APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's revocation of his probation. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentences in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Rhea Jackson, was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary, robbery, misdemeanor theft, attempted rape, aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of rape. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of thirty-four years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises eight issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting certain testimony concerning fingerprints; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony about the victim's response to a photographic line-up; (4) whether the Defendant was entitled to a mistrial due to statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument; (5) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions; (6) whether the conviction for aggravated kidnapping violates due process under State v. Anthony; (7) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury concerning lesser-included offenses; and (8) whether the Defendant's sentences are excessive. Because the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury on all of the lesser-included offenses of the indicted offenses of robbery and aggravated rape, we reverse and remand for retrial the Defendant's convictions of robbery and rape. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Connie Parsons, pled guilty to two counts of criminal responsibility for facilitation of rape of a child and was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On September 17, 2001, the petitioner filed pro se in the Davidson County Circuit Court a petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that the trial court impermissibly interfered in the plea negotiations and, thus, her convictions were void. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, Consuela P. Carter, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court's denial of full probation for her conviction for possessing with intent to sell less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony. She was sentenced to five years, with probation after serving nine months. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Buren E. Laney, convicted on his guilty plea to the offense of violation of an habitual traffic offender order, appeals from the lower court's imposition of a six-year incarcerative sentence. Because we disagree with Laney, a career offender, that the sentence imposed was improper, we affirm.

The defendant, Johnnie C. Weems, pled nolo contendere to three separate counts of Class C felony vehicular homicide, was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to five years on each count to run concurrently, and was denied alternative sentencing. On appeal, he contends the sentences are excessive and the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Lauderdale County jury convicted the defendant, Michael Lewis, of reckless aggravated assault. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the trial court erred in conducting an ex parte hearing outside the presence of the defendant and his attorney; (3) the trial court erred in permitting a witness to testify to statements made by the co-defendant; (4) the trial court erred in refusing to admit into evidence a letter allegedly written by the victim; and (5) the trial court erred in permitting the defendant to represent himself. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Isaac Milholen, was convicted in 1997 of rape of a child and incest and sentenced to twenty-three years and eight years, respectively. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed his petition because he had brought an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his direct appeal, and he now appeals that dismissal. We affirm the order of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

The defendant challenges the revocation of his probation by the Sumner County Criminal Court. We affirm.

The defendant was convicted of violation of an habitual motor vehicle offender order, a Class E felony, and sentenced to two years as a Range I, standard offender in the Department of Correction. He argues on appeal that the trial court improperly set his sentence at the maximum by failing to give adequate weight to applicable mitigating factors and erred in denying his request for full probation or other alternative sentencing. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Homer Frank Beavers, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of assault. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a standard Range I offender to a total effective sentence of five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court denied the appellant's request for probation and the appellant appealed to this court. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Boyd L. Jones, III, pled guilty to possession of marijuana. As part of his plea agreement, he expressly reserved with the consent of the trial court and the State the right to appeal three related certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The certified questions of law stem from the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress. The central issue in this appeal is whether law enforcement officers violated the Defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when they entered his residence without a search warrant and detained him until they obtained written consent to search from the lessee of the residence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The post-conviction court granted each of the petitioners post-conviction relief on the grounds that the state had violated the requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose an exculpatory FBI laboratory report and an exculpatory witness statement. In this appeal of right, the state contends (1) that Harper's petition is barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (2) that the trial court erred by permitting the petitioners to amend their petitions and allege new grounds after a remand from this court; (3) that the trial court erred by determining that the state suppressed the FBI laboratory reports and a witness statement; and (4) that Hutchison received the effective assistance of counsel at trial, an alternative ground for relief asserted by Hutchison. In response to the state's appeal, the petitioners assert that the trial court erred by excluding from evidence the affidavit of a juror which would demonstrate that the FBI lab reports would have created reasonable doubt. The judgment is affirmed.

In a four-count indictment, Defendant, Wallace Jones, was charged with statutory rape, sexual battery, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and exhibition of material harmful to a minor. He applied for pre-trial diversion, which the district attorney general declined to grant. Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Defendant's request to be placed on pre-trial diversion. Defendant filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which was granted by the trial court and this court. On appeal, the State concedes that the district attorney abused his discretion and that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and this case remanded to the district attorney general to properly consider all facts pursuant to State v. Bell, 69 S.W.3d 171 (Tenn. 2002). We agree. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded to the district attorney general to consider and weigh all relevant factors to the pre-trial diversion determination. Furthermore, we conclude that the trial judge should be recused from further proceedings in this matter.

The appellant, Rachel N. Bennett, pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to eighteen felony offenses. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of nine years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contests the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Christopher A. Davis, was found guilty by a jury of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. The jury sentenced the Appellant to death for each of the first degree murder convictions. The Appellant presents the following issues in this appeal as of right: (1) The trial court erred by not granting the Appellant's motion to disqualify the Davidson County District Attorney General's office from prosecuting the case; (2) the trial court erred by not granting the Appellant's motion to prohibit the State from relying upon the Appellant's prior murder conviction as an aggravating circumstance, because the conviction was for a crime committed while the Appellant was a juvenile; (3) the trial court erred by not suppressing the statement the Appellant made to police; (4) the trial court erred by denying defense counsel's motion to be allowed to withdraw from representing the Appellant; (5) the trial court erred by granting the State's motion to require the Appellant to supply the State information concerning mental health expert testimony to be presented during the sentencing phase of the trial; (6) the trial court erred by allowing a physician who did not perform the autopsy to testify concerning the autopsy and evidence obtained in connection therewith; (7) the trial court erred in allowing victim impact evidence to be introduced; (8) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (9) that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the jury's finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; (10) that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a finding that the aggravating factors were established beyond a reasonable doubt; (11) that Tennessee's death penalty statutory scheme is unconstitutional in several instances; (12) that the trial court erred in allowing certain cross-examination of defense witnesses; and (13) that the cumulative effect of errors made at trial denied the Appellant a fair trial in violation of his due process rights. Based on our review of the record on appeal, we affirm both the Appellant's convictions and the sentences imposed.

The Appellant, Robert Dallis Payne, appeals the order of the Hickman County Circuit Court summarily dismissing his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. Upon review of the record before this Court, we conclude that the Appellant has failed to perfect his application for permission to appeal in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions and, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed.

The appellant, Robert Johnson, was found guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court of forgery and was sentenced to six years incarceration. On appeal, the appellant contests evidentiary rulings of the trial court and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Concluding that the appellant's arguments have no merit, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.