APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Alfio Orlando Lewis, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief and asserts in two issues that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary due to (1) trial counsel’s ineffective representation, and (2) violations of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

As found by the trial court, appellant, Guy G. Bigger, Jr., was defrauded by Anthony Fields and Guy Fields with regard to the sale of a 332 acre tract of land in Marshall County, Tennessee. The Fields’ conveyed a portion of the tract to the appellee, Patrick Smith. Mr. Bigger brought suit seeking, among other things, to set aside the Fields’ deed to Mr. Smith alleging it to be a fraudulent conveyance. The trial court found Mr. Smith to be a bona fide purchaser who gave adequate consideration for the transfer and denied relief as to Smith. Mr. Bigger appealed challenging the findings of the trial court. We find the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings and affirm.

I agree fully with the majority’s resolution of this case and the issues raised therein. I write separately, however, to express my concern with the apparent inconsistency in the grounds alleged by the Department. Specifically, while the parents’ failure to make reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home for the first four months after removal of the child from the home is a definition of abandonment, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A), it is questionable to me whether the Department can rely on that ground when it has entered into a permanency plan that gives a parent one year to find stable and suitable housing. The majority found that ground unavailable because the Department did not use reasonable efforts, making it unnecessary to address my concern. I agree with that conclusion, but want to make it clear that some question about reliance on that ground may exist regardless of the Department’s efforts.

The petitioner, David James Cantrell, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal involves a mother’s efforts to prevent the termination of her parental rights to her three children while she completes her treatment for methamphetamine addiction. After the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services took custody of the children, it devised a permanency plan obligating the mother to address her drug addiction and to complete other remedial tasks within twelve months. However, after six months of the mother’s failed attempts to restore order to her life, the Department filed a petition in the White County Juvenile Court to terminate the mother’s parental rights. Between the filing of the Department’s petition and the hearing, the mother made significant steps toward completing the tasks in the permanency plan. Despite the mother’s progress, the juvenile court terminated her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment, failure to comply with the permanency plan, and failure to remedy the conditions that had required the children’s removal. The mother has appealed. We have determined that the Department has failed to present clear and convincing evidence of one or more grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights.

American Protection Insurance Company and Tower Automotive Products Company, Inc. appeal the trial court’s grant to Loucindra Taylor of 12% permanent partial disability to both of her arms. First, the Appellants contend that the injured employee did not give notice to the employer as required by law. Second, the Appellants argue that the medical evidence failed to show that the Plaintiff’s condition was related to her employment. Third, the Appellants claim that the 12% award to each arm is excessive and not supported by the evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The employee, Lawrence Parisi, has appealed the trial court's dismissal of his workers’ compensation lawsuit. Mr. Parisi was a Mississippi resident. He worked at a Ryan's Family Steakhouse in Mississippi and was injured there. Based upon the facts of this case and the applicable law, we affirm the dismissal entered by the trial court.

On May 27, 2004, the Juvenile Court Referee entered an order terminating the parental rights of S.A.M.H. ("Mother") to her two minor daughters. The Referee concluded that the State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services ("DCS") had proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds to terminate Mother's parental rights existed and that doing so was in the best interests of the children. Pursuant to Tenn. R. Juv. P. 4(c)(2), the Referee was required to inform Mother of her right to request a rehearing before the Juvenile Court Judge as well as the manner and time limits within which to perfect such a request. The Referee inadvertently failed to inform Mother than she had only five judicial days in which to file her request for a rehearing. Mother filed her request for a rehearing one day late. The Juvenile Court Judge dismissed Mother's appeal after concluding that it was untimely and the Referee's decision had become final after five judicial days. We vacate the judgment.

The Appellant, William O. Ewerling, proceeding pro se, appeals his misdemeanor convictions by the Davidson County Criminal Court for possessing a weapon in a public park, possession of a handgun while under the influence of alcohol, and criminal trespass. On appeal, Ewerling argues the trial court erred as follows: (1) improperly admitted hearsay statements; (2) admitted non-relevant evidence; (3) permitted introduction of evidence from a witness who had no personal knowledge of the matter; (4) improperly instructed the jury; and (5) imposed excessive sentences. Additionally, Ewerling argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we conclude that issues (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) are waived as the record is insufficient to permit a review of these issues. With regard to Ewerling's sufficiency argument, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support his convictions for possessing a weapon in a public park and possession of a handgun while under the influence. However, we conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for criminal trespass. Accordingly, the convictions and sentences for possessing a weapon in a public park and possession of a handgun while under the influence are affirmed; the conviction for criminal trespass is reversed and dismissed.

The petitioner, Randall Blakeney, appeals the trial court's order denying post-conviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. The pleading is barred by the statute of limitations and was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A jury convicted the defendant, Charles Michael Hall, for a third offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (D.U.I.), a Class A misdemeanor, and for driving after having been declared a habitual motor vehicle offender, a Class E felony. For the D.U.I. conviction, he received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail with a release eligibility at 75% and a $1500 fine. For the habitual motor vehicle offender offense, he received a sentence of one year as a Range I standard offender to be served in the Department of Correction. The sentences are to be served consecutively. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court improperly denied charging a proposed jury instruction; and (3) the trial court improperly charged the jury. After reviewing the matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner filed a “Writ of Certiorari and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Motion for Post-Judgment Relief” in the trial court. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of both his petition for writ of habeas corpus and his application for writ of certiorari. Following our review, we affirm the denial of both forms of relief.

This case involves a dispute over the proper amount of child support to be paid for the parties' two minor children. Father requested a child support adjustment due to the emancipation of the parties' oldest child. He additionally requested a downward deviation of his child support payments due to significant additional parenting time in excess of that contemplated by the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines, as well as, significant additional monies paid for private school and other expenses for the children. The previous court order required Husband to pay $4,100 per month for their three minor children based on an income of $10,000 per month. The trial court determined that Husband's new child support amount for the remaining two minor children would be $3,700 per month. Father argued that the proper amount after the emancipation of their oldest child should reduce his child support to $3,200 per month. Father also argued that he should be entitled to a downward deviation reducing his child support to $1,000 per month for his two minor children. We agree with Father that the trial court incorrectly modified his child support following the emancipation of the parties' oldest child. Although Husband's current income is in excess of $10,000 per month, Wife did not carry her burden of proving that additional child support based on an amount over $10,000 per month is reasonably necessary. Child support should be set at 32% of $10,000, $3,200 per month. With regard to Father's request for a downward deviation of his child support obligation, we find that there has been no change of circumstances since the last court order and that this issue could have and should have been litigated at the time of the previous Order, so the matter is barred by res judicata. Child support is set at $3,200 per month for the remaining two minor children.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Jim L. Townsend, appeals the trial court’s denial of his application for writ of error coram nobis/petition for post-conviction relief. Finding that the instant petition is not proper as either a motion for writ of error coram nobis, petition for post-conviction relief, or application for writ of habeas corpus relief, we affirm the dismissal of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Stanley Harvell, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Pro se plaintiff appeals the order of the trial court dismissing his personal injury lawsuit for failure to comply with an order compelling discovery. Because no order compelling discovery was entered by the trial court, we reverse.

A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Keith Latrell Jackson, guilty of possession with the intent to sell twenty-six (26) grams or more of a substance containing cocaine in a Drug-Free School Zone and of possession of a firearm with the intent to employ it in the commission of or escape from an offense. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-six years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a surveyor pertaining to the use of GPS in determining the distance between the location of the offense and the real property that comprises Wharton School; and (4) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we reverse the Defendant's conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm with the intent to employ it in the commission of or escape from an offense, and we affirm the Defendant's conviction and sentence for possession with the intent to sell twenty-six (26) grams or more of a substance containing cocaine in a Drug-Free School Zone.

The Petitioner, Lorenzo D. Harris, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Came the appellant, Michael L. Calandros, pro se, and also came the Attorney General on behalf of the State of Tennessee, and this case was heard on the record on appeal from the Criminal Court of Sullivan County; and upon consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that this avenue of appeal is unavailable to the defendant because the sentence in this case is neither illegal nor void.

The Petitioner, Horatio L. Rice, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to establish that his convictions are void or that his sentence has expired. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, the widow of decedent, appeals from probate court judgment that decedent died intestate. Decedent had executed an individual will, as well as a joint mutual will with Appellant, on the same day. Both wills executed by decedent contained revocation clauses purporting to revoke all prior wills. Neither Appellant, nor the witnesses to the execution of the wills, could recall the order in which Decedent executed the wills. Probate court held that, since each of Decedent’s two wills purported to revoke all prior wills and the order in which they were executed could not be established, Decedent died intestate. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the probate court.

The appellant, Jesse James Johnson, was indicted for driving on a revoked license, violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act and third offense driving on a revoked license. At trial, the appellant's counsel argued that the order declaring the appellant to be an habitual traffic offender had expired as it was more than three (3) years old. The trial court prohibited the jury from considering the argument. The jury found the appellant guilty of driving on a revoked license and violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act. In a separate phase of the trial, the trial court found the appellant guilty of third offense driving on a revoked license. The appellant received a sentence of three (3) years and six (6) months for the violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act and eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for the third offense driving on a revoked license. After the denial of a motion for new trial, this appeal ensued. Despite the absence of a transcript of the hearing on the motion for new trial, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting the appellant's counsel from arguing that the order declaring the appellant to be an habitual motor vehicle offender had expired.

The appellant, Julia Mosely, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to facilitation of attempted rape of a child and felony failure to appear. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she was sentenced to six years for the facilitation conviction and one year for the felony failure to appear. The trial court ordered that the two sentences be served consecutively, with both sentences suspended and to be served on probation. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation and ordered her to serve the balance of her sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the revocation of her probation. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Harpeth Valley Utilities District of Davidson and Williamson Counties is a supplier of water and sewer services with charges for such services being based on gallonage of water measured by a water meter installed where the water main supply line joins the water line owned by the customer. Ridgelake Apartments is an apartment complex served by both a main residential water meter and an irrigation meter. Water supplied through the irrigation meter is not subject to sewer charges, but water supplied through the main residential meter is subject to such charges. Over a period of years, leaks developed in the water lines owned by Ridgelake on the Ridgelake side of the main residential water meter. Ridgelake sought reimbursement of sewer charges for water lost in these leaks on the basis that such water did not enter the sanitary sewer system. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Utility District, and we affirm the action of the trial court.