Roy E. Keough v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner Roy E. Keough appeals as of right the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. On May 9, 1997, a jury found the Petitioner guilty of the premeditated murder of his wife, Betty Keough, and the attempted first degree murder of Kevin Berry. For the murder conviction, the jury found that the Petitioner had previously been convicted of one or more felonies for which the statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person. See T.C.A. _ 39-13-204(i)(2). The jury further found that this aggravating circumstance outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury then sentenced the Petitioner to death. The trial court imposed a forty-year sentence for the attempted murder conviction to be served consecutive to his sentence of death. The Petitioner's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court. See State v. Keough, 18 S.W.3d 175 (Tenn. 2000). On December 12, 2000, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. An amendment was filed on February 14, 2003, and an addendum to the amended petition was filed on November 6, 2007. The post-conviction court held hearings on various dates in September, October, and November 2007. On July 23, 2008, the post-conviction court entered an order denying relief. On appeal to this Court, the Petitioner presents a number of claims that can be characterized in the following categories: (1) the Petitioner's trial counsel were ineffective, (2) the Petitioner's appellate counsel were ineffective; (3) the Petitioner was denied a fair trial and (4) Tennessee's death penalty statutory scheme is unconstitutional. Following a thorough and exhaustive review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harold Lee Harden v. Judy Kay Harden
This is a divorce action. Husband/Appellant appeals from the trial court's division of marital assets, award of attorneys fees to the Wife, and the stay of the proceedings during the pendency of the appeal. Affirmed as modified. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Wilson County Board of Education v. Wilson County Education Association and Steve Johnson
An assistant principal was transferred to a teaching position and grieved the transfer pursuant to a locally negotiated agreement between the local board of education and the organization representing teachers. After pursuing remedies through the school board, the teacher asked the trial court to compel the board to arbitrate resolution of the dispute. The trial court granted summary judgment to the school board, concluding that Tenn. Code Ann. _ 49-2-303 applied since "assistant principals" are statutorily the same as "principals" and, under the holding in Marion County Board of Education v. Marion County Education Association, 86 S.W.3d 202 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), the director of schools has the authority to transfer principals unrestrained by locally negotiated agreements. Mr. Johnson and the association appealed, claiming that Tenn. Code Ann. _ 49-2-303 does not apply to assistant principals and that the director of schools must comply with their agreement in making transfer decisions. We agree that the arbitration provision is not enforceable, but for a different reason. We hold that there was no meeting of the minds as to the procedure to be used as the final step in the grievance procedure. Consequently, there was no enforceable agreement to arbitrate. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas M. Gautreaux vs. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority
Thomas M. Gautreaux ("Gautreaux") filed a petition pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act for access to a settlement agreement involving Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority ("the Hospital" or "Erlanger") in a previous lawsuit. The Hospital denied the request, claiming that the document was privileged under the Tennessee Peer Review Law. Gautreaux then filed a petition for a show cause hearing. After the hearing, the trial court determined that the settlement agreement was exempt from disclosure under the Peer Review Law. Gautreaux appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Charles D. Stechebar vs. Deere & Company & John Doe
This case concerns a complaint for review by writ of certiorari and supersedeas. The initial action was a personal injury suit, arising from an automobile accident in which Plaintiff Charles D. Stechebar's vehicle was allegedly hit by a tractor-trailer owned by Defendant Deere and Company ("Deere") and driven by Defendant John Doe, an unidentified employee of Deere. The personal injury suit was dismissed with prejudice in the general sessions court when the plaintiff failed to appear for the initial trial date. The record reflects that twelve days before the initial trial date, the plaintiff had filed an amended civil summons and obtained a new trial date. Fifty days after the dismissal, the plaintiff filed an appeal to the circuit court, asserting that he had not been notified of the dismissal in time to file an appeal within the ten-day window required by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 27-5-108(a)(1). The circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff then filed the complaint for review by statutory writ of certiorari and supersedeas. The circuit court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the writ on the ground that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for which review could be granted. We hold that the plaintiff stated a claim for relief under statutory writ of certiorari and supersedeas. The trial court's judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy Lynn Harris v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I concur with the result reached in the majority opinion, given existing precedent. I write separately, though, to express my dissatisfaction with the result reached. I believe that once the habeas court concludes that a judgment is void, whether for an illegal conviction or |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tracy Lynn Harris v. Jim Worthington, Warden
The Petitioner, Tracy Lynn Harris, appeals as of right from the Morgan County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joseph Marion Barker v. Angel Chandler
This is the second appeal from a parenting plan entered by the trial court. The only issue in both appeals involved the necessity of a "paramour provision" in the parenting plan. On remand from the first appeal, the trial court was directed by this Court to determine whether a paramour provision was in the best interests of the children. After a hearing, the trial court determined that it was in the best interests of the children to have a paramour provision in effect. Mother appealed. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring a paramour provision as the record is devoid of any evidence to support a finding that the paramour provision is in the best interests of the children. Reversed. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Lee Gann, Alias Rickey Lee Gann
The Defendant, Ricky Lee Gann, alias Rickey Lee Gann, pled guilty to seven counts of theft of property valued $1,000 or more, a Class D felony, two counts of theft of property valued $500 or more, a Class E felony, and two counts of theft of property valued $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced to an effective six-year term in the Tennessee Department of Correction, followed by twelve years of probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences and in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alejandro Chevo Guana A.K.A. Alejandro Chevo Gouna
Appellant, Alejandro Chevo Guana, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder for killing Tennessee State Trooper Calvin Jenks during a routine traffic stop. He was sentenced to life in prison. He was also convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, for which he was to serve one year. He appeals, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) limiting his cross-examination of his co-defendant to reveal alleged bias; (2) denying a change of venue; (3) refusing to use his proffered jury questionnaire; (4) denying his request for individual and sequestered voir dire; and (5) finding the evidence sufficient for conviction where, he claims, the only evidence of premeditation was the testimony of his accomplice. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George R. Fyke
On April 5, 2007, the Defendant, George R. Fyke, pleaded guilty to four counts of forgery, one count of identity theft, and three counts of passing worthless checks. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, he received an effective six-year sentence to be served in the Community Corrections Program for these convictions. Thereafter, on April 21, 2008, the Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of identity theft, one count of theft over $10,000, two counts of theft over $1,000, one count of attempted theft, and two counts of forgery. Also on that day, the Defendant admitted his violation of his April 2007 community corrections sentence. The trial court granted the Defendant a furlough to attend and complete a one-year rehabilitation program before sentencing. Following the Defendant's failure to complete the program, a sentencing hearing was held. The trial court ordered that the remainder of the Defendant's six-year sentence be served in confinement and, for the April 2008 convictions, imposed an effective eight-year sentence to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering revocation of his community corrections sentence and that his eight-year sentence his excessive. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court. However, we must remand for entry of a corrected judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Karen Koons
The Defendant-Appellant, Karen Koons, was convicted by a Lawrence County jury of driving under the influence, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. She received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days probation, following service of forty-five days in jail. On appeal, Koons challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Linda M. Moran
Appellant Linda M. Moran pled guilty to a 207-count indictment after it was revealed that she had stolen approximately $73,000 from her employer over the course of nearly a decade. At sentencing, Appellant argued that she should be given some form of alternative sentencing. The trial court disagreed and imposed an effective sentence of nine years in custody. Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Robertson, a/k/a Jere Robertson vs. Clara Robertson Hodges, et ux., et al
|
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
James Erwin vs. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America
|
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Calvin Benn vs. Public Building Authority of Knox County, et al
|
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Billy Joe Stricklan
This appeal involves contested wills and a settlement agreement involving minors. After the death of Billy Joe Stricklan ("Decedent"), his daughter, Teresa Diane Stricklan Coleman ("Daughter"), filed two wills for Probate. Finding the first will valid would result in the entirety of Decedent's estate being awarded to Daughter, while finding the second will valid would result in the estate, minus $100 to Daughter, being divided among Decedent's greatgrandchildren. After the probate court certified the case to circuit court for a will contest, Daughter and the guardian ad litem for the great-grandchildren negotiated a settlement. These parties obtained the probate court's approval of the settlement over the objection of the proponent of second will, Decedent's brother, Reed Stricklan ("Brother"). The probate court also ordered a partial distribution of the cash assets now held in the estate to Daughter. Brother appeals. We vacate the settlement order. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Madison N.J.M.
This is a case involving the custody of a minor child, Madison N.J.M. ("the Child"). The Child lived with her mother, K.S. ("Mother"), until she was four. After 1 the Child was adjudicated dependent and neglected, she was placed in the temporary custody of her maternal grandmother, L.R. ("Grandmother"). Grandmother later sought permanent custody. A paternity suit was filed and it was ultimately determined that C.A.M. ("Father") is the Child's biological father. Soon after paternity was established, Father entered into a mediated agreement which provided that Grandmother would remain as the Child's primary caregiver with parenting time for Father. A final order adopting the terms of the mediated agreement was entered and Grandmother was granted custody of the Child. Father actively pursued a parental relationship and increased time with the Child; he later sought full custody. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court ordered a change of custody from Grandmother to Father based upon its finding of a material change in circumstances and its determination that custody with Father is in the best interest of the Child. On appeal de novo to the trial court, the judgment was affirmed. Grandmother appeals. We also affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Dejuan Webster v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Joseph Dejuan Webster, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree murder. State v. Joseph Dejuan Webster, No. M2007-00050-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2229208, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 29, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2008). He received a life sentence for the conviction which was ordered to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. Id. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief. Petitioner filed an amended petition, and the post-conviction court held a hearing. After the hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We have reviewed the record and conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tenithia Malena
The Defendant-Appellant, Tenithia Malena, was convicted by a Hardeman County Circuit Court jury of one count of burglary, a Class D felony, and one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. The trial court approved the sentence recommendation by the State and sentenced Malena as a Range I, standard offender to three years of supervised probation for the burglary conviction. The court also ordered her to pay $20,000 in restitution by April 4, 2008 and ordered her to pay the restitution balance of $34,662.44 in monthly payments of $350.00 starting May 1, 2008. In addition, the trial court sentenced her, pursuant to the State's recommendation, as a Range I, standard offender to six years of supervised probation for the theft conviction, which was to be served consecutively to the burglary conviction, for an effective nine-year probationary sentence. In this appeal, Malena challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence, (2) the admission of her financial records as evidence related to the theft charge, and (3) the trial court's denial of her motion for new trial on the ground that extraneous prejudicial information was considered by the jury. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Hall v. Am Comp Assurance Corporation
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Michael Hall (“Employee”) alleged that he sustained compensable injuries as a result of repetitive use of his hands and arms in the course of his employment as a butcher for Latham’s Meat Company (“Employer”). Employer denied that he had sustained a compensable injury. In the alternative, it alleged that Employee’s injuries had been caused by his part-time work for a second employer. The trial court found that Employee had sustained compensable injuries to his arms and that Employer was liable for workers’ compensation benefits arising from those injuries. It awarded 22.5% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to both arms. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred by finding that a compensable injury occurred and by finding that Employee sustained permanent disability as a result. We affirm the judgment. |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Lara L. Battleson vs. Dean L. Battleson
Approximately 29 months after the parties' divorce became final, Lara L. Battleson ("Wife") filed a motion in the trial court asking that Dean L. Battleson ("Husband") be held in contempt because of his failure to pay child support. Wife served a copy of the motion and notice of hearing on Douglas R. Beier ("Counsel"), the attorney who had represented Husband in the divorce action. Counsel filed a motion to dismiss supported by an affidavit stating that he no longer represented Husband and that his mail to Husband had been returned undeliverable. The trial court found that service on Counsel was sufficient. As a consequence of this ruling, the court denied Counsel's motion to dismiss; it also granted the motion for contempt. Husband appeals. We vacate the trial court's judgment of contempt and remand for further proceedings. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tyler M.
At an earlier time, i.e., November 1, 2004, the trial court, inter alia, ordered Pamela M. ("Mother") to pay Gregory L. E. ("Father"), the then-custodian of their child, Tyler M. ("the Child"), a child support arrearage of $7,920 (through October 31, 2004) and prospective monthly child support of $165 plus $35 to be applied on the arrearage. Over the years that followed, several petitions were filed, the disposition of which are not germane to the issues on this appeal. On November 23, 2005, Mother filed a petition for modification based upon the fact that the Child was then in her custody under an order of the trial court. The trial court entered an order on February 15, 2006, providing that "current support is terminated because [Mother] now has custody of the [C]hild." The record contains a number of subsequent pleadings and orders that also are not relevant to this appeal. Finally, on January 16, 2009, Mother filed a petition for modification seeking "to terminate all arrearage and liquidate arrearage to [F]ather." The trial court entered an order on July 17, 2009, determining that "the arrearage balance was proper based on the fact that child support cannot be modified retroactively." The court did reduce Mother's monthly arrearage payment from $50 to $35. Mother appeals and both sides raise issues. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kay & Kay Contracting, LLC vs. Tennessee Department of Transportation
Kay and Kay Contracting, LLC ("Contractor") entered into a contract with the Tennessee Department of Transportation ("TDOT") to build a bridge in Campbell County, Tennessee. Contractor subsequently entered into a subcontract with Whitley County Stone, LLC ("Subcontractor") to provide the excavation and grading work on the project. Subcontractor does not have a written contract with TDOT. Both Contractor and Subcontractor filed claims with the Claims Commission alleging they were owed money by TDOT. Subcontractor was dismissed as a party because it did not have a written contract with TDOT, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 9-8-307(a)(1)(L). The Commissioner, however, determined that Contractor was allowed to prosecute Subcontractor's claim as a "pass-through" claim. The sole issue on this interlocutory appeal is whether Tenn. Code Ann. _ 9-8-307(a)(1)(L) removes the State's sovereign immunity such that Contractor can assert a "pass-through" claim against TDOT on Subcontractor's behalf. We conclude that sovereign immunity from such a claim is not removed, and we reverse the judgment of the Claims Commission. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Regina D. Wiser vs Cyrus W. Wiser, Jr.
This appeal concerns post-divorce modification of alimony and child support. The parties had two children; during the marriage, the wife remained at home and cared for the parties' children. The husband was self-employed through his solely owned company. Ultimately, the parties divorced on stipulated grounds, and the husband was ordered to pay child support. The husband was awarded his business. The trial court awarded two commercial buildings to the wife and ordered the husband to pay the associated mortgage. The husband was ordered to pay alimony until the buildings were paid off, after which the wife's income was to be derived from the buildings. After the divorce, the income of the husband's company increased substantially and the husband refinanced the buildings. Two years after the divorce, the wife filed a petition for modification of alimony and child support. After a trial, the trial court declined to increase the alimony. It granted an increase in the husband's child support obligation to the maximum under the guidelines, but declined to award more than the guideline amount. The trial court also declined to award the wife attorney fees. The wife now appeals. We find that the increase in the income of the husband's company was a substantial and material change in circumstances, and that the decision not to increase alimony was an abuse of discretion, and therefore modify the alimony award. We affirm the trial court's refusal to grant an upward deviation from the guideline amount of child support. We reverse the trial court's denial of the wife's request for attorney fees with respect to child support and alimony, but affirm the denial of attorney fees for the refinancing of the two buildings awarded to the wife. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |