APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Raymond Mitchell, was convicted in 1996 of two counts of rape and one count of attempted rape. He pled nolo contendere to a third rape charge, which was reduced to sexual battery. He received a total effective sentence of fifteen years as a Range I, standard offender, and his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Subsequently, he filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, alleging he was entitled to earn sentence reduction credits and challenging his classification as a "multiple rapist." The trial court dismissed the petition and he appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the Department of Correction ("DOC") did not err by classifying the petitioner as a multiple rapist and determining he was not eligible for sentence reduction credits. The petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, improper jury instructions, double jeopardy violations, and again challenging the sentence enforcement by the DOC. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and this appeal followed. We affirm the order of the post-conviction court denying the petition but remand for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 2 and 3 to reflect that the petitioner is a "multiple rapist," and his sentences are to be served as such.

Father appeals termination of his parental rights. Father conceded and the juvenile court found that grounds exist for termination of Father's parental rights. The juvenile court also found that termination of Father's parental rights was in the child's best interest. Father appeals the finding that termination was in the child's best interest. We affirm.

The defendant, Robin McNeal Vanhoose, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to correct illegal sentence. The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, to affirm the dismissal by the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon reviewing the record, the defendant’s brief, and the State’s motion and brief, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s motion to correct illegal sentence.

Seanise Shaw, the petitioner, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for
post-conviction relief. The lower court found her allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel
unsupported by the evidence and denied relief. Because we are unpersuaded of error, we affirm.

The defendant pled guilty in 2000 to vehicular homicide and the judgment ordered, in addition to setting the sentence at five years and the restitution amount, that he forfeit his driver's license for five years. Following his release from incarceration, he petitioned the trial court to reduce the period of suspension of his license to three years. The trial court granted this petition, and the State appealed, arguing that the court was without authority to alter the license revocation period. Upon our review, we find that the judgment, which was the basis for the defendant's request that the trial court reduce the suspension period to three years and the State's appeal of the court order doing so, had been superseded by an amended judgment entered several days after the first which corrected the listing of the statute for the defendant's conviction offense but omitted setting a period of suspension of his driver's license. Accordingly, we vacate the order of the trial court reducing the suspension period to three years and remand for entry of a second corrected judgment, this one to set a period for the license revocation.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Raymond K. McCrary, pled guilty to one count of manufacture of a Schedule VI controlled substance, marijuana, a Class E felony, and one count of possession for resale of a Schedule VI controlled substance, marijuana, also a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to one year in the Department of Correction on each count to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying alternative sentencing. Based on our review, we affirm the length of the sentence but modify it to reflect a period of incarceration of sixty days, with the remainder to be served on probation with appropriate conditions to be established by the trial court.

Because of questions regarding the trial court's denial of appointed counsel in this proceeding that resulted in the termination of parental rights, the Department of Children's Services has acknowledged that the trial court's judgment must be vacated. We agree.

The Petitioner, Victor D. McMiller, Sr., appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

I agree that under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. _____, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), enhancement factors (3), (10), and (21) of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-114 cannot be applied in sentencing Defendant. However, instead of modifying the sentence, I would remand for a new sentencing hearing. In light of Blakely, I feel that the trial court should be given the opportunity to impose the appropriate punishment upon the only valid enhancement factor in this case: proof of a prior conviction(s) of defendant as an adult.

This appeal arises from a post-divorce case in which the trial court found the Appellant to be in both criminal and civil contempt for her failure to comply with the court's order respecting co-parenting time and division of property. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in its finding of criminal contempt because she was not provided adequate notice under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b). The Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in its award of attorney's fees to opposing counsel. We reverse the trial court's order to the extent that it decrees the Appellant to be in criminal contempt and we modify the trial court's order which awards attorney's fees to opposing counsel.

The defendant, Franklin Darnell Brown, Jr., was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court ordered concurrent sentences of six years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine and that the sentence was excessive. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This appeal involves a tenant who was injured when she slipped on the metal threshold of a rented condominium unit. The tenant and her husband filed a negligence action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against both the owner of the condominium unit and the homeowners’ association. The trial court granted the condominium owner’s and the homeowners’ association’s motions for summary judgment, and the tenant and her husband have appealed. We have determined that the owner of the condominium unit was not responsible for the maintenance and repair of the metal threshold because it was part of the condominium’s common elements. While the homeowners’ association had a duty to maintain the threshold in a reasonably safe condition, we have determined that the association is not liable to the tenant and her husband as a matter of law because they failed to present evidence that the association had actual or constructive notice of the condition that caused the tenant’s fall.
 

I agree with the majority opinion that application of enhancement factor (14) violates the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. _____, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). However, I would remand for a new sentencing hearing for the trial court to use the only applicable enhancement factor, the Defendant’s prior convictions. While the trial court did state that the prior convictions “should be considered very strongly as far as enhancement,” the trial court then immediately stated that Defendant had to be on probation at the time of the offense which is the subject of this appeal, and the trial court applied that enhancement factor also.

I agree with the analysis and conclusion of the majority on the issue of responsibility for the threshold. I also concur in the result reached in this case because the tenants, the Dentons, unquestionably had knowledge of the defective condition of the threshold that was superior to that of the association. I write separately, however, because I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis of the appropriateness of summary judgment on the notice issue.1

On November 13, 2002, the defendant, Leonard H. Cutshall, was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for (1) transportation of untaxed beer in excess of 100 cases and (2) depriving the State of lawful revenue, both Class E felonies. The defendant pled guilty to these charges at a hearing held on April 21, 2003. As part of the plea agreement, the defendant was to be sentenced to two years as a Range II offender for each count and pay a fine of $2,000 for each count. In addition, the defendant was ordered to pay the State $511.27 in lost revenue. At a hearing held on September 15, 2003, the trial court denied the defendant alternative sentencing and probation. The defendant has appealed that decision to this Court. We have found no error on the part of the trial court. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Monroe County Senior Citizens Center (“the Center”) – a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation – filed a claim against the Estate of Cora Veal (“the Estate”). The Center alleges that Cora Veal (“Mrs. Veal”) personally promised to pay for repairs to the Center’s roof, but that she failed to completely honor her promise prior to her death at the age of 92 on September 16, 2002. The trial court denied the Center’s claim. The Center appeals, claiming the trial court erred in its interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-203 (2000), the so-called Tennessee Dead Man’s Statute (“the Statute”). We affirm.

I disagree with the majority’s treatment of the deceased’s statements reflected in the minutes of the corporation. As the majority’s reasoning goes the statements of the deceased contained in the minutes were to the corporation, i.e., she was talking to the corporation. Therefore “the corporation is barred from testifying regarding Ms. Veal’s statements.”1

This appeal involves an automobile dealer whose vehicles were damaged by paint overspray from a church's construction project on adjacent property. The dealer filed suit against the church in the Circuit Court for Humphreys County seeking damages for the cost of cleaning the vehicles and lost profits. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the church had not properly supervised the painting and that the paint overspray had damaged the automobile dealer. Accordingly, the trial court awarded the dealership $344,778 in damages and $11,170 in discretionary costs. On appeal, the church takes issue with the trial court's decisions regarding liability, damages, and discretionary costs. The dealer also takes issue with the damages award. The dealer's evidence regarding its lost profits is too speculative to support the trial court's judgment. However, we have determined that the evidence supports a judgment for $85,692. We have also determined that the trial court erred with regard to a portion of the discretionary costs. Accordingly, we reduce the dealer's damages to $85,692.00 and modify the award for discretionary costs to $8,501.25.

Numerous heirs to property in Fayette County sought to sell two parcels of land for partition. Defendants/Appellees opposed the partition of one of the tracts. The trial court ordered that both tracts be sold for partition by auction, which was held on September 30, 2000. During the pendency of the partition suit, an investor bought the fractional interests in the property from numerous heirs, and intervened as a defendant in the case. The interest of the intervening defendant was foreclosed upon by the individual who had loaned him funds to purchase the fractional interests in the land. After the foreclosure, first intervening defendant brought a cross-claim against second intervening defendant/appellant. The trial court entered a judgment against second intervening defendant for the amount of overbid at foreclosure, $150,000. Second intervening defendant/appellant appeals and also appeals the final judgment in the partition case. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
 

The defendant, Christopher Kirkendall, indicted for one count of attempted first degree murder and two counts of aggravated robbery, was convicted of facilitation of attempted second degree murder and two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery, all Class C felonies. The trial court imposed a sentence of six years for facilitation of attempted second degree murder and, after merging the robbery convictions, imposed a five-year sentence for one count of facilitation of aggravated robbery.  The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to a previously imposed twelve-year sentence for an unrelated offense. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the identity evidence and argues that the sentences should be concurrently served. Since the filing of the briefs, the defendant has also asked to consider the impact of the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ____ , 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), as to the lengths of the sentences. The judgments are affirmed as modified.

The case before us concerns the untimely death of Montrell Mason and the aggravated robbery of Clinton Anderson and Christopher Fears. The defendant stands convicted of Mason's felony murder in the perpetration of robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and weapon possession. We affirm the convictions and sentences.

The Appellant, Marcus Vashawn Nixon, appeals his jury conviction for rape of a child in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. As grounds, he asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress pre-trial photo identification evidence based upon a Rule 16 discovery violation.  After review of the record, we find no reversible error and affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Hatcher, was tried and convicted for first degree felony murder, second degree murder, attempted first degree murder and reckless endangerment for shooting three victims.   The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction with the felony murder conviction and then sentenced the Defendant to life with the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction, twenty years for the attempted murder conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the reckless endangerment conviction. The Defendant appeals, contending that: (1) the trial court erred by not granting his motion for new trial because the State failed to give the Defendant exculpatory evidence; (2) the trial court improperly allowed the State to refer to an alleged robbery previously committed by the Defendant; (3) the trial court erred when it allowed a witness to testify about the alleged robbery; (4) the trial court improperly allowed expert fingerprint testimony; (5) the trial court erred when it did not grant a mistrial based upon the State’s biblical references; (6) the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss a sleeping juror; (7) the trial court erred when it allowed hearsay testimony of a witness; and (8) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we conclude that there is no reversible error in the judgments of the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm its judgments.