APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a trial court's order granting Appellee's motion which was labeled a motion to dismiss but treated as a motion for summary judgment. The trial court determined that Appellant lacked standing to bring her cause of action, and, alternatively, was barred from bringing her claim by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Appellant seeks review by this Court, and, for the following reasons, we affirm.

The petitioner, Willie L. Hicks, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Michelle Tipton, was convicted by a Sevier County jury of the first degree felony murder and second degree murder of Pamela Hale. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction with her first degree felony murder conviction, resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Tipton raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts; (2) whether the District Attorney General's office should have been disqualified from prosecuting the case based upon Appellant's co-counsel's subsequent employment with the State; (3) whether the testimony of two witnesses should have been excluded due to disclosure violations; (4) whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence certain photographs of the deceased and a portion of the deceased's skull; (5) whether the State's closing argument was proper; (6) whether the trial court erred in admitting her co-defendant's statement; and (7) whether the trial court should have instructed the jury with regard to parole eligibility. After a review of the record, we reverse Tipton's conviction for second degree murder based on the trial court's failure to instruct the jury concerning the natural and probable consequences rule. However, a review of the issues raised on appeal reveals no error. Accordingly, Tipton's conviction and sentence for first degree felony murder are affirmed.

The father filed a Petition to change custody of minor son from mother to father. Upon hearing evidence, the Trial Court held there had been a material change of circumstances and it was in the child's best interest to award custody to the father. On appeal, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Tyris Lemont Harvey, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, pled guilty to burglary and theft of property valued over $500. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective four-year sentence, as a Range II offender, and ordered that the Petitioner's sentences run consecutively to a prior sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the case finding plaintiff had not established sufficient evidence to prove notice and causation of injury. Plaintiff insists the court was in error in weighing the evidence. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his habeas petition, contending that the judgments reflect thirty percent release eligibility rather than the statutorily mandated one hundred percent service required of multiple rapists. Because the petitioner was convicted by a jury, as opposed to pleading guilty, we conclude that the trial court was required to impose the one hundred percent service requirement.  Therefore, the trial court’s failure to properly mark the judgments does not render the judgments void but should be amended as a clerical error, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.  We affirm the denial of habeas relief.

The Appellant, Yolando Odom, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Odom pled guilty to one count of robbery and accepted an eight-year sentence as a Range II offender, despite only meeting the statutory criteria for a Range I offender. On appeal, Odom contends that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to inform him of possible defenses at trial and in failing to review the proof with respect to the elements of the indicted offense of aggravated robbery. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Joseph A. Maine, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty pleas were not knowing or voluntary and that his trial counsel was ineffective for, among other things, erroneously advising him that he would be eligible for release after serving only twenty-five years of his life sentence.1 Because the record reflects that the petitioner was similarly misinformed by the trial court as to the release eligibility date for his life sentence, we conclude that his pleas were not knowing or voluntary. Accordingly, we reverse the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition and remand the case for the petitioner to withdraw his pleas of guilty.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the defendant, Antonio Sanders, of two counts of  first degree felony murder; two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; one count of  aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and five counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the two counts of first degree murder together and the two counts of aggravated robbery together and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment for the felony murder, eight years for the aggravated robbery, three years for the aggravated burglary, and three years for each count of attempted robbery, all to be served concurrently. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient, that the trial court improperly approved the use of an interpreter at trial, and that the trial court erred in ordering the sequestration of the jury. We affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Martez Towen Fitts, pled guilty to sale of cocaine over .5 grams and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years, all suspended except for forty-eight hours and the balance to be served on probation, with the first six months on intensive probation. Additionally, he was ordered to comply with alcohol and drug assessment programs, obtain his GED, and pay a $2000 fine. The trial court subsequently revoked the defendant's probation, and he appealed. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I agree with the result reached by the majority. I write separately to point out that the applicable statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-105, expressly provides that an application for a beer permit “shall disclose” that “no . . . person to be employed . . . has been convicted of any violation of the laws [pertaining to beer or other alcoholic beverages] or any crime involving moral turpitude within the past ten (10) years.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-105(c)(7). In addition to this requirement pertaining to the contents of the application, Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-105(b), dealing with what “an applicant must establish,” contains a proof requirement using the same language. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-105(b)(4).

This is an appeal of a divorce action in which the Wife argues that the trial court failed to make an equitable distribution of the marital estate and the trial court erred in dismissing her independent lawsuit against Husband, and a corporation owned by Husband, for wages claimed to be earned by Wife and owing by the corporation. We hold that the distribution of marital property should be modified so as to award Wife sole ownership of the marital home, subject to Husband's right of first refusal to purchase the home in the event it is sold, and Husband's right to visit and maintain the gravesite of the parties' daughter, located near the home on part of the marital estate, upon Husband's providing reasonable notice to Wife. We further find that the trial court erred in dismissing Wife's lawsuit against Husband and therefore vacate the trial court's order dismissing with prejudice the Wife's lawsuit against Husband and the corporation. We affirm the trial court's ruling in all other respects.

This case involves the Petitioner’s application for a permit to sell beer both on and off-premises of her proposed business establishment. The trial court affirmed the Appellee McMinn County Commission’s decision to deny the permit, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-105, on grounds that Petitioner’s application contained a false statement. Petitioner contends on appeal that she should have been granted the permit because she did not know the statement was false at the time she made it, and because she attempted to amend the application to correct the false statement prior to the hearing before the McMinn County Chancery Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted this interlocutory appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in awarding the employee temporary total disability benefits in excess of 400 weeks where the employee had not attained maximum medical improvement within the 400-week period. We hold that the statutory "maximum total benefit" of 400 weeks applies to temporary total disability benefits. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and hold that the employer's liability for temporary total disability benefits is statutorily limited to 400 weeks. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Calvin O. Tankesly, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the trial court should have granted him relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence allegedly showing that extraneous prejudicial information was imparted to the jury at his trial. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the petition.

The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment with the trial court. After conducting a hearing on the motion, the trial court entered an order which amounted to a denial of the plaintiff’s motion.  Accordingly, the trial court’s order does not constitute a final judgment which the plaintiff may appeal to this Court. This appeal stands dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

A Greene County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bronzo Gosnell, Jr., of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's conviction on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court summarily dismissed as time-barred. Because we agree that the petition is time-barred, we affirm.

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion. I believe the judgments of conviction provide illegal sentences and are, therefore, void. I believe the case should be remanded for the trial court to transfer the case to the Marshall County Circuit Court for entry of corrected judgments of conviction.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee 100 percent permanent disability. The employer contends the trial court was in error in calculating the average weekly wage and in finding the employee was totally disabled.  Judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Arthur Buford, who was indicted for aggravated perjury, was convicted of perjury.  The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) that the state failed to make a proper election of offenses; and (3) that the trial court erred by permitting the defendant's former attorney to testify as a witness for the state. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

The defendant, Malcolm Whiteside, entered pleas of guilty to forgery, assault, resisting arrest, aggravated burglary, two counts of evading arrest, and four counts of theft under $500. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of seven years to be served in the community corrections program. A violation warrant was filed less than one month after the defendant was placed on community corrections. A second violation warrant was filed three years later. At a hearing held six years after the filing of the second warrant, the trial court revoked the community corrections sentence and ordered service of the balance of the sentence in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by revoking community corrections and ordering service of the sentence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendants based on Plaintiff's failure to respond to Defendants' statements of undisputed facts. We affirm.

The petitioner, Tony Willis, appeals from the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred by summarily dismissing the petition. The judgment is affirmed.

This is a breach of contract action wherein the trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant on the grounds that the contract was too uncertain and indefinite to be enforced. The action of the trial court is reversed, and the case remanded for trial on its merits.