APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, DeMarco Waters, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief with respect to his convictions for one count of first degree premeditated murder, three counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of attempted second degree murder, and four counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus seventy-seven years. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Martin Hubert White, pled guilty in the Giles County Circuit Court to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and burglary of an automobile, a Class E felony, and received an effective three-year sentence suspended to time served and supervised probation.  On appeal, the Appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion.  Based upon our de novo review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

The Petitioner, Christopher Demotto Linsey, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cell phone, failing to object to evidence presented at trial, and failing to file a timely motion for new trial.   Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying relief.   

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence in support of one statutory ground of termination, the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children. We vacate the judgment of the trial court, holding that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence to support the sole statutory ground of termination found by the trial court.

The defendant appeals the trial court’s judgment finding that he violated a reckless driving city ordinance, Metropolitan Code of Law § 12.68.180, when he drove 65 miles per hour in a 45-mile-per-hour zone.  During trial, Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Tennessee (“Metro”) presented evidence regarding the defendant’s speed to support its allegation that the defendant was driving recklessly.  Following proof of the defendant’s excessive speed, the trial court found that the defendant had failed to rebut the presumption created by ordinance that he was driving in such a way as to demonstrate “a wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.”  The defendant challenges the constitutionality of such ordinance, which provides a rebuttable presumption that the defendant was driving recklessly when driving at least fifteen miles per hour over the speed limit.  However, the defendant’s issues concerning constitutionality of the ordinance were not properly raised or decided by the trial court, and upon our determination that the ordinance is not facially unconstitutional, we hold that the defendant has waived his issues regarding the constitutionality of the ordinance.  Upon our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment that the defendant violated Metropolitan Code of Law § 12.68.180.

John W. McClarty, J., dissenting.

The majority affirms the trial court’s judgment that the defendant, Abdiqani Gelle (“Defendant”), violated a reckless driving city ordinance, Metropolitan Code of Law §12.68.180, by driving 65 miles per hour in a 45-mile-per-hour zone.  The trial court determined that Defendant had failed to rebut the presumption created by the ordinance that he demonstrated “a willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property,” i.e., drove recklessly.  Defendant challenges the constitutionality of the ordinance.  Specifically, Defendant raises the issue of whether the ordinance violates his due process rights under the Tennessee Constitution, article 1, section 8, whether the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) has jurisdiction to administer a “criminal-type punishment” due to violation of its ordinance, and whether such punishment would violate Defendant’s rights under the Tennessee Constitution, article 1, section 16. Metro argues that Defendant waived the issues by failing to properly raise them during the trial proceedings.

This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. Paternal grandparents Russell B. (“Grandfather”) and Louella B. (“Grandmother”) (“Grandparents,” collectively) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Alexandria Y. (“Mother”) and Ricky B. (“Father”) to their minor child, Naomi B. (“the Child”). After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child. Mother and Father appeal. Grandparents raise additional issues as appellees. We find, inter alia, that in addition to the grounds found by the Trial Court, the proof is clear and convincing in support of the grounds alleged by Grandparents of abandonment by failure to visit against Mother and persistent conditions against both Mother and Father. We find further, as did the Trial Court, that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified, resulting in affirmance of the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child.

Petitioner, Linda Anne Dunavant, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition alleging that the post-conviction court erred in finding that she received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In 2012, plaintiff HCTec Partners, LLC (“HCTec”) and James Prescott Crawford (“Crawford”) entered into an employment agreement under which Crawford was prohibited from disclosing any of HCTec’s confidential information and competing with HCTec for one year after Crawford’s employment with HCTec ended. When Crawford left HCTec to work for a competitor in 2019, HCTec sought to enforce the agreement. HCTec sued Crawford for breach of contract and sued Crawford’s new employer, The Rezult Group, Inc. (“Rezult”), for inducement of breach pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-50-109. After extensive discovery, HCTec moved for summary judgment as to both claims, which the trial court granted. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects.

Petitioner, Demetrius Grimes, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denial of his petition. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

Two counties assessed the same property for multiple tax years.  The taxpayer appealed the double assessments to the State Board of Equalization.  The administrative law judge determined that Houston County had assessed the taxpayer’s real and personal property for more than five years before Stewart County assessed the same property.  Based on Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-2-115(d), the judge voided the later assessment.  The Assessment Appeals Commission reversed in part.  The Commission ruled that the state statute only applied to real property.  And because the personal property was located in Stewart County, Stewart County was the proper taxing authority for that property.  The trial court affirmed the agency decision.  On appeal, we conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-2-115(d) only applies to real property.  Because the agency’s decision is also supported by substantial and material evidence in the record, we affirm.

The Appellant, Lance White, was convicted in the Madison County Circuit Court of various offenses, including driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, and received an effective six-year sentence to be served as eleven months, twenty-nine days in confinement followed by five years on supervised probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the Appellant’s probation, and the Appellant filed a “Motion to Correct Sentence.” The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant appeals. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.

A Clay County jury convicted the defendant, William Isaac Atwood, of possession of a prohibited weapon and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and the trial court imposed an effective Range II sentence of thirteen years’ incarceration.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the trial court’s sentencing him as a Range II offender.  Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.  

The Defendant, Marcus Malone, appeals as of right from his convictions for second degree murder, attempted first degree murder, five counts of attempted second degree murder, twelve counts of aggravated assault, six counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of one hundred thirty-three years. The Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress his police statement; (2) the trial court erred by failing to inquire into the Defendant’s request for substitute counsel; (3) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on criminal responsibility and by failing to instruct the jury on facilitation or self-defense; (4) the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the shooter; (5) his sentence is excessive; (6) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive service; and (7) his aggregate sentence is unconstitutional in light of his status as a juvenile at the time of the offenses. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child.  Because the trial court’s order lacks sufficient factual findings and legal conclusions, we vacate and remand.

The Appellant, Jeremiah McDaniel, was convicted in the Monroe County Criminal Court of solicitation of a minor to commit sexual battery, a Class A misdemeanor, and received a sentence of one hundred eighty days to be served in jail. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by constructively amending the indictment from solicitation of a minor to commit sexual battery by an authority figure to solicitation of a minor to commit sexual battery because sexual battery is not a lesser-included offense of sexual battery by an authority figure; that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction because the evidence fails to show lack of consent; that the trial court should have dismissed the case or stricken the victim’s trial testimony because the State failed to produce the victim’s audio-recorded statement; that the trial court erred by admitting photographs of Facebook messages allegedly between the Appellant and the victim into evidence; that the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of the victim, by advising the victim of the victim’s Fifth Amendment rights, and by allowing the victim to invoke those rights; and that his six-month sentence in confinement is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that sexual battery without consent is not a lesser-included offense of sexual battery by an authority figure but that sexual battery without consent is a lesser-included offense of solicitation of a minor to commit sexual battery by an authority figure. Therefore, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense. However, we also conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the Appellant’s conviction of solicitation of a minor to commit sexual battery. Therefore, the conviction is reversed and vacated, and the original charge is dismissed.

The Defendant, Kevvon Clark, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder; first degree felony murder; two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; aggravated rape, a Class A felony; and aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, for which he is serving an effective life sentence. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder), 39-13-305 (2018) (especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-13-502 (2018) (subsequently amended) (aggravated rape), 39-13-402 (2018) (aggravated robbery). On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated rape, and (2) this court should grant relief, as a matter of plain error, from the trial court’s failure to give a jury instruction in accord with State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Brandon Wayne Watson, appeals his Tipton County Circuit Court jury convictions of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. On cross-appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred by merging the defendant’s conviction for aggravated sexual battery into his conviction for rape of a child. Because the evidence sufficiently supports the verdicts, we affirm the defendant’s convictions. Because the defendant’s dual convictions do not violate the principles of double jeopardy, we reverse the trial court’s merger of the offenses and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.

The plaintiff in this action filed a petition for declaratory judgment to quiet title to his farm in Maury County, Tennessee. In his petition, the plaintiff asked for all relief necessary to quiet title, including a declaration on the boundaries of his farm and a declaration on his rights to the disputed property. In their answer, the defendants asserted adverse possession under Tennessee Code Annotated
§§ 28-2-102 and -103. The plaintiff later nonsuited one of his claims and, during the hearing on his motion for summary judgment, stated that he was seeking only a declaration on where the boundaries of his farm were “on the face of the earth.” Finding that matters related to possession of the property were not at issue, the trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff and declared the location of his “legal boundary.” The court then denied the defendants’ Motion for Relief from Judgment under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 52.02, 58, 59.04, 60.01, and 60.02. On appeal, the defendants contend, inter alia, that the trial court’s order was not final because it did not adjudicate the parties’ respective rights to possess the area in dispute. We agree. Because the purported final judgment does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The Petitioner, Matthew Reynolds, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated kidnapping, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for not properly investigating the case and not requesting a sequestered jury, a change of venue, and a severance from his co-defendants. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying relief. 

Defendant, John William Gay, was convicted following a jury trial of aggravated robbery and theft of property under $1,000. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve a twelve-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the aggravated robbery and a concurrent eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence for the theft conviction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated robbery and theft of property. Defendant further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying every enhancement factor it cited, failing to apply mitigating factors, and violating the purposes and principles of sentencing. Following our review of the entire record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, the trial court’s failure to merge the theft conviction and the aggravated robbery conviction constituted plain error. The case is remanded to the trial court for merger of those convictions and entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect said merger.

The Petitioner, Athanasios D. Edmonston, appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and misdemeanor assault convictions and his effective twenty-four-year sentence.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by determining that his petition was untimely and that due process did not require tolling the statute of limitations period.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Sherman Lee Harris, pleaded guilty to delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance and received a suspended sentence of twelve years on supervised probation in 2011. In 2013, Defendant pleaded guilty to facilitation of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance and received a suspended sentence of 10 years on supervised probation, to be served consecutively to his 12-year sentence. On January 29, 2021, after only hearing from Defendant’s probation officer regarding new charges in Shelby County, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation in both cases and ordered he serve the balance of his sentences. Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay evidence without determining that it was reliable or that there was good cause to admit the evidence. After our review, we reverse and remand the judgments of the trial court because the State only produced unreliable hearsay evidence and thus failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant had violated the law. On remand, the trial court should hold another hearing to determine if Defendant violated his probation.

Appellants seek review of an order granting partial summary judgment. Because the order is not a final order giving rise to a Tenn. R. App. P. 3 appeal, we do not have jurisdiction; accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Petitioner, Nehad Sobhi Abdelnabi, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim that he was denied a trial by an impartial jury and in dismissing his second amended petition claiming that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to convey a plea offer. After hearing oral arguments and following a review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.