APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Darrell Stamper, has appealed the December 16, 2021 order of the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). As the December 16, 2021 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Petitioner, Joshua Simpson, was convicted upon his guilty pleas to aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated burglary, for which he received an effective twenty-year sentence. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the trial court denied after a hearing. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter his guilty pleas. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Glenn Bohanan, Jr., Defendant, was charged with one count of rape of a child, three counts of rape, and four counts of incest, for events that took place over the span of several years. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of all counts of the indictment and sentenced to an effective sentence of 40 years. Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for rape of a child in Count 1, rape in Counts 3 and 4, and incest in Counts 5-8 because the victim did not testify specifically that Defendant penetrated her on each occasion; and (2) the sentence is excessive. After a review of the evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Bryan Williams, Petitioner, was convicted of multiple sex offenses and a panel of this Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. State v. Bryan Williams, No. W2013-00418-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 280398, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2014), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner now appeals from the Gibson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the record, oral argument, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In 2009, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Dustin Shawn Price, of first degree felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, two counts of reckless endangerment, and three counts of attempted first degree murder.  The trial court sentenced him to life plus forty years of incarceration.  The Petitioner appealed his convictions to this court, and we affirmed the judgments.  State v. Dustin Shawn Price, No. M2012-00117-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 4539034, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 26, 2013), no perm. app. filed.  Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing.  After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by failure to support and by wanton disregard, Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 36-1-113(g)(1), and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); and (2) incarceration as a result of a criminal act, under a sentence of ten (10) or more years, and the child is under eight (8) years of age at the time the sentence is entered by the court, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). Appellant also appeal the trial court’s determination that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because the relevant statutory time period is not specified in the trial court’s order and in view of the sparsity of evidence, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent by failure to support. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights on the remaining grounds, and on its finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

Petitioner, Tondreon Bowles, also known as Tondreon Merriweather, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. Petitioner argues that his guilty plea to being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a Class C felony, was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner claims that he believed he was pleading guilty to being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony, and therefore, his sentence is illegal. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court; however, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of judgment forms in counts two and four.

Defendant, Hans Banks, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for second degree murder. After a trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense, voluntary manslaughter, and received a sentence of six years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements given to the police and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of voluntary manslaughter. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Garet Myers, of evading arrest in a motor vehicle, a Class E felony; reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor; speeding, a Class C misdemeanor; and driving without a license, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of two years, with thirty days to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. The Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the court’s refusal to approve the Defendant’s request for a special jury instruction, the exclusion of evidence, and the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record, the parties’ briefs, oral argument, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from an unorthodox procedural history, wherein the trial court made its findings of facts and conclusions of law in an order granting summary judgment, the result of which terminated the mother/appellant’s parental rights. The court determined that the undisputed material facts clearly and convincingly established five grounds on which to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The court also found the undisputed material facts established that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother appeals, asserting that the trial court violated her due process rights by terminating her parental rights without affording her an effective opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. She contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to continue the hearing on the petitioners’ motion for summary judgment. She also contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on each of the alleged statutory grounds for termination as well as the issue of the child’s best interests. Following a careful review of the record, we have determined that the mother’s due process rights were not violated, and the trial court did not err in denying her motion for a continuance. We reverse the trial court’s ruling that Petitioners proved the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility; however, we affirm the trial court in all other respects. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Garric Dorsey, for one count of Class B aggravated sexual battery, one count of Class C solicitation of a minor, and one count of Class B felony sexual exploitation of a minor. Although Petitioner’s criminal history was that of a Range II offender, Petitioner entered a guilty plea as a Range III offender to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery and one count of solicitation of a minor, both Class C felonies. The State dismissed the count of sexual exploitation of a minor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to eleven years’ incarceration on both counts and ran the sentences concurrently. Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, which the post-conviction court denied following a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his due process rights were violated. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Robert Glen Gray, appeals as of right from the McNairy County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for two counts of delivery of more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel (1) told Petitioner that he could “beat the charges” and obtain convictions for simple possession/casual exchange of methamphetamine; (2) failed to file a motion to sever; (3) failed to review the entirety of the discovery materials with Petitioner, specifically the laboratory report on the methamphetamine and photographs of Petitioner exchanging money and drugs; and (4) failed to explain the State’s plea offer “in its entirety.” Following our review, we affirm.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s entry of a permanent parenting plan involving one minor child.  The mother appeals the trial court’s designation of the father as the primary residential parent of the minor child.  We vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact to facilitate appellate review. 

This appeal concerns an alleged conversion of funds. Rebecca Durbin, Teresa Fletcher Kidd, and Ramona Lewis ("Plaintiffs," collectively), the adult children of the late Charles Lewis ("Charlie"), sued Bernice Lewis ("Defendant"), Charlie's widow, in the Chancery Court for Washington County ("the Trial Court").Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant exercised undue influence over Charlie in his later years and converted funds in a bank account that Charlie had intended for them to have. After a trial, the Trial Court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendant appeals, arguing among other things that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiffs' claim had expired. Defendant also argues that the Trial Court erred by not awarding her any darnages for Plaintiffs' failure to maintain Charlie's house, which Defendant continued to live in pursuant to Charlie's will. We hold that Plaintiffs were on constructive notice of their claim against Defendant no later than October 5, 2009, and thus their lawsuit filed in October 2019 is time-barred. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Trial Court with respect to Plaintiffs' claim against Defendant. However, we affirm the Trial Court as to its declination to award Defendant any damages for Plaintiffs' failure to maintain Charlie's house as Plaintiffs owed her no duty to maintain the house; per Charlie's will, that was his Estate's responsibility. We thus affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the Trial Court's judgment.

Petitioner, Montez Davis, was convicted of second degree murder, reckless endangerment, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a Hamilton County jury. State v. Montez Davis, No. E2011-02066-CCA-R3CD, 2012 WL 6213520, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 10, 2013). The post-conviction court denied several of Petitioner’s claims but ultimately granted post-conviction relief and vacated Petitioner’s second degree murder conviction. The State appealed and Petitioner filed a cross-appeal. After a thorough review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s grant of post-conviction relief and reinstate Petitioner’s second degree murder conviction.

The pro se Petitioner, Raymond-Bernard Bailey, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the error coram court erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing because he has newly discovered evidence to show his innocence of the crimes. Based on our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Breyon Bates, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Andre Anthony, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his pro se Motion to Correct Judgment Order. After review, we conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.

The Petitioner, Joseph Thomas, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the coram nobis court erred in concluding that he was not entitled to error coram nobis relief from his Alford guilty pleas. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

This appeal involves the mortgagors’ petition to set aside the non-judicial foreclosure of a piece of real property, alleging that the mortgagors and owner of the property were not given proper notice of the non-judicial foreclosure sale. The mortgagee and the beneficiary of the deed of trust concerning the property at issue is the City of Chattanooga. The property was sold to Vince Trotter in a foreclosure auction. In a court order, which was certified as final pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Trotter, determining that Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-5-106 prevented the foreclosure sale from being considered void or voidable due to lack of notice and that the mortgagors had a constitutionally adequate remedy of monetary damages. Despite the mortgagors arguing that Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-5-106 is unconstitutional as applied to governmental entities, the Tennessee Attorney General’s Office was not notified of the constitutional challenge to the statute, as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.04, Tenn. R. App. P. 32, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-107(b). Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Mr. Trotter and remand to the trial court to provide the required notice to the Tennessee Attorney General’s Office.

In 2020, a Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Mimms, of facilitation of first degree premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit first degree premeditated murder.  The trial court imposed concurrent fifteen-year sentences in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. 

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the proof was less than clear and convincing that termination was in her child’s best interest. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence of three grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest, we affirm.

On May 24, 2021, the Defendant, Milton Keith Perkins, filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36.1 seeking to correct an illegal sentence. He alleged that his negotiated Tennessee sentence was illegal because the judgment indicated it should be served “consecutively to any present sentence including Texas parole,” but his Texas sentence was adjudicated after the Tennessee conviction. The trial court summarily denied the Defendant’s motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Deanna Lynn Akers (“Wife”) and Neil E. Powers (“Husband”) were divorced by the Circuit Court for Bradley County (the “trial court”) in 2016. Wife was awarded $1,100.00 per month in alimony in futuro. Following a slew of post-trial motions and proceedings, Husband filed a petition to terminate Wife’s alimony on August 6, 2019. A hearing was held after which the trial court terminated Wife’s alimony and entered a judgment against Wife for the overpaid amount. Because the trial court erred in terminating Wife’s alimony altogether, the trial court’s decision is vacated and remanded for reinstatement of Wife’s in futuro support. Because Husband established, however, a substantial and material change in his earning ability, a modification of the amount of alimony is appropriate and should be determined by the trial court on remand.