APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a jury trial, the appellant, Bernard E. Roller, Jr., was convicted of driving under the influence. The trial court sentenced the appellant to an eleven month, twenty-nine-day sentence and suspended all of the sentence except for fifteen days, which the appellant was ordered to serve in the workhouse. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal challenging: (1) his sentence as excessive; (2) the trial court's decision to exclude evidence about the tachograph in the police officer's car; (3) comments made by the prosecutor during rebuttal argument; (4) the trial court's failure to take corrective action following the prosecutor's prejudicial comments; and (5) the trial court's failure to question the appellant in accordance with Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999). Although we conclude that issues (1), (2), (3), and (4) are without merit, the record is devoid of evidence to allow this Court to determine whether the appellant personally and knowingly waived his right to testify. Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the appellant's right to testify was violated, and if so, whether the violation of the appellant's right to testify was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The paternal grandmother of an eight year old boy, who had had custody of the child for the most recent four years of his life, filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of his mother so the grandmother could adopt him. The trial court granted the petition, finding clear and convincing evidence of several grounds for termination and that such a step was in the child's best interest. We affirm the termination on the ground of abandonment.

The petitioner's judgment forms entered May 29, 1996, reflect that he pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony, committed on November 18, 1994, and possession of cocaine greater than one-half gram with intent to sell, a Class B felony, committed on October 3, 1994. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years on the murder conviction and twelve years on the cocaine conviction. The judgments ordered the sentences to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to sentences for other convictions listed on the judgment forms. The petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus relief claiming that his sentences are void because they are in direct contravention of statutory law requiring them to be served consecutively rather than concurrently. The trial court granted habeas corpus relief, and the State appealed. We hold that the testimony presented by this petitioner was outside the record of the underlying convictions and proceedings and therefore should not have been considered by the trial court. We reverse and remand this case for a determination as to whether the record of the underlying convictions and proceedings constitutes satisfactory proof that the petitioner was on bail for the Class B cocaine offense when the second degree murder was committed.

The Appellant, Michael Douglas, appeals a 1 s of right from the judgment of the Shelby County
Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Douglas was convicted in 2000 of
attempted second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, Douglas contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s (1) failure to seek suppression of a photo array because the photograph used was obtained following an unlawful arrest and (2) failure to adequately cross-examine a witness as to whether an agreement existed between the witness and the State. After review of the issues presented, the judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, David Scott Akers, was indicted for the crimes of robbery and attempted robbery and, following a jury trial, was convicted of theft under $500 and attempted robbery. The trial court consolidated the sentencing hearing for these convictions with Akers’ two pending probation revocation hearings. Following this hearing, Akers received an effective ten-year sentence for his two jury convictions and two one-year sentences from the revocation of his sentences for violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO) Act. On appeal, Akers raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting Akers’ three prior MVHO convictions for impeachment purposes; (2) whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and at sentencing; and (3) whether the trial court erred in conducting the revocation hearing without proper notice. Finding no error, the judgments of the Dyer County Circuit Court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Harry M. Nimmons, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to three counts of possessing with the intent to sell less than one-half gram of cocaine and resulting effective sixteen-year sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because he would have gone to trial if his attorneys had explained evidentiary issues to him. We affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Dennis Christopher Lowery, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's revoking his probation that he had received for his convictions upon guilty pleas to theft and misdemeanor evading arrest. The defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and sentencing him to confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this child custody dispute, the Trial Court determined there was a substantial material change in circumstances and designated father as primary caregiver. On appeal, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Marcus Brooks, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. A review of the record supports the State’s position. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Trial Court awarded plaintiff Judgment against defendants. On appeal defendants sought to reverse Judgment of the Trial Court. No transcript of evidence was filed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This is a divorce case. The parties were married in 1972. In 2001, the husband filed for divorce based on inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable differences, and the wife counterclaimed for divorce on the basis of inappropriate marital conduct. After the March 2002 trial, some of the parties’ main assets were sold in foreclosure. In October 2002, the trial court granted a divorce to the wife on the grounds that the husband had committed adultery. The divorce decree resolved all of the property issues between the parties. The trial court also found implicitly that the wife could not be rehabilitated, based on a letter from the wife’s physician, and awarded alimony in futuro. Two weeks later, the husband filed a motion for reconsideration, based in part on the interim sale of some of the parties’ assets and the husband’s consequent inability to fulfill his obligations under the decree. In April 2003, the trial court denied the husband’s motion to reconsider. From that order, the husband now appeals and challenges many of the trial court’s rulings. We affirm the trial court’s division of the marital property and its allocation of the marital debts. We find, however, that the letter from the physician was inadmissible hearsay, and consequently reverse the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro and remand for an award of rehabilitative alimony and for other proceedings.
 

Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of Plaintiff Mosley, a motorcycle patrolman, who was seriously injured in an on-duty motorcycle accident. Applying comparative fault principles the trial judge held Metro 75% at fault and Mr. Mosley 25% at fault for his injuries. Finding that Plaintiff has failed to establish cause in-fact between the alleged defect in the helmet and the injuries to Plaintiff, we reverse the action of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Eric D. Jones, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a ground entitling him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Mike Settle, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that thePetitioner has failed to establish a ground for which post-conviction relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted on June 18, 1997 for especially aggravated burglary, aggravated rape, robbery, aggravated burglary and attempted rape. After a direct appeal to this Court, his robbery conviction was reversed. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed this decision. The petitioner then filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief based upon allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to his remaining convictions. The trial court denied this petition. The petitioner now appeals the trial court's decision. We affirm the trial court.

The instant appeal was stayed in 1999 by this Court's order upon suggestion of bankruptcy. The stay has been lifted, and the case proceeds on Amelia Swafford's appeal from the trial court's order in favor of the defendants Bobby and Betty Johnson and Old Hickory Engineering & Machine Co., Inc. ("OHEMCO"). We reverse the trial court.

The petitioner, Terrance Lowdermilk, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. The petition is barred by the statute of limitations and does not establish that the petitioner is alternatively entitled to relief by a writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of a mother to her two teenage sons on the grounds of abandonment, failure to comply with the permanency plan, and failure to remedy the conditions that led to the children being removed from her custody. After thoroughly examining the record, we agree with the trial court that all those grounds have been proved by clear and convincing evidence and that it is in the best interest of the children that the mother's parental rights be terminated. We also find that the Department of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to assist the mother, but that her own lack of honest effort rendered that assistance ineffective. We accordingly affirm the trial court.

The petitioner, Dan Bill Johnson, sought habeas corpus relief, asserting that his five-year robbery sentence had expired. Although not granting the relief sought by the petitioner, the trial court determined that his life sentence had expired and identified the date at which he began serving his robbery sentence, with the Department of Correction then to determine his release date. Both the petitioner and the State appealed. Following our review, we reverse the order of the trial court and dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner is to be returned to custody.

The Defendant, Andre Baldwin, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder. The Defendant was subsequently sentenced to serve a life sentence of imprisonment. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Finding the evidence legally sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Linda Ottinger and Marion Ottinger (“Plaintiffs”) are the paternal grandparents of H.O. (“the Child”). The Child’s father died in 2000. Plaintiffs sought visitation with the Child. This visitation was opposed by the Child’s mother, Shelly Evans Ottinger (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs filed a petition to obtain grandparent visitation under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306. After trial, the Trial Court held, inter alia, that the Child has had a significant existing relationship with the Plaintiffs and the loss of that relationship presents the danger of direct and substantial harm to the Child. The Trial Court granted Plaintiffs visitation. Defendant appeals. We reverse.
 

I concur completely in Judge Swiney’s opinion. I write separately to emphasize what the majority opinion expressly states, i.e., that the Defendant in the instant case did not challenge the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306 (2001 & Supp. 2003). I continue to have some doubt that the deprivation of a relationship with grandparents can form the basis for the type of substantial harm contemplated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993). See Dugan v. Myers, C/A No. E2001-00281-COA-R3-JV, 2001 WL 1117514, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed September 24, 2001), no perm. app. requested (Susano, J., concurring). However, since that issue is not before us in this case, we do not need to reach it.

Sherri Dyer Kendall (“Plaintiff”) sought treatment for bipolar disorder from a psychiatrist, Lane Cook, M.D. (“Defendant”). Defendant prescribed Topamax for Plaintiff. Less than one week later, Plaintiff began to experience loss of vision, severe headache, and severe vomiting. Plaintiff was diagnosed with acute angle closure glaucoma and underwent several surgical procedures to control or correct the problem. When Defendant prescribed Topamax to Plaintiff, it was unknown in the medical community that a potential side effect of Topamax was acute angle closure glaucoma. That acute angle closure glaucoma was a potential side effect was discovered later by the medical community, and Plaintiff1 sued Defendant2 for medical malpractice. At the close of Plaintiff’s proof at trial, Defendant moved for a directed verdict, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This is a zoning case. The principal issue is whether a rezoning amendment must explicitly designate the maximum density approved with reference to ancillary documentation.

The initial judgment declared that Standifer Lane was a public road for one-tenth mile only. Sixteen (16) months after the judgment was entered, the County filed a Rule 62.02 motion alleging that "one-tenth mile" was a mistake because all concerned had agreed upon two-tenths mile. The judgment was amended to provide that Standifer Lane is a public road for a distance of 950 feet or to an existing driveway. The Rule 62.02 motion is untimely.