APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Because the notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

After expiration of the maximum sentence imposed for a non-violent felony conviction, a petitioner sought full restoration of his citizenship rights. The trial court restored all of the petitioner’s rights, except for his firearm rights. Discerning that the trial court erred in limiting the restoration of the petitioner’s rights, we reverse and remand.

This appeal relates to a healthcare liability action. The Claims Commission denied the State’s motion to dismiss based upon the claimants’ failure to satisfy the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122. We reverse the trial court and remand for dismissal.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, filed by John Kirk Tarver (“Petitioner”), seeking to recuse the judge in this case involving post-divorce matters. Following our thorough review of the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner, we discern no error and therefore affirm.

This appeal involves a payment dispute among several companies, including a construction company, a concrete company, and a fabricator company, that ultimately centered on a question of alter-ego status. The trial court found that the concrete company and the construction company were one and the same, and therefore were alter egos of each other. The trial court granted the concrete company enforcement of its lien and awarded it the funds that were deposited in the clerk’s office for the work performed on a building project. The trial court also denied the fabricator company’s cross-claim against the construction company for breach of contract for subcontracting work to the concrete company. The concrete company appeals. We affirm.

Petitioner, Oscar Smith, a death row inmate, appeals the trial court’s order denying his “Motion to Reopen Post-Conviction Proceedings and/or for Review under Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001.”  The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen and his DNA petition in the same order.  Petitioner has filed a notice of appeal (Docket No. M2022-00455-CCA-R3-PD) and an application for permission to appeal (Docket No. M2022-00460-CCA-R28-PD).  The Court hereby consolidates these two appeals under Docket No. M2022-00455-CCA-R3-PD.  The record has been filed and Petitioner, in addition to having filed an application for permission to appeal, has already filed his appellate brief.  Upon our review, we affirm the rulings of the trial court pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

The Defendant, Justin Antonio McDowell, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of possession of more than 0.5 gram of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver within a drug-free zone, a Class A felony; possession of more than twenty-six grams of methamphetamine with the intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture within a drug-free zone, a Class A felony; unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a violent felony, a Class B felony; and two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a), (c), (i) (possession of cocaine or methamphetamine) (2018) (subsequently amended); 39-17-1307(b)(1) (possession of a firearm after previously having been convicted of a violent felony); 39-17-1324(a) (possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony) (2018) (subsequently amended); 37-17-1324(g)(2) (increasing the penalty for unlawful possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, if the defendant had a prior felony conviction at the time of the present offense). The trial court merged two of the firearm convictions and imposed an effective thirty-year sentence, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained after his unlawful detention and a warrantless search of his car and motel room, (3) the trial court erred in admitting drug evidence because an unbroken chain of custody was not established, and (4) he is entitled to a sentence reduction due to post-sentencing changes to the drug-free zone sentence enhancement statute. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit challenging the reapportionment plan for the districts of the Tennessee Senate that the Tennessee General Assembly enacted after the 2020 census.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs alleged that the reapportionment plan violates article II, section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution because it fails to consecutively number the four Senatorial districts included in Davidson County.  The Plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief.  The trial court granted a temporary injunction enjoining the Defendants from enforcing or giving any effect to the boundaries of the Senatorial districts.  The trial court provided the General Assembly with fifteen days to remedy the defect pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-18-105, stating that if the defect was not remedied, the trial court would impose an interim plan for the 2022 election.  Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-5-101(a)(1) sets the deadline for filing candidate nominating petitions as the first Thursday in April at noon.  Thus, the trial court further extended the statutory April 7, 2022 filing deadline for Senatorial candidates until May 5, 2022.  The Defendants filed an application for extraordinary appeal in the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.  This Court assumed jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-3-201(d)(3).  We conclude that the trial court erred by granting the injunction because it failed to adequately consider the harm the injunction will have on our election officials who are detrimentally impacted by the extension of the candidate filing deadline, as well as the public interest in ensuring orderly elections and avoiding voter confusion.  We vacate the injunction and remand to the trial court.  

Sharon G. Lee, J., dissenting.

On April 6, 2022, a three-judge panel granted a temporary injunction enjoining the defendants, William Lee, as Governor of Tennessee, in his official capacity, Tre Hargett, as Tennessee Secretary of State, in his official capacity, and Mark Goins, as Tennessee Coordinator of Elections, in his official capacity, from enforcing or giving effect to the reapportionment plan for the Tennessee Senate. The Senate reapportionment plan creates four senatorial districts within Davidson County that are not consecutively numbered (the districts are numbered 17, 19, 20, and 21). Yet article II, section 3, of the Tennessee Constitution requires that in a county with more than one senatorial district, the districts have to be numbered consecutively. The three-judge panel gave the General Assembly fifteen days (until April 21, 2022) to remedy the constitutional defect and extended the qualifying deadline for prospective Senatorial candidates from April 7, 2022, to May 5, 2022.

A Rutherford County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Derrick Himes, of three counts of rape of a child and three counts of aggravated sexual battery.  The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years for each rape of a child conviction and eight years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction.  The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for each rape of a child conviction, concurrent sentences of eight years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction, and ordered that the
twenty-five-year sentence and the eight-year sentence be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of thirty-three years.  On appeal, the Appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions, (2) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to elicit irrelevant and prejudicial testimony from the State’s witnesses, and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Amanda L. Moore, Defendant, appeals after a jury convicted her of two counts of vehicular assault, one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”), and one count of reckless endangerment.  The trial court merged the DUI conviction into the convictions for vehicular assault.  Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of four years.  After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court improperly admitted the results of a blood draw used by the hospital for medical treatment; (2) the trial court improperly allowed her to be questioned extensively about her driving history on cross-examination; (3) the trial court improperly allowed the State to meet with its expert during cross-examination; and (4) the trial court had improper ex parte communication with the jury during deliberation.  After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand to the trial court for entry of a judgment form for DUI.  

The Defendant, Wayne David Jones, was convicted by a jury of two counts of reckless homicide, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of child neglect, for which he received an effective twenty-five-year sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficent to support his convictions because the jury improperly weighed conflicting expert medical testimony regarding the thirteen-month-old victim’s head trauma and cause of death.  Following our review, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions.  However, we determine error with the classification of the Defendant’s child neglect conviction as a Class A misdmeanor and the imposition of a misdemeanor sentence.  Accordingly, we vacate the conviction and sentence for child neglect and remand for entry of a modified Class E felony child neglect conviction and for the trial court to impose a corresponding felony sentence.  In all other respects, we affirm. 

Defendant, Mark Dewayne McMurry, was indicted for and pleaded guilty to robbery.  Prior to sentencing, Defendant moved to recuse the trial judge.  The trial court denied Defendant’s motion for recusal and, following a sentencing hearing, sentenced Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to serve 10 years in incarceration.  In this appeal as of right, Defendant challenges his sentence as excessive and argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for recusal.  Following our careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

Appellant appeals the judgment entered against him by the trial court, ordering him to pay Appellee unpaid wages. We affirm.

The pro se Petitioner, Lamario Hill, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus from his convictions for first degree felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment and concurrent sentences of nine and four years, respectively. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the judgment for his life sentence is void (1) because it was imposed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(i), which he claims is invalid, and because it was imposed in contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-501(a)(2) and 40-28-115(b)(1); and (2) because it was imposed in violation of the Eighth Amendment pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016). We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Markist Cole, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that due process considerations warranted the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(a). Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The pro se Petitioner, Tut Mayal Tut, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court but remand the case for entry of corrected judgments.

This appeal involves the calculation of post-judgment interest applying Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121. The trial court calculated
post-judgment interest utilizing the statutory interest rate that was applicable when the judgment was entered without modifying the interest rate when the statutory rate subsequently changed. Discerning no error, we affirm. We also deny the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal.

The Petitioner, Billy Gene DeBow, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition seeking habeas corpus relief from his first-degree murder conviction.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the habeas corpus court abused its discretion by dismissing his petition without ruling on the merits of his claims and that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because his judgment is void and his sentence is illegal.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition. 

This appeal concerns the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in a wrongful death lawsuit.  James Williams (“Plaintiff”), individually as next of kin and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Granville Earl Williams, Jr., deceased (“Decedent”), sued Smyrna Residential, LLC d/b/a Azalea Court and Americare Systems, Inc. (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County (“the Trial Court”).  Decedent was a resident of Azalea Court, an assisted living facility.  Plaintiff alleged his father died because of Defendants’ negligence.  Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration, citing an arbitration agreement (“the Agreement”) entered into by Decedent’s daughter and durable power of attorney Karen Sams (“Sams”) on behalf of Decedent when the latter was admitted to Azalea Court.  Notably, the durable power of attorney (“the POA”) did not cover healthcare decision-making.  The Trial Court held that Sams lacked authority to enter into the Agreement and that, in any event, the wrongful death beneficiaries would not be bound by the Agreement even if it were enforceable.  Defendants appeal.  We affirm.

This appeal involves an award of attorney fees after a remand from this Court.  The appellant argues that the statute authorizing such fees is inapplicable by its terms and also unconstitutional as a violation of her right to access the courts.  We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner, Kristina Cole, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition arguing that the post-conviction court erred in its denial of her petition. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga.1 Plaintiff, a computer teacher at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The teacher alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the teacher had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that she had met all other pleading requirements to sustain her RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the teacher sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the teacher is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer.

The Defendant, Christopher Scott Montella, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2018).  He received a sentence of eleven years.  On appeal, the Defendantcontends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction, (2) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to sever, (3) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search, (4) the Defendant suffered a violation of Brady v. Maryland 373 U.S. 83 (1963) when the State failed to inform the Defendant the victim’s trial testimony would be different than the victim’s previous testimony, (5) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on juror misconduct, and (6) the trial court erred by sentencing the Defendant to eleven years.  We conclude that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to sever; however, the error was harmless.  We reverse the Defendant’s conviction based on juror misconduct and remand the case for a new trial.