APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Emmett Crutcher, pled guilty in 2005 to attempted aggravated arson and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In 2006, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied his petition, and we affirm that judgment.

Defendant, Bobby Glenn Scott, entered a plea of guilty to possession of methamphetamine, a Schedule II drug, a Class B felony; possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, a Class E felony. The transcript of the guilty plea submission hearing is not in the record. The judgments of conviction reflect that the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twelve years for possession of cocaine, two years for his weapons conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his misdemeanor conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of twelve years. Defendant attempted to reserve a certified question of law under Rule 37(b)(2)(I) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized after execution of a search warrant. After review, we conclude that this Court does not have jurisdiction to address the certified question because the certification did not meet the requirements of State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988). The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

This is a case involving the chancery court’s decision not to terminate a mother’s parental rights. The father and his wife petitioned the court to terminate the mother’s rights and allow the wife to adopt the minor child. The court held a termination hearing to determine if the other’s rights should be terminated. In the order dismissing the petition for termination and adoption, the court found that the mother had not abandoned the child by failure to visit because her attempts to maintain contact and visit the child were thwarted by the father and his wife. As to the father and wife’s contention that the mother abandoned the child by her failure to pay child support, the court found that the mother had no reason why she did not pay child support, but then found that her failure to pay did not constitute abandonment. On this appeal, we do not have a transcript of the trial proceedings. The father filed a statement of the evidence, and the mother filed an objection to the father’s proposed statement of the evidence. In the mother’s filed objection, she stated that the parties stipulated at trial that her failure to pay child support “was not sufficient in itself to terminate [her] parental rights.” The chancery court certified its own statement of evidence, concurring with the mother’s filed objection and stating that the mother’s failure to pay child support was not willful
because of her lack of education and inability to maintain employment. Father appeals, and we affirm.

I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err by approving the special litigation committee’s report. For a variety of reasons, however, I must respectfully dissent with regard to the holding that a minority shareholder suing on behalf of a for-profit corporation can never recover attorney fees under the common fund doctrine. First, I do not believe that failure of the General Assembly to include the common fund doctrine in the Tennessee Business Corporation Act (“TBCA”) abrogates our holding in Grant v. Lookout Mountain Co., 28 S.W. 90 (Tenn. 1894). Secondly, the common fund doctrine is not analogous to Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-17-401(d), which authorizes an award of attorney fees against the opposing party. Finally, from a policy standpoint, the application of the common fund doctrine to shareholder derivative suits is desirable to promote corporate accountability.

A minority shareholder in a closely held Tennessee corporation filed a derivative suit claiming that the company’s majority shareholder, who also served as the corporation’s president and chairman of its board of directors, misappropriated corporate funds. The minority shareholder also filed an individual claim against the majority shareholder alleging that he breached a pre-incorporation agreement in which the majority shareholder agreed to offer available stock to the corporation and other shareholders before purchasing the stock himself. A litigation committee appointed by the corporation to investigate the allegations against the majority shareholder found merit to the charges. The litigation committee recommended to the corporation that the company either settle the derivative claim or proceed with the litigation if the majority shareholder was unwilling to resolve the lawsuit in accordance with terms proposed by the committee. The trial court found that the litigation committee’s findings and recommendations were in the corporation’s best interests and that, once a settlement was reached, the derivative suit would be dismissed. The trial court also granted summary judgment to the majority shareholder on the individual breach of contract claim and denied the minority shareholder’s request for attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s acceptance of the litigation committee’s report and the denial of attorney’s fees to the minority shareholder, but reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the majority shareholder on the breach of contract claim. We accepted review to determine: (1) whether a plaintiff in a shareholder’s derivative suit brought on behalf of a for-profit corporation may recover attorney’s fees; and (2) whether the trial court was correct in adopting the findings of the litigation committee’s report. We hold that Tennessee law does not authorize an award of attorney’s fees to a plaintiff in a shareholder’s derivative suit brought on behalf of a for-profit corporation. We also hold that the trial court did not err in approving the sufficiently independent, thoroughly researched report of the litigation committee. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to those issues is affirmed.

Plaintiff sued recipient of an inter vivos gift to recover the gift on the grounds defendant violated a fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff, and the failure of defendant to comply with conditions of the gift. The Trial Court ruled in favor of defendant. We affirm.

This case involves a property dispute between neighbors. Property owner and her son who resides on her property brought an action to quiet title and for ejectment against a neighboring property owner. The trial court imposed sanctions against the defendant under Rule 37 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure for failing to comply with its order compelling discovery responses. The court subsequently granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and, after a hearing on damages, issued a permanent injunction against the defendant and her son and a judgment for damages and costs against the defendants. The defendants have appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, reverse in part and remand.

An inmate appeals the dismissal of his lawsuit under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-807(b) for failure to make partial payment of the filing fee and argues the trial court abused its discretion in failing to specify the amount of the partial payment due. The trial court gave the inmate an opportunity to make the filing fee payment prior to dismissal and was not required to specify the amount due since the statute provided the formula to determine the amount of the partial payment due. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Wells Fargo Financial Leasing, Inc., brought this action against Mountain Rentals of Gatlinburg, Inc., to collect rent under an equipment lease. The trial court granted summary judgment to Wells Fargo, and Mountain Rentals appealed. After careful review, we hold that the rental agreement is an enforceable finance lease and that Mountain Rentals’s obligation to pay rent was irrevocable and independent. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

These consolidated appeals involve punishment for criminal contempt. The two defendants are businesses that were providing sexually oriented entertainment, as defined by the Nashville Metropolitan Code of Laws, without licenses. The businesses continued to provide sexually oriented entertainment in violation of injunctions forbidding such activity and later injunctions ordering the businesses to be closed. The businesses were held in contempt of court, and an individual who was a corporate officer or part owner of each business was sentenced to five days in jail in each case, to be served concurrently. The individual appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he should be punished for contempt. We affirm.

The defendant, Kevin E. Glasgow, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a class E felony, and received a sentence of one year, suspended after 150 days. He was acquitted of driving on a revoked license. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction and that the jury rendered an inconsistent verdict by finding him guilty of DUI and not guilty of driving on a revoked license. We conclude that no error exists, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Paul Hayes, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his petition for relief but provides no proof of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the judgment from the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Keith T. Perry, pled guilty to second degree murder in 2000, with an agreed sentence of thirty years to be served at one hundred percent. He subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus relief claiming the following: (1) the thirty-year sentence violated Blakely v. Washington and its progeny; (2) the thirty-year sentence violated the Tennessee Code’s requirement that Range I offenders not be sentenced to more than twenty-five years; and (3) the Tennessee Code sections applicable are ambiguous. The habeas court denied the petition, and, upon a thorough consideration of the facts and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The Defendant, Seletta McKinnis, was arrested and pled guilty to failing to appear in court. She received a sentence of “time served.” The Defendant was subsequently indicted on separate offenses and applied for pretrial diversion. The prosecutor denied her application, explaining that she had previously served a sentence of confinement. She appealed to the Circuit Court, which also denied her application, and now she appeals, arguing that her “time served” sentence should not preclude her from pretrial diversion. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, William Edward Wright, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of one count of conspiracy to sell over twenty-six grams of cocaine, a Class B felony; two counts of facilitation of the sale of over twenty-six grams of cocaine, a Class C felony; and one count of possession with intent to deliver over twenty-six grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to twenty years for the conspiracy conviction, ten years for each of the facilitation convictions, and twenty years for the possession with intent to deliver conviction. Finding the defendant to be a professional criminal, that he had an extensive history of criminal activity, and that the offenses were committed while he was on probation, the trial court ordered that the twenty-year sentences be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of forty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conspiracy and facilitation convictions, the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress his statement and the evidence seized during the search of his residence, and his sentence was excessive. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand for the entry of a corrected judgment in Count 3 to reflect the correct conviction offense of facilitation of the sale of over twenty-six grams of cocaine.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Mario Merritt, of especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming he was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, finding the Petitioner failed to prove that trial counsel was deficient and that any alleged errors caused prejudice. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this divorce case filed by the Appellee/Mother, she was granted a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court divided the marital property and ordered the Appellant/Father to pay alimony in futuro and child support for the parties’ two minor children, the oldest of whom is severely disabled. The trial court ordered the Father to acquire the equipment necessary to take care of the child while visiting in his home and to begin intensive training in the use of equipment. Both parties were to maintain term life insurance in the face amount of  $250,000. Additionally, the trial court awarded Mother attorneys’ fees in the amount of $15,000.00 and ordered Father to pay child support arrearages in the amount of $4,756.00. Father appeals the decision of the trial court regarding the award of alimony, the upward deviation of child support, the award of attorneys’ fees, and the award of support arrearages. We reverse in part, affirm in part and remand.

The appellant, Antonio Ramon Smiles, was convicted of introduction of contraband into a penal institution and possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver. He received a total effective sentence of three years of confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s failure to dismiss the indictment for introduction of contraband into a penal institution and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Trial Judge awarded primary residential custody of the parties’ child, d.o.b. 2/14/05, to the father. The mother appealed the award of custody. We affirm the Trial Court’s Judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, William Rainey, reported a gradual injury to his arms in August 2000. He received medical treatment for arm and neck symptoms through workers’ compensation and returned to work. Mr. Rainey alleged that he sustained a second injury, to his neck, in May 2002. Tennsco denied that a new injury was reported. Mr. Rainey was examined by two doctors through workers’ compensation.  Neither doctor considered him to be a surgical candidate. Mr. Rainey sought additional treatment on his own. Eventually, surgery was performed on his cervical spine. At trial, the employer, Tennsco Corporation (Tennsco) denied that Mr. Rainey had sustained a permanent disability as a result of his work injury. The trial court awarded 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Tennsco has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the award. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted by jury of possession of .5 grams or more of a schedule II substance (cocaine) with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony. For his conviction, he was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. In this appeal, the defendant presents four issues for review: (1) whether the trial court improperly admitted evidence of a prior un-indicted drug sale at the defendant’s residence in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence ; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to include the defendant’s special instruction in the jury charge; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; and (4) whether the defendant was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury verdict due to improper extraneous influences on the jury’s deliberation. Finding no errors requiring reversal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted review to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly determined that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support dual convictions of criminally negligent homicide and facilitating escape. Because the defendant, who was charged with the care of the five-year-old victim, took him swimming at a lake without notifying his parents, drank beer and used marijuana, and dared the victim into the water and then failed to supervise his activities, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of criminally negligent homicide. Because the defendant, after discovering the disappearance of the victim, discouraged immediate contact with the authorities so that her son, a fugitive from justice, could avoid the police, the evidence was also sufficient to support the conviction of facilitating escape. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the portion of the 1981 judgment declaring Randy L. May infamous is contrary to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2712 (1975) (amended 1981).1 However, I cannot concur with the Court’s dramatic expansion of the application of the “great and efficacious” writ of habeas corpus in this case. Until today, it had been well settled that the writ did not apply to collateral consequences of a criminal conviction or to circumstances that did not involve imprisonment or a “restraint of liberty” as that concept had been understood at common law. Rather than recognizing a brand new classification of collateral consequences in order to provide Mr. May relief, this Court should simply leave Mr. May to pursue his other, well-established plain, adequate, and speedy remedies.

Incident to a conviction for first degree murder, the petitioner was declared infamous, a status which involves the loss of rights of citizenship, including the right to vote. At the time of the offense, homicide was not listed as an infamous crime under the statute. We granted permission to appeal to determine whether the judgment could be corrected through the writ of habeas corpus. Because the illegal disenfranchisement of the petitioner qualifies as a “restraint on liberty,” a threshold requirement under our statute, we grant limited habeas corpus relief but uphold the underlying conviction and the term of incarceration. The opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for modification of the judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, David Rader, sustained a permanent hearing loss, which he alleged was caused by his work. The only doctor to testify completed a C-32 which stated that the hearing loss was more probably than not related to Mr. Rader’s work, but had no specific knowledge of noise levels at Mr. Rader’s workplace other than Mr. Rader’s subjective statements. The trial court ruled that Mr. Rader failed  to sustain his burden of proof, and entered judgment for the employer, Aerostructures Corporation.  Mr. Rader has appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court, and award 15% permanent partial disability to his binaural hearing.