APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case involves premises liability. At her apartment complex, the plaintiff tripped and fell on the metal edging of a limestone gravel walkway and sustained injuries to her elbow. The plaintiff sued the owner of the apartment complex, alleging premises liability, and also sued the company that put in the metal landscape edging. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion was granted. We affirm, finding that the plaintiff did not establish that defendants violated the duty of reasonable care.

The State appeals from an adverse ruling on a suppression motion. The State contends that the trial court erred in finding the consent to search was not knowing or voluntary and that discovery of the contraband was not inevitable. The State avers that the standard of review should be de novo without presumption of correctness. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff/Appellant, an unsuccessful candidate for mayor of The City of Memphis, brought “Complaint for Election Contest” against Defendant/Appellee, Shelby County Election Commission and Tennessee Division of Elections. Plaintiff/Appellant filed Motion to Compel Discovery and for Continuance, asserting that Defendant/Appellee had withheld information crucial to Plaintiff/Appellant’s case. The trial court denied Plaintiff/Appellant’s Motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s action pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2). We affirm.

Indicted for aggravated burglary and the attempted first-degree murder of her estranged husband, Judy C. Turner entered a best-interests plea to assault with intent to commit second-degree murder, a Class B felony. As part of a plea agreement with the state, the aggravated burglary charge was dismissed. The length and manner of service of the defendant's sentence was reserved for the trial court's determination. The trial court denied alternative sentencing and imposed a nine-year incarcerative sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that she should have received an eight-year sentence making her eligible for probation or split confinement. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal contesting the award of discretionary costs by the Trial Court. We affirm.

This appeal involves the parental relationship between a three-year-old child and her biological father. Shortly after the child's birth in Ohio, her mother placed her for adoption with relatives residing in Tennessee. These relatives filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County seeking to terminate the biological father's parental rights and to adopt the child. The biological father thereafter filed a petition to establish parentage. Following a bench trial, the trial court established the child's parentage and determined that the biological father had not abandoned the child. Accordingly, the trial court denied the adoptive parents' petition to terminate the biological father's parental rights and to adopt the child. Because it had reserved ruling on the custody and visitation arrangements, the trial court granted the adoptive parent's application for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur that an interlocutory appeal is warranted in this case. We also concur with the trial court's conclusion that the adoptive parents failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the biological father abandoned his daughter.

Based on his participation in a home invasion and robbery that resulted in the death of a victim, the defendant, Spencer Peterson, was charged by the Shelby County Grand Jury in thirteen separate indictments with one count of first degree premeditated murder; two counts of first degree felony murder; two counts of attempted first degree murder; eight counts of aggravated robbery; one count of aggravated burglary; three counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery; and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery. The indictments were consolidated for trial, at the conclusion of which the defendant was convicted of all counts as charged with the exception of the first degree murder and attempted first degree murder counts, in which he was convicted, respectively, of the lesser-included offenses of second degree murder, a Class A felony; and attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. After merging the three second degree murder convictions and the separate convictions of aggravated robbery involving the same victim, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to consecutive terms of twenty years for the second degree murder conviction and eight years for each of the four aggravated robbery convictions. The trial court ordered concurrent sentences for the remaining convictions, for an effective sentence of fifty-two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his second degree murder conviction; the denial of his motion to suppress his statement to police; the admission at trial of photographs of the victim; the propriety of the jurors having been allowed to directly question trial witnesses; and the consecutive sentencing imposed. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments as to certain of the offenses and for the trial court to set out its basis for consecutive sentencing.

Petitioner, Raymond Roger Jones, appeals the Washington County Criminal Court's dismissal of his pro se combined motion to reopen his post-conviction petition, petition for writ of error coram nobis, and petition for DNA analysis. Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Knox County Criminal Court of two counts of first degree murder. He received consecutive life sentences. This Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See State v. Jones, 735 S.W.2d 803 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Washington County Criminal Court. The trial court dismissed the petition, and this Court affirmed. See Raymond Roger Jones v. State, No. 03C01-9102-CR-00068, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584, (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, July 26, 1991), perm. to app. denied (Tenn. 1992). On June 22, 2001, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to reopen his post-conviction petition, alleging that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), established a new rule of constitutional law requiring retroactive application to his case. Petitioner subsequently filed a supplemental request for DNA analysis. The trial court dismissed the motion and denied Petitioner's request for DNA Analysis. Petitioner appeals. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Frank W. Johnson, pled guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to thirteen and one-half years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he pled guilty to an illegal sentence. The trial court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Demetrie Owens, was found guilty by a jury on two counts of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000 and one count of possession of contraband in a penal institution. The jury found the appellant not guilty of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two theft convictions and sentenced the appellant to three years and four months on the theft and four years and eight months on the drug offense. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instructions on the charge of possession of contraband in a penal institution, and his sentence. Because the appellant failed to include his challenge to the jury instructions in a motion for new trial, that issue is waived. As to the remaining issues, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions and that the trial court properly sentenced the appellant.

Aggrieved of the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief, the petitioner appeals. Based upon Roger L. Hickman v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. E2002-01916-SC-R11-PC (Tenn., Knoxville, Sept. 2, 2004), we affirm.

The defendant appeals from convictions of aggravated assault and evading arrest. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts, and that the sentence of eight years for aggravated assault was excessive. After careful consideration and a thorough review of the record, the convictions and the sentences are affirmed.

The Defendant, Ronald Harrison, was indicted for rape, and he pled guilty to the lesser-included offense of sexual battery. After holding a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion, suspended sentence and probation, and sentenced the Defendant to two years in the county workhouse. The Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his application for judicial diversion; and (2) sentenced him to two years. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the Defendant’s application for judicial diversion. Further, we hold that the trial court improperly enhanced the Defendant’s sentences in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and we reduce the Defendant’s sentence in accordance with this opinion to the presumptive minimum of one year. We remand the case for the entry of appropriate judgments of conviction.

This is a divorce case. The husband appeals from the trial court’s divorce decree distributing the marital and separate property and awarding the wife alimony in futuro. We affirm.
 

This parental termination case presents the Court with two issues: (1) whether a case manager can testify regarding facts about which she has no personal knowledge but which are documented in a case file not made an exhibit, and (2) whether the guardian ad litem of a minor child can testify as a witness. At the trial of this case, the State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services presented only two witnesses: the case manager who had only been working on the file for six months and the child's guardian ad litem. The case manager had no firsthand knowledge of the facts except what she had read in the case file which was not present at the trial and not introduced into evidence. The defendant objected on the basis of hearsay and the trial court allowed the case manager to testify under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The guardian ad litem testified concerning her investigation into the matter over the Defendant's objection. We hold that the case manager's testimony was hearsay and was not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. We hold that the guardian ad litem's testimony was not admissible pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 40 which forbids such testimony. Because of the exclusion of the testimony of these witnesses, the trial court should have granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand to the Juvenile Court for Sevier County for a new trial.

This appeal involves a homeowner’s attempt to pierce the corporate veil to reach the shareholders of a construction company. During the course of the litigation, the construction company was administratively dissolved, and the homeowner filed a motion to join as defendants the shareholders, officers, and directors. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the homeowner against the construction company for breach of contract, but denied the homeowner’s motion to join the shareholders, officers, and directors. We affirm.
 

The plaintiffs filed a complaint for repayment of borrowed money. The defendant, who was living in Ohio at the time, did not to respond to the complaint. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for default judgment, to which the defendant again failed to respond. After a hearing, the trial court granted the default judgment. The judgment was domesticated in Ohio, and substantial monthly garnishments were ordered from the defendant’s trust funds to satisfy the judgment. More than two years after the garnishments began, and almost three years after the default judgment was rendered, the defendant took his first step to contest the plaintiffs’ claim, by filing a motion for relief from judgment. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm the trial court.

The Appellant, Charles R. Turner, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of two counts of identify theft and sentenced to concurrent sentences of three years, with service of one year in confinement. In addition, Turner was ordered to pay restitution. On appeal, Turner raises four issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by failing to suppress an in-court identification by a witness; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; (3) whether the trial court imposed excessive sentences; and (4) whether the trial court erred in determining the amount of restitution. After review of the record, we conclude that the identification issue is without merit and the evidence is legally sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of conviction. However, after review, we conclude that the trial court failed to sentence the Appellant in accordance with the 1989 Sentencing Act and to properly determine the Appellant’s ability to pay the ordered restitution. Accordingly, we remand the case for a proper determination of these sentencing issues.

The defendant appeals, on a certified question of law, the trial court’s failure to suppress evidence resulting from his warrantless arrest and search of his home. Because the defendant has failed to properly reserve a certified question of law for appeal, we dismiss.

The trial court terminated parents’ rights based on abandonment. Father appeals. We affirm.

I agree that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that, under the terms of the 1989 Sentencing Act, the trial court erred by applying enhancement factors (10), (11), and (17).  It is my view, however, that the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 2004), precludes the application of enhancement factor (21) in this case.

The Appellant, Rosendo Reyna, appeals his convictions for multiple felony drug offenses by a Shelby County jury. On appeal, Reyna raises the single issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. After review, we find the evidence sufficient. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are affirmed. However, because the record reflects that the offenses were not properly merged, we remand for merger and entry of corrected judgments.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court determined that the plaintiff sustained a 25% vocational impairment to the body as a whole. The defendant asserts that: 1) the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof of permanent injury; 2) the trial court erred in finding plaintiff had an operative disk lesion which necessitated surgery; 3) the trial court erred in not granting defendant's motion for additional facts or to amend judgement; and 4) the trial court erred in finding that Dr. Anthony Segal's charges were reasonable and necessary and in granting plaintiff's motion for discretionary costs. Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred when it awarded plaintiff a 25% disability impairment to the body as a whole, urging that the award should have been higher. We agree with the position of the     plaintiff, and for the reasons set forth below, we modify the judgment of the trial court to award a forty-five percent (45%) vocational disability to the body as a whole.