APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded appellee Sharon Clark’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits and held appellant Sprint PCS liable rather than Clark’s successor employer, appellee Convergys. The trial court also assessed discretionary costs against Sprint. Sprint contends that the trial court erred in (1) holding it rather than Convergys liable for Clark’s claim; (2) relying on medical depositions taken while Sprint was not a party; and (3) assessing discretionary costs against it. After our review of the record, we reverse the trial court’s judgment against Sprint and order judgment against Convergys. We remand
this matter for the reassessment of discretionary costs.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee was an LPN for a nursing home. She was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome in 2003. She was terminated, for reasons unrelated to her work injury, in 2005. She began working in a similar job for a second nursing home. In September 2006, she had surgery to treat her condition. She sued the earlier employer, but not the latter employer, seeking workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court applied the “last day worked” rule, and found that the injury occurred while she worked for the second employer. The lawsuit was dismissed. The employee has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its determination of the date of her injury. We affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, Curtis Palmer, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective as follows: (1) counsel admitted the petitioner’s guilt during the trial without the petitioner’s consent; (2) counsel failed to adequately investigate possible grounds for a speedy trial; (3) counsel failed to challenge invalid indictments; and (4) counsel failed to properly litigate the suppression of evidence. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction
relief is affirmed.

The petitioner, Jerome Bond, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following his convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, the petitioner was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and twenty-five years. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an alibi witness at trial. Following review of the record, the denial of post-conviction relief is affirmed.

In this workers’ compensation action, the trial court awarded benefits for a 70% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole for the combination of a lower back injury and a mental injury. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in awarding benefits for the mental injury and by relying upon the evaluating physician’s impairment rating for the lower back injury. In the alternative, the employer contends that the award is excessive and that the trial court erred by finding that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.1

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee sustained a compensable shoulder injury. She alleged that she sustained an additional injury to her back as a result of medical treatment for the shoulder injury. Her employer denied that claim. A settlement of both claims was approved by the Department of Labor. The settlement agreement stated that the back injury was being settled on a disputed claim basis, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-206(b). The employee returned to work for her employer for approximately three years. She was unable to satisfy her production quota and was eventually terminated for that reason. She sought reconsideration of both claims in the trial court. The trial court held that reconsideration of the back injury claim was barred by the terms of the settlement. It denied reconsideration of the shoulder injury claim because her
termination was for “misconduct.” Employee has appealed, contending that the trial court erred.1 We affirm the judgment.

In 2001, a Hardeman County jury convicted the Petitioner, Melvin L. Cofer, of one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”), third offense, one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, and one count of vehicular homicide. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to a twenty-one year effective sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in which he alleged that his indictment was fatally defective. The habeas corpus court summarily denied the petition. On appeal, he contends that the habeas corpus court erred when it summarily dismissed his petition and failed to appoint him counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand the case for the appointment of counsel and for a hearing on the issue of the sufficiency of the indictment for aggravated vehicular homicide.

In this divorce action, the husband appeals the trial court’s award to the wife of permanent alimony. In addition, he contends the trial court erred in requiring him to pay the wife’s monthly health insurance premiums and to maintain an existing life insurance policy on his life with the wife designated as the beneficiary. We affirm.

In this workers’ compensation action, the trial court found the employee had sustained an
occupational disease as the result of environmental conditions at a hazardous waste storage facility on the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Reservation. The employer has appealed on the ground that no specific irritant or contaminant was identified as having caused the employee’s illness and that the trial court was precluded from finding the employee sustained a compensable occupational disease because he suffered from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease prior to his employment with Bechtel Jacobs Co., LLC. After review of the record, 1 we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Scotty Lee Johnson, appeals from the revocation of his probation. In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by ordering incarceration. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Anthony L. Williams, of first degree premeditated murder, felony aggravated assault, and felony reckless endangerment. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve a life sentence for his first-degree murder conviction, a four-year sentence for his aggravated assault conviction, and a two-year sentence for his felony reckless endangerment conviction. The Defendant appeals, contending: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense; and (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on defense of others. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial with co-defendant Maurice Nash, Defendant, Spencer Louis Lark, Jr., was found guilty of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to six years for each aggravated assault conviction, and two years for his felony reckless endangerment conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of six years. Defendant does not appeal the length or manner of service of his sentences. In his appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Alisha J. Glisson, was convicted of felony murder, aggravated robbery, and three counts of attempted aggravated robbery. She was sentenced to an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant presents a single issue for our review: whether the proof is sufficient to support her conviction for felony murder. She argues that the State failed to show that she was criminally responsible for the death of the victim and, alternatively, failed to sufficiently corroborate the testimony of the accomplices. After a review of the evidence in the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiffs/Appellees bring this case pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and a negligent bailment theory. They allege that auto service center made poor cosmetic repairs to interior of their car and that exterior of the car was damaged while at the service center. Finding no violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and that Defendant/Appellant failed to overcome presumption of negligent bailment, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee, Byron Smallen, alleged that he had sustained a gradual hearing loss as a result of exposure to noise in the workplace. Ownership of his employer had changed approximately one year prior to his last day worked. The trial court awarded 50% permanent partial disability to the hearing of both ears, and assigned liability to the new owner of the business, International Muffler. That party has appealed, contending that the trial court incorrectly applied the last injurious exposure rule. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Edward Leon Davis, was convicted by a jury of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine) weighing more than .5 grams, a Class B felony. For his conviction, the defendant received a sentence of ten years. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant probation or alternative sentencing.

The Defendant, Archie Ray Moore, was convicted of selling .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to nineteen years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; and (2) the trial court erred in denying him community corrections and in setting the length of his sentence. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brandon D. Thomas, was convicted by a jury of misdemeanor evading arrest. He was sentenced to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Warren County Jail. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on resisting arrest as a lesser-included offense of misdemeanor evading arrest. We conclude that this contention lacks merit, and we accordingly affirm.

Following the entry of a final decree in a divorce action, Husband filed a motion to alter or amend the decree, pursuant to Rule 60, Tenn. R. Civ. P., asserting that the parties made a clerical error in the marital dissolution agreement, as a result of which Wife received a higher percentage of marital assets than intended. The trial court denied relief. We affirm the action of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael S. Morani, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Michael Virga, was convicted of aggravated arson for burning down a trailer home where he resided. He was also convicted of first degree felony murder for the death of Rochelle Hinrich, who died in the fire. He challenges his convictions, arguing that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress his confession to law enforcement officers because the statements were not given freely, voluntarily, and intelligently. He also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a factual dispute about whether defendant signed a lease as a tenant and is liable under the terms of the lease. The Trial Court held defendant liable for damages under the lease. We affirm.

Mother and Father appeal the order of the Juvenile Court for Dickson County, Tennessee terminating their parental rights. Mother’s termination was based on: noncompliance with the permanency plan; failure to visit; failure to establish a suitable home; and the persistence of conditions that prevent return of the children; and the children’s best interests. Father’s termination was based on noncompliance with the permanency plan and the children’s best interests. Finding by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the children’s best interests, as modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant-appellant, Tony Lee Crowe (hereinafter “Crowe”), was convicted by a jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. He received an effective sentence of sixteen years’ imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He now appeals challenging (1) the sufficiency of the evidence, (2) whether the trial court properly exercised its role as the thirteenth juror, and (3) the denial of his amended motion for new trial based on new evidence. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm Crowe’s convictions but remand the case for the sole purpose of considering the third amended motion for new trial.

The defendant, Tommy Holmes, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a violent offender to twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. He raised a number of issues in his original direct appeal, including whether the trial court erred in finding that he had forfeited his right to trial counsel. We found no merit in the other claims, but remanded to the trial court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing with respect to the forfeiture of counsel issue. See State v. Tommy L. Holmes, No. W2006-00236-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1651876 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 2007), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007). After holding that hearing, the trial court entered an order finding that the defendant had forfeited the right to counsel by physically assaulting his trial counsel. The defendant now appeals from that order, arguing that his behavior was not sufficiently egregious to warrant the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s order finding that the defendant waived his right to counsel. Having previously found no merit to the defendant’s other issues raised on direct appeal, we also affirm his judgment of conviction.