APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Gary Randall Yarnell, the petitioner, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The lower court found his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and unknowing and involuntary guilty pleas unsupported by the evidence and denied relief. Because we are unpersuaded of error, we affirm.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner is appealing the lower court’s denial of habeas corpus relief.

This case is about nuisance and infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff homeowners and their minor child lived in a house in a subdivision. The defendant landowner owned a house next door to the plaintiffs’ home. The defendant landowner rented his house to tenants. The tenants allegedly began to engage in disturbing conduct, including illegal drug use, discharging firearms, and harassment. The plaintiffs sued the tenants and the defendant landowner for nuisance and for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant landowner filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiffs had no medical evidence of their emotional distress. Counsel for the plaintiffs did not respond to the motion for summary judgment and did not notify the plaintiffs of the pending motion. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the landowner. The plaintiffs later got a new attorney and filed a motion to set aside this judgment. The trial court set aside the grant of summary judgment, to enable the plaintiffs to file a response. After the plaintiffs filed a response, the trial court again granted summary judgment in favor of the landowner. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and reverse as to claims of nuisance and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer asserts that the trial court erred in its finding that the employee had sustained an 85% permanent partial disability to the whole body and in awarding 237.1 weeks of temporary total disability for an inguinal hernia sustained in the course of his employment with JD Construction.  Because the employee had not reached maximum medical improvement and had not received surgical treatment as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-212, we find the award of permanent partial disability to be premature and reverse. The trial court’s award of temporary total disability benefits is modified to award temporary partial disability benefits, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Bonzie Lavender, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal involves the collateral consequences of the dismissal of a wrongful death claim for failure to prosecute. The mother of a student who fell to his death from a dormitory window filed suit in both state and federal court against the university her son was attending. After the state proceedings lay dormant for over one year, the Circuit Court for Davidson County dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute. Thereafter, the university moved to dismiss the federal suit on the ground that the dismissal of the state suit was res judicata with regard to the federal claim. The mother filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion in state court requesting modification of the dismissal order to reflect that it was not an adjudication on the merits. The state court denied the mother's request for Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 relief and also denied her request for permission to file a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 appeal. The mother has appealed both decisions. We have determined that the trial court erred by denying the mother's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee asserts that the trial court erred in its finding that the employee suffered 55% permanent partial disability to the whole person as the result of a back injury and only an 85% permanent partial disability to the right lower extremity as the result of a knee injury, both injuries occurring in the course of appellant's employment with the Atlantic Soft Drink Company, Inc., a/k/a Pepsi Cola Company. We conclude that the evidence presented supports the findings of the trial judge and, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Morris Lamonte Marsh, was convicted of four counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of second degree murder, two counts of attempted second degree murder, and one count of aggravated assault. After merging two of the first degree felony murder convictions and the two second degree murder convictions into the first two felony murder convictions and merging the aggravated assault conviction into one of the attempted second degree murder convictions, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve a total effective sentence of two life sentences plus forty years. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the law governing criminal responsibility; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in all respects with the majority opinion save its view of the admissibility of the search warrant under Rule 41(c), Tenn. R. Crim. P. The defendant complains that his trial counsel failed to object to the state’s introduction of a copy of the search warrant into evidence. He asserts that the warrant states that “there is probable and reasonable cause to believe that Marvin O. Norton B/M is now in unlawful possession of the following . . . cocaine or derivatives of same . . . .” He argues that the content of the search warrant was objectionable because it contained hearsay, was irrelevant to the facts at issue, and made specific reference to the defendant as the individual in possession of the cocaine.

I fully concur with Judge Hayes' notable and well-written opinion. Like Judge Hayes, I believe that the defendant was seized when the officer asked him to step out of his vehicle and that the seizure was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. I also agree that the defendant's consent to search his person was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal seizure so as to be free from any taint. In consequence, the convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

A Robertson County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Marvin Norton, of possessing twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the appellant claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and (2) that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent. Based upon my review of the record, the encounter leading up to Defendant’s consent to submit to a search was a brief police-citizen encounter requiring no objective justification. State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Tenn. 2000). Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the Appellant, Antonio D. Jones, was convicted of one count of Class B felony possession of cocaine, one count of simple possession of marijuana, and one count of criminal trespass. The Appellant was sentenced to twelve years for felony possession of cocaine, eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of marijuana, and thirty days for trespassing. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently for an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, the Appellant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish his guilt of possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell. He also argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search. After review, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Jones’ motion to suppress. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction for possession of marijuana and felony possession of cocaine are reversed and remanded for a new trial. Jones’ conviction for criminal trespass is affirmed.

The petitioner, Kevin White, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. In this appeal as of right, the petitioner presents one issue for review: whether the trial court erred in refusing to exclude his trial counsel from the courtroom during his testimony at the post-conviction hearing. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In Case No. 15207, the Bedford County Grand Jury charged Defendant, Gregory Bernard Grier, with the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine in Count 1, and with delivery of the same cocaine in Count 2. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of both charges. The trial court merged the conviction in Count 2 with the conviction in Count 1, and, following a sentencing hearing, Defendant was sentenced to serve nine (9) years in the Department of Correction as a Range II multiple offender for his Class C felony conviction. Due to the unique procedural history of this case pertaining to the preparation of the record on appeal and the status of Defendant's former counsel at the time of filing a statement of the evidence in lieu of a verbatim transcript, we are compelled to reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a parental termination case. The parents' next door neighbors overheard the mother striking, cursing, and threatening her daughter over a baby monitor and recorded the incident. The tape also captured the father coming home from work and asking the mother about certain marks on the child. The neighbors subsequently turned the tape over to the Tennessee Department of Children's Services. The juvenile court placed the children in the protective custody of the department, and the department implemented a permanency plan requiring the mother and father, among other things, to undergo therapy. The department subsequently filed a petition in the juvenile court seeking to terminate the parents' parental rights. The juvenile court found that the department proved each ground alleged by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was in the children's best interest. We affirm.

Petitioner, Francis Sanschargrin, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding no grounds entitling Petitioner to habeas corpus relief. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mark Medley, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court's denial of post-conviction relief. In his petition, and now in this appeal, he alleges that he entered an involuntary guilty plea based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, John R. Black, a/k/a Rene J. Black, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, as amended, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that trial counsel's assistance was ineffective (1) for failing to prepare an adequate record for appeal; (2) for failing to request an instruction on the lesser included offense of false imprisonment or raise the trial court's failure to do so on appeal; and (3) for failing to object to the prosecutor's improper questions and comments during Petitioner's cross-examination at trial and during closing argument. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of Defendant, Kendrick D. Hutton, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant requests this Court to remand the matter for a new probation revocation hearing because the trial court failed to follow the statutory procedure governing probation revocations. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, E & W Bonding Company, appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for relief of its obligation under a bail bond of $100,000 in the case of criminal defendant Carlos Albert Cabellero-Grajeda. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jeffrey Casey, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The issue presented for review is whether the petition was properly dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. The judgment is affirmed.

The appellant, Daniel Lee Cook, pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to reckless burning, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as thirty days in jail and the remainder on probation. The trial court also ordered the appellant to pay restitution in the amount of one hundred fifty dollars per month for five years. On appeal, the appellant claims that the State failed to prove the fair market value of the destroyed property and that the trial court erred by ordering a payment schedule that extended beyond the maximum statutory term of probation supervision that could have been imposed for the offense. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to determine the amount of the victim's loss. However, the trial court erred regarding the restitution payment schedule. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Randy L. May, sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Wayne County Circuit Court, claiming that his 1981 life sentence had been rendered void by the Board of Probation and Parole's order that not only denied parole but also mandated, according to the petitioner, that he serve the balance of his sentence. The circuit court granted the state's motion to dismiss the petition without a hearing, and the petitioner appealed. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

A Marshall County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Dwayne Tyrone Simmons, of aggravated burglary and theft of property valued less than $500. The trial court sentenced the appellant to concurrent sentences of eight years, ten months for the aggravated burglary conviction and nine months, eighteen days for the theft conviction. In this appeal, the appellant raises various issues, including that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated burglary conviction and that he was unable to present photographs of the home in question to the jury. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.