APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In that petition the petitioner alleges that the indictment charging the petitioner with one count of felony murder and one count of first degree murder is void because the counts therein fail to allege sufficient facts to vest jurisdiction in the trial court. Upon a review of the record in this case we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a child support case involving the allocation of private school tuition. The trial court ordered the father to pay one-half of the minor children’s private school tuition. We affirm.
 

The Defendant, Michael Lee McCormick, was convicted in 1987 of the first degree murder of Donna Jean Nichols. The Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder. The Defendant's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. McCormick, 778 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. 1989). Subsequently, the Defendant filed for post-conviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and a new trial was awarded. See Michael Lee McCormick v. State, No. 03C01-9802-CR-00052, 1999 WL 394935 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, June 17, 1999). In conjunction with the new trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress statements the Defendant made to police officers prior to his 1987 arrest. The trial court granted the Defendant's motion. The State now appeals by permission. See Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of an injunction against Appellant to remove its electrical lines and facilities from McNairy County. The trial court found that Appellant was a “nonconsumer owned electric system” and, as such, subject to injunction under T.C.A. §65-34-103. Finding that Appellant is, in fact, an “electric and community service corporation,” we hold that Appellant is not subject to injunction under T.C.A. §65-34-103. We reverse and remand.
 

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In that petition the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus to release him from his conviction for especially aggravated robbery. We are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This case involves a dismissal for failure to prosecute. In January 1988, the plaintiff residents filed this lawsuit against the defendant municipal officials for allegedly enacting an unconstitutional and unreasonable annexation ordinance. In 2003, after the case had been on the trial court’s docket for fifteen years with little activity, the trial court clerk filed a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. In June 2003, the trial court granted the clerk’s motion and dismissed the case. The plaintiff residents now appeal. We affirm, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case. The caption of the case lists 17 Plaintiffs. However, the first 1 two named Plaintiffs, Dwayne and Julie Byrd (“the Byrds”), are now counsel to the Plaintiffs and are not real parties in interest. The suit was originally filed when the Byrds were law students and residents of Getwell West. Subsequently, the Byrds moved out of Getwell West, but entered appearances on behalf of the other Plaintiffs after they became licensed to practice law. 2On November 14, 1995, the trial court entered an order dismissing the case for lack of prosecution. Apparently, however, that order was inadvertently entered, and two weeks later the trial court set that order aside. -2- Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court is Affirmed.

The petitioner, Michael S. Holmes, was convicted in 1997 of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated kidnapping, felony escape, burglary of a vehicle, and theft of property over $1000. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and improper jury instructions on lesser-included offenses. After a review of the affidavits submitted by the petitioner, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and this appeal followed. We affirm the order of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

The defendant, a physician, was charged in three separate indictments with a total of twenty sexual offenses involving eleven different victims. The counts charged in the indictments were alleged to have occurred over a time span of six years. The trial court denied the defendant's pre-trial motion to sever the counts for separate trials and granted the State's motion to consolidate all three indictments for a single trial. The defendant was subsequently found guilty of one count of sexual battery by an authority figure, six counts of sexual battery, and three counts of assault. He was acquitted on three counts of rape and three counts of sexual battery. The defendant then presented several issues on appeal, including: (1) that the trial court erred in denying the motion to sever the offenses; and (2) that the defendant was improperly convicted of sexual battery by an authority figure. The Court of Criminal Appeals held, among other things, that the trial court erred in denying the motion to sever. However, the Court found this error to be harmless and therefore affirmed the convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals also held that the defendant's conviction for sexual battery by an authority figure was proper as a physician fell within the ambit of the applicable statute. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the failure to sever the counts against the defendant was reversible error, and therefore we reverse the convictions. Further, we hold that a physician is not an authority figure as contemplated under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-527 (2003) and therefore the defendant's conviction under this statute was improper. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for new trials.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant of the attempted first degree murder of a police officer, and the defendant pled guilty to twenty-nine charges, including multiple counts of car burglary, felony theft, and misdemeanor theft. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years for the attempted murder conviction and as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of six years for the remaining convictions. The trial court ordered that the twenty-five-year and six-year sentences be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to a six-year revoked probation sentence. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred (1) by refusing to dismiss a juror for cause; (2) by refusing to compel the state to provide the defense with the police department's written use-of-force policy; (3) by refusing to allow the defense to cross-examine police officers about the use-of-force policy; (4) by refusing to allow an expert to testify about the victim's excessive use of force against the defendant; (5) by refusing to instruct the jury on deadly force; and (6) by ordering consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael Keith Kennedy, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Antonio Lyons, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court found the petition to be untimely filed. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Reginald K. Watkins, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Adrian Wilkerson, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Eight full-time Memphis police officers, all of them former officers with the Memphis Police Reserve, sued for declaratory judgment finding that time they served in the Memphis Police Reserve should be credited toward the thirty years of service required in order to receive an automatic promotion to the rank of Captain under Section 67 of the Memphis Charter. Plaintiffs argued that designation of reserve officers as “part-time employees” in Article III, Section 28-56 of the Memphis Code, entitles them to receive such service credit. The Shelby County Chancery Court denied their request for declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.
 

Linda Jane Holt ("Plaintiff") and Billy Dale Holt ("Defendant") were divorced in June of 2002. As part of the divorce judgment, Plaintiff was ordered to sell the marital residence and give $20,000 of the proceeds to Defendant. Defendant filed a petition for contempt in July of 2003, claiming Plaintiff had not sold the house. Plaintiff answered and filed a counter petition claiming Defendant had violated a permanent restraining order contained in the divorce decree by writing letters to her and their daughter. The Trial Court ordered Wife either to sell the house within four months or the Court Clerk would sell it at public auction. The Trial Court also ordered that Defendant be permanently restrained from sending Plaintiff and the parties' daughter letters or other written correspondence. The Trial Court also ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs in connection with the petition for contempt and the counter petition. Defendant appeals the award of attorney's fees and costs. We vacate the award of attorney's fees and affirm the award of costs.

The Petitioner, Corey Harrison, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Ricky H. Krantz, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This action arises out of Appellant's parole hearing proceedings. Subsequent to his original parole hearing, Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Davidson County Chancery Court. Upon Appellant's motion for summary judgment and Appellee's motion to dismiss, the trial court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss and denied Appellant's motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey M. Hodges, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Brian Shane Caldwell, was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and first degree burglary. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment and ten years, respectively. The Defendant's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Brian Shane Caldwell, No. 1176, 1988 WL 94393 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Sept. 13, 1988). The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief alleging, inter alia, that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief; this appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Rawshard J. Smith, pled guilty to possessing less than .5 grams of cocaine. He was sentenced as a standard Range I offender to three years on intensive probation. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1991, the Petitioner, Kenneth R. Lewis, pled guilty to second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to twenty-five years in prison. The Petitioner did not perfect a direct appeal. In 2003, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which the habeas court summarily dismissed. The Petitioner appeals the order dismissing his petition, contending that: (1) his plea and sentence were illegal; and (2) the habeas court erred when it dismissed his petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the habeas court's judgment.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jonathan D. Tears, of multiple drug-related offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years. The Petitioner did not appeal his convictions or sentence, but filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on the grounds that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing on the post-conviction petition, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because: (1) both his trial and appellate counsel failed to properly advise him about the law regarding his right to file a motion for new trial; (2) trial and appellate counsel failed to inform the Petitioner of his right to appointed counsel for appeal; and (3) trial and appellate counsel failed to fully advise him of his right to appeal the sentence imposed by the trial court. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we conclude that there exists reversible error in the trial court's judgment.

In 1981, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jesse Haddox, of second-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. In 2002, the Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition requesting DNA testing pursuant to the Post Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The trial court denied the Petitioner's post-conviction petition, concluding that the results of any tests of the remaining DNA evidence would not exonerate the Petitioner. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that the trial court erred by denying his post-conviction petition. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we conclude that there exists reversible error in the trial court's judgment.

This is a direct appeal as of right from two jury verdict drug convictions of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, Terrell Thomas, to concurrent terms of six years for each offense. On appeal, the Defendant argues two issues: (1) the State failed to provide exculpatory information to the defense in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 65 (1963); and, (2) the trial court erred in not granting the Defendant's motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.