APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff corporation and stockholders sued defendant to enforce a Stock Redemption and Shareholder Agreement signed by defendant, when he refused to comply with the terms of the Agreement after he was terminated from the company. The Trial Court granted plaintiff partial summary judgment, finding that the Agreement was enforceable, and defendant has appealed. We affirm the partial summary judgment of the Trial Court and remand, with instructions.

The Petitioner, Craig L. Beene, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial  court’s dismissal.

The Appellant, Naomi Lovell Preyer, appeals the sentencing decision of the Tipton County Circuit Court. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Preyer pled guilty to identity theft and forgery, both Class D felonies. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of twelve years, as a career offender, for each conviction and ordered that the sentences be served in confinement. On appeal, Preyer asserts that the trial court’s denial of a community corrections sentence was error.   Following review of the record, we affirm.

An employee/minority shareholder appeals the summary dismissal of his action in which he sought to recover commissions the corporation allegedly owed him for prior work and damages arising out of an alleged breach of fiduciary duty and fraud by the president/majority shareholder. The trial court granted the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the corporation and by the president/majority shareholder, finding the employee failed to show that there was a genuine issue for trial as to whether employee was owed commissions and whether the president/majority shareholder committed fraud or breached his fiduciary duty. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother/Appellant appeals the Order of the Shelby County Juvenile Court terminating her parental rights to her two minor children. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the grounds of persistence of conditions and failure to substantially comply with the permanency plans are not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that termination of her parental rights is not in the best interests of the children. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support termination on the grounds of failure to substantially comply with the permanency plans, and clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interests of the children, we affirm.

This is a construction case. In a contract prepared by the plaintiff, contractor agreed to install sewer lines, water lines, roads and to perform certain site preparation work for a section of a subdivision development owned by the defendant-owner. The total contract price is $925,000, which includes the material and labor to complete the project. The trial court entered judgment for contractor. Owner appeals and contractor cross-appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, William Miller, pleaded guilty to sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, and two counts of sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, Class C felonies, in exchange for an effective sentence of 12 years. On post-conviction appeal, the petitioner argues that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced and entered without an understanding of the consequences, that the prosecution failed to disclose favorable evidence, and that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate alibis and inform him of opportunities to appeal motions. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Prison Disciplinary Board found a prisoner guilty of two disciplinary infractions, fined him $5.00 for each infraction and sentenced him to two thirty-day terms in punitive segregation. The prisoner filed a petition for writ of certiorari, alleging that there were irregularities in the procedures followed by the disciplinary board and that its actions were arbitrary, capricious, and characterized by an abuse of discretion. The trial court granted the writ, and the department accordingly sent the administrative record to the court for review. The respondents then filed a motion for judgment on the record. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the prisoner's claim. We affirm the trial court.

A Weakley County jury convicted the Petitioner, Peter Graves, of possession of both a schedule II and a schedule IV drug with intent to sell or deliver, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifteen years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. The Petitioner now appeals, claiming: (1) he was denied the right to a fair trial because the jury saw him in handcuffs and shackles; (2) he was denied the right to a fair trial because the trial court did not conduct a jury out hearing when jurors wanted to ask him questions; and (3) he was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel. Upon a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The trial court entered an order modifying its earlier parenting plan. After the Court’s judgment, the mother filed a motion attacking the jurisdiction of the Court to modify the prior order. The trial court overruled the motion. On appeal, we find that neither the child nor either of the parents have resided in Tennessee since 2002. Therefore, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to modify its prior order. We reverse and dismiss.

The mother and stepfather of two minor children filed a petition against the father of the children to terminate the father’s parental rights. The petitioners alleged, inter alia, that the father abandoned the children by failing to exercise any of the residential time and vacation time awarded to the father in the divorce and that he had willfully failed to visit the children during the four months preceding the filing of the petition. Following a bench trial, in which the mother and stepfather were represented by counsel, but the father was pro se, the trial court dismissed the petition to terminate based upon the finding that “due to the costs of transportation between the parties respective homes in Giles County and Cannon County and due to [the father’s] limited income,” the petitioners had failed to establish the ground of abandonment. The mother and stepfather have appealed, contending the trial court failed to correctly apply the law to the facts of this case and that the evidence clearly and convincingly proves that the father’s failure to visit was willful due to the fact he had a vehicle, for which he could afford insurance, and the cost of driving the approximately sixty miles between their homes was within his financial means. We have determined that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the best interests of the minor children, which is mandated by Tenn. S. Ct. R. 13 § 1(d)(2) in proceedings to terminate a parent’s rights when the petition is contested. We have also determined that if the father was indigent, which fact may be significant to the issue of willfulness, he had a constitutional right to appointed counsel. As Tenn. S. Ct. R. 13 § 1 (c) and (e) mandates, when the father appeared without counsel, the trial court had an affirmative duty to advise the father of his rights and to conduct an indigency hearing to determine if he was without sufficient means to pay reasonable attorney fees for representation in this case and, if so, to appoint counsel to represent him. We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including if necessary a new trial on the merits of the issues raised in the petition filed in this matter.

In this appeal of a directed verdict in a wrongful death case, Daniel Pantoja Garcia (“Husband”) claims that Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk Southern”) was negligent in failing to warn his now-deceased wife, Lydia Garcia (“Wife”), of the presence of diesel fuel inside a fuel tank that Wife, as an employee of Progress Rail Services Corporation (“Progress Rail”), was assigned to dismantle. As Wife was cutting the tank with a torch-cutter on Norfolk Southern’s property, the tank exploded, killing Wife. The trial court granted a directed verdict because it found no evidence that Norfolk Southern owed any duty in this case. We affirm.

This appeal involves a declaratory judgment regarding the termination of a contract to install a cable system and provide cable service to a trailer park as well as a counter-complaint for damages. The trial court determined that the contract was properly terminated and dismissed the counter-complaint. On appeal, the Appellant argues that (1) the Appellee waived its contractual right to have this matter decided pursuant to Kentucky law; (2) that the trial court erred in determining that it materially breached the contract by failing to install a new system in a timely manner; (3) that the trial court erred in determining that it did not provide cable service equal to the service rendered by the former cable provider; (4) that the trial court erred in determining that the contract was properly terminated; (5) that it is entitled to damages because the Appellee failed to notify the Appellant with information about new residents as required by the contract; and (6) that the trial court erred by awarding the Appellee its attorney’s fees and failing to award the Appellant its attorney’s fees. We find that the Appellee has waived its right to have this matter determined pursuant to Kentucky law. The trial court did not err in determining that the Appellant materially breached the contract by not providing cable service equal to the service previously provided and that the contract was properly terminated. Furthermore, we find that the Appellant is not entitled to damages because the Appellant did not prove what damages it incurred due to the Appellee’s failure to provide the homes of new residents as required by the contract. Finally, the trial court did not err in awarding the Appellee’s attorney’s fees. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for the award of Appellee’s attorney’s fees on appeal.

Appellant, David Harold Hammond, was convicted by a Madison County jury of one count of rape.  As a result, the trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range II multiple offender to twelve years incarceration. Because Appellant was on probation at the time the rape was committed, the trial court ordered Appellant’s sentence to run consecutively to two existing felony sentences. Appellant complains on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the rape conviction and that the trial court improperly ordered him to serve his sentence for rape consecutively to his existing sentences. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and the trial court properly sentenced Appellant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Joey Dewayne Thompson, appeals from his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 25 years to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant claims that the conviction of second degree murder is unsupported by sufficient evidence, that the verdicts are contradictory, that the prosecution for and conviction of second degree murder violated principles of double jeopardy, and that the prosecution was barred by principles of collateral estoppel. Following our review, we affirm the convictions.

The Appellant, James Alan Bates, appeals the order of the Sullivan County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief in which he asserted ineffective assistance of counsel. Bates contends that trial counsel was ineffective based upon the following: (1) failing to call a DNA expert as a witness at trial; (2) failing to utilize an investigator to aid in locating potential defense witnesses; (3) failing to adequately communicate and report developments in preparation of the defense at trial and on appeal; (4) failing to file a motion for a speedy trial; and (5) failing to provide “street clothes” for incarcerated defense witnesses, who testified while wearing their jail uniforms.  After review, we affirm.

Defendant, Gary M. Carter, pled guilty to statutory rape, a Class E felony, with the length and manner of service of his sentence to be determined following a sentencing hearing. Defendant received a sentence of two years to be served in split confinement with nine months incarceration followed by four years probation. Defendant argues, on appeal, (1) that the trial court erred in denying full probation and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion in denying judicial diversion and not articulating the reasons on the record. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the denial of judicial diversion and reverse the imposition of the sentence of nine months incarceration and remand to the trial court for an entry of an amended judgment imposing 7.2 months incarceration followed by four years probation.

The Appellant, William Justin Brewster, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Knox County Criminal Court. Brewster argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief on his asserted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel both during trial and on appeal. Upon thorough review, we conclude that the post-conviction court correctly denied the petition and affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Lynn Adams, injured his lower back in the course of his employment in October 2002. The employer, Ace Trucking Company, accepted the injury as compensable. Mr. Adams received temporary total disability benefits and medical treatment. He was released to full duty in February 2003. However, he was unable to return to work for reasons unrelated to his employment. In April 2004, he sought, and received, additional medical treatment for his back injury. He was referred to a neurosurgeon, who concluded that his symptoms were not caused by his work injury. Mr. Adams had an independent medical examination in August 2005. The evaluating physician concluded that Mr. Adams had sustained a permanent impairment of 8% to the body as a whole as a result of the October 2002 injury. The trial court found that Mr. Adams had suffered a permanent injury, and awarded 20% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Ace Trucking appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Rimmer, was convicted of one count of premeditated murder, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of theft of property. In the penalty phase of the trial, the jury imposed a sentence of death for the first degree murder. On appeal as of right, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions, reversed the sentence of death, and remanded to the trial court for a second sentencing hearing. State v. Rimmer (Rimmer I), No. W1999-00637-CCA-R3-DD, 2001WL 567960 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 25, 2001). At the conclusion of that proceeding, a different jury imposed the death penalty based upon one statutory aggravating circumstance, i.e. that the defendant had a previous conviction for a felony with statutory elements involving violence to the person. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2) (1997). As required for the imposition of a sentence of death, the jury also concluded that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. This sentence was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. State v. Rimmer (Rimmer II), No. W2004-02240-CCA-R3-DD, 2006 WL 3731206 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec.15, 2006). Our review is mandatory. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1) (2006). Upon careful review of the entire record, we hold as follows: (1) although the trial court erred during the sentencing hearing by excluding evidence solely on the grounds of hearsay, the evidence was either introduced through other means or lacking in relevance or reliability, so the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) for a waiver of his right to testify to have been valid, a defendant need not state on the record that he was informed by counsel of our ruling in State v. Cazes, 875 .W.2d 253, 266 (Tenn. 1994); (3) the jury instruction defining reasonable doubt does not offend due process; (4) references by defense counsel and a defense witness that the defendant previously had been on “death row” did not, under these circumstances, entitle the defendant to a new sentencing hearing; and (5) the sentence of death satisfies the proportionality guidelines. As to the remaining issues, we agree with the conclusions reached by the Court of Criminal Appeals. The relevant portions of the opinion are appended. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.

The question in this appeal is which statutory local option sales tax distribution system is to be applied.  We have essentially concluded that the appropriate statute is the one in effect when the distribution is to be made. I concur totally with the majority opinion and write separately simply toemphasize the context in which this decision is made and the consistency of the logic of the opinion with the practicalities of that context.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a permanent disability as a result of his work injury and awarded benefits for 80% permanent partial disability. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in finding that the employee’s permanent disability was work-related and, in the alternative, that the award was excessive. The employee contends that the trial court should have found him to be permanently and totally disabled. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves protracted litigation concerning the zoning of a parcel of land located in Memphis, Tennessee. After a bridge, which provided the only access to the property, collapsed, the landowners planned to install and maintain billboards on the subject parcel by helicopter. The landowners initially applied to the Memphis City Council to have the subject parcel re-zoned from agricultural uses to commercial uses. The Memphis City Council rejected the landowners’ application. The landowners filed a petition for review by common law and statutory writ of certiorari and an action for declaratory judgment in the circuit court. The circuit court entered an order reversing the decision of the Memphis City Council and  remanding the case to the Council for a new hearing. Upon remand, the Memphis City Council once again rejected the landowners’ application. The landowners filed a petition for contempt in the circuit court alleging the Council violated the court's order on remand. The trial court found that the Council violated its order, but that the Council was not in willful contempt of the court’s order because it relied on the erroneous advice of its lawyer in interpreting the order. The trial court remanded the case to the Memphis City Council for a new hearing. The City filed an appeal in this Court. After noting that reliance on the advice of counsel is not a defense to contempt, we reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case to the trial court to determine if the contempt was willful. On remand, the trial court found that the City was in willful contempt of the trial court’s order and assessed daily damages of $1,500, accruing from June 13, 2003 order, until the Council complied with the court’s order. The City filed a second appeal in this Court. We vacate the trial court’s damages order and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The issue on appeal in this annexation dispute between the annexing city and the county is which tax allocation statute controls the allocation of Local Option Revenue derived from the annexed territory: the one in effect when the city passed the annexation ordinance on final reading, or the one in effect when the annexation ordinance became operative following a protracted quo warranto action. The city, which annexed valuable retail and commercial property, contends the tax scheme in effect in 1995 when the ordinance passed final reading applies. The county contends Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-115(b)(2) (1998), which was enacted after the ordinance was passed by the city, applies because it was in effect when the ordinance became operative. The Chancellor ruled in favor of the city, finding the statute in effect when the city passed the annexation ordinance applies. We reverse finding Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-115(b)(2) (1998), which was in effect when the ordinance became operative, controls the allocation of tax revenue from the annexed territory.

A Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Cameron Winselle, guilty of two counts of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to two consecutive life sentences. On appeal, the Defendant claims the evidence does not sufficiently support his convictions. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.