APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Client appeals the dismissal of its legal malpractice action against the attorneys who represented it in a bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court determined that the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations and that there were no grounds upon which the trier of fact could find that the loss alleged by the client was caused by any negligent act or omission of the defendants. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Donte Montgomery, pled guilty to one count of possession with the intent to sell more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, and the trial judge imposed a sentence of six years in the workhouse as a standard offender. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was dismissed by the post-conviction court after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends he was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel, and his guilty plea was not voluntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Jim Corbett Corder, was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to four years in prison. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jimmy Wayne Green, was indicted for theft of property and two counts of assault. In accordance with a plea agreement, he submitted a best interest plea to one count of assault in exchange for the State dismissing the other count of assault and the theft charge. The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, thirty days of which was to be served in confinement with the remainder to be served on probation. The Defendant now appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Richard Madkins, filed a February 2005 Davidson County Criminal Court petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1994 jury-tried conviction of especially aggravated robbery, for which he was originally sentenced to a term of 60 years and re-sentenced in 2003 to a term of 25 years. Before the habeas corpus court, the petitioner argued that he was illegally re-sentenced because the 1994 jury verdict and conviction were void and because, instead of re-sentencing, he should have been immediately released from custody. Following a hearing, the habeas corpus court dismissed the petition, and we affirm.

The Petitioner, Demond Gardner, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After appointing the Petitioner counsel and holding a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner filed this appeal, contending that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Frank Lee Tate, was convicted of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and incest, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, career offender, to concurrent sentences of sixty years for his aggravated rape conviction and fifteen years for his incest conviction. In his pro se appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, and his classification as a career offender for sentencing purposes. The State argues on appeal that the trial court erred in not sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after finding that Defendant was a repeat violent offender. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and his sentence for his incest conviction. We set aside the sentence for aggravated rape, and remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing on the sole issue of whether Defendant should be sentenced as a repeat violent offender or as a career offender for his aggravated rape conviction.

The defendant, Zachary V. Henning, was convicted at a jury trial in Lauderdale County Circuit Court of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10.000.  He was sentenced, as a Range I offender, to 10 years for aggravated robbery, three years for aggravated assault, and two years for theft of property. The trial court merged the conviction of aggravated assault with the aggravated robbery conviction and imposed the theft sentence to run concurrently with that for aggravated robbery, for an effective sentence of 10 years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and complains that his sentence is excessive. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts but that multiple convictions for aggravated robbery and theft violate double jeopardy protections. Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction judgments for aggravated assault and theft are vacated, and the jury’s “guilty verdict” for the theft is merged into the judgment of conviction of aggravated robbery. The defendant’s aggravated robbery sentence is affirmed, and we remand solely for the correction and entry of an appropriate judgment consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Marvin D. Nance, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the State failed to elect a set of facts upon which it was relying to sustain his convictions; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) the trial court erred by not granting him a mistrial after the State made allegedly improper argument; (4) the State committed a discovery violation; and (5) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiffs, parents and son brought suit against the University for injuries to the son sustained while practicing football, charging the coaches were negligent in allowing practice to continue under dangerous conditions. The Commissioner ruled in favor of the University, except as to the dispute over insurance, and awarded plaintiffs $3,600.00 under the contract of insurance with the University.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee was entitled to a permanent partial disability award of eighty-five percent (85%) to the left lower extremity. The employee contends that the trial court erred by (1) finding that the employee was not permanently and totally disabled, and (2) commenting upon the reputation of an expert witness. The parties also raise the issue of the apportionment of liability to the Second Injury Fund if the employee is found to be permanently and totally disabled. We affirm the trial court in all
respects.

The appellant, Timothy Jowers, pled guilty to robbery and possession of contraband in a penal facility. As part of the plea agreement, the trial court approved a concurrent sentence of five years for each conviction. The appellant was ordered to complete a six-month inpatient treatment program for drug and alcohol abuse prior to serving the balance of his sentence on probation. Subsequently, a probation violation warrant was issued against the appellant, alleging that he failed to complete the six-month program as required by the trial court. The appellant filed a motion to revoke his own probation, asserting that he was incarcerated in Oklahoma serving a five-year sentence for a conviction in that state and admitting to the probation violation. The trial court denied the motion to revoke probation because the warrant had not yet been served on the appellant due to his incarceration in Oklahoma. After the warrant was finally served on the appellant, an amended probation violation warrant was filed and served on the appellant. The trial court held a hearing on the matter, revoked the appellant’s probation, and awarded the appellant jail credits for time served in Tennessee prior to his plea and for time served in incarceration after service of the probation violation warrant. On appeal, the appellant complains that the trial court improperly denied retroactive jail credits for time served in Oklahoma.

The Petitioner, Fredrick L. Brown, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner claims that the concurrent life sentences he is serving for two first degree murder convictions are illegal and void because the second offense was committed while he was out on bail for the first offense and that, under these circumstances, Tennessee law mandates consecutive sentencing. A recent decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court compels our conclusion that summary dismissal was proper. The judgment of the Bledsoe County Circuit Court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Kenneth Workman, pled guilty in the Giles County Circuit Court to aggravated burglary, Class D felony theft, and Class D felony vandalism. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective four-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction and ordered restitution in the amount of $5000.00. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the amount of restitution is excessive. After a review of the record, restitution is reduced from $5000.00 to $2750.00. Otherwise, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This is a divorce case. The parties had a long-term marriage and their children are now adults.  During the marriage, the husband worked in the telecommunications industry and the wife was primarily a homemaker. The parties’ marital estate consisted largely of real property. They had incurred a substantial debt to the Internal Revenue Service. After a three-day hearing, the trial court declared the parties divorced and ordered that the real property be sold to satisfy the debt owed to the IRS. The trial court equally divided the IRS debt and any remaining proceeds from the sale of the properties. The trial court also awarded the wife a lump sum judgment representing temporary support during the pendency of the action, ordered the husband to pay the wife transitional alimony for five years, and denied the wife’s request for attorney’s fees. The wife now appeals the division of the marital estate, the decision to make the alimony award transitional rather than in futuro, and the denial of her request for attorney’s fees. The husband appeals the amount of the alimony award and the judgment for temporary support awarded to the wife. We modify the alimony to award alimony in futuro instead of transitional alimony, and affirm the remainder of the trial court’s decision.

The Defendant, Tarrean Nuby, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first degree murder and aggravated robbery. On appeal, he alleges there was insufficient evidence for any rational jury to convict him of attempted first degree murder. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Charles A. Green, was convicted on his guilty pleas of three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The defendant, a Range I offender, received four-year sentences, with two counts to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of eight years. The effective sentence involved split confinement of one year in jail and seven years on probation. The trial court later found that the defendant had violated his probation by committing a new offense and revoked his probation. The defendant appeals, arguing that substantial evidence does not support that determination. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Artis Reese, was indicted on four counts of aggravated robbery, one count of possession of marijuana, and one count of aggravated criminal trespass. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated criminal trespass. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged two of the aggravated robbery convictions into the other two aggravated robbery convictions and imposed consecutive eight-year sentences on the resulting two convictions for aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a concurrent sentence of six months for aggravated criminal trespass, resulting in an effective sentence of sixteen years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, this appeal followed in which the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the process for appointing a new justice to become the fifth member of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The issues in this case involve the proper interpretation of sections 17-4- 101 to 17-4-118 of the Tennessee Code Annotated (“the Tennessee Plan”) and matters of constitutional law. For the reasons stated below, we hold that: (1) the first list of nominees certified to the Governor under the Tennessee Plan was not rendered invalid upon one nominee’s subsequent withdrawal from consideration for appointment; (2) an individual listed on a panel of nominees certified to the Governor by the Tennessee Judicial Selection Commission (“the Commission”) which has been rejected by the Governor may not be included on the second panel of nominees certified to the Governor under the Tennessee Plan; (3) the Governor’s rejection of Lewis and Gordon did not violate the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) because a nominee or applicant to fill a judicial vacancy is not an “employee” for purposes of the THRA; (4) the equal protection challenge to the Governor’s rejection of the first panel is a non-justiciable political question; (5) the equal protection challenge to the Governor’s rejection of the first panel is otherwise without merit; (6) the Governor's letter rejecting the first list of nominees did not encroach on the powers assigned to the Commission by the Tennessee Plan; and (7) the trial court erred in its determination of the appropriate remedy.

The Petitioner, Chico McCracken, was convicted of one count of murder in the perpetration of a felony and one count of aggravated robbery. He petitioned for post-conviction relief claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the post-conviction petition, and we affirm that judgment.

A Franklin County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Jimmy Dale Pickett, of first degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life and twenty years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant claims (1) that he is entitled to a retrial because the State violated the rule of sequestration; (2) that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress his confessions; (3) that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to use a transcript, which had not been introduced into evidence, during deliberations; (4) that the trial court erred by refusing to give the jury a corpus delicti instruction; and (5) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. Finding no errors requiring reversal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this action for a judgment for fees for legal services rendered, the Trial Court entered Judgment for plaintiff and defendants appealed. We affirm.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of F.R.G. (“Mother”) and R.K.B. (“Father”) with respect to their minor child, C.G.B. (“the child”) (DOB: December 31, 2003), upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds for terminating their parental rights existed and that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals, arguing procedural defects in the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Andre Neely, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After a review of the pleadings, the lower court’s order and the applicable law, this Court concludes that the lower court properly determined that the Petitioner’s claims were waived and properly dismissed the petition. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s dismissal.

The Petitioner, Pierre Andre Brown, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.