APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the parental rights of a father who has been incarcerated off and on for most of this fourteen-year-old daughter’s life. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights in the White County Juvenile Court while he was serving a fifteen-year-sentence for first degree robbery. The juvenile court, relying on the grounds contained in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), (3), (9) (Supp. 2004), terminated the father’s parental rights. The father has appealed. We have determined that the Department has presented clear and convincing evidence that the father abandoned his daughter as proscribed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (Supp. 2004), that he failed to remedy conditions as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A), and that terminating his parental rights is in his daughter’s best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating the father’s parental rights.

In this action arising from a motor vehicle accident, plaintiffs claimed damages for personal injuries and the jury returned a verdict finding defendants 100% at fault for the accident, but awarded no damages for personal injuries to plaintiffs. On appeal, we affirm.

On April 7, 2003, Amy J. Doss ("Mother") filed divorce and custody proceedings in the Circuit Court for Lake County, Illinois (the "Illinois Court"). On that same day, Timothy L. Doss ("Father") filed divorce and custody proceedings in the Family Court for Rhea County, Tennessee (the "Tennessee Court"). Both the Illinois Court and the Tennessee Court have asserted subject matter jurisdiction over the custody proceedings and inconsistent orders have been entered regarding child support and visitation. The issues on this Tenn. R. App. P. 10 interlocutory appeal by Mother center around whether the Tennessee Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the custody proceedings and, if so, whether it properly exercised that jurisdiction. We conclude that: 1) the Tennessee Court did not have "home state" subject matter jurisdiction; and 2) even if the Tennessee Court had "significant connection" subject matter jurisdiction, it nevertheless should have declined to exercise that jurisdiction because the Illinois Court clearly is the more appropriate forum. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Tennessee Court with regard to the custody proceedings.

The defendant, Frank Peter Pinchak, entered a nolo contendere plea to vehicular assault, aggravated assault, and violation of the implied consent law. The trial court deferred the imposition of two concurrent two-year sentences for vehicular assault and aggravated assault, placing the defendant on judicial diversion for a term of six years. For violating the implied consent law, the trial court suspended the defendant's license for one year. The trial court then dismissed sua sponte the implied consent law violation, noting that the indictment failed to charge a criminal offense. The State appeals the single issue of whether the trial court erred in dismissing the implied consent violation and argues that diversion is inappropriate if the offense is reinstated. Concluding that an indictment is not a necessary prerequisite to adjudication of a civil implied consent law violation, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of the charge, remand the case for reinstatement of the trial court's original imposition of a one-year suspension of the defendant's driver's license, and conclude that diversion is not appropriate for this civil offense.

The petitioner, Kenneth Lee Weston, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition was properly dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

After having been indicted for the offense of first degree murder, Petitioner, David Joe Douglas Blair, pled guilty to the lesser included offense of second degree murder on June 6, 1999, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, and received a sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On January 5, 2001, Petitioner filed a "Motion for Appointment of Counsel" pertaining to this matter and referenced a statute pertaining to the right to petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court appointed counsel and an amended petition for post-conviction relief was filed. The State answered, and in its answer alleged that the petition should be summarily dismissed because it was filed outside of the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed, and filed his brief. The State has filed a motion for this court to affirm the dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Finding merit in the motion, we grant same and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shelby County employee appealed denial of review by the County’s Civil Service Merit Board following elimination of her position. The Shelby County Circuit Court affirmed the denial of a review by the Board because employee’s position was eliminated due to loss of funding as opposed to disciplinary action against her. Employee appeals. We affirm.

The Petitioner, James A. Vaughn, was convicted of one count of first degree murder, three counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count of reckless endangerment, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life plus twenty-two years. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentences on appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant pled guilty to aggravated robbery and was also found guilty after a bench trial of especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-five years for the Class A felony especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and to fifteen years for the Class B felony aggravated robbery conviction. The two sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant argues two issues: 1) his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping violated his right to due process pursuant to State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991), and; 2) the trial court erred in imposing excessive sentences and in running the sentences consecutively. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Curtis Tate, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) “[p]lain error exists in the record in that the two material and crucial witnesses were not called at trial”; (2) the trial court’s instructions to the jury were incomplete and misleading; (3) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight; (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the appellant’s conviction; and (5) the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a claim for homeowner's insurance benefits. In 1998, a tornado damaged a home in East Nashville. The owner of the home held an insurance policy that provided coverage for guaranteed replacement cost above the policy limit, once repairs had been completed. After the insurer had paid the owner the actual cash value of the damage, the owner sold the home to the plaintiff for $80,000. Along with the sale, the owner assigned to the plaintiff the rights to any claims or proceeds under the insurance policy. The plaintiff, without making any repairs, began a process of attempting to collect supplemental proceeds under the policy. After the insurer failed to respond to the plaintiff's demand for an appraisal, the plaintiff submitted two sworn statements in proof of loss, claiming a total of $405,072.93 in replacement costs. The insurer rejected the plaintiff's proofs of loss, and this suit followed. Following a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $405,072.93, in addition to $35,000 in damages for bad faith. Because we find that the judgment entered by the trial court was the product of an inconsistent jury verdict, we vacate and remand.

This appeal involves protracted litigation concerning the zoning of a parcel of land located in Memphis, Tennessee. After a bridge, which provided the only access to the property, washed away, the landowner planned to install and maintain billboards on the subject parcel by helicopter. The landowner initially applied to the Memphis City Council to have the subject parcel re-zoned from agricultural uses to commercial uses. The Memphis City Council rejected the landowner’s application. The landowner filed a petition for review by common law writ of certiorari and an action for declaratory judgment in the circuit court. The circuit court entered an order reversing the decision of the Memphis City Council and remanding the case to the Council for a new hearing.  Upon remand, the Memphis City Council once again rejected the landowner’s application. The landowner filed a petition for contempt in the circuit court alleging the Council violated the court’s order on remand. The trial court found that, while the Memphis City Council violated the court’s order in every respect, it was not in willful contempt of the court’s order because it relied on the erroneous advice of its lawyer in interpreting the order. The trial court then proceeded to remand the case to the Memphis City Council once more for a new hearing. The City filed an appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves a decision by the Davidson County Circuit Court to grant a petition for a writ of scire facias after expiration of the ten-year statute of limitations. In granting the petition, the trial court first found that the debtor was equitably estopped from asserting the defense of the statute of limitations because of his bad faith and willful misconduct. Next, the trial court found that the judgment creditors timely filed their petition for a writ of scire facias because the ten-year statute of limitations had been tolled by debtor's filing of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case and also by the entry of the Order for Payment by Installments. The debtor appealed to this Court. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The appellant has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In that motion, the appellant argued that his guilty plea resulted in a void sentence because it was ordered to run concurrent to a prior unrelated offense that the appellant was out on bond for at the time of the commission of the offenses which resulted in the guilty plea. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the motion and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Trial Court enforced a mediated Settlement Agreement, reduced to writing and signed by the parties, over the wife's objection. On appeal, we affirm.

After a bench trial, the Defendant, Jose Luis Quintero, was convicted of the first degree murders of Meceia Nelson and Darius Boleyjack. The Defendant waived a sentencing hearing and agreed to a sentence of two concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that 1) the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions; 2) the Defendant's statement to the police should have been suppressed; and 3) the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify about statements made to her by one of the victims. Finding no errors entitling the Defendant to a reversal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee had suffered a compensable injury to his left knee and awarded permanent partial disability benefits of forty percent for the left lower extremity, but
denied recovery for the employee’s back injury. The employee contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s conclusion that his back injury was not compensable. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the holding of the trial court and remand for a determination of permanent partial disability benefits.

The defendant, Marshaun Luden, appeals from the trial court's order revoking his probation and reinstating his original sentence of five years as a Range I, standard offender in the Department of Correction. The defendant does not contest the revocation of his probation. Rather, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider any additional alternative sentencing options. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Steven G. Hughes, petitioned the Johnson County Criminal Court for habeas corpus relief from his Cocke County convictions of aggravated robbery. The court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed. The state has moved this court to affirm the convictions pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. We sustain the court's motion and affirm the order of dismissal.

The Petitioner, Larry Bohannon, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition seeking post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations and is, therefore, time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the trial court.

The petitioner, Chico Lopez Chigano, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Vincent Marcel Williams, of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, and reckless homicide, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for the aggravated child abuse conviction and four years for the reckless homicide conviction. The defendant appeals, claiming that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966); (3) his right to a fair trial was violated when a police officer testified at trial concerning a polygraph test and the defendant's prior convictions; (4) the burden of proof was improperly shifted from the state to the defendant by the prosecutor's statements during closing argument; and (5) the trial court erred by refusing to apply or give sufficient weight to mitigating factors and by improperly applying enhancement factors in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgement of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Carlos Rice, appeals the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. The petition was filed outside the applicable statute of limitation and is, therefore, time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The Defendant, Derrick Sawyers, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Jackie F. Curry, petitioned the Johnson County Criminal Court for habeas corpus relief from his three 2000 Knox County convictions of aggravated rape. The court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed. The state has moved this court to affirm the convictions pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. We sustain the court's motion and affirm the order of dismissal.