APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus in Case No. 242704 in which Defendant alleged that the municipal ordinance supporting his conviction for reckless driving was unlawfully enacted. Defendant also appeals the trial court's order declaring him to be an habitual motor vehicle offender in Case No. 239641. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court's judgments in Case Nos. 242704 and 239641.

The petitioner, Wayne Davidson, was convicted in the Meigs County Criminal Court of second degree burglary. Upon being found by a jury to be an habitual criminal, the petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment. Subsequently, the petitioner filed in the Davidson County Circuit Court a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the statutes under which he received a life sentence were unconstitutional. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a dispute over the custody of a non-marital child. The child's father requested the Wilson County Juvenile Court to designate him as the child's primary residential parent because of the mother's history of substance abuse. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court designated the mother as the child's primary residential parent and established a visitation schedule for the father. The court also ordered the father to pay child support and to maintain insurance for the child. The father asserts on this appeal (1) that the juvenile court's findings of fact were insufficient, (2) that the evidence does not support designating the mother as the child's primary residential parent, and (3) that the court based its decision on the outmoded tender years doctrine. We affirm the juvenile court's order.

Petitioner, Donavan Edward Daniel, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging, as amended, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing (1) to raise the legality of Petitioner’s detention as an issue in his motion to suppress; (2) to demonstrate a particularized need for expert services and timely present the affidavit of the proposed expert to the trial court; and (3) to request a mistrial or curative instruction when two prospective jurors stated during voir dire that they were familiar with Petitioner’s juvenile record and family background.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied Petitioner’s request for post-conviction relief. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The issue in this case is whether child support may be awarded when neither party has been designated the primary residential parent. The Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s judgment to award equal parenting time between the parties. Neither party contests this modification. We hold that the Court of Appeals erred, however, in awarding child support to one party when neither party was designated the primary residential parent. We remand to the trial court for the designation of a primary residential parent, for the consideration of the amount of child support to be paid, and for entry of a parenting plan.

The defendant, Billy Wayne Quillen, pled guilty to two counts of attempt to obtain a controlled substance by fraud and was placed on judicial diversion for two years. His diversion was subsequently revoked, and the trial court reinstated his original two-year sentence to be served at 100%. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve his sentence at 100% without release eligibility, and the State agrees. Based upon our review, we modify the defendant's sentence to reflect release eligibility after service of 30% of the two-year sentence.

Defendant, Stanley Craig Hughes, was indicted for one count of second degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, two counts of reckless endangerment, and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon. The State entered a nolle prosequi on the unlawful possession of a weapon charge, and Defendant was tried on the other charges. Defendant’s first trial ended in a mistrial. At the conclusion of Defendant’s second trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated assault and not guilty of the charge of second degree murder and both counts of reckless endangerment. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault, and that the trial court improperly applied enhancement factors and failed to consider mitigating factors in determining the length of Defendendant’s sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Tony Mabry, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  Petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel because she (1) failed to request a pre-trial voice line-up; (2) failed to cross-examine the victim about his prior statements to the police; and (3) failed to subpoena the police officer who took the victim’s initial statement to testify at trial. After a thorough review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Wayne Bostic, was convicted of one count of delivery of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. The trial court sentenced Defendant to five years confinement as a Range I, standard offender. Defendant does not appeal his sentence. Defendant does, however, appeal the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following a review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant was indicted on three counts of first degree murder, and a jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. On appeal, this Court reversed Defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial because of the inappropriate admission of certain evidence and the prosecutor’s reliance on the inadmissable evidence during closing argument. State v. Frankie E. Casteel, No. E1999-00076- CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 329538 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, April 5), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 2001). At the conclusion of the second trial, the jury again found Defendant guilty of three counts of first degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the Hamilton County District Attorney’s Office should have been disqualified from prosecuting Defendant in this case; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; (3) the trial court erred in allowing certain testimony; and (4) the trial court erred in admitting Defendant’s adopted admission through Marie Hill’s testimony. Following a thorough review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, George G. Faulkner, appeals the order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a wrongful death action. The plaintiff’s decedent was riding as a passenger in a car driven by the defendant’s decedent. The car collided at a high rate of speed into the guard rail of a bridge.  Both the driver and the passenger died in the accident. It was later determined that the driver was intoxicated, but that the passenger had not been drinking. The plaintiff, the mother of the passenger, filed this wrongful death action against the estate of the driver, alleging that the driver’s negligent conduct caused the death of her son. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The jury concluded that the passenger was 50% at fault for his demise, because the passenger knew or should have known that the driver was intoxicated when he got into the car. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse, finding no material evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that the passenger knew or should have known that the driver was intoxicated.

Plaintiff/Buyer brought a cause of action alleging breach of a real estate contract and seeking specific performance. The trial court entered judgment for Defendant/Seller. We affirm in part, modify in part, and remand.
 

Defendant, Franklin D. Brooks, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for burglary, theft, and vandalism. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary, a Class D felony. Following a sentencing hearing, Defendant was sentenced as a Range II offender to serve seven years on community corrections. As a condition of his sentence, Defendant was ordered to complete the Lifelines program while incarcerated. Defendant appeals his sentence. We conclude that the trial court erred by sentencing Defendant to serve more than one year of his sentence of split confinement in continuous confinement. We also conclude that Defendant is entitled to receive credit for time served in confinement. Accordingly, we remand this case for entry of an Amended Judgment to allow credit for time served in confinement, and we modify the sentence, and order that Defendant be released from custody and placed on community corrections to serve the remainder of his sentence.

After pleading guilty to two counts of murder, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his sentences. Relief was denied by both the trial court and by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Thereafter, counsel for the petitioner neither withdrew nor filed an application for permission to appeal in this Court. Petitioner filed multiple other pleadings, including a second petition for post-conviction relief seeking a delayed appeal to this Court from the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissing his first petition for post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted an evidentiary hearing on the second petition for post-conviction relief, at which the trial court held that the petitioner had been denied due process by the actions of his counsel in failing to either withdraw or file an application for permission to appeal after the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision of the first petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed. We reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals, holding that because there is no right to effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, and because the petitioner was afforded a full evidentiary hearing and full review in his first-tier post-conviction appeal, there was no due process violation.

The post-conviction court ordered a new trial relating to the petitioner’s felony murder conviction for which he was sentenced to life without parole, but denied him relief regarding his especially aggravated robbery conviction. The state appeals, contending the post-conviction court erred in granting relief based upon the trial court’s failure to charge second degree murder as a lesser-included offense of felony murder. The petitioner cross-appeals, asserting: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level; (2) he is entitled to relief based upon the results of DNA testing; (3) the trial court erred in failing to charge intoxication as a defense; (4) the trial court erred in admitting victim impact evidence and in failing to properly instruct the jury during the penalty phase; and (5) the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Freeman Antoine Hale, appeals from the judgment of the Hamilton County Criminal Court revoking his community corrections sentences. Hale pled guilty to aggravated burglary and possession of cocaine with intent to sell and received an effective three-year sentence. As a result of these convictions, he was placed on intensive probation but, following violations of release, he was resentenced to community corrections. Hale then proceeded to violate his community corrections agreement, and the trial court ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentences in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Hale asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the violations occurred. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal concerns the dismissal of a common law writ of certiorari by the Circuit Court of Lake County. Appellant, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Certiorari to challenge the results of a prison disciplinary proceeding instituted against him. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely filed in violation of the applicable statute of limitations. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Appellant, Bernie R. McGill, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Knox County Criminal Court. The post-conviction court concluded that it was without jurisdiction to review McGill's claims because the petition was filed outside the one-year limitation period. After review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Michael Addison, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Arzolia Charles Goines, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Sanford and Sons Bail Bonds, Inc., the appellant, appeals from the trial court’s denial of relief from
final forfeiture of its bond. At the hearing set to determine whether final forfeiture of the bond
should occur, the appellant did not appear and the trial court entered a judgment against the appellant declaring final forfeiture. The appellant then sought relief from the final forfeiture judgment, pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11- 201(b), and sought a stay of execution of the judgment. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed in this matter, we are without jurisdiction to determine whether the trial court erred in entering a final forfeiture against the appellant based upon its claim under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-201(b). We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a stay of execution or relief under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm the judgment of the trial court