APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant appeals from the judgments of the trial court denying him habeas corpus relief. The trial court dismissed the petitions, finding that they failed to state cognizable claims for habeas corpus relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Harry G. Sturgill, was convicted by a jury of eight counts of rape of a child and two counts of statutory rape. As a result, he received a twenty-five year sentence for each of his eight child rape convictions and a two-year sentence for each of his statutory rape convictions. Two of the child rape convictions were ordered to be served consecutively. All of the other sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, for an effective fifty-year sentence. In this direct appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in regard to his child rape convictions and the length and consecutive nature of the sentences. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Trial Court terminated the mother's parental rights after finding statutory grounds to terminate and clear and convincing evidence that it was in the child's best interest that the parent's rights be terminated. On appeal, we affirm.

The Trial Court convicted respondent on "six counts" of contempt. On appeal, we hold evidence supports only one count of contempt.

The defendant appeals from the Trial Court's awarding Judgment to plaintiff for $1,000.00. The record on appeal is insufficient to review alleged error. We affirm.

This is a declaratory judgment action filed by Marlin Financial & Leasing Corporation ("Marlin") against its insurer, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company ("Nationwide"), seeking a determination as to coverage under Marlin's insurance policy with Nationwide. Specifically, the suit seeks to obligate Nationwide to pay $8,333.33, the amount of Marlin's settlement of a claim asserted by AmSouth Bank ("AmSouth" or "the Bank"), and associated attorney's fees and expenses of $52,654.05. The trial court granted summary judgment to Marlin, finding that AmSouth's claim against Marlin for "loss of use" of certain property was covered under the business liability feature of the policy and that Marlin was entitled to reimbursement for the amount of its settlement of AmSouth's claim and Marlin's related litigation expenses. The trial court ultimately awarded Marlin prejudgment interest, but it refused to assess a bad faith penalty against Nationwide. Nationwide appeals and both sides raise issues. We affirm.

The petitioner, Dewayne Cathey, petitioned the Hardeman County Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his sentence in his 1993 Shelby County, guilty-pleaded conviction of first degree murder. The lower court summarily dismissed the petition, and on appeal, the petitioner claims that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing. Upon our review of the record, we reverse and vacate the trial court’s order. Furthermore, we order the lower court to grant habeas corpus relief.

Joseph and Nina Rotello ("Defendants") purchased a mobile home from Clayton Sevierville and financed the purchase through Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance, Inc. ("Plaintiff"). After Defendants defaulted on the installment contract, Plaintiff filed suit and then filed a properly supported motion for summary judgment seeking possession of the mobile home. Defendants, who were proceeding pro se, filed a response to the motion for summary judgment, but failed to offer any competent proof to establish a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The Trial Court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and we affirm.

Petitioner, William Hackworth, pled guilty to four counts of incest and received an effective twelve-year sentence as a Range I offender. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, in part, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek DNA testing in order to establish the paternity of the child borne of the victim in this case. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that it was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations and that Petitioner was not entitled to post-conviction DNA analysis. Petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Ydale Banks, of first-degree felony murder, first-degree premeditated murder, conspiracies to commit both modes of first-degree murder, especially aggravated burglary, especially aggravated robbery, three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of aggravated assault. The defendant now claims on appeal that: (1) the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress his pretrial statement; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to grant the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal; (3) the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support the convictions for first-degree murder; (4) the trial court erred in admitting prejudicial photographs into evidence in the sentencing phase of trial; (5) the trial court erred in admitting victim-impact evidence during the sentence phase; (6) the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c) relative to the use of victim-impact evidence are unconstitutional; (7) the trial court erred in instructing the jury; and (8) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the definition of "knowingly." We reverse the judgment of conviction of conspiracy to commit felony murder but otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, David Lee Bellamy, plead guilty to violation of an habitual traffic offender order, two counts of reckless aggravated assault, four counts of reckless endangerment, driving under the influence, driving under the influence, fourth offense, improper passing, and driving left of center, with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of twelve years. Unsatisfied with the denial of alternative sentencing, the appellant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Aggrieved of the order to serve 90 days of his two-year sexual battery sentence in confinement, the defendant, Michael K. Miller, appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, pro se, employed counsel during appeal, but appeal is premature. We dismiss appeal and remand.

Competing Petitions between The Conservator of the Estate and the Conservator of the Person resulted in the Trial Court altering the Ward's living arrangements. On appeal, we affirm.

Husband appeals trial court’s final decree of divorce pertaining to division of marital
property. We affirm.

Defendant, James Allen Michaels, pled guilty to two counts of robbery, both Class C felonies. Defendant was originally indicted on charges of aggravated robbery. For his convictions, Defendant was sentenced as a Range II offender to eight years and three years as a Range I standard offender, to be served consecutively. The length of the sentences imposed was agreed upon in the negotiated plea agreement. Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of probation. After reviewing the record on appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Janice K. Stewart ("Mrs. Stewart") was the record owner of a parcel of real property located in Tall Oaks Court subdivision when this litigation began. Several of Mrs. Stewart's neighbors filed this suit claiming Mrs. Stewart was in violation of the subdivision restrictions by having a freestanding metal garage and a separate large wooden structure on her property. The Trial Court agreed and gave Mrs. Stewart the option of keeping one of the structures as a garage and ordering her to remove the other structure. Mrs. Stewart subsequently transferred the property to her husband, Ed Stewart ("Mr. Stewart"), who then was added as a defendant. The neighbors filed a petition for contempt against both Mr. and Mrs Stewart when they continued to have both a freestanding metal garage and the wooden structure on their property. A hearing was held on the petition for contempt and the Trial Court held Mrs. Stewart in contempt and found the wooden structure still to be in violation of the subdivision restrictions. We affirm the Trial Court's finding that the wooden structure is in violation of the subdivision restrictions. We vacate the finding of contempt and remand for further proceedings on the claim of contempt as to Mrs. Stewart.

The defendant, Dennis Christopher Lowery, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's revoking his probation that he had received for his convictions upon guilty pleas to theft and misdemeanor evading arrest. The defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and sentencing him to confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Michael Douglas, appeals a 1 s of right from the judgment of the Shelby County
Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Douglas was convicted in 2000 of
attempted second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, Douglas contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s (1) failure to seek suppression of a photo array because the photograph used was obtained following an unlawful arrest and (2) failure to adequately cross-examine a witness as to whether an agreement existed between the witness and the State. After review of the issues presented, the judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, David Scott Akers, was indicted for the crimes of robbery and attempted robbery and, following a jury trial, was convicted of theft under $500 and attempted robbery. The trial court consolidated the sentencing hearing for these convictions with Akers’ two pending probation revocation hearings. Following this hearing, Akers received an effective ten-year sentence for his two jury convictions and two one-year sentences from the revocation of his sentences for violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO) Act. On appeal, Akers raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting Akers’ three prior MVHO convictions for impeachment purposes; (2) whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and at sentencing; and (3) whether the trial court erred in conducting the revocation hearing without proper notice. Finding no error, the judgments of the Dyer County Circuit Court are affirmed.

Following a jury trial, the appellant, Bernard E. Roller, Jr., was convicted of driving under the influence. The trial court sentenced the appellant to an eleven month, twenty-nine-day sentence and suspended all of the sentence except for fifteen days, which the appellant was ordered to serve in the workhouse. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal challenging: (1) his sentence as excessive; (2) the trial court's decision to exclude evidence about the tachograph in the police officer's car; (3) comments made by the prosecutor during rebuttal argument; (4) the trial court's failure to take corrective action following the prosecutor's prejudicial comments; and (5) the trial court's failure to question the appellant in accordance with Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999). Although we conclude that issues (1), (2), (3), and (4) are without merit, the record is devoid of evidence to allow this Court to determine whether the appellant personally and knowingly waived his right to testify. Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the appellant's right to testify was violated, and if so, whether the violation of the appellant's right to testify was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The paternal grandmother of an eight year old boy, who had had custody of the child for the most recent four years of his life, filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of his mother so the grandmother could adopt him. The trial court granted the petition, finding clear and convincing evidence of several grounds for termination and that such a step was in the child's best interest. We affirm the termination on the ground of abandonment.

The petitioner, Floyd W. Jenkins, appeals the Monroe County Criminal Court's denial of his Motion for Probation. The state contends that the trial court properly denied the motion because the petitioner is serving his sentences in the Department of Correction and the trial court no longer has jurisdiction over him. We agree with the state and, pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R., affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner's judgment forms entered May 29, 1996, reflect that he pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony, committed on November 18, 1994, and possession of cocaine greater than one-half gram with intent to sell, a Class B felony, committed on October 3, 1994. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years on the murder conviction and twelve years on the cocaine conviction. The judgments ordered the sentences to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to sentences for other convictions listed on the judgment forms. The petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus relief claiming that his sentences are void because they are in direct contravention of statutory law requiring them to be served consecutively rather than concurrently. The trial court granted habeas corpus relief, and the State appealed. We hold that the testimony presented by this petitioner was outside the record of the underlying convictions and proceedings and therefore should not have been considered by the trial court. We reverse and remand this case for a determination as to whether the record of the underlying convictions and proceedings constitutes satisfactory proof that the petitioner was on bail for the Class B cocaine offense when the second degree murder was committed.

The petitioner, Harry M. Nimmons, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to three counts of possessing with the intent to sell less than one-half gram of cocaine and resulting effective sixteen-year sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because he would have gone to trial if his attorneys had explained evidentiary issues to him. We affirm the trial court.