APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Derick Bailey, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of one count of felony murder and one count of premeditated first degree murder. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdicts. Although we conclude that the evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction for premeditated murder, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of felony murder. Accordingly, we affirm the appellant's conviction for first degree felony murder.

On September 3, 1999, a Fentress County jury convicted the Defendant of four counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony; five counts of rape, a Class B felony; and thirteen counts of incest, a Class C felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty years. The Defendant now appeals arguing that ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, along with newly discovered evidence, prejudiced the Defendant to the point of depriving him of a fair trial with a reliable result. After a review of the record, we conclude that the Defendant was denied due process through ineffective assistance of counsel. We therefore reverse the Defendant's convictions and remand this case to the Fentress County Circuit Court for a new trial.

The defendant, Brian Antione Starks, was convicted, by jury, of first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and eleven years as a Range I, standard offender for the robbery conviction, to be served consecutively to the life sentence. The defendant timely appealed, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the testimony of his accomplices was not sufficiently corroborated. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 2.

The Appellant, Author R. Turner, appeals the order of the Davidson County Criminal Court summarily dismissing his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In 1995, the Appellant pled guilty to aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnaping, and two counts of aggravated rape.  As a result of these convictions, he was sentenced to forty years imprisonment. In April 1996, the Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging as grounds ineffective assistance of counsel and improper imposition of consecutive sentences. This petition was dismissed, and this court affirmed the dismissal on appeal. Arthur R. Turner¹ v. State, No. 01C01-9707-CR-00274 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Sept. 23, 1998), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1999). On January 7, 2002, the Appellant filed a second petition for post-conviction relief, which is the subject of this appeal, again alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was involuntary because “. . . the State caused him to be influence (sic) by four mind-altering drugs.”

The defendant, Robert J. Williams, pled guilty in the Henry County Circuit Court to one count of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and two counts of selling less than one half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony. As a Range I, standard offender, he received one eight-year sentence and two three-year sentences to be served concurrently as one year in confinement and the remainder in a community corrections program. The defendant appeals, claiming that his sentences are excessive. We affirm the defendant’s sentences, but we remand the case for entry of corrected judgments.

The defendant, Sandra Lynn Baumgartner, appeals the mandatory outpatient treatment (MOT) plan imposed by the Shelby County Criminal Court following her acquittal of first degree murder due to her insanity at the time of the crime. She contends that the trial court erroneously required mandatory outpatient treatment because the evidence does not show that her mental condition is likely to deteriorate rapidly, making it substantially likely that she would cause serious harm. She also argues that the MOT plan imposed by the trial court is contrary to the medical proof, punitive, oppressive, and impossible to perform. We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the MOT plan’s requirements that the defendant live in a supervised residential facility and have someone supervise the administration of her medicine. We affirm the MOT plan as modified to exclude these requirements and remand the case for the trial court to reinstate the original condition that the defendant reside with her parents in their home.

The Defendant, Rodney Dimitri Caples, was originally indicted for rape of a child. He subsequently entered a “best- interest” plea of guilty¹ to the lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery. He later filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel and that, as a result, his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied his petition. This appeal followed.

The petitioner, Mark A. Mitchell, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition, which sought post-conviction relief and post-conviction DNA analysis. The single issue presented for review is whether the petition was properly dismissed. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Cecil Eugene Brannan, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to three counts of vehicular assault and one count of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense. The plea agreement stipulated that the petitioner would receive a total effective sentence of eight years incarceration. The petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that trial counsel failed to advise him that his plea agreement violated double jeopardy principles. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant was found guilty by a jury of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to life plus twelve years, respectfully, in the Department of Correction. The defendant contends that he was mentally incompetent to stand trial or to give a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights and that his sentences were in error. We affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The defendant, Kristina Dawn Catron, pleaded guilty to one count of fabricating evidence, one count of making a false report, and one count of misdemeanor theft under $500. The negotiated plea agreement produced an effective sentence of three years. The manner of service of the sentence was to be determined by the trial court. Following a presentence investigation and a sentence hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve the sentence in confinement. It is from this sentencing determination that the defendant appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court based on the need to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense.

The Appellant, James L. Feenin, proceeding pro se, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Feenin is currently a Department of Correction inmate at the South Central Correctional Facility in Wayne County, where he is serving an effective nineteen-year sentence. On appeal, Feenin argues that his incarceration stems from a void indictment. Specifically, he contends that two counts of the indictment, to which he pled guilty, were not signed by the district attorney general. Finding this argument without merit, the judgment of the Wayne County Circuit Court is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and setting fire to personal property. The defendant received an effective sentence of nine years. The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for attempted second degree murder. We affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The petitioner, Willie Tom Ensley, appeals the trial court's denial of his post-conviction petition requesting DNA analysis. The issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred by summarily dismissing the petition without the appointment of counsel, an opportunity to amend, or an evidentiary hearing. The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

The defendant, William Rhea Jackson, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to aggravated assault and aggravated burglary, Class C felonies, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive sentences of six and five years, respectively. The trial court also ordered that the defendant serve his effective eleven-year sentence consecutive to an effective thirty-four-year sentence that he received for offenses committed five days before the current crimes. He appeals, claiming that his sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the defendant, Pharez Price, of facilitation of felony murder, facilitation of attempted first degree murder, facilitation of attempted second degree murder, facilitation of attempted especially aggravated robbery, and criminal responsibility for the conduct of another for felony reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty-three years. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) the trial court improperly found a child witness competent to testify, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for any of the offenses other than felony reckless endangerment. We reverse and dismiss the convictions for facilitation of attempted first degree murder and facilitation of attempted second degree murder, affirm the other convictions, and remand for a determination of concurrent/consecutive sentencing.

In this appeal the appellant, Louis Tyrone Robinson, complains that the Davidson County Criminal Court erroneously dismissed his petition for the writ of habeas corpus without affording the appellant a hearing on the petition. After reviewing the record in this matter we are of the opinion that the criminal court was correct in its summary dismissal of the petition and we therefore affirm the action of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The defendant, Kenneth Lee England, was convicted by a Campbell County Criminal Court jury of retaliation for past action, a Class E felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a career offender to six years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient and that the trial court erred by allowing the state to impeach him with his prior retaliation for past action convictions under Tenn. R. Evid. 609. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mohamed F. Ali, appeals from the judgment of the Washington County Criminal Court denying him post-conviction relief from his convictions for rape and attempted bribery. He is serving an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Department of Correction. The petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in (1) applying incorrect law governing judicial bias, (2) finding that the convicting trial judge was not biased against him, (3) excluding evidence of judicial bias, (4) refusing the petitioner's discovery requests regarding the issue of bias, and (5) denying the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the post-conviction court.

The defendant appeals his convictions of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. He received a life sentence for the first degree felony murder conviction and an additional twenty-one year sentence for his especially aggravated robbery conviction. The defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. The defendant also argues his twenty-one- year sentence for especially aggravated robbery is excessive. The defendant alleges the trial court misapplied enhancement factors (1), (8), (13), and (16) and erred in finding him a dangerous offender to support its consecutive sentence determination. We affirm the convictions, but remove the presumption of correctness due to the misapplication of four enhancement factors and remand for a new sentencing hearing on the especially aggravated robbery conviction only.