APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pursuant to Rule 9, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, both the defendant and the State were granted appeals from an interlocutory order of the trial court granting in part, and denying in part, Defendant's motion to exclude Rule 404(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence, testimony. After a careful review of the evidence, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's order.

The defendant was convicted of DUI, second offense. He contends that 1) the evidence was insufficient, 2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on reasonable doubt, 3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the inference from refusal to submit to a chemical test, and 4) the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion to strike the enhancement count. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. However, I question whether a “reasonable certainty” equates to a “moral certainty” relative to the definition of reasonable doubt in Tennessee. Also, I believe that trial courts in this state should not be using varying definitions of reasonable doubt.

This is an appeal by the petitioner from the denial of his post-conviction relief petition. The petitioner was originally convicted of especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to 60 years at 100% service. After careful review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Appellant Dennis Ray Jones was convicted in the Henry County Circuit Court of manufacturing methamphetamine and was sentenced to three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant Pamela Kay Barker was convicted of criminal responsibility for facilitating the manufacturing of methamphetamine and was sentenced to two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellants raise numerous issues, including the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, the sufficiency of the evidence, and sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for a correction of Appellant Barker’s judgment of conviction.

Defendant, Michael David Totty, was indicted on one count of burglary of a building other than a habitation, a Class D felony, and one count of theft of property over $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of a burglary other than a habitation on count one and guilty on count two, theft of property. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III persistent offender to ten years on the theft conviction and six years on Defendant’s conviction of facilitation of a burglary. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences to run concurrently for an effective sentence of ten years. Defendant does not appeal his sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court’s denial of his motion for a continuance prevented Defendant from securing a material witness for trial and denied his counsel an adequate opportunity to evaluate Defendant’s competency to stand trial. Defendant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Robert E. Allen, pled guilty to aggravated assault, three counts of domestic assault, vandalism, evading arrest, public intoxication and reckless burning. The trial court sentenced him to five years in prison for the aggravated assault and eleven months and twenty-nine days on each of the other charges, with the sentences to run concurrently. The Petitioner did not perfect an appeal of his sentence, but petitioned for post-conviction relief on the grounds that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing on the post-conviction petition, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel for the following reasons: (1) trial counsel failed to properly advise him as to the potential sentences for all the charges covered in the plea agreement; and (2) trial counsel failed to advise him of his right to appeal the sentence imposed by the trial court. Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition.

A Fayette County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Jerome Taylor, of possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of more than 0.5 ounces of marijuana with intent to deliver, and felony possession of a handgun. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eighteen years for cocaine possession, three years for marijuana possession, and three years for felony possession of a handgun. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) that insufficient evidence exists in the record to support his convictions; and (2) that his sentence is excessive. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal arises out of a complaint filed by the Appellant, Samuel Timothy Collins, against the
Appellee, NBC Bank, for damages he allegedly incurred as a consequence of his erroneous arrest and incarceration by the Knox County Sheriff’s Department. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the Defendant in a medical malpractice action. The trial court awarded summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. We affirm.
 

I concur in the result reached by the majority. I do so because I believe the record before us
reflects undisputed material facts that negate an essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of action, i.e., the element of “proximate causation” of the appellant’s damages. I do agree with the appellant that there remains a genuine issue of material fact for the trier of fact as to the element of “cause in fact.” I believe a jury could reasonably find that there is a “cause and effect relationship between the defendant’s tortious conduct and the plaintiff’s injury or loss.” White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W. 2d 525, 529 (Tenn. 1998). As the Supreme Court has pointed out, “cause in fact” addresses the “‘but for’ consequences of an act.” Id. However, in my judgment, the conduct of the Sheriff’s Office, once the deputies arrived at the bank and thereafter took the appellant into custody, conclusively militates against a finding of proximate causation tying the bank’s conduct to the appellant’s damages.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner fails to assert a ground of relief entitling him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal is from a will contest. The trial court entered judgment according to the terms of a settlement agreement between the parties. Appellants contend they withdrew their agreement to the settlement before approval of the agreement by the trial court. They accordingly submit the agreement is not enforceable. We affirm judgment of the trial court enforcing the terms of the settlement agreement.

This is an employment tax case. The State of Tennessee appeals the determination of the Tennessee Claims Commission that Crew One Productions is not liable for Tennessee employment tax by virtue of a federal safe harbor provision known as section 530. We reverse, holding Tennessee is not bound by the federal safe harbor provision.

Father filed a petition for an initial determination of custody against the Mother. Father alleged that he was the fit and proper person for the custody of the child. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the juvenile court entered a judgment and permanent parenting plan which found that the Mother was more comparatively fit to continue serving as the primary residential caregiver. Father appeals the trial court’s judgment. We affirm.
 

Mark Edward Igou ("Husband") sued Dinah Carol Igou ("Wife) for a divorce. After trial, the Trial Court awarded Wife alimony only to the extent of requiring Husband to "pay all cost of tuition, books, fees, and other charges relating to [Wife's] obtaining a master's degree whether it's in education or any other related field which will increase her compensation" with the restrictions that Wife must complete the course of study within five years from the entry of the Trial Court's order and that Wife must achieve passing grades. Wife appeals the Trial Court's judgment as to alimony and attorney fees. We affirm.

The Petitioner was discharged from her executive position as Director of the Lenoir City Housing Authority for misconduct connected with her employment. The Authority was awarded McKinney Act funds, an audit of which revealed that $156,000.00 of these funds were inappropriately expended, which led to the discharge of the Petitioner.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to consider whether the Sixth Amendment entitles the defendant to participate, through counsel, in the determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant to seize a sample of the defendant's blood. Because we find that the defendant has no such entitlement, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Plaintiff was an at-will employee of the Defendant when he was terminated for an asserted cause. In this action he alleges that he was wrongfully terminated because the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Handbook afforded him a contractual right of peer review. The motion of the Defendants for summary judgment was granted upon a finding that the Handbook was not an employment contract. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a medical malpractice action. The trial court awarded Defendant Luis A.
Fiallo, M.D., summary judgment based on the statute of limitations and statute of repose. We
affirm.
 

The defendant pled guilty to two counts of attempted second degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed two consecutive ten-year sentences. The defendant contends on appeal the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a boundary-line case. The Defendant's survey evidence was excluded, and reputation evidence offered by the Plaintiff as to the common boundary line was admitted. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

Defendant, Cecil Moss, appeals from the trial court's order revoking his probation and reinstating his original sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider any alternative sentencing options other than incarceration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of robbery under a theory of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another. The defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. We conclude a reasonable jury could have inferred the defendant's intent to assist in the robbery based upon his contemporaneous assault on the victim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.