APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case concerns the termination of parental rights. The appellants, who are the parents, seek reversal of the termination of their parental rights to the care and custody of their daughter, A.M.H. The trial court predicated the termination on the ground that the parents abandoned A.M.H. by willfully failing to visit her for four months. First, we hold that the statute of repose under section 36-1-113(q) of the Tennessee Code Annotated does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to review the termination of parental rights. Second, because the undisputed evidence shows that there was animosity between the parties and that the parents were actively pursuing custody of A.M.H. through legal proceedings during the four-month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights, we hold that the trial court erred in finding a willful failure to visit. Finally, we conclude that the parents’ consent to transfer custody and guardianship of A.M.H. to the appellees was not made with knowledge of the consequences of the transfer. Therefore, according the parents those superior rights to the custody of their child that constitutional law mandates, only a showing of substantial harm that threatens the child’s welfare may deprive the parents of the care and custody of A.M.H. Although A.M.H. has now been with the appellees for more than seven years, six of those years elapsed after the parents’ first unsuccessful legal filing to regain custody. Evidence that A.M.H. will be harmed from a change in custody because she has lived and bonded with the Bakers during the pendency of the litigation does not constitute the substantial harm required to prevent the parents from regaining custody. For the reasons discussed below, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the chancery court to be expeditiously transferred to the Juvenile Court of Shelby County for the entry of an order that implements a plan to reunite A.M.H. with her natural parents.

We granted the appeal in each of these cases to determine the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1003 (2003), which prohibits the possession of child pornography. Initially, the statute is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. Secondly, we hold that because the charges against Pickett were multiplicitous, only one conviction is permissible under the circumstances of that case. In consequence, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in each case is affirmed.

The Defendant, Jermeil Ralph Tarter, was indicted by a Sullivan County grand jury for evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the indicted offense. In this direct appeal, the Defendant alleges that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court erred in requiring the Defendant to serve this sentence consecutively to his prior sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a child custody dispute. The biological parents of the child involved in this action met in Georgia, where the child was born in December 2002. The parties lived together with the child, but never married. Initially, the parties moved several times with the child, following job opportunities for the father. When the child was about nine months old, the parties moved to Jackson, Tennessee.  Not long after that, the mother and the child returned to Georgia to live with the mother’s parents in Georgia, in order for the mother to seek professional help for depression. About nine months later, after an altercation between the mother and the child’s maternal grandmother, the mother told the father that she could not care for the child and asked him to assume custody. Accordingly, the father took the child to live with him in Jackson. About two months later, the father filed the instant petition for legitimation of the child and to seek custody. The mother opposed the father’s petition and filed a counter-petition for custody. After a hearing, the trial court determined that the father was comparatively more fit than the mother and designated him as the primary residential parent.  The mother now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s determination.

The Defendant, Octavia Cartwright, was convicted of evading arrest in a motor vehicle with risk of death or injury, attempted first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, and four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. The Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of ninety-one years in prison as a Range I offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions for attempted murder and especially aggravated kidnapping; (2) the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant; (3) the trial court erred when it determined the Defendant was competent; and (4) her constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. After throughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences.

The Defendant, Donald Wayne Joiner, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of one count of escape, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a career offender to six years in the Department of Correction. He filed a timely motion for a new trial, which was denied. In this appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for escape beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Reginald E. Bost, appeals the decision of the Knox County Criminal Court revoking his alternative sentence. In July 2004, the Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine and received an eight-year sentence. This sentence was suspended, and he was placed in the Community Alternative to Prison Program. On April 13, 2005, a warrant was issued, wherein it was alleged that the Defendant violated the conditions of the program. The warrant was later amended to include additional violations. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the Defendant violated the conditions of his sentence and ordered that his original eight-year sentence to the Department of Correction be reinstated. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence does not support full revocation of his alternative sentence. After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The issue we review in this case is whether the defendants exercised peremptory challenges during jury selection based on race and/or gender in a discriminatory manner contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Batson v. Kentucky. The Defendants used six of their seven peremptory challenges to strike women from the jury panel, including the only African-Americans who were seated in the jury box. In response to the Plaintiff’s race-based Batson challenge, the Defendants responded that one of the African-American women was dismissed because she had difficulty remembering the verdict in a previous civil jury case in which she had served as a juror and because she had a family history of cancer. As to the Plaintiff’s gender-based Batson objection, the Defendants responded that the women were excused based on “experience and body mechanics.” The trial court overruled the Plaintiff’s objections and the trial proceeded. Following a defense verdict, the Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. After careful review of the record and applicable authorities, we hold that the Defendants’ stated reasons for exercising peremptory challenges to strike the African-Americans and women from the jury panel were insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Batson v. Kentucky. Because the trial court erred in overruling the Plaintiff’s Batson objections, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial.

The Appellant, John Whatley, appeals the judgment of the Maury County Circuit Court denying post-conviction relief. Whatley is currently serving an eleven-year sentence in the Department of Correction as a result of his conviction for aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, Whatley argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) “failing to adequately consult with and prepare [Whatley] for trial”; (2) failing to present a potential defense witness at trial; (3) opening the door for the introduction of prejudicial testimony; and (4) failing to properly preserve a conflict of interest issue for appeal. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This is the second appeal of a property case involving the ownership of three parcels of real property held by tenants-in-common.  We dismissed the first appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the trial court's order did not constitute a final judgment.  On remand, the trial court entered a supplemental decree.  After reviewing the record and the supplemental decree, we find that there is still not a final appealable judgment.  We must, therefore, dismiss this second appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This is an insurance case. The plaintiff cargo company entered into a carrier agreement with an independent trucking company to transport freight, in which the trucking company agreed to indemnify the plaintiff for any loss or damage to the freight transported.  The trucking company obtained a motor truck cargo liability insurance policy, which insured property while in due course of transit. In the process of transporting a shipment of tires for the plaintiff, the driver for the trucking company parked the trailer portion of the tractor-trailer behind a shopping center and left it overnight.  During the night, the cargo was stolen.  The trucking company submitted a claim against its cargo insurance policy and the claim was denied.  The plaintiff sued the trucking company and the cargo insurance company for breach of contract, seeking to recover the value of the stolen cargo.  The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment against the defendant cargo insurance company and, in response, the defendant insurance company filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the cargo insurance company, finding that the shipment of tires was not “in transit” when it was stolen and that, consequently, there was no coverage under the policy.  The plaintiff cargo company appeals.  We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer asserts that the trial court erred in finding the employee's back injury compensable, in finding the employee to be permanently and totally disabled, and in apportioning the permanent total disability award between the employer and the Second Injury Fund. The Second Injury Fund also asserts the trial court erred in finding employee to be permanently and totally disabled and in calculating the award. The employee asserts the trial court erred in allocating a setoff for disability insurance payments. We reverse in part and modify in part. Tenn. Code. Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right, Judgment of the Macon County Circuit Court is reversed in part and modified in part. HOWELL N. PEOPLES, SP. J., in which WILLIAM M. BARKER, CHIEF JUSTICE, and JEFFREY S. BIVINS, SP. J. joined. M. Clark Spoden, Julie A. Schreiner-Oldham, Brian Neal, Frost Brown Todd, LLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant, Unipres, U.S.A., Inc. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General, Lauren S. Lamberth, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant Second Injury Fund. William Joseph Butler, E. Guy Holliman, Farrar, Holliman & Butler, Lafayette, Tennessee, for Appellee, Lona Swindle. 1 MEMORANDUM OPINION Facts Lona Swindle filed her complaint against Unipres U.S.A., Inc. ("Unipres") for workers' compensation benefits on April 1, 22 alleging that she sustained "cumulative injuries to both of her hands, elbows and arms." She also alleged that she had received court awarded vocational disability for previous work injuries for which the Second Injury Fund would be responsible. The complaint did not mention any claim that she had sustained a work-related injury to her back. On January 14, 23, Ms. Swindle amended her complaint to add the assertion that she was permanently and totally disabled as a result of a "combination of the Plaintiff's pre-existing non-work-related injuries and/or conditions and the subject work-related injuries . . ." The amended complaint also did not mention any claim of a work-related back injury. In January 22, Ms. Swindle was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. She was treated by Dr. Roy Terry, who performed surgeries on both wrists. He released her to return to work without restrictions on June 27, 22. Ms. Swindle returned to work at Unipres with activities that were less repetitive, but involved heavier lifting and more bending than the job that caused the carpal tunnel syndrome. On September 13, 22, Ms. Swindle saw Jennifer Dittes, a certified physician's assistant with complaints of back pain. Ms. Swindle testified that she stopped working at Unipres on October 21, 22 because of back pain. She did not report a back injury to her employer as being work related. On April 8, 23, Ms. Swindle filed an application for long-term disability benefits for the back injury and represented her injuries were not work related. Decision Below The trial court found that the Ms. Swindle's bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was work- related, that the back injury resulted from the carpal tunnel syndrome, and that the combination of the injuries and her pre-existing condition caused her to be permanently and totally disabled. The trial court apportioned 7 percent of the award to Unipres and 3 percent to the Second Injury Fund. The trial court also granted Unipres an offset for payments to Ms. Swindle made by a disability insurance policy for long-term disability due to her back injury. Standard of Review The standard of review in a workers' compensation case is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Houser v. BiLo, Inc., 36 S.W.3d 68, 7-71 (Tenn. 21). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in workers' compensation cases to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee, Steven Quincy Manchester (Manchester), an eighteen percent permanent partial disability award based upon a twelve percent impairment rating. The trial court also determined the employer, Bridgestone Firestone, Inc. (Bridgestone) was not entitled to a credit for a portion of the temporary total benefits it paid to the employee. Bridgestone has appealed, contending the trial court erred in that the impairment rating was not supported by the medical evidence and in not allowing the credit it claimed. We modify the trial court's judgment by reducing the impairment rating to ten percent to conform to the evidence presented, and remand the case to the trial court for determination of permanent partial disability. We affirm the trial court's judgment disallowing a set off for the temporary total benefits paid by Bridgestone.

A Wayne County Jury convicted the defendant of four hunting related offenses. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of seventy days, to serve forty-two days in incarceration with the remainder suspended. The defendant argues on appeal that he should have been granted probation with regard to his entire sentence. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Vivian Earl McDaniel, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court denied relief, and the Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the convicting court lacked jurisdiction over him because he was improperly shuttled between state and federal custody in violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

This is a negligence case brought under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act.  The plaintiff’s minor daughter slipped and fell at a public swimming facility and broke her arm.  The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant swimming facility, alleging that her minor daughter slipped
on a wet concrete floor in the dressing room area and that the swimming facility created and maintained a dangerous and defective condition that caused her daughter’s injury.  At trial, the defendant swimming facility moved for an involuntary dismissal at the close of the plaintiff’s proof.
The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The plaintiff now appeals, arguing that the trial court applied an adult standard of care to her minor daughter, and that she established a prima facie case of negligence against the defendant.  We affirm, finding that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of negligence.

The Defendant, Anthony Dewayne Cotton, pled guilty to possession of a schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver .5 grams or more, unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the Defendant reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a breach of contract case. The plaintiff finance broker and the defendant church entered into an agreement under which the plaintiff broker was to assist the church in obtaining a loan, and the church would pay the plaintiff a 3% broker’s fee for this service. The plaintiff broker negotiated a financing arrangement as requested by the church. Independent of the plaintiff, the church obtained financing from a different lender. The plaintiff then claimed a right to its broker’s fee under the parties’ agreement, claiming that it had an exclusive arrangement with the church. The church refused to pay the fee, denying that it had an exclusive arrangement with the plaintiff broker. The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against the church to recover its broker’s fee. The trial court held in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that the parties’ agreement was exclusive. The church now appeals. We affirm, finding that the issue turns on the credibility of the witnesses.

The Petitioner, Ronald E. Walker, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court denied relief, and the Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received an illegal sentence that was used to enhance the sentence that he is presently serving. He also asserts that the sentence that he is presently serving is void on its face. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The petitioner, Torrence Ladovia Reed, pled guilty in the Circuit Court for Giles County to four counts of sale of cocaine (Class B felony), two counts of delivery of cocaine (Class B felony), one count of conspiracy to deliver cocaine (Class C felony), six counts of conspiracy to sell cocaine (Class C felony), and one count of sale of marijuana (Class E felony). He received a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief and alleged that his pleas were involuntary because his counsel was ineffective in failing to properly explain to him the difference between consecutive and concurrent sentences. After careful review, we find no grounds for which to grant relief, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Ricky Dale McDonald, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief.  He argues that he is currently held on an expired sentence that should be shortened due to post-conviction relief he was awarded in 1989. After careful review, we conclude that the petitioner is not presently held on an expired sentence and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Milburn L. Edwards, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of twenty-one counts of rape, two counts of first degree burglary, two counts of aggravated burglary, one count of second degree burglary, one count of aggravated rape, one count of assault with intent to commit rape and one count of robbery. He received an effective sentence of life plus 415 years, which was later modified to life plus 195 years on appeal. State v. Edwards, 868 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). A petition for post-conviction relief was denied by the trial court and the denial was affirmed on appeal. Milburn L. Edwards v. State, No. M2002-02124-CCA-R3-PC, 2003 WL 23014683 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Dec. 15, 2003). On March 13, 2006, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his convictions for the failure of the district attorney general to endorse the indictments. The trial court dismissed his petition without the appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, James D. West, entered guilty pleas in the Madison County Criminal Court to driving after having been declared a habitual motor vehicle offender, two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of reckless endangerment. He received an effective sentence of four years. On October 4, 2005, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Davidson County Criminal Court alleging that his sentence had expired. On January 5, 2006, the trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing or the appointment of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Williamson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, LaCorey Damont McKissack, of selling 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and fixed his fine at $20,000. The trial court approved the fine and sentenced the defendant to 11 years in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that the fine and sentence are excessive. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves an automobile accident that occurred on a road maintained by Madison County.  The plaintiff sued the negligent driver who struck his vehicle, the other driver’s parents, and Madison County. Relevant to this appeal, the plaintiff alleged that the design of the road and inadequate signs and road markings contributed to the accident. The trial court granted summary judgment to Madison County, finding that it was immune from suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act.  We affirm.