Marcus Ward v. State of Tennessee
In this post-conviction case, the issue we review is whether the defendant's plea of guilty to aggravated sexual battery was knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily made when the trial court did not advise the defendant of the following consequences of his guilty plea: (1) mandatory registration as a sexual offender, and (2) a mandatory sentence of community supervision for life in addition to his incarceration. We hold that the trial court was not required to advise the defendant of the requirement of sex offender registration because it is a remedial and regulatory measure, and therefore a collateral consequence of the guilty plea. We further hold that the trial court was required to advise the defendant of the mandatory sentence of lifetime community supervision because it is a punitive and direct consequence of the guilty plea. Because the trial court failed to ensure that the defendant was informed of the lifetime supervision consequence, we hold that his guilty plea to aggravated sexual battery was not knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily entered. Accordingly, this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Trehern
The Defendant, Richard Trehern, was convicted by a jury in the Hawkins County Criminal Court of two counts of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, violent offender to concurrent twenty-year sentences. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred by denying his motion to compel the State to produce the victim's and the victim's brother's medical records, and that his sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Claude Phillips
The defendant, Claude Phillips, appeals from his convictions of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to twenty years as a Range II, multiple offender for his aggravated robbery conviction and to a consecutive sentence of fifteen years as a Range III, persistent offender for his aggravated assault conviction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support either conviction and that he was improperly sentenced. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lorenzo Myrick
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Lorenzo Myrick, of reckless homicide, a Class D felony, and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to three years for reckless homicide, concurrent with ten years for facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court committed reversible error by improperly commenting on the evidence; and (3) the trial court improperly denied probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wilson County Board of Education v. Wilson County Education Association and Bill Repsher
A teacher and the teachers' representative organization appeal the trial court's declaration that the local school board was not required to submit to arbitration as the last step in a grievance procedure set out in a locally negotiated agreement. We affirm the trial court based upon our conclusion that no enforceable agreement to arbitrate exists. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Takeita M. Locke
The Defendant, Takeita M. Locke, appeals her conviction for criminally negligent homicide and the trial court's denial of her petition for writ of error coram nobis for a related especially aggravated robbery conviction. She had been convicted in an earlier trial of especially aggravated robbery related to the same facts and victim. For the homicide conviction, the Defendant received a sentence of two years as a Range I offender, to be served concurrently with the twenty-year sentence she was serving for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, she challenges (1) the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss for violation of her right to a speedy trial, and (2) the trial court's denial of her petition for writ of error coram nobis related to the especially aggravated robbery conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Gilliam
In this consolidated appeal, the State challenges the trial court's dismissal of the charges of official misconduct, see T.C.A. _ 39-16-402 (2006), and official oppression, see id. _ 39-16- 403, against each defendant. The State contends that the court erroneously concluded that the defendants, as employees of Corrections Corporation of America, were not public servants as that term is used in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-16-402 and -403. Because we agree with the State, we reverse the trial court's order dismissing the charges in each case and remand the cases to the Criminal Court of Hamilton County. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrei Ciobanu
The Defendant, Andrei Ciobanu, was charged with vandalism of property with a value of at least $1,000 but less than $10,000. See T.C.A. _ 39-14-408. The trial court granted his motion to suppress eyewitness identification evidence and dismissed the case. In this appeal filed by the State, we reverse the order of the trial court suppressing the evidence and dismissing the case. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
George Brady v. Tennessee Department of Corrections
In 1977, the appellant was found guilty of armed robbery and the murder of four individuals. He was sentenced in state court to four consecutive ninety-nine year terms for the murders, and was subsequently sentenced in federal court to ninety-nine years for the bank robbery. He served thirty years in federal prison and was turned over to state authorities in 2007 to begin serving his state sentences. He sought a declaratory judgment that the state sentences were to run concurrently with the federal sentence and that, as a consequence of serving his federal sentence, he was immediately eligible for parole consideration on the state court sentences. The trial court found that the state court sentences ran consecutively to the federal sentence and granted the appellee's motion for summary judgment. Finding no error, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Maxie
The petitioner, Eric Maxie, appeals the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. A jury convicted the petitioner of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I violent offender to serve ten years and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the petitioner’s conviction. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied his petition. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition for post-conviction relief. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Franklin County Board of Education v. Lisa Crabtree and Franklin County Education Association
This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action. The trial court determined that Defendant teacher's grievance against the Franklin County Board of Education was not subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement between the Board and the Franklin County Education Association. The trial court also dismissed Defendant teacher's counterclaim under Tennessee Code Annotated _ 49-5-510. We affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Reginald Denard Usher, son of Reginald Smith, deceased vs. Charles Blalock & Sons, Inc. et al.
Reginald Smith ("the Decedent") died when the exposed metal edge of a device known as a "Guardrail Energy-Absorbing Terminal" ("the crash cushion") penetrated the window of the cab of his moving overturned tractor-trailer and cut him nearly in half. His son, Reginald Denard Usher ("the plaintiff"), filed this action in the trial court against Charles Blaylock & Sons, Inc. The plaintiff also filed a claim against the State with the Tennessee Claims Commission. The essence of the claims is that the crash cushion was negligently placed at the end of a series of concrete barriers that served to separate traffic entering on and exiting from the roadway connecting to the temporary end of Interstate 140 in Blount County. The alleged negligence was the failure to install a "transition panel" between the last concrete barrier and the crash cushion. Such a panel is designed to cover the otherwise exposed edge of the crash cushion thereby preventing vehicles from "snagging" the exposed metal edge. Eventually, the claim against the State was joined with the claim against Blaylock. The case was tried to a jury with the circuit judge sitting as the Claims Commissioner; the jury was utilized by the trial judge in an advisory capacity with regard to the claim against the State. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The jury found that the plaintiff's total damages were $2,000,000. It apportioned fault 25% to the Decedent, 37.5% to the State, and 37.5% to Blaylock. Acting as the Claims Commissioner, the trial court went against the advice of the jury and dismissed the claim against the State. The court found (1) that the plaintiff failed to carry the burden of proof with respect to the applicable standard of care for installing crash cushions; (2) that the plaintiff failed to prove a breach of duty; and (3) that, in any event, the Decedent was at least 50% at fault for speeding through a construction zone in foggy conditions. Later, the trial court granted Blalock's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and entered judgment in its favor. The court held (1) that Blalock was not responsible, as a matter of law, for leaving off the transition panel because the State's inspector on the scene "directed" Blalock to leave it off; (2) that the plaintiff failed to carry the burden of proving, by expert testimony, what a reasonably prudent contractor would have done under the circumstances; and (3) again, that the Decedent was at least 50% at fault. The court, acting as 13th juror, conditionally granted Blalock a new trial in the event the judgment in its favor was vacated or reversed. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm the judgment in favor of the State. We vacate the judgment in favor of Blalock and remand for a new trial as to that defendant. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Ty Amanns, et al vs. Jeff Grissom, et al.
This suit was filed in Circuit Court after first being filed and then voluntarily non-suited in Chancery Court. After multiple discovery abuses, the trial court entered an order pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37 dismissing the plaintiffs' suit. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth J. Cradic v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Kenneth J. Cradic, appeals the summary dismissal of post-conviction relief by the Sullivan County Criminal Court. The Petitioner was convicted of three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and three counts of incest, a Class C felony. He received a sentence of twenty years for each rape of a child conviction and a sentence of four years for each incest conviction. The trial court ordered that two of the twenty-year sentences for rape of a child be served consecutively to one another but concurrently with the third conviction and ordered that the three counts of incest be served consecutively to one another but concurrently with the rape of a child convictions, for an effective sentence of forty years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief without appointing counsel. Upon review, we reverse the judgment summarily denying post-conviction relief and remand this case to the postconviction court for a full evidentiary hearing on the Petitioner's claim of ineffectiveassistance of counsel regarding the misapplication of the sentencing law. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joey D. Herrell v. Howard Carlton, Warden - Concurring
I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion, given existing precedent. I believe though, that once the habeas court concludes that a judgment is void, it should transfer the case to the convicting court—a court of equal jurisdiction—for further proceedings. The habeas court should not be allowed to act further regarding the convicting case by limiting the options available to the Petitioner or to the convicting court upon transfer of the case. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joey D. Herrell v. Howard Carlton, Warden
The petitioner, Joey D. Herrell, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his application for his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In six separate cases, the petitioner pled guilty to the following: theft of property under $500, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, especially aggravated robbery, three counts of attempted aggravated burglary, theft of property over $1000, and evading arrest. The offenses in four of the cases were committed while the petitioner was released on bond from the remaining two cases. All pleas were entered on the same day, and the trial court imposed concurrent sentencing, which resulted in the petitioner receiving an effective sentence of twenty years. He has filed the instant habeas corpus petition alleging that the imposition of concurrent sentencing resulted in illegal sentences because they were imposed in direct contravention of a statute, as he had been released on bond at the time some of the offenses were committed. The habeas corpus court and the State agreed that the sentences were illegal, and the court found that the illegal portion of the sentences was not "a material element" of the petitioner's guilty plea agreement and that, therefore, he was not entitled to withdraw the plea. Rather, the court remanded the case to the trial court for imposition of consecutive sentencing. On appeal, the petitioner disagrees and asserts that he should be allowed to withdraw the plea. Following review of the record, we agree with the petitioner, reverse the decision of the habeas court, and remand with instruction to conduct a hearing to determine whether the illegal sentences were a material, bargained-for element of the plea agreement. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Blackburn & McCune, PLLC v. Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc. and Pre-Paid Legal Services of Tennessee, Inc.
This appeal involves legal insurance. The defendants have sold legal insurance for many years. The plaintiff law firm provided legal services to policyholders pursuant to the defendants' legal insurance policies. After Tennessee began to regulate legal insurance, the defendants were required to obtain State approval of their insurance rates and plans. The defendants submitted plans to the State. The plans included proposed rates and anticipated claims expenses, consisting primarily of the fees paid to the plaintiff law firm. The State informed the defendants that the initial filings did not reflect a sufficient loss ratio, that is, ratio of expenses to premium rates. The defendants revised the State filings to reflect an increase in the compensation paid to the plaintiff law firm. At the same time, the defendants presented the plaintiff law firm with a contract that required the plaintiff to pay the defendants for certain administrative services. The amount to be paid to the defendants essentially equaled the amount by which the defendants increased the plaintiff's compensation rate. Years later, the plaintiff discovered facts that caused it to conclude that the contract was a subterfuge to allow the defendants to recoup the increased compensation to the law firm while appearing to comply with the State's loss ratio requirement. The plaintiff informed the State of these facts and of its suspicion that the purpose of the arrangement was to circumvent the loss ratio requirement. After receiving this information, the State took no adverse action against the defendants. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit seeking restitution, asserting that the contract with the defendants was fraudulently induced and that it was void and unenforceable as against public policy. The plaintiff also asserted a claim under the filed rate doctrine, seeking to recover the difference between the pay rate that the defendants filed with the State and the rates actually paid to the plaintiff. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse the grant of summary judgment as to the claims of fraudulent inducement and violation of public policy, finding that genuine issues of material fact exist as to those claims. We affirm the trial court's decision on all remaining claims. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tremaine Nathaniel Pointer
The Defendant-Appellant, Tremaine Nathaniel Pointer, appeals the revocation of his probation by the Criminal Court of Davidson County. In case number 2006-D-2927, Pointer entered a guilty plea to possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. In case number 2007-B-1142, Pointer pled guilty to felony failure to appear, a Class E [*2] felony. Pursuant to his plea agreement, he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an eight year term of imprisonment for the drug conviction and was ordered to have a mental health and drug assessment. He was also sentenced to one year for the felony failure to appear conviction, which was imposed to run consecutively to the eight year sentence, for an effective nine-year sentence. The trial court ordered Pointer to serve six months in jail and the remainder of his sentence on supervised probation. After a revocation proceeding on September 19, 2008, Pointer was placed back on probation to be supervised by the community corrections program, and that placement was revoked on June 1, 2009, when the court ordered Pointer to serve his sentence. On appeal, Pointer contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement after revoking his probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking Pointer's probation in cases 2006-D-2927 and 2007-B-1142. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rodney A. Lucas
The Defendant-Appellant, Rodney A. Lucas, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County to possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony. He received a sentence of eight years to be served on probation. The trial court revoked Lucas' probation after his second violation. On appeal, Lucas admits that he violated his probation for a second time; however, he claims the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Russel B. Cain
The defendant, Russel B. Cain, entered a plea of guilty to three counts of aggravated sexual battery of a victim under the age of thirteen, a Class B felony, but reserved a certified question of law to Counts Two and Three of the indictment. Specifically, he requests this |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joann Butler, et al. v. Marion County, Tennessee
Landowners filed suit to determine ownership of that portion of Ann Wilson Road that crosses their property. Defendants sought and were granted summary judgment based on the running of several statutes of limitations. Landowners appealed. We affirm. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
Tonya L. Gerakios v. Michael T. Gerakios, Jr.
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court granted the wife a divorce, equitably divided the parties' property, and awarded the wife alimony in solido. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ambreco Shaw v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Ambreco Shaw, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, Petitioner contends that (1) counsel failed to fully investigate all possible defenses; (2) counsel failed to adequately meet with Petitioner and allow him to be involved in his defense; (3) counsel failed to properly convey and explain settlement offers; (4) counsel failed to properly advise Petitioner concerning his right to testify; (5) counsel improperly allowed Petitioner to appear at trial in prison clothing; (6) counsel failed to request a mental evaluation in a timely manner; and (7) counsel failed to cross-examine witnesses and provide proof at the sentencing hearing. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quidon Clemons
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Quidon Clemons, was convicted of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, aggravated stalking, a Class E felony, and violation of an order of protection, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to two years for aggravated stalking. As to the misdemeanors, Defendant was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days for assault, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for violation of an order of protection. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. On appeal, Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark Allred v. Berkline, LLC, et al.
The employee sustained gradual injuries to his arms and shoulders as a result of repetitive motion in the course of his employment. His employer denied liability based upon the affirmative defense of misrepresentation of physical condition. Employee had sustained gradual injuries to his left shoulder and arm during a previous job. He was placed under permanent activity restrictions and received a workers’ compensation award as a result of those injuries. In applying for employment with appellant, he did not disclose the prior injuries. The trial court concluded that the employer did not prove the misrepresentation defense. Permanent total disability benefits were awarded. Employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that it did not sustain its burden of proof as to the affirmative defense. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings and that the employee’s misrepresentation was willful, was relied upon by the employer and was causally related to his subsequent injuries. Because we find that the employer sustained its burden of proving its affirmative defense, we reverse the awarding of benefits. Finally, we conclude that the employer is not entitled to recover the cost of retaining a consulting physician to view a surgical procedure that did not take place. |
Overton | Workers Compensation Panel |