time with Haven. The court awarded custody to Father. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Susan Gail Stephens
The Defendant, Susan Gail Stephens, was charged with two counts of statutory rape and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The Defendant applied for pretrial diversion and has twice been denied. In the instant appeal, the Defendant challenges the prosecutor’s second denial of her application for pretrial diversion. Specifically, she claims that the prosecutor erred on remand by: (1) declining to consider any new information submitted by the Defendant since the date of the original application—information allegedly relevant to her amenability to correction; and (2) failing to properly consider and weigh her amenability to correction as instructed by this court in its previous decision. Following a careful review of the record and the applicable authorities, we agree with the Defendant that the prosecutor should have considered any evidence on remand, whether favorable or unfavorable, that was relevant to the Defendant’s current status for amenability to correction. Accordingly, we hold that an abuse of prosecutorial discretion occurred and once again remand the case to the prosecutor for consideration of all relevant factors. The judgment of the trial court upholding the prosecutor’s denial of diversion is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to remand to the prosecutor for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Laraiel Winton v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Laraiel Winton, aggrieved by his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Following the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that successor counsel committed ineffective assistance, that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during argument, and that trial counsel committed ineffective assistance in several instances not previously raised on direct appeal. Determining that the allegations concerning trial counsel’s performance were previously determined, that the prosecutorial misconduct claim is waived, and that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice concerning successor counsel’s ineffective assistance, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Adelaida Fielding et al. v. The Metropolitan Government of Lynchburg, Moore County, Tennessee et al.
The plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate a re-zoning ordinance on the grounds that it constitutes illegal “spot zoning,” and that the re-zoned area was improperly classified in violation of the local general zoning ordinance. The trial court upheld the re-zoning ordinance, finding it was enacted in furtherance of public safety goals and that the re-zoning classification was reasonable and rational. We affirm. |
Moore | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Pitts Bradford v. David Wilson Pitts
This is the second appeal of this post-divorce case in which David Wilson Pitts (“Father”) petitioned for suspension or termination of his child support obligation owed to Jennifer Pitts Bradford (“Mother”). The trial court denied Father’s request, holding that Father failed to prove that a substantial variance in his income was present. Father appealed, and this court directed the trial court to consider Father’s tax return in determining whether a substantial variance existed. On remand, the trial court found that a substantial variance existed between Father’s income at the time of the divorce as reflected in the tax return and his income at the time of the request for suspension or termination. The trial court modified Father’s support obligation and imposed court’s imposition of sanctions against Mother but affirm the decision of the trial court in all other respects. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Webb v. Mark Thomas Webb
Father in divorce action appeals trial court’s designation of Mother as primary residential parent and division of marital property. Because the order appealed does not resolve all claims, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Roger Lee Neal v. Kelli Jean Hayes
This case arises from a long-running legal dispute between Roger Lee Neal (“Neal”) and Kelli Jean Hayes (“Hayes”) concerning their minor child (“the Child”). Neal and Hayes disputed, among other things, custody matters relating to the Child. In March 2011, the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Trial Court”), entered an order confirming findings of the Special Master, Sarah Higgins (“the Special Master”) and resolving numerous contested issues. In the same order, the trial judge, Judge Swann, stated, in effect, that he no longer could be neutral towards Neal because of Neal’s villainous statements about the Special Master and Neal’s “admitted perjury” and recused himself from any further participation in these cases. Husband appeals, arguing, in part, that Judge Swann could not simultaneously rule on the Special Master’s findings and recuse himself because of lack of neutrality. We hold that as both the Special Master and Judge Swann expressed an understandable lack of neutrality in their findings and order, respectively, the Trial Court’s March 2011 order is vacated, and we remand for further proceedings to be held before a neutral court. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
George Arthur Lee Smith v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, George Arthur Lee Smith, appeals from the Hamblen County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for the following reasons: 1) for failing to move to suppress a recorded conversation between Petitioner and a co-defendant; 2) for failing to argue at trial the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to hearsay as rebuttal to the State’s theory of motive; 3) for failing to call Petitioner’s mother and stepfather as witnesses at trial; 4) for failing to move to strike the testimony of Petitioner’s sister at trial; 5) for failing to request a jury instruction regarding corroboration of accomplice testimony; 6) for failing to request a limiting instruction concerning evidence of Petitioner’s prior bad acts; 7) for failing to assert intoxication as a defense; and 8) for failing to object to improper comments by the prosecutor during voir dire and closing argument. Petitioner also contends that the post-conviction court erred by not allowing hearsay testimony from Petitioner’s mother at the post-conviction hearing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Tammy Bernice Davenport
The defendant, Tammy Bernice Davenport, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s revocation of her probation and subsequent sentencing. The defendant pled guilty in 2008 to the promotion of methamphetamine manufacture and received a ten-year sentence to be served on supervised probation. Following a prior revocation and reinstatement of her probation, a second violation warrant was issued alleging a violation based upon new charges and the use of intoxicants. Following a revocation hearing at which the defendant acknowledged her violations, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered that her sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the defendant to serve the balance of her sentence in confinement. Following review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s actions as a defendant already on probation is not entitled to a second grant of an alternative sentence. Because we conclude no error occurred in this case and because the case has no precedential value, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in accordance with Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary Lee Martin v. S. Dale Copeland
In this boundary line dispute, plaintiff sued defendant, the adjoining property owner, and defendant countersued. Each of the parties employed their own surveyors who testified at the trial, and the Trial Court ultimately established a boundary line between the parties. Defendant appealed to this Court. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Dean Moore
The defendant, Joseph Dean Moore, appeals his conviction and sentence after being found guilty by a Cannon County jury on the charge of failure to appear, a Class E felony. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, arguing that his resolve to kill himself constituted a good, reasonable excuse for failing to appear at a legal proceeding. Further, he contends that the maximum sentence of four years, as a Range II offender, was excessive and that he should have been given an alternative sentence of probation. Concluding that no reversible error occurred upon this record, we affirm the judgment from the trial court. |
Cannon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Georgia Ann Tate
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement Defendant, Georgia Ann Tate, pled guilty to three counts of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, and received a sentence of five years for each count, to be served concurrently with each other. Also, pursuant to the plea agreement, she pled guilty to one count of sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine and received a sentence of eight years to be served consecutively to the other sentences, for an effective sentence of thirteen years. The manner of service of the effective sentence was agreed to be determined by the trial court. Other pending charges were dismissed. The trial court ordered the entire effective sentence to be served by incarceration. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by denying her an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barbara Jean Hooper Flynn v. Robert Dean Flynn
The trial court denied Husband’s petition to modify alimony upon finding he was voluntarily underemployed, and found him to be in civil contempt. We vacate the finding of voluntary underemployment, affirm the finding of contempt, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Reagan Farr, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
The trial court determined that the Commissioner of Revenue’s assessment of sales and use taxes against out-of-state Plaintiff for sales to customers in Tennessee was not permitted under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Commissioner of Revenue appeals. We reverse and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua David McBurnett
The Defendant, Joshua David McBurnett, pled guilty to five counts of statutory rape by an authority figure and three counts of incest, Class C felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-532, 39-15-302 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four concurrent terms of four years’ confinement for two counts of statutory rape and two counts of incest, two concurrent terms of five years’ confinement for one count of statutory rape and one count of incest, and two concurrent terms of six years’ confinement for the remaining two counts of statutory rape. The trial court imposed partial consecutive sentencing yielding an effective fifteen year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his fifteen-year sentence is excessive. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals |