APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment with the trial court. After conducting a hearing on the motion, the trial court entered an order which amounted to a denial of the plaintiff’s motion.  Accordingly, the trial court’s order does not constitute a final judgment which the plaintiff may appeal to this Court. This appeal stands dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

I agree with the result reached by the majority. I write separately to point out that the applicable statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-105, expressly provides that an application for a beer permit “shall disclose” that “no . . . person to be employed . . . has been convicted of any violation of the laws [pertaining to beer or other alcoholic beverages] or any crime involving moral turpitude within the past ten (10) years.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-105(c)(7). In addition to this requirement pertaining to the contents of the application, Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-105(b), dealing with what “an applicant must establish,” contains a proof requirement using the same language. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-105(b)(4).

This is an appeal of a divorce action in which the Wife argues that the trial court failed to make an equitable distribution of the marital estate and the trial court erred in dismissing her independent lawsuit against Husband, and a corporation owned by Husband, for wages claimed to be earned by Wife and owing by the corporation. We hold that the distribution of marital property should be modified so as to award Wife sole ownership of the marital home, subject to Husband's right of first refusal to purchase the home in the event it is sold, and Husband's right to visit and maintain the gravesite of the parties' daughter, located near the home on part of the marital estate, upon Husband's providing reasonable notice to Wife. We further find that the trial court erred in dismissing Wife's lawsuit against Husband and therefore vacate the trial court's order dismissing with prejudice the Wife's lawsuit against Husband and the corporation. We affirm the trial court's ruling in all other respects.

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion. I believe the judgments of conviction provide illegal sentences and are, therefore, void. I believe the case should be remanded for the trial court to transfer the case to the Marshall County Circuit Court for entry of corrected judgments of conviction.

This case involves the Petitioner’s application for a permit to sell beer both on and off-premises of her proposed business establishment. The trial court affirmed the Appellee McMinn County Commission’s decision to deny the permit, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-105, on grounds that Petitioner’s application contained a false statement. Petitioner contends on appeal that she should have been granted the permit because she did not know the statement was false at the time she made it, and because she attempted to amend the application to correct the false statement prior to the hearing before the McMinn County Chancery Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his habeas petition, contending that the judgments reflect thirty percent release eligibility rather than the statutorily mandated one hundred percent service required of multiple rapists. Because the petitioner was convicted by a jury, as opposed to pleading guilty, we conclude that the trial court was required to impose the one hundred percent service requirement.  Therefore, the trial court’s failure to properly mark the judgments does not render the judgments void but should be amended as a clerical error, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.  We affirm the denial of habeas relief.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee 100 percent permanent disability. The employer contends the trial court was in error in calculating the average weekly wage and in finding the employee was totally disabled.  Judgment is affirmed.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the defendant, Antonio Sanders, of two counts of  first degree felony murder; two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; one count of  aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and five counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the two counts of first degree murder together and the two counts of aggravated robbery together and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment for the felony murder, eight years for the aggravated robbery, three years for the aggravated burglary, and three years for each count of attempted robbery, all to be served concurrently. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient, that the trial court improperly approved the use of an interpreter at trial, and that the trial court erred in ordering the sequestration of the jury. We affirm the trial court.

A Greene County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bronzo Gosnell, Jr., of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's conviction on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court summarily dismissed as time-barred. Because we agree that the petition is time-barred, we affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the case finding plaintiff had not established sufficient evidence to prove notice and causation of injury. Plaintiff insists the court was in error in weighing the evidence. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Martez Towen Fitts, pled guilty to sale of cocaine over .5 grams and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years, all suspended except for forty-eight hours and the balance to be served on probation, with the first six months on intensive probation. Additionally, he was ordered to comply with alcohol and drug assessment programs, obtain his GED, and pay a $2000 fine. The trial court subsequently revoked the defendant's probation, and he appealed. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Tyris Lemont Harvey, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, pled guilty to burglary and theft of property valued over $500. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective four-year sentence, as a Range II offender, and ordered that the Petitioner's sentences run consecutively to a prior sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Yolando Odom, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Odom pled guilty to one count of robbery and accepted an eight-year sentence as a Range II offender, despite only meeting the statutory criteria for a Range I offender. On appeal, Odom contends that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to inform him of possible defenses at trial and in failing to review the proof with respect to the elements of the indicted offense of aggravated robbery. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Joseph A. Maine, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty pleas were not knowing or voluntary and that his trial counsel was ineffective for, among other things, erroneously advising him that he would be eligible for release after serving only twenty-five years of his life sentence.1 Because the record reflects that the petitioner was similarly misinformed by the trial court as to the release eligibility date for his life sentence, we conclude that his pleas were not knowing or voluntary. Accordingly, we reverse the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition and remand the case for the petitioner to withdraw his pleas of guilty.

Relying upon a common law rule, the trial court continued the defendant's trial on the charge of accessory after the fact to first degree murder until after the trial and conviction of the principal offender. The defendant sought interlocutory review of the trial court's order, asserting that her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated by application of the common law rule. The Court of Criminal Appeals refused to grant the defendant's application for an interlocutory appeal, finding no reason to deviate from the general practice of evaluating speedy trial claims on direct appeal. We granted the defendant permission to appeal to consider the following issues of law: (1) whether the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 591 ("Reform Act"), abrogated the common law rule that a principal must be tried and convicted before an accessory after the fact may be tried; (2) if not, should this Court judicially abrogate the common law rule; and (3) whether a defendant is entitled to interlocutory review of the trial court's order denying her motion to dismiss the indictment because of an alleged violation of her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. We hold that the common law rule has not been abrogated by the Reform Act, and we decline to judicially abrogate it. We also hold that the defendant is not entitled to seek interlocutory review of the trial court's order rejecting her alleged Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation. Applying these holdings, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals insofar as it denied the defendant interlocutory review of her speedy trial claim, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court which continued the defendant's trial on the charge of accessory after the fact until after the trial of the principal offender. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant, Felix Tyrone Smith, pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault and one count of possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell. Defendant was sentenced to an effective eight-year sentence on supervised probation. In 2002, Defendant was found to be in violation of the conditions of his probation but the trial court reinstated Defendant's probation. Approximately two years later, after the filing of another probation violation warrant, the trial court revoked Defendant's probation and ordered Defendant to serve the original eight-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by relying on evidence not included in the record when revoking Defendant's probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jason Dwight King, pled guilty to DUI, driving on a suspended license, felony evading arrest, reckless endangerment, and reckless driving. The petitioner pled nolo contendere to theft over $1,000 and theft under $500. As a result, he received an effective sentence of two-and-a-half (2 1/2) years. The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

In this premises liability suit, we are called upon to evaluate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant/landowner. The trial court concluded that, as a matter of law, the injured plaintiff, an employee of an independent contractor performing electrical work on the premises, could not establish that the defendant/landowner owed him a duty. Since the plaintiff could not establish an essential element of his negligence cause of action, the trial court granted the defendant/landowner’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

The appellant, Brian Eric McGowen, a.k.a. Brad Lee O'Ryan, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and attempted especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction for his murder conviction, to forty years incarceration for his especially aggravated robbery conviction, and to twenty years incarceration for his attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the appellant raises numerous issues for our review, including the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, evidentiary issues, jury instructions, and sentencing. Upon our review of the record, we merge the appellant's conviction for attempted especially aggravated robbery into his conviction for especially aggravated robbery. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

The defendant, Arthur Buford, who was indicted for aggravated perjury, was convicted of perjury.  The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) that the state failed to make a proper election of offenses; and (3) that the trial court erred by permitting the defendant's former attorney to testify as a witness for the state. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

The defendant, Malcolm Whiteside, entered pleas of guilty to forgery, assault, resisting arrest, aggravated burglary, two counts of evading arrest, and four counts of theft under $500. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of seven years to be served in the community corrections program. A violation warrant was filed less than one month after the defendant was placed on community corrections. A second violation warrant was filed three years later. At a hearing held six years after the filing of the second warrant, the trial court revoked the community corrections sentence and ordered service of the balance of the sentence in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by revoking community corrections and ordering service of the sentence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Emerson E. Russell ("the plaintiff") and his wife, Angie Russell, brought this suit for medical malpractice against Dr. Ted W. Brown, Jr., seeking damages associated with injuries allegedly suffered by the plaintiff as a result of a surgical procedure performed by Dr. Brown. The plaintiff also named as a defendant Dr. S. Morgan Smith, the anesthesiologist who attended the plaintiff's surgery. In the complaint, the plaintiff averred, among other allegations, that he was not adequately informed of alternative treatments for his snoring problem, and that he was not fully advised of the attendant risks of the procedure performed by Dr. Brown. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants. Following the trial, the defendants filed separate motions for discretionary costs, which motions were granted in part and denied in part. The plaintiff and his wife appeal, arguing that the plaintiff was not furnished sufficient information to enable him to give "informed" consent to the surgery performed by Dr. Brown. They also contend that the trial court's charge to the jury on the issue of informed consent did not adequately instruct the jury on the subject. Finally, they raise several issues pertaining to evidentiary matters. As a separate issue, the defendants contend that the trial court's awards of discretionary costs were inadequate. We affirm the judgment of the trial court with respect to the jury's verdict. We modify the trial court's two awards of discretionary costs. As modified, those awards are affirmed.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendants based on Plaintiff's failure to respond to Defendants' statements of undisputed facts. We affirm.

The petitioner, Tony Willis, appeals from the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred by summarily dismissing the petition. The judgment is affirmed.

Diana Ruth Brown ("the defendant") was stopped by a City of Oak Ridge police officer and cited for speeding. Following an adverse decision in municipal court, the defendant appealed to the trial court. The trial court ruled that the defendant could not pursue, in the trial court, her assertion and defense that the posted speed limit of 45 mph was not legally established. Subsequently, that court found her guilty of speeding and imposed its judgment. The defendant appeals. Both sides raise issues. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.