APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This personal injury action arose following a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff timely commenced an action in which she sought $1 million in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages. After the defendant was served but failed to file an answer to the complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment, which the trial court granted as to liability only, leaving open the amount of damages to be awarded. The case remained dormant for seven years until the plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint that increased the request for compensatory damages from $1 million to $2 million. The amended complaint, however, was never served on the defendant. Thereafter, a final judgment was entered in which the plaintiff was awarded the monetary damages she sought in the amended complaint, that being $2 million for compensatory damages and $1 million for punitive damages. Seventeen months later, and after paying $30,000 toward the $3 million judgment, the defendant filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(3) motion to set aside the default judgment on the ground the judgment was void ab initio for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff opposed the motion arguing, inter alia, that the Rule 60.02(3) motion was untimely and that it should be denied based on exceptional circumstances as recognized in Turner v. Turner, 473 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 2015). Following a hearing and finding the motion timely, the trial court determined (1) that the defendant had not been served with the amended complaint, (2) that the judgment was void, and (3) that the plaintiff had not proven the requisite exceptional circumstances to deprive the defendant of Rule 60 relief due to the plaintiff’s failure to establish another person’s detrimental reliance on the void judgment. We affirm.

In this post-divorce action, Douglas Patrick Hoering (“Husband”) petitioned for a modification of his periodic alimony payment to Marlita Dapar (“Wife”), alleging that “she is no longer suffering from a financial disadvantage, as she has obtained housing and support from her paramour for some time.” The trial court ordered a reduction in Husband’s monthly spousal support payment from $1,200 to $600, in a judgment containing no findings of fact. Based on our de novo review of the record, we hold that Husband failed to demonstrate a substantial and material change of circumstances that would warrant decreasing his payment of alimony in futuro to Wife. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

In this case involving a petition for grandparent visitation, where the minor child’s parents had divorced and the mother had been admitted to an inpatient rehabilitation facility, the maternal grandparents asserted that the minor child’s father had prevented them from visiting with the child once the father had obtained full custody of the child. The trial court conducted a hearing and subsequently granted to the grandparents monthly visitation with the child plus additional time during school breaks and holidays. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We decline, however, to grant an award of attorney’s fees to the grandparents on appeal.

In a parentage action, the juvenile court adopted a permanent parenting plan and determined the father’s child support obligation.  The court also declined a request to change the child’s name.  On appeal, both parents take issue with the parenting plan, and the mother claims that the father’s income was higher than found by the court.  Despite their differences, the parents agree that the court’s order contains insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We vacate in part and remand.

The pro se Petitioner, Monoleto Delshone Green, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the Petitioner’s notice of appeal is untimely and we find nothing that warrants the waiver of the timely notice of appeal requirement, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Michael Wayne Robinson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, and unlawful possession of a weapon, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, John David Grant, appeals from the Robertson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his effective six-year community corrections sentence for his aggravated assault and vandalism of property convictions.  On appeal, he contends that his counsel at the revocation hearing provided ineffective assistance.  Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jimmy Evan Milstead, was convicted by a Hardin County criminal court jury of unlawful possession of a weapon, driving on a revoked license, and evading arrest. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in 1) failing to suppress a rifle discovered in the car that the Defendant was driving; and 2) in admitting the rifle after the rifle was left in the Defendant’s car for 26 days in an impound lot. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Teresa Sumpter, for the Class A felony of theft of property valued over $250,000 and for the Class B felony of money laundering. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixty years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction and ordered the defendant pay $373,412.77 in restitution. The defendant filed this timely appeal, challenging the evidence supporting her theft conviction and the trial court’s ruling allowing the defendant’s prior theft convictions to be entered into evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this post-divorce proceeding, Father appeals a default judgment entered against him as a sanction that: 1) modified the parties’ parenting plan and decreased his child support obligation based on the emancipation of one of his children and 2) awarded Mother a monetary judgment in the amount of $7,635 ($2,000 as reimbursement for half of the middle child’s vehicle; $500 for sanctions not paid; and $5,135 for attorney’s fees and court costs paid by Mother).  Father filed a motion requesting the trial court to set aside the default judgment, asserting he did not receive proper notice of Mother’s motion for default.  The trial court summarily denied Father’s motion without holding a hearing.  We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

In this healthcare liability action, a decedent’s estate and her son sued a nursing home and the county that owned the nursing home, alleging that the nursing home was negligent in the care of the decedent. The nursing home and the county filed a motion to dismiss the case for failure to comply with the certificate of good faith filing requirement in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. The trial court denied the motion, finding that an exhibit attached to the complaint satisfied the certificate of good faith filing requirement. Because the exhibit did not contain all of the information required for a certificate of good faith, we reverse and remand.

A Van Buren County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Joel Ernest Blanton, for seven counts of rape of his eleven-year-old daughter and one count of aggravated sexual battery of his ten-year-old daughter.  At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted the Defendant of six counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of 212 years.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for rape of a child in Counts 1, 2, and 4 and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Brenda F.1 (“Mother”) and David F. (“Father”) to their three children who were then minors. As grounds, DCS alleged: (1) abandonment by failure to visit one of the children, Orian F.; (2) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home for the children; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (4) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal; (5) incompetency of the parents to provide care and supervision of the children; and (6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The trial court found that DCS established all six grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, and that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Although the parents have appealed only the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and the trial court’s best interest findings, we have reviewed all of the alleged grounds, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a mother’s petition seeking to relocate to Canada with the parties’ minor child.  Determining relocation to Canada with the mother to be in the child’s best interest, the juvenile court approved the mother’s petition, and the father appealed to this Court.  Discerning no error, we affirm. 

Michael James Elrod, Defendant, was indicted by the McMinn County Grand Jury for second degree murder and aggravated assault after attacking his parents with a hunting knife. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 20 years for second degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to three years, suspended to probation, for aggravated assault. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. Defendant maintains on appeal (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions based on his insanity and diminished capacity defenses; and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves an action resulting from an alleged assault on a minor by a substitute teacher employed by the Shelby County Board of Education. The trial court granted Shelby County’s motion to dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 3 and 4.03 regarding process and service of process. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand.

Appellant initially filed suit against a doctor and the hospital where she had surgery. Nearly a year later, Appellant amended her complaint to add the doctor’s employer as an additional defendant. The first suit was voluntarily dismissed, and the plaintiff refiled against the doctor and her employer, relying on the savings statute. The trial court dismissed the claims against the doctor on the basis that Appellant failed to substantially comply with the Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 in the second action and therefore was not entitled to an extension on the savings statute. The trial court granted the employer summary judgment on the basis that the first complaint naming it was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm.

At issue is an election commission’s decision to set an election on proposed referendum measures to a local government’s charter.  In pre-election litigation over this decision, the trial court concluded, for various reasons, that the election commission’s decision to hold the election should be reversed.  The election commission now urges this Court to reinstate its decision to hold an election and to remand this matter to it with instructions to schedule a referendum election at a future date pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-3-204(a).  As explained in more detail in this Opinion, we conclude that this requested relief is not proper under the cited statute.  Moreover, because this appeal cannot serve as a vehicle to grant the election commission any relief, we consider the matter moot.  Notwithstanding this posture in the case, we do find it appropriate, in the exercise of our discretion, to address one of the specific legal issues presented by this appeal as an exception to the mootness doctrine.  As to that issue, which concerns the interpretation of a form requirement the local government’s charter places on petitions to amend the charter by referendum election, we agree with the trial court that the referendum petition at issue in this case ran afoul of the requirement in dispute.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of a will.  Mary Bell McGraw Marlin (“Decedent”), a property owner in Rutherford County, left her farm to her surviving children.  Decedent’s holographic will provided equal acres to each heir, although a survey purporting to show how to divide the land was missing.  After years of futile discussions over how to divide the farm, Decedent’s grandson Harry Marlin, III filed suit in chancery court seeking to partition the land.  The matter was referred to the Probate Court for Rutherford County (“the Probate Court”).  After a hearing, the Probate Court entered an order dividing the land amongst the heirs.  Harry Marlin, III appeals.  He argues that the Probate Court erred by dividing the land into equal acres without regard to the economic value of the respective tracts.  We hold, inter alia, that Decedent’s will controls and it provided for equal acres, not equally valued acres.  We further find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Probate Court’s determination as to which tract each heir was to receive.  We affirm.

Daniel Greenberg appeals the order of the Circuit Court for Williamson County (the “trial court”), enrolling a California judgment under which Mr. Greenberg is obligated to pay child support to his ex-wife. Because his brief is not in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27, Father’s issues are waived and his appeal must be dismissed.

The Defendant, Jason Matthew Campbell, appeals his convictions and effective twenty-three-year sentence for possession of more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of a firearm by a convicted violent felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.  The Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish his constructive possession of the methamphetamine and pistol and that the prosecutor committed misconduct during rebuttal argument by violating the missing witness rule, shifting the burden of proof, and stating a personal opinion. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Benjamin Lee Pearson, Jr., pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery and received a total effective sentence of sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that his counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.  The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Brett A. Patterson, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the Montgomery County Circuit Court, contending that newly discovered evidence revealed that a vial of the victim’s blood was broken during transportation to the crime laboratory with other items of evidence, and the blood spilled onto the other evidence.  The Petitioner further contended a “tow-in receipt” for a vehicle the Petitioner had been driving revealed that the State had obtained certain items of evidence prior to the issuance of a search warrant.  Additionally, the Petitioner contended that the statute of limitations for filing the error coram nobis petition should be tolled.  After an evidentiary hearing, the coram nobis court denied the petition.  On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the coram nobis court’s ruling.  Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The pro se petitioner, William Eblen, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court for Lake County, arguing the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. He insists his sentence should have expired, but the Tennessee Department of Correction “erased” sentence reduction credits he had earned. The State contends the trial court properly dismissed the petition. Upon our review of the record, the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

The State filed this action against the defendants for judicial enforcement of an order and assessment entered by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation concerning violations of the Water Quality Control Act.  The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the State as to the defendants’ liability for upfront civil penalties and damages due under the order.  We affirm.