APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Derrick L. Dillard, argues in this appeal that the trial court erred by imposing an illegal sentence following a hearing in which the trial court found that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his Community Corrections sentence. The State agrees that the trial court erred. After a full review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

This appeal is the continuation of a protracted dispute between Tennessee State University and a faculty member stemming from his termination for sexually harassing a student. After the courts vacated the dismissal, the university and the Tennessee Board of Regents established a process of transitional reinstatement. The professor objected and refused to report to work. Thereafter, the professor filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Davdison County to hold the university and the board in contempt. The trial court heard the matter without a jury and declined to hold either the university or the board in contempt. The professor has appealed. We affirm because orders declining to grant contempt petitions are not appealable.

The petitioner, Harry David Johnson, was convicted in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of the first degree murder of his wife, Katherine Trotter Johnson, and he received a sentence of life imprisonment. Subsequently, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel during his trial. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing, ultimately determining that the petitioner had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that trial counsel was ineffective. The petitioner timely appealed this ruling. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for a new trial.

The defendant, Gregory Skinner, was convicted of two counts of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony, and one count of sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, a Class E felony, and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years for each of the two counts of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, to be served concurrently, and to three years for the sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of thirteen years. This sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to a previous sentence. The defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in applying a nonstatutory factor in setting his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 2 and 3.

This case is an appeal from a wrongful death claim in which the Defendant was found only fifty percent at fault. The Plaintiffs appeal to this Court for review of two procedural issues. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of a biological father whose daughter was surrendered to a licensed child-placing agency without his knowledge. Soon after notifying the biological father that it had custody of the child, the agency filed a petition in the Davidson County Juvenile Court seeking to terminate the father’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court concluded that the biological father had abandoned his daughter and that the child’s best interests required terminating her biological father’s parental rights. We have determined that the agency has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the biological father has abandoned his daughter.
 

I disagree with the standard of review employed by the court in this case for the reasons
discussed at more length in In Re Z.J.S., No. M2002-02235-COA-R3-JV, 2003 WL 21266854, at
*18-22 (Tenn.Ct.App. June 3, 2003) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed; Estate of Acuff v.
O’Linger, 56 S.W.3d 527, 533-37 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2001). However, I would reach the same result
employing the standard of review recited in Acuff v. O’Linger, 56 S.W.3d 527 at 537. Therefore,
I concur with the court’s decision to reverse the order terminating R.G.L.’s parental rights.

The appellant, Holly Fant,1 pled guilty to aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon
resulting in bodily injury and agreed to have her sentence determined at a sentencing hearing. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I, Standard Offender to a four-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. After an appeal, this Court reversed and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. See State v. Holly Fant, No. W2001-02634-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1284229 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, June 5, 2002). After a new sentencing hearing, the appellant was again sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, Standard Offender to a four-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the appellant challenges her sentence by arguing that the trial court: (1) improperly applied certain enhancement factors to her sentence; (2) based its determination on evidence not in the record; and (3) improperly denied her request for a “special needs” Community Corrections sentence. After a complete review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I agree that the defendant’s sentence should be affirmed. In my view, however, it was error for the trial court to apply enhancement factor (6), that the defendant treated the victim with exceptional cruelty. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(6). Application of this factor requires a finding of cruelty over and above that inherently attendant to the crime for which the defendant is convicted. State v. Embry, 915 S.W.2d 451, 456 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). In other words, such evidence must “denote[ ] the infliction of pain or suffering for its own sake or from the gratification derived therefrom, and not merely pain or suffering inflicted as the means of accomplishing the crime charged.” State v. Kelly Haynes, No. W1999-01485-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 14, 2000). Enhancement factor (6) has typically been applied insituations where the victim was tortured or abused. See State v. Davis, 825 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). This court has upheld the application of this factor based on proof of extensive physical abuse or torture, see State v. Williams, 920 S.W.2d 247, 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), as well as proof of psychological abuse or torture, see State v. Thomas Lebron Mills and Carl Franklin Mills, No. 936 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Dec. 19, 1985) (holding that acts of mental cruelty, by themselves, can be as vicious and scarring as acts of physical cruelty). Here, there is no evidence that the defendant tortured or abused the victim or that she inflicted pain and suffering greater than that necessary to complete the offense. Rather, after shooting the victim, the defendant dialed 911 and waited with him until emergency assistance arrived. Nevertheless, I concur with the majority that the four-year sentence, one year above the minimum, was warranted.

A Morgan County jury found the Defendant, Glen Holt, guilty of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years in prison for the aggravated robbery charge, to be served concurrently with a life sentence for the murder conviction. The Defendant appeals, contending: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred when it allowed a photograph, offered by the prosecution, to be admitted into evidence without a proper foundation; (3) that the jury did not follow the trial court’s instructions with regard to felony murder; and (4) that he did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive his constitutional right to testify in his own defense. Although we conclude that issues (1), (2) and (3) are without merit, the record is insufficient for us to determine whether the Defendant personally and knowingly waived his right to testify. Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the Defendant’s right to testify was violated, and if so, whether the violation of the Defendant’s right to testify was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant, Dwight Miller, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison in 1996. On December 29, 1998, this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case to the Haywood County Circuit Court for a new trial. See State v. Dwight Miller, No. 02C01-9708-CC-00300, 1998 WL 902592 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Dec. 29, 1998). At the conclusion of the second trial, appellant was convicted again by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. The issues presented for our review include: (1) whether the trial court erred in permitting the prior recorded testimony of a witness to be read into the record; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial after a bomb threat occurred during the course of the trial; and (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction for first degree murder. Appellate review is available for the sufficiency of the evidence despite the appellant's failure to file a timely motion for new trial under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b). The review of the issues, however, is also dependent upon either a timely filed notice of appeal, or in the interest of justice, a waiver of the timely filing of a notice of appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). Because the appellant filed an untimely motion for a new trial, his notice of appeal is likewise tardy. Additionally, the appellant has not sought a waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal. Under these circumstances we conclude that the appellant has waived review of these issues on appeal. Nevertheless, we have in the interest of justice, reviewed the primary issue of the sufficiency of the evidence. The evidence is more than sufficient to support the verdict of the jury. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Dexter P. Jones, appeals from the Wilson County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his four convictions for assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and resulting consecutive eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentences. He contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made because the trial court did not advise him that he was waiving a double jeopardy claim. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.

The defendant, Walter Eugene Ingram, filed a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence” in the Shelby
County Criminal Court. Upon reviewing the motion and the State’s response, the trial court
summarily dismissed the motion, finding that it failed to allege grounds for relief. The defendant
appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the defendant’s appeal should be dismissed

The defendant, Richard Eugene Thompson, appeals the lower court’s failure to grant alternative sentencing following his guilty plea to vehicular assault. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to two counts of felony reckless endangerment, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The sole issue before the Court in this post-conviction proceeding is whether the petitioner, Jerry Neal Carpenter, was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel. At trial, the jury was given instructions on first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and robbery. The trial court declined trial counsel’s request to provide the jury with lesserincluded offense instructions, and Carpenter was convicted of first degree felony murder. Carpenter argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because appellate counsel failed to challenge the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on second degree murder as a lesser-included offense. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we hold that Carpenter has failed to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We therefore affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment denying post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Barry Graham, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range III, persistent offender to concurrent sentences of thirteen years for the aggravated burglary conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the theft conviction, to be served consecutively to a sentence in a previous case. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the circumstantial evidence at trial was sufficient to establish his guilt of the offenses. We conclude the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find him guilty of aggravated burglary and theft under $500 beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty years in the
Tennessee Department of Correction. He contends on appeal that 1) the evidence was insufficient to prove that the killing was “knowing,” 2) the trial court erred in admitting a photo of the victim while he was alive, allowing a “memo of understanding” to be read into evidence, and refusing to admit a report of an expert witness into evidence, 3) the State made improper remarks during closing argument, 4) the trial court gave erroneous jury instructions as to the definition of “knowingly,” and 5) the sentence was improper. We conclude that the definition of “knowingly” given by the trial court improperly lessened the State’s burden of proof and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial, based on the erroneous jury instruction given by the trial court.

The appellant, Marcillo Anderson, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty years as a Range One, Standard Offender. His release eligibility was classified as violent, requiring him to serve one hundred percent (100%) of his sentence. In this direct appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s denial of a jury instruction on self-defense. We hold that none of the issues raised by the appellant warrant a reversal and affirm the conviction.

In this appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County the Plaintiff/Appellant, Peggy Pistole, argues that the trial court erred in excluding witness testimony upon grounds that their identity was not disclosed in Ms. Pistole's response to interrogatories. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.

The petitioner, Wheatley Graham, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the post-conviction
court is affirmed.