APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Billy M. Higgins, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation for failure to complete a drug rehabilitation program. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court.

Lori Ann Duncan appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's revocation of her probationary sentence. Duncan claims that the lower court abused its discretion in ordering her to serve her sentence in incarceration in the Department of Correction. However, we are unpersuaded and affirm the lower court's judgment.

The appellant, Jesse Tuggle, was convicted by a jury in the Williamson County Circuit Court of one count of forgery, one count of theft of property valued under $500, and one count of criminal impersonation. The trial court sentenced the appellant to one and one-half years of imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the forgery conviction, eleven months and twenty-nine days imprisonment for the theft conviction, and six months imprisonment for the criminal impersonation conviction. The trial court further ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the appellant contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his forgery conviction and argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Franklin County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of Sale of a Schedule II Controlled Substance, cocaine, and one count of Delivery of a Controlled Substance, also cocaine. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to eight years in prison. The Defendant appeals, contending: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions; and (2) that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After reviewing the record, we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support the Defendant's convictions and the trial court did not err in sentencing the Defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Treasa Renee Shorter, pled guilty to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell. The trial court imposed a sentence of nine years and nine months to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant contends: (1) her sentence is excessive; and (2) the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and robbery. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in (1) not properly transferring the case from juvenile court, (2) denying her request for a continuance, (3) admitting a tape recorded statement by the defendant, (4) admitting certain photographs of the victim, (5) refusing to allow expert testimony regarding the defendant's mental condition, (6) refusing to allow evidence of a co-defendant's subsequent crimes, (7) failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser included offenses, and (8) sentencing. We conclude that the trial court erred in applying enhancement factors six and ten. The trial court also erred in not applying the mitigating factor (victim released alive) to the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. The sentence is reduced for (1) aggravated robbery from ten years to nine years, (2) aggravated kidnapping from ten years to nine years, and (3) especially aggravated kidnapping from twenty-one years to twenty years. We reverse the trial court's determination that the sentences should be served consecutively. We remand to the trial court to amend the judgment for case number 01-00564 to reflect that the defendant was a standard violent offender rather than a repeat violent offender. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

The defendant was convicted of facilitation of felony murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced to twenty-three years. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in 1) allowing testimony by Dozier that the defendant told her the victim had been involved in the robbery because the statement was inadmissible hearsay, and 2) refusing to admit the prior written statement of Dozier into evidence under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 613(b). We remand for correction of the judgment form to reflect the correct felony classifications. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all other respects.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Andre Anthony, was convicted of two counts of forgery over five hundred dollars, one count of forgery over one thousand dollars, one count of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. In his appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of attempt to commit first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery; (2) the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained through an inventory search of Defendant's vehicle; (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that "serious bodily injury" is an element of the offense of especially aggravated robbery; and (4) the trial court erred in ordering Defendant's sentences for attempt to commit first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery to be served consecutively. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was found guilty by a jury of two counts of premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The felony murder convictions were merged into the premeditated murder convictions. Thereafter, the jury sentenced the appellant to death based upon the existence of three aggravating circumstances: the appellant had previously been convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person; the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of defendant or another; and the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to twenty-five years imprisonment for especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping, to run consecutively to his sentences for first degree murder and to a prior out-of-state sentence. On appeal, appellant presents forty-five issues. After an extensive review of the record and the applicable law, we find that none of these issues warrants a reversal of this case. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are AFFIRMED.

We have this case on direct appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3, from the judgment of the circuit court approving the order of a hearing committee of the Board of Professional Responsibility that suspended Charles F. Galbreath, the appellant, from the practice of law for a thirty-day period. The circuit court essentially adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the hearing committee. Galbreath does not contest those factual findings but argues that the sanction imposed is excessive. Upon review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the thirty-day suspension is appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Defendant, Ricky Raymond Bryan, was first tried and convicted of the first degree murder of Charlotte Scott in 1995. At the conclusion of Defendant's first trial, the trial judge, acting in his capacity as thirteenth juror, granted Defendant's motion for a new trial. Defendant's second trial was held in April 1996, and the jury once again found Defendant guilty of first degree murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, this Court remanded for a new trial because the introduction of Defendant's statement of November 15, 1994, violated Defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. At the same time, this Court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. State v. Bryan, 990 S.W.2d 231, 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Following a third jury trial, Defendant was again convicted of first degree murder and sentenced by the jury to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant now appeals his conviction arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was the person who killed the victim, Charlotte Scott. Alternatively, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation as required at the time of the offense in order to sustain a conviction of first degree murder. Defendant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious bodily injury beyond a reasonable doubt. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This lawsuit emanates from a 1989 sale of land, which included a portion of land to which the seller did not have title. Two subsequent assignees of the original buyer filed a cause of action against the seller, seeking rescission or reformation of the 1989 transaction and alternate relief. The trial court awarded plaintiffs’ damages and declined to award equitable relief. We affirm.

The defendant, Christopher C. Rigsby, appeals from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court's denial of alternative sentencing following his conviction of aggravated assault. Because the record supports the trial court's ordering the defendant to serve the six-year sentence in the Department of Correction, we affirm.