APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Catherine May Cooper, pled guilty to one count of attempt to obtain a controlled substance by altered prescription, a Class D felony, and one count of felony failure to appear, a Class E felony. The Sullivan County Criminal Court sentenced her to two years for the Class D felony and one year for the Class E felony to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying her probation or alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Stacy Allen Melton, appeals from the Greene County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. He contends that his guilty plea was involuntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the trial court.

The trial court denied the State’s petition for child support and retroactive child support for Respondent/Father’s two minor children. We reverse.

A Bradley County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Lisa Durbin Howard, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced her to life imprisonment. The appellant appeals her conviction, claiming (1) that the trial court's comments to the jury during deliberations amounted to an improper "dynamite" or Allen charge; (2) that the trial court erred by excluding a defense expert's testimony; (3) that the State impermissibly excluded the only African-American from the jury pool; (4) that juror misconduct denied her the right to a fair and impartial jury; (5) that the State failed to preserve the audiotaped recording of the preliminary hearing as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1(a); and (6) that the trial court erred by not conducting a proper jury poll. We conclude that the appellant has waived these issues because she failed to file a timely motion for new trial. Moreover, we discern no plain error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Alan E. Monday, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for reckless homicide, a Class D felony. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney advised him not to testify and failed to call a favorable witness. We affirm the trial court.

The petitioner, Wayne Michael Fuller, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief. His post-conviction petition attacked his 1998 guilty-pleaded convictions and sentence for seven counts of statutory rape and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The petitioner received maximum two-year sentences for each statutory rape conviction and 11 months, 29 days for the contributing to the delinquency of a minor conviction. The court ordered five of the statutory rape sentences to be served consecutively, resulting in an effective sentence of ten years. The post-conviction petition, amended on multiple occasions, alleged ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and violations of Blakely v. Washington and of the petitioner's right against self-incrimination. The post-conviction court denied relief, and we affirm.

The Appellant, Shawn Peele, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court.  Peele pled guilty to facilitating aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a Range I offender to three years incarceration. On appeal, Peele argues that the trial court erred in denying a suspended sentence. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a direct appeal as of right from convictions on a jury verdict for burglary and theft of property. The Defendant, Jeffrey Lee Scales, was sentenced to concurrent sentences of four years for his Class D felony burglary conviction and two years for his Class E felony theft conviction. On appeal, the Defendant argues only one issue: there is insufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the two offenses for which he was convicted. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Young Bok Song, a/k/a Mike, was convicted by a jury of seven counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and four counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and received an effective sentence of sixty-five years, to be served at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred by: (1) not appointing an interpreter; (2) not providing the defendant with a copy of a forensic interview tape; (3) allowing the State to ask the defendant numerous argumentative questions; and (4) not granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Following our review, we affirm the trial court.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant Billy Joe Regel, Individually, and d/b/a/ Bartlett Prescription Shop on the grounds of laches, and Plaintiff Finova Capital Corporation appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, Darrell Carter, pled guilty to five counts of aggravated sexual battery. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction to be served at one hundred percent. The petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and an alleged unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. The post-conviction court denied the petition. For the following reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

The appellant, Stanley Phillip Chapman, was convicted by a jury in the Tipton County Circuit Court of second degree murder. He received a sentence of twenty-two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises several issues for our review, including the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The City of Memphis appeals from the trial court’s reversal of the Civil Service Commission’s decision to terminate a City employee/Appellee for violation of the substance abuse policy. The trial court found that the positive drug test, which provided the only substantial and material evidence for Appellee’s termination, was inadmissible as evidence for failure of the City failed to comport with 42 U.S.C. §290. We affirm.

The appellant, Jamie Brown, was convicted by a Knox County Jury of simple possession of marijuana. As a result, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress. Because the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, James D. Black, was found guilty of aggravated perjury, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to two years, all suspended but sixty days, and placed Defendant on supervised probation for four years. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion. However, I do so on the merits, as opposed to the petitioner’s failure to follow procedural requirements for habeas corpus petitions.

The appellant, Curtis Emmanuel Lane, pled guilty to simple possession of marijuana and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended upon payment of court costs and fines. Pursuant to Rule 37 (b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the appellant attempted to reserve a certified question of law to this Court on the issue of whether the evidence should have been suppressed as the result of an illegal arrest. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the appellant failed to properly reserve a certified question of law. Therefore, the appellant's issue is not properly before this Court, and this appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder on November 14, 1997. The trial court sentenced the petitioner on the same day to twenty years to be served as a Range I, standard offender with a release eligibility of thirty percent. On July 27, 1999, the trial court amended the judgment stating that the petitioner’s release eligibility would be one hundred percent with credit given for time served up to fifteen percent of his sentence. The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief on October 12, 2004. On November 15, 2004, the habeas court summarily dismissed the petitioner’s petition. The petitioner appealed this decision. We affirm the decision of the habeas court.

The appellant, Homer Alson Maddin, III, was convicted by a jury of four counts of aggravated rape in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-502. As a result, the appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-five years at one hundred percent. The appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the mental state of reckless, and that the trial court erred in applying certain enhancement factors to determine his sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This Court reversed a judgment of dismissal of Plaintiff’s action and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the court entered judgment for Plaintiff, as authorized by the appellate court, and also, on motion of Plaintiff, awarded attorney fees for the appeal. Defendant-Appellants appeal, asserting that the award of attorney fees was not authorized by the appellate court and, therefore, the trial court did not have authority to award same. Appellants also assert that the award of attorney fees was excessive, and Appellee asserts, in a separate issue, that the award of fees was inadequate. Both parties appeal. We affirm and remand.

Matthew Ballard filed this action pursuant to the federal Jones Act, seeking damages for the injuries he sustained when he fell on the deck of a barge owned and operated by his employer, Serodino, Inc. ("the defendant"). The jury returned a verdict assessing 75% of the fault to the plaintiff and 25% of the fault to the defendant. As a consequence of the jury's allocation of fault, the plaintiff was awarded $37,500, i.e., 25% of the total damages found by the jury. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that there is no material evidence to support a finding that he was 75% at fault. He also argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict. We affirm.

In this post-divorce proceeding, Carol Lyn Roberts (“Mother”) seeks to relocate to North Carolina with the parties’ minor child, Victoria Noel Roberts (DOB: June 25, 1997). William Frederick Roberts (“Father”) filed a petition in opposition to the move. Following a bench trial, the court determined, under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108, that the parties were spending “substantially equal intervals of time” with their child and that it was in the child’s best interest to remain in Tennessee.  Accordingly, the court denied Mother’s request to relocate. Mother appeals. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s decision and grant Mother’s request to relocate with the child.

In a class-action case, in which a settlement had been agreed to, certain members of the class were allowed to opt out of the class action based on the representations of their purported attorneys that their clients had been notified of the settlement and the proposed opt out and that they approved of same. Subsequently, litigation was commenced by the former members of the class in another jurisdiction, and the original defendants were compelled to defend the case incurring expenses, including attorney fees. The original defendants, and one of the attorneys for the class, filed motions against the purported attorneys for the opted out class members for them to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court for making false representations to the court that resulted in the court allowing the opt out. The respondent attorneys moved to dismiss the motions filed on the basis that, if there was contempt, it was criminal only and on the basis of judicial estoppel. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent attorneys holding that any contempt was criminal and not civil and on the basis of judicial estoppel. The motions of the original defendants and a plaintiffs' attorney were dismissed. The  defendants and plaintiffs' attorney have appealed. We affirm.

The chief point of contention in this bitterly fought divorce case involves the valuation and disposition of a one-half interest in a service company which the husband and his business partner founded and worked for during the marriage. Both parties had asked the court to award the husband the share of the business, and the wife had asked the court to award her the monetary equivalent of one-half its value. Instead, the trial court awarded the business to the wife, together with all the debt associated with it. The wife argues on appeal that actions by the husband rendered the company valueless and the distribution of property and debt was, consequently, inequitable. Because we find that the business had no value apart from the efforts of its principals, we modify the valuation of property and allocation of debt. Because of the modification, we remand the case to the trial court to reconsider the question of attorney fees.

The Defendants, Lyle T. Van Ulzen and Billy J. Coffelt, were each convicted of one count of felony escape, two counts of aggravated assault, and three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and were each sentenced to an effective sentence of ninety years in prison. Coffelt now appeals, contending that: (1) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant when it found that no mitigating factors applied; and (2) the trial court erred when it ordered that his sentences run consecutively. Van Ulzen also appeals, contending that the sentence imposed was not justly deserved in relation to the seriousness of the offense and is greater than that deserved under the circumstances. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.