APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Michael Ray Hogan, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of the remainder of his four-year sentence based upon his committing new offenses, failing to report his arrests to his probation officer, and for failing to report to his probation officer. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) finding that the Defendant violated his probation because the firearm and suspected marijuana were seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; (2) considering proof that occurred after the violation warrant was filed; (3) and requiring the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in custody. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Marlon Jermaine Johnson, acting pro se, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417(c)(2)(A) and for possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417(c)(1).  On appeal, the Petitioner argues his sentence is illegal because the trial court entered his judgment incorrectly, resulting in errors on the face of the judgment.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Defendant, Sonya Nale, is charged by indictment with bribery of a public servant, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-16-102 (2018). After the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to disqualify the Twelfth Judicial District Attorney’s office, we granted the State’s application for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 to review the trial court’s order. We reverse the trial court’s order disqualifying the district attorney general’s office from prosecuting the case.

The petitioner, Tavares Dewayne Buchanan, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel.  Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court abused its discretion by disqualifying the Twelfth Judicial District Attorney General’s office. As noted by the majority, a trial court’s decision to disqualify a prosecutor or an entire district attorney general’s office is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Clinard v. Blackwood, 46 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tenn. 2001); State v . Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309, 313 (Tenn. 2000). A court abuses its discretion by “apply[ing] an incorrect legal standard, or reach[ing] a decision which is against logic or reasoning that caused an injustice to the party complaining.” State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999); see Clinard, 46 S.W.3d at 182.

The Petitioner, Marlon Sontay, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and rape.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Jo C. Borden, Defendant, pled guilty in an open plea in case number 19-360-3 to two counts of retaliation for past action and, in case number 19-361-3, to one count of vehicular assault; three counts of reckless aggravated assault; one count of reckless endangerment with a vehicle; and three counts of driving on a revoked license. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of five years in case number 19-360-3 and to an effective sentence of ten years in case number 19-361-3, and it aligned the sentences in the two cases consecutively. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court improperly sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender, that it erred by imposing a sentence of confinement, and that it abused its discretion by aligning his sentences consecutively. After a thorough review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences or by denying alternative sentencing but that the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender. Accordingly, we remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights.  The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that seven grounds for termination as to the mother were proven: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to support; (3) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton disregard; (4) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (5) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (6) persistent conditions; and (7) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody.  Additionally, the juvenile court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.  The mother appeals.  On appeal, the Department of Children’s Services does not defend the ground of abandonment by failure to visit.  We reverse the juvenile court in part and affirm in part, affirming the ultimate termination of parental rights.

The Defendant-Appellant, Dashun Shackleford, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury as charged in a twenty-count indictment; four alternative counts each of aggravated robbery against four victims and four corresponding counts of criminal gang offense enhancement. The trial court merged the aggravated robbery convictions into four counts and imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration to be served at 85 percent. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his gang enhancement convictions; and (2) the gang enhancement counts violate his constitutional rights to due process and expressive association. Upon our review, we conclude that the State failed to sufficiently prove the gang enhancement counts and failed to comply with the notice requirements mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35- 121(g). Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the judgments in Counts 13 through 16, and remand for resentencing as to those counts. Because the gang enhancements are no longer applicable to the Defendant’s case, we decline to address the constitutional questions raised in this appeal.

In this action alleging violations of a federal securities law due to purported misrepresentations and omissions in an initial public stock offering, the plaintiffs sought to certify a class consisting of all persons who purchased common stock during the initial public offering.  The trial court certified the class, determining that the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23 had been satisfied.  The defendants have appealed.  Although we dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims under section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77l, due to lack of standing, we otherwise affirm the trial court’s certification of the proposed class.

Father appeals the trial court’s award of unsupervised parenting time and an award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Specifically, Father argues that Mother is a high risk for abduction of the parties’ children and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing her unsupervised visitation.  We affirm the trial court’s award of unsupervised parenting time to Mother, but we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to her.

This appeal concerns the Open Courts Clause of the Tennessee Constitution.  Michael Halliburton (“Halliburton”), an inmate, filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) against the Tennessee Board of Parole (“the Board”) seeking judicial review of his March 10, 2020 parole proceedings before the Board.  The Trial Court dismissed Halliburton’s petition.  In so doing, the Trial Court relied on Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812, which provides that “on notice of assessment of any fees, taxes, costs and expenses under this part, a clerk of a court may not accept for filing another claim by the same inmate until prior fees, taxes, costs and other expenses are paid in full.”  This Court affirmed, holding in part that Halliburton waived his issue of whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 violates the Open Courts Clause in Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution.  However, the Tennessee Supreme Court found that Halliburton sufficiently raised the issue in his answer to the Board’s motion to dismiss.  Our Supreme Court granted Halliburton’s application for permission to appeal, and remanded for this Court to consider his Open Courts issue. We hold, inter alia, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 places a constitutionally permissible limitation on the right of inmates to file civil actions.  The statute does not permanently bar inmates from seeking redress; it simply requires they pay outstanding fees first.  Therefore, we hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 does not violate the Open Courts Clause.  We affirm.

The Appellant, Joshua V. Lowe, pled guilty in the Maury County Circuit Court to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Appellant received a sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and was placed on probation.  The trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $52,000 to be paid in monthly installments of $773.  On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the Appellant’s ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, McArthur Bobo, was convicted by a Shelby County criminal court jury of second-degree murder in 2009. Following a remand from our supreme court, the trial court held a new hearing on the Defendant’s motion for new trial on May 12, 2021, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred 1) in denying the motion for new trial because it was unable to act as thirteenth juror in determining the sufficiency of the evidence; 2) in failing to grant a mistrial or striking the testimony of a witness whose written statement was allegedly not provided to the Defendant; 3) in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress; 4) in admitting jailhouse calls into evidence; 5) in allowing testimony that children were present near the shooting scene; and 6) in failing to grant a mistrial based on a totality of all errors. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jerry P. Haley, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis by the Lauderdale County Circuit Court, arguing the coram nobis court erred in summarily dismissing the petition because newly discovered evidence exists which is material to his case. After our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Petitioner, James A. McCurry, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Troy Springfield, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Appellant appeals from various orders entered against him in two consolidated cases. Because we lack subject matter jurisdiction, we dismiss this appeal

This appeal arises from a conservatorship case in which the chancery court authorized the attorneys ad litem for the ward of the conservatorship to enter into a compromise and settlement regarding a dispute among the ward and his four siblings over their deceased father’s estate. The sole issue on appeal is whether the Chancellor abused his discretion in finding the settlement was in the ward’s best interest. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

A Wilson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Rashad Dewayne Seay, Jr., of two counts of the sale of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of eighteen years for each offense.  The Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the court summarily dismissed as untimely.  On appeal, we reversed the summary dismissal.  Rashad Dewayne Seay, Jr. v. State, No. M2017-01128-CCA-R3-PC, 2018 WL 3203442, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 29, 2018), no perm. app. filed.  On remand, the post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing after which it filed a written order denying the Petitioner relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure the Petitioner was present during the jury instructions, failing to ensure that the jury was properly instructed, failing to adequately investigate and prepare an identification expert, and failing to inform the Petitioner of the consequences of withdrawing his direct appeal.  After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This case involves a challenge to a decision to non-renew the employment of a non-tenured teacher. The plaintiff sued the defendants for breach of her one-year contract of employment.  The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

A bank brought an action against a borrower for failure to repay a promissory note.  The borrower asserted that the bank failed to mitigate its damages by failing to sell the shares of stock it held as collateral to pay off the loan at a time when the stock’s value was high.  After a bench trial, the trial court granted judgment in favor of the bank, holding that the parol evidence rule prevented consideration of his purported oral modification of the parties’ agreement. Borrower appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Misty Rose Brown, acting pro se, was convicted of one count of child abuse and neglect and one count of facilitation of rape of a child following a trial.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years for the facilitation conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the child abuse and neglect conviction, to be served concurrently.  The Defendant, again acting pro se, appeals her convictions and argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This action involves a contractual dispute over the sale of a 2010 Honda Civic that a pro se appellant purchased from a used car dealer.  The appellant’s brief significantly fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.  Accordingly, we find that any issues on appeal are waived.  We dismiss the appeal.

Appellant filed this products liability action more than 10 years after undergoing a total hip replacement using Appellee's hip implant system. The trial court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss on the ground that Appellant's lawsuit fell outside the 10-year statute of repose and any exceptions thereto. Discerning no error, we affirm.