APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, John Allan Lezotte, entered pleas of guilt to driving under the influence and child endangerment, reserving the right to appeal a certified question of law. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2). The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion to suppress. The judgments are affirmed.

This case arises from the trial court’s grant of Appellee’s Tenn. R. Civ. P.  12.02 Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Under the Tennessee long-arm statute and the relevant case law, we find that the criteria for personal jurisdiction over Appellant are met. Consequently, we reverse and remand.

The petitioner, Marquez Winters, was found guilty by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of attempted first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping. He received a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals that ruling. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Karen Renee Howell, pled guilty to three counts of first degree felony murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of theft over $1,000. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to three consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole for the murders, a consecutive term of twenty-five years for the attempted murder, and a concurrent effective term of twenty-five years for the remaining convictions. The Defendant's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Howell, 34 S.W.3d 484 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that her guilty pleas and sentencing were marred by the ineffective assistance of counsel, and that her guilty pleas were not entered voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly. After a hearing, the trial court denied relief. This direct appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Andre Mayfield, filed for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking to invalidate several convictions he obtained in 1989. The State responded by filing a motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the State's motion and this appeal followed. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The petitioner, Randall Edwin Cobb, appeals pro se from the order of the Obion County Circuit Court dismissing his petition for habeas corpus relief for failure to state a claim. The petitioner pled guilty in June 2000 to one count for possession of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, with the intent to sell within 1000 feet of a school zone, a Class B felony, and on two counts for sale of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school zone, each a Class B felony. In this appeal, he challenges: (1) whether the trial court properly dismissed his habeas corpus petition; (2) whether the petition stated a claim for relief; (3) whether the judgments are void; and (4) whether the indictments were defective. After reviewing the matter, we affirm the decision of the trial court, but remand for entry of corrected judgments.

The Petitioner Steven L. Anderson appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This appeal questions the apportionment of attorney fees and costs. The plaintiff suffered a compensable on-the-job injury and by the negligence of a third party. He recovered workers' compensation benefits, and settled his tort action thereafter. The employer's subrogation rights were stipulated, but the parties could not agree upon a proportional allocation of fees.

The juvenile court and custodial party in a dependency and neglect proceeding were granted a Rule 10 application for extraordinary appeal from the chancery court’s order staying and restraining proceedings of dependency and neglect in the juvenile court. We reverse the order of the chancery court.

The petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of a delayed appeal by which to present his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner’s due process right to appeal was not violated simply because he failed to take action to secure representation. The record reflects that the petitioner was not declared indigent and that the onus in obtaining representation rested with him. His coram nobis petition was outside the applicable statute of limitations and was properly dismissed. We affirm.

This case involves a surviving spouse’s attempt to set aside a financial transaction made by the decedent approximately one year prior to the decedent’s death. The trial court voided the transfer and awarded the proceeds to the surviving spouse, determining that the transfer was fraudulent and intended to defeat the interest of the surviving spouse. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse.

Helen Broyles ("Plaintiff") sued Emma Woodson and the Estate of H.Y. Woodson, Emma Woodson, Executrix ("Defendants") claiming that her husband and H.Y. Woodson entered into an agreement in 1990 for Plaintiff's husband to purchase a house located in LaFollette, Tennessee for $21,000. Both Plaintiff's husband and H.Y. Woodson had passed away when the complaint was filed. Plaintiff claimed Emma Woodson was not calculating interest properly and had not given Plaintiff proper credit for the house payments that had been made. Plaintiff requested the Trial Court examine the relevant documentation and establish the amount of Plaintiff's equity and the amount still owing. It was admitted by the parties that there was an agreement of some sort between their deceased husbands. However, that agreement was either an oral agreement or, if it had been reduced to writing, the written instrument appeared to be lost or destroyed. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to Defendants after concluding: (1) the Statute of Frauds rendered the agreement unenforceable; (2) the Dead Man's Statute precluded admission into evidence of any proof regarding the terms of the agreement; and (3) Defendants had negated an essential element of Plaintiff's contract claim which required her to establish the essential elements of the alleged contract with reasonable definiteness. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm as modified.

The defendant, Michael Paul Mondell, was convicted of facilitation of the second degree murder of his father, Francis Mondell. The trial court imposed a 12-year Department of Correction sentence. The defendant appeals and challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the sentence. We affirm the conviction but modify the sentence to eight years.

In post-divorce proceedings, Husband/Appellant sought modification of his support obligation to Wife/Appellee. Divorce Referee found no change in circumstances on which to base a modification. The trial court affirmed the Referee’s findings. Husband/Appellant appeals. We affirm.

The Appellant, Michael Woods, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. On appeal, Woods raises four issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to use Woods’ prior criminal convictions for purposes of impeachment when the convictions were more than ten years old; (3) whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow Woods to present proof that two other co-defendants had been convicted of the crime; and (4) whether the sentence is excessive. After review of the record, we find that because Woods’ motion for new trial was not timely filed, issues 2 and 3 are waived. After review of issues 1 and 4, we find no error and affirm the conviction and resulting sentence.

This appeal involves a post-divorce petition for a reduction or termination of alimony. Following a bench trial, the trial court ordered petitioner to continue paying $1,000 per month in alimony in futuro to Wife and granted Wife's request for her attorney's fees and court costs. Wife's counter-petition for an increase in alimony was denied. Both parties appeal. We affirm.

I concur in the results reached and most of the reasoning used in the majority opinion. I disagree, though, with the conclusion that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ____, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), does not affect the sentencing. However, I believe the defendant’s history of criminal of convictions justifies the sentence he received.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The trial court found the employee failed to prove his chronic lung problems were related to his occupational exposure. We affirm.

Two cases that pertain to the same child are consolidated on appeal. The child was placed in custody of the Department of Children’s Services at the age of two and one-half years due to filthy conditions at home, lack of supervision, exposure to pornography and drug paraphernalia and parents drug use when both parents were arrested at the family’s home. The Juvenile Court found the child to be dependent and neglected and a victim of aggravated sexual battery. Parents appealed and received de novo trial in Circuit Court which separately concluded the child was dependent, neglected and a victim of severe child abuse and sexual battery. In a separate action, DCS petitioned the Juvenile Court to terminate both parents’ parental rights. DCS investigator interviewed the mother while she was in custody on unrelated charge and after the mother had been appointed counsel. The DCS investigator had not consulted with nor been encouraged by DCS attorneys about questioning the mother. After being released from custody the mother was interviewed by detective. After being advised of her Miranda rights she signed a statement waiving the rights and admitted that she and the father sexually abused the child. The mother had been apprised of her rights against selfincrimination, yet she made a voluntary statement. Thus, she waived her rights against selfincrimination.  Juvenile Court terminated the rights of both parents based on abandonment, persistent conditions, and severe child abuse. Both parents appeal. We affirm.

Appellant, James Thomas Jefferson, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Appellant argues the trial court should have granted his petition for post-conviction relief because (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction as to lost or destroyed evidence, and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the chain of custody. Because we find these issues to be without merit, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her first degree murder conviction, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that she received the effective assistance of trial counsel. She also contends she was denied the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the post-conviction petition.

This appeal arises out of an action for divorce. The trial court awarded the wife a divorce from the husband on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and denied the husband’s counterclaim for divorce. After classifying and valuing various items of property in the marital estate, the trial court divided the marital property between the husband and wife. Further, the trial court awarded the wife transitional alimony in the amount of $6,000.00 per month for three years and then $3,000.00 per month for the next three years. Finally, the lower court ordered each party to pay his or her own attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant, Richard Simon, filed a "Petition for Declaratory Judgment and/or Equitable Relief" and a pro se "Petition Seeking Nunc Pro Tunc Order" requesting the trial court to modify or correct his sentence to grant him retroactive sentence reduction credits. The trial court concluded that it was without jurisdiction to modify Defendant's sentence, and dismissed his petitions. Because there is no right of appeal from the trial court's dismissal of Defendant's motions, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Fernando Deandra Vaughn, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court erred by not waiting for the disposition of the drug charges against him before revoking his probation on the basis of those charges. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiffs in this medical malpractice action filed their complaint approximately three weeks after the three-year medical malpractice statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a)(3) (1980), had expired. The defendants moved to dismiss the action as time-barred. In response, the plaintiffs argued that their action should not be time-barred because the primary plaintiff was mentally incompetent during most of the repose period. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that due process requires tolling of the statute of repose during the period of a plaintiff’s mental incompetency. In support of their contention, the plaintiffs relied on Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000), and other precedents which provide for tolling of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a) (2003), on the basis of a petitioner’s mental incompetency. The lower courts granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm. We hold that due process does not require tolling of the medical malpractice statute of repose during the period of a plaintiff’s mental incompetency. The legislature has the constitutional power to place reasonable temporal limitations on rights of action in tort. By contrast, a post-conviction petition, despite its procedurally civil nature, is available only to a person who is in custody following a criminal conviction and sentence; such a petition thus implicates life and liberty interests in a way that materially differentiates it from civil actions. Therefore, the precedents which require tolling for mental incompetence in the context of post-conviction petitions are inapposite to questions of tolling statutes of repose in civil tort actions.