APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Ricky Thompson, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder, aggravated assault, and arson. He was sentenced to death for the first degree murder. Upon the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court entered an order modifying the jury's verdicts to not guilty by reason of insanity. The State raises one principal issue in this direct appeal, which it states as follows: whether the trial court erred in reversing the jury's determination of guilt and granting the Defendant a judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity on charges of first degree murder, aggravated assault, and arson. Because we find the evidence legally sufficient to support the jury's verdicts, we reverse the trial court's order, reinstate the jury's verdicts, and remand the case to the trial court for consideration of the Defendant's motion for a new trial and sentencing on the aggravated assault and arson convictions.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Voss Johnson, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated robbery, one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, and one count of second degree murder. Defendant now appeals his convictions arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for second degree murder based on a theory of criminal responsibility. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Ricky Lynn Littrell, was convicted by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury of theft of property valued more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a career offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this delayed appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the stolen merchandise into evidence because a chain of custody had not been established; and (3) the trial court erred by allowing a list of the stolen merchandise into evidence because the testifying witness did not properly authenticate the list pursuant to Rule 901, Tenn. R. Evid. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Evelyn Holly was convicted of second degree murder following a jury trial. Defendant now challenges her conviction arguing that the trial court erred in not suppressing her statement to the police. Defendant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction of second degree murder. Specifically, Defendant argues that the evidence showed that she and the victim, Ronald Kyles, were engaged in mutual combat at the time of the killing and requests this court to reduce her conviction to voluntary manslaughter. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant's conviction for second degree murder.

The appellant, Valerie Arlene Bullion, pled guilty in the Marshall County Circuit Court to operating a motor vehicle in violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act, a Class E felony; driving under the influence, tenth offense, a Class E felony; driving on a revoked license, fourth offense, a Class A misdemeanor; and violation of the implied consent law. The trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, suspended the appellant's driver's license for ten years, and imposed a three thousand dollar ($3000) fine. On appeal, the appellant complains that the sentences imposed by the trial court are excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Johnnie W. Reeves, of two counts of aggravated child abuse of a child six years of age or less. The trial court imposed two concurrent twenty-year sentences. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs of the victim's injuries. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, David D. Harris, pled guilty to seven counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, in the Davidson County Criminal Court on June 16, 1999. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three eight-year sentences, to be served consecutively. The trial court suspended the sentences and ordered the Defendant to serve three consecutive eight-year terms on supervised probation. The State appealed, and this Court reversed the portion of the sentence that ordered the Defendant to serve twenty-four years of probation on the three consecutive eight-year sentences, holding that a probationary sentence for aggravated robbery is contrary to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(a). Accordingly, we reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for re-sentencing. Upon re-sentencing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to three eight-year prison terms and ordered that the sentences run consecutive to each other and consecutive to a sentence that the Defendant is currently serving in Williamson County. The Defendant appealed the trial court's re-sentencing order and raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erroneously denied his request for a new sentencing hearing and; (2) whether the trial court erroneously denied the Defendant's request, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, for a reduced sentence. After a through examination of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the Defendant's request for a new sentencing hearing; however, because we conclude that the trial court erroneously believed that it was without the authority to impose concurrent sentences, we reverse and remand for it to determine whether the three sentences should run consecutively or concurrently.

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of attempted reckless homicide, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. The trial court merged the attempted reckless homicide conviction into the aggravated assault conviction, and the defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender, to ten years for aggravated assault and six years for aggravated burglary, with the sentences to run concurrently. The defendant contends that the trial court improperly merged the attempted reckless homicide conviction into his aggravated assault conviction. Also, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight. We conclude, following plain error review, that attempted reckless homicide is not a recognized crime in Tennessee. We reverse and dismiss the defendant's conviction for attempted reckless homicide. Further, we conclude that the jury instruction regarding flight was not error, and the trial court correctly sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender. We affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences for aggravated burglary and aggravated assault.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the State engaged in a vindictive prosecution and failed to perform testing on evidence which would have supported his claim of self-defense. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Robert L. Leach, Jr., was found guilty by a jury of two counts of premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of aggravated rape, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The felony murder convictions were merged into the premeditated murder convictions. The jury sentenced the defendant to death based upon the finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. As to victim Sarah McBride, the jury found three aggravating circumstances: the defendant had previously been convicted of one or more violent felonies; the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; and the murder was knowingly committed by the defendant while committing or attempting to commit robbery or aggravated rape. As to victim Jean Poteet, the jury found the same three aggravating circumstances and the additional aggravating circumstance that the victim was seventy years of age or older or was particularly vulnerable due to a significant handicap or significant disability, physical or mental. The trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery and aggravated rape convictions. In this appeal, the defendant raises numerous issues relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, the constitutionality of the death penalty, and the application of certain capital case procedures. We conclude that no harmful error exists, and we affirm the convictions and sentences. The case should be remanded, though, for correction of clerical errors by which the judgments for Counts 5 and 6 have respectively been switched to Counts 6 and 5.

The appellant, Marcus Thompson, was convicted in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of one count of conspiracy to sell or deliver cocaine, one count of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, and one count of selling and delivering cocaine. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of forty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction and fines totaling $150,000. On appeal, the appellant raises several issues for our review, including speedy trial, sufficiency of the evidence, double jeopardy, evidentiary rulings, and sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but reduce the amount of the appellant's fines to a total amount of $50,000.

The Appellant, Ronald B. Finch, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated rape. As a result of these convictions, Finch was sentenced to concurrent thirty-year sentences in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Finch raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions and (2) whether the sentences imposed were excessive. After review of the record, we find no error. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.