APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Convicted in 1990 of first-degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, the petitioner, Tommy Joe Walker, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, through which he claimed that ineffective assistance of trial counsel fouled his convictions. Because the record supports the denial of post-conviction relief, we affirm.

The Appellant, Samuel Pegues, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pegues was convicted of second degree murder and received a sentence of twenty-one and one-half years. On appeal, the single issue presented for our review is whether Pegues was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

A jury found the defendant guilty of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The two first degree murder convictions merged, and the jury sentenced the defendant to life without the possibility of parole. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty-four years for especially aggravated robbery, to run concurrently with his previous sentence for abuse of a corpse. The defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress an incriminating statement he made on December 2, 1998, that the jury charge regarding criminal responsibility was in error and that his sentencing was erroneous. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Harold Russell Gregory, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as forty-five days, day for day, in the county jail and the remainder to be served on probation. In addition, the trial court suspended the defendant's driving privileges for two years, ordered that he participate in an alcohol evaluation and treatment program, and imposed a six hundred dollar fine. The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress evidence that was obtained pursuant to an illegal stop; (3) that his request for an attorney was not an express refusal to take a breathalyzer test; and (4) that the trial court erred by refusing to allow a defense witness to testify. We affirm the trial court's actions.

The Appellant, Brenda F. Jones, was indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury for the offenses of vehicular homicide and driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI). Following a jury trial, the Appellant was convicted of DUI but acquitted of vehicular homicide. For the DUI conviction, the trial court sentenced Jones to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with sixty days confinement. On appeal, Jones argues that a term of sixty days confinement is excessive because (1) the trial court's sentence reflects consideration of conduct for which Jones was exonerated, and (2) the trial court improperly applied enhancement factors and failed to apply relevant mitigating factors. After review of the record, we find merit to both issues. Accordingly, we modify Jones' sentence to eleven months, twenty-nine days with service of twenty days confinement.

The defendant, Melvin Cofer, was convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide, see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-213, -218, and vehicular assault, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-106. The trial court imposed Range I, concurrent sentences of twenty-one years and three years, respectively. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the results of the blood alcohol test; (2) that the trial court erred by limiting defense counsel's questioning of potential jurors; (3) that the evidence is insufficient to support the aggravated vehicular homicide conviction; (4) that the trial court erred by refusing to qualify a defense witness as an expert; (5) that the state failed to establish a proper chain of custody prior to the admission of the results of the blood alcohol test; and (6) that the trial court erred by denying his request for special jury instructions. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Antonio Huntsman, was convicted of reckless homicide and the trial court ordered a sentence of three years and six months. In this appeal of right, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial court erroneously limited cross-examination of an eyewitness; (2) that the trial court allowed the admission of irrelevant evidence; (3) that the sentence was excessive; and (4) that he was erroneously denied some form of alternative sentencing. The judgment is affirmed.

After a bench trial, the Defendant, Janice Hall, was convicted of two counts of vandalism under five hundred dollars, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial judge sentenced her to concurrent terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with thirty-five days to serve in confinement. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial judge erred by ordering her to serve thirty-five days in confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, James Russell Gann, petitioned for habeas corpus relief on the grounds that his judgment of conviction is not signed by the trial judge. The trial court denied relief and this direct appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Tyrone Cunningham, appeals from his conviction by a Lauderdale County Circuit Court jury of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him as a career, violent offender to the maximum sentence of sixty years. The defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his second degree murder conviction, (2) the trial court erroneously denied his pretrial motion for a continuance, and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing him as a career offender. We affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.

The Petitioner and his co-defendant were convicted of aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping. The Petitioner appealed, and our Court affirmed the convictions. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the trial court denied. Our Court affirmed the denial, concluding that the Petitioner had received effective assistance of counsel. The Petitioner then filed a post-conviction petition requesting DNA (deoxyribonucleic) testing pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. After the State responded that no biological evidence was in existence to be tested, the Petitioner requested that the court appoint him new counsel. The trial court denied both the Petitioner's post-conviction petition for DNA testing and his request for new counsel. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his post-conviction petition for DNA testing and by denying his request for new counsel. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Franklin County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant and Susan Davis, the co-defendant, for one count of aggravated robbery and for one count of theft of property valued between five hundred and one thousand dollars. A jury convicted the Defendant and co-defendant on both counts. The Defendant now appeals, contesting the sufficiency of the State's evidence. Specifically, the Defendant contends that the State did not introduce sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant entered the home of the alleged victims. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was tried on two counts of first degree premeditated murder and convicted of two counts of facilitation of first degree murder for which he received consecutive twenty-four-year sentences. In his appeal, he presents the following claims: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in excluding evidence of others having motives to kill the victims; (3) the State made an improper statement during its closing argument that constituted plain error; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Edward Lee Tucker, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder due to the invalidity of the plea. The trial court found that the motion should be considered as a petition for post-conviction relief and dismissed the petition as barred by the statute of limitations. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Doyle Borders, pled guilty to possession of Dilaudid, a Schedule II controlled substance, with the intent to sell or deliver. As part of his plea agreement, he expressly reserved with the consent of the trial court and the State the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The certified question of law concerns the validity of a search warrant. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Scott Dwayne Martin, appeals from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. In this appeal of right, the petitioner contends that because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, his guilty pleas were neither knowingly nor voluntarily made. The judgment is affirmed.