APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, James David Duncan, was convicted by a Morgan County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (Supp. 2017) (subsequently amended) (second degree murder), 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-102(a)(l)(A)(i) (Supp. 2017) (subsequently amended). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to sixteen years for attempted second degree murder and to eight years for aggravated assault, with the sentences to be served concurrently to each other and consecutively to an Anderson County conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that ( 1) prosecutorial misconduct occurred during voir dire, opening statement, and closing argument, (2) he is entitled to plain error relief because the trial court failed to conduct a hearing pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) regarding prior bad act evidence, (3) the court erroneously instructed the jury, and (4) cumulative trial errors require relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, John Foxx, was convicted following a jury trial of sale of less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, delivery of less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, and simple possession. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve an effective fifteen-year sentence after application of the criminal street gang enhancement statute. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in applying the criminal street gang enhancement statute because the statute is unconstitutional and because the evidence was insufficient to support application of the criminal street gang enhancement statute. Following our review of the entire record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jayson Bryant Collier, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for possession of one-half ounce or more of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a school, possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, theft of property valued at five hundred dollars or less, unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, driving on a revoked license, and speeding.  On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution, and that his sentence is illegal under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.  After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.    

The Petitioner, Timothy A. Baxter, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.  

Gary Wayne Garrett filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion seeking correction of clerical errors in his judgments of conviction.  Mr. Garrett claimed that he was entitled to pretrial jail credit on various counts, several of which were ordered to be served consecutively.  The trial court issued a comprehensive written order finding that the judgments correctly awarded pretrial jail credit and dismissed the motion.  We determine that this appeal is frivolous and affirm the dismissal of the motion.

In this divorce case, a father appeals the trial court’s reduction of his parenting time after the parties had co-parented equally by agreement, and then nearly equally under a temporary court order. He also appeals the award of alimony. We reverse the residential parenting schedule portion of the parenting plan entered by the trial court and remand for the imposition of a plan that better maximizes both parents’ time with the child. Regarding alimony, because the trial court did not make the required findings, its judgment on that issue is vacated.

The Appellant, Noel Maltese, was convicted in the Williamson County Circuit Court of conspiracy to commit theft of property valued $250,000 or more, a Class B felony, and criminal simulation, a Class E felony, and received an effective eight-year sentence to be served as forty-eight hours in jail followed by supervised probation.  On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine her about a codefendant’s having to serve a lengthy prison sentence for similar conduct for which the Appellant was on trial.  Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Danny Ray Lacy, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus for his first degree murder conviction, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily dismissing his petition.  We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Vernell Evans, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, asserting his sentences are illegal because the trial court incorrectly imposed 100% service requirements for each sentence.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Andrea Gonzalez Martinez, pleaded guilty to felon in possession of a handgun, and the trial court imposed a sentence of sixteen years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing.  After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

The Defendant, Sterling White was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of evading arrest, a Class E felony; reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor; and leaving the scene of an accident, a Class B misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-603 (2018) (subsequently amended) (evading arrest), 55-10-205 (2020) (reckless driving), 55-10-102 (Supp. 2017) (subsequently amended) (leaving the scene). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a persistent offender to six years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a continuance. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, an attorney, filed a creditor’s claim against Decedent’s estate for legal fees allegedly owed to Appellant for his representation of Decedent in her divorce action and in her challenge of the seizure of certain assets by the State of Tennessee. Appellant argued that he represented Decedent in the seizure matter under a contingency fee agreement; however, Appellant failed to produce a valid contingency fee agreement. At the hearing, the only proof of fees Appellant produced was an invoice for $3,847.51, and the trial court awarded him the full amount of that invoice. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Darius Henderson, was convicted following a jury trial of one count of theft of property valued over $2,500 but less than $10,000 (Count 1) and one count of evading arrest while operating a vehicle (Count 2). Based on Defendant’s prior Tennessee convictions and a Georgia conviction, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III persistent offender to consecutive sentences of twelve years in Count 1, and six years in Count 2. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a Range III persistent offender because he had only four prior Tennessee felonies and the State did not submit proof that Defendant’s Georgia conviction qualified as a felony conviction in a foreign jurisdiction. See T.C.A. §40-35-107. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for Defendant to be sentenced as a Range II offender.

The Petitioner, Yasin Solomon Hawkins, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his waiver of the right to a jury trial was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. 

A Davidson County grand jury indicted the defendant, Keinesa Renee Kyshay Lillard, for one count of attempted first-degree murder, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, one count of especially aggravated robbery, one count of evading arrest by use of a motor vehicle involving risk of death or serious bodily injury to others, and four counts of simple possession of a controlled substance.  Following trial, a jury convicted the defendant of attempted second-degree murder (count one) and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (count two), for which she received an effective sentence of thirty-two years in confinement at 100 percent.  On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her conviction for attempted second-degree murder, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment, and her sentence was excessive.  After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for the execution of a amended judgment for the employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction.

This appeal concerns an ATV (all-terrain vehicle) accident. Sam Vaulton, a minor, by his parents, next friends and natural guardians, Barry Vaulton and Joy Vaulton, and Barry Vaulton and Joy Vaulton, individually (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) sued Polaris Industries, Inc. (“Polaris”) and Ritchie Power Sports, LLC (“Ritchie”) (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”) for injuries Sam Vaulton received from the winch on his ATV (called “The General”). The General was manufactured by Polaris and sold by Ritchie. Sam Vaulton lost his right index finger when he directed his friend to push the “out” button on the winch-controls while Sam Vaulton was holding the winch-hook and the cable went in rather than out. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the Trial Court’s conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiffs were provided an owner’s manual or safety instructions; the undisputed evidence shows they were provided. However, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether a tether was attached to the winch-hook and whether the General’s winch was in a defective or unreasonably dangerous condition when it left Polaris’ control. We hold further that the Trial Court erred in concluding at this summary judgment stage that Polaris had no duty to attach a rubber stopper to the winch. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The judgment of the Trial Court is thus affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part.

The Defendant, Emily L. Williams, appeals the trial court’s denial of her Rule 35 motion for a reduction of her four-year sentence for attempted tampering with evidence. She also attempts to appeal the original sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we conclude that the time for her to appeal her original sentence has expired and the interest of justice does not require that the timely notice of appeal requirement be waived. We affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the motion to reduce the sentence.

This appeal involves an employer's appeal of an order to compel medical treatment. The employer argues the trial court erred by ordering it to provide the employee specific continuing treatment, as well as treatments requested by all of her approved treating physicians in the future, without evidence that the continuing and future treatments are reasonably necessary and causally related to her work injury. The employer's appeal has been referred to this Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Suprerne Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court's order compelling the requested medical treatment, but modify the order to omit predetermined approval of future medical treatments, and affirm as modified.

The Petitioner, Damarkus Lowe, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree murder conviction, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for advising him not to testify in his own defense. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In March of 2021, Steven C. James, Defendant, filed a “Motion for Relief from Sentence.” The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Defendant appealed. After a review of the record, we determine Defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal document and that the interest of justice does not favor waiving the timeliness requirement in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

This appeal concerns the revocation of a criminal defendant’s probation. We granted Defendant’s application for permission to appeal to consider whether revocation proceedings are a one-step or two-step process on the part of the trial court and the appropriate appellate standard of review to be employed in reviewing such determinations. Defendant in this case pleaded guilty to theft of property over $1,000 but less than $10,000 and received a six-year sentence, which the trial court suspended to supervised probation. A series of revocation proceedings ensued. At Defendant’s fifth and final revocation hearing, the trial court fully revoked his probation. Defendant took issue with the consequence imposed for his probation violation; however, the Court of Criminal Appeals found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and affirmed its decision. Judge Timothy L. Easter filed a separate concurring opinion in which he emphasized his belief that a trial court, after it has determined probation should be revoked, is not statutorily required to hold an additional hearing or make any additional findings to determine the manner in which the original sentence should be served. We granted Defendant’s application for permission to appeal. While we do not agree with Defendant that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve the balance of his six-year sentence in prison, we do take this opportunity to clarify and bring uniformity to the standards and principles applied by the trial courts and appellate courts in probation revocation proceedings. We conclude that a probation revocation proceeding ultimately involves a two-step inquiry. A trial court, upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant violated the conditions of his or her probation, must determine (1) whether to revoke probation, and (2) the appropriate consequence to impose upon revocation. On appeal, the appellate court must review both decisions separately for abuse of discretion. More specifically, if the trial court has properly placed its findings on the record, the standard of review for probation revocations is abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness. Considering this Court’s prior opinions establishing the appellate standard of review of a trial court’s sentencing decisions, we expressly extend the same principles to appellate review of a trial court’s decision to revoke probation. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in Defendant’s case, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Emily Leanne Brooks, entered an open guilty plea to second degree murder. Prior to sentencing, she obtained new counsel and filed a motion to withdraw her plea one week after it was entered. That motion, along with her subsequent motion to reconsider, was denied following the trial court’s balancing analysis of the factors set forth in State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436, 446 (Tenn. 2010), and its determination that the Defendant was not a credible witness. The Defendant was, thereafter, sentenced to twentyone years. She appeals as of right, noting that she immediately sought to withdraw her plea and arguing (1) that the significance of her traumatic brain injury on her decision-making process was underappreciated by her prior attorneys and the trial court, and (2) that given her difficulties, she should have been allowed to speak with her parents who were present in the courtroom before being required to accept the take-it-or-leave plea deal that was presented that day. Following our review, we affirm.

Pro-se petitioner, Joseph Smith, filed an untimely notice of appeal from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the interest of justice does not warrant a waiver of the notice requirement because Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim for relief. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal as untimely.

Father appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s order suspending his parenting time with his minor children.  The Circuit Court had tried the matter de novo following an appeal by Father from prior proceedings in the Williamson County Juvenile Court.  Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that Father failed to timely perfect his appeal to the Circuit Court from the Juvenile Court’s order.  Therefore, we conclude that the Circuit Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and we vacate its order and dismiss the case. 

The Defendant, Daron Hall, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of evading arrest, a Class E felony; driving a motor vehicle while his license was suspended, a Class B misdemeanor; criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor; violating the “light law,” a Class C misdemeanor; and operating a motor vehicle without a proper license plate, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-603 (2018) (subsequently amended) (evading arrest), 55-50-504 (2018) (driving on a suspended license), 39-16-301 (2018) (criminal impersonation), 55-9-402 (2018) (motor vehicle light law), 55-5-114 (2018) (proper license plate). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to six years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a continuance. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.