State of Tennessee v. Sandra Kay Webb and Tabitha Nicole Webb
W2001-00447-CCA-R3-CD
The defendants, Sandra Kay Webb and Tabitha Nicole Webb, were convicted of forty-seven counts of cruelty to animals and each was sentenced to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each count, with incarceration for sixty days and a prohibition from either owning animals for ten years. In addition, the defendants were ordered to pay $39,978.85 in restitution to the Jackson-Madison County Humane Society and to perform fifty hours of community service work, and each defendant was fined a total of $5000. Soon afterwards, the trial court found that each had possessed animals since their convictions and revoked their community corrections sentences. On appeal, the defendants argue that their convictions should be reversed because the search warrant affidavit was defective, as was its execution; the affiant was untruthful in the affidavit; the animal cruelty statute is unconstitutionally vague; animal shelter records, utilized by the State during the trial, were hearsay and should not have been allowed; the evidence was insufficient, failing to prove either that the defendants acted knowingly or intentionally or failed to provide necessary care; the humane society was not entitled to restitution; the defendants should not have been required to serve their sentences in incarceration or prohibited for ten years from possessing animals; their community corrections sentences should not have been revoked; and the court should not have ordered that their dogs be forfeited. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court as to forty-seven of the counts, but remand for entry of a corrected judgment to show that the defendants were acquitted of Count 8 and for an evidentiary hearing as to the payment of restitution.
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Originating Judge:Judge Roger A. Page |
Madison County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/24/03 | |
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Originating Judge:Donald H. Allen |
Madison County | Supreme Court | 06/24/03 | |
Ronnie Jones vs. George Stokely
E2002-01593-COA-R3-CV
This is a boundary line dispute. The plaintiffs, Ronnie A. Jones and his wife, Vonda H. Jones ("the Jones"), appeal the trial court's finding that the property line they share with their neighbors, the defendants George Stokely and his wife, Sheila Y. Stokely ("the Stokelys"), is as alleged in the Stokelys' counterclaim. The Jones contend: (1) that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's determination of the location of the boundary line; (2) that the trial court committed reversible error when it admitted into evidence, as ancient records, certain maps and documents; and (3) that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to grant the Jones a new trial based upon "newly discovered" evidence. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Telford E. Forgerty, Jr. |
Cocke County | Court of Appeals | 06/24/03 | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael E. Bikrev
M2001-02910-CCA-R3-CD
The Defendant was charged with and convicted of burglary. The trial court sentenced him to three years' incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and (2) that the State did not establish a proper chain of custody concerning the stolen property in this case. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that legally sufficient evidence was presented at the Defendant's trial to support his conviction and thus that the trial court did not err by denying the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. We also conclude that a proper chain of evidence was established for the recovered property in this case and thus that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the property into evidence. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Originating Judge:Judge Seth W. Norman |
Davidson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/24/03 | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus J. Turco
W2001-01085-SC-R11-CD
The parties have addressed several issues in this case, each of which concerns the trial court's authority to grant relief pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, which articulates the procedure for correcting or reducing a sentence. Only one, however is dispositive: whether the trial court can, after adjudicating guilt, imposing sentence, and entering judgment, grant judicial diversion as Rule 35(b) relief. This issue is one of first impression in this state. After careful examination of the record and due consideration of applicable authority, we conclude that there is no statutory authority for permitting judicial diversion after an adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence. Therefore, judicial diversion was erroneously granted. Because our ruling on this issue is dispositive of this cause, we need not address other issues presented by the parties.
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Judge John P. Colton, Jr. |
Shelby County | Supreme Court | 06/24/03 | |
State of Tennessee v. Jackie Leonard Durham and Gary Lee Raines, alias Gary L. Rains
E2001-01509-CCA-R3-CD
The defendants, Jackie Leonard Durham and Gary Lee Raines, alias Gary L. Rains, appeal as of right their convictions by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury for second degree murder, a Class A felony. Durham received an agreed twenty-five-year sentence as a violent offender, and Raines received an agreed twenty-year sentence as a violent offender. Both defendants contend that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support their second degree murder convictions and (2) prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument requires a new trial. Additionally, Raines contends that (3) the trial court committed plain error by not instructing the jury on voluntary intoxication. We affirm the trial court's judgments of conviction.
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Originating Judge:Judge Stephen M. Bevil |
Hamilton County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/24/03 | |
Shirley K. Hensley v. England/Corsair Upholstery
E2002-01763-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded 5 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed insisting the expert medical testimony is not sufficient to support the award. The judgment is affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court is Affirmed. THAYER, SP. J., in which ANDERSON, J., and, BYERS, SR., J., joined. J. Steven Collins, of Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellants, England/Corsair Upholstery Manufacturing Company, Inc., and Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance. Edwin A. Anderson, of Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee, Shirley K. Hensley. MEMORANDUM OPINION The trial court awarded the employee, Shirley K. Hensley, 5 percent permanent partial disability as a result of sustaining an occupational disease. The employer and insurance carrier have appealed insisting the evidence is not sufficient to support the award. Facts The employee had been working as a seamstress or sewing operator for about thirty years. At the time of the trial, she was fifty-five years of age and had completed the ninth grade in school. In August 1993 she started working for the defendant furniture manufacturing company. She testified she worked with fabric material most of the time and that in handling fabric, her hands became very dry. She and other sewing operators kept lotion for use on their dry hands. She said that about one year prior to stopping work in November 1998, she began to work with leather. Her hands started swelling and cracking. It got so bad that they would bleed. She stated the green dye would actually rub off on her hands and she tried wrapping her hands with gauze and masking tape. Sometime later, she testified her "feet broke open." She worked with leather for about a year before going to the doctor. She eventually saw Dr. Ellis who treated her for several years. He recommended she see Dr. Alexander, a dermatologist. She stated she went to see him and his treatment was the same as Dr. Ellis and more expensive so she quit going to Dr. Alexander and returned for treatment with Dr. Ellis. After being off from work for about six months, she was terminated. The employee testified she had tried to find work with Wal-Mart as a greeter but when they saw the condition of her hands and asked what had caused the problem, Wal-Mart officials advised her they did not have a job available. She said her hands and feet have healed to some extent but she has not found any employment. Dr. Roy C. Ellis, a family physician, testified by deposition, and said he first saw Ms. Hensley on August 22, 1998 and she had severe hand dermatitis; that he prescribed several medications; she returned to work on September 8; she came back to see him on September 28 showing signs of severe rash and allergic dermatitis which he felt was definitely due to the fabric, either leather or vinyl, or both. He stated that over a period of time when she was off work, she would get better and when she returned to work, she got worse. He opined her "work conditions led up to and caused the allergic dermatitis." The doctor stated the medical impairment would fall into class three in the range of 25 to 54 percent and he gave her a 5 percent impairment. Dr. Jay Hammett, a family practice physician testifying by deposition, performed an independent medical examination on October 8, 1999 and examined the records of several other doctors. He learned she was also being treated for a thyroid condition and hypertension and thought her problems could be related to her medications for these problems. He said he thought the opinion of Dr. Ellis on causation was speculation since a skin biopsy or patch test had not been conducted. He was of the opinion she could resume her sewing work. Also, if her work conditions did cause her problems, he felt her impairment would be in the class two range of 1 to 24 percent and he fixed her impairment rating at 2 percent. Defendant's plant manager and company nurse both testified Ms. Hensley told them during July 1998 her problem was not work-related. However, these conversations were prior to the August 1998 visit to Dr. Ellis. The plant nurse admitted that during November 1998 she advised her doctor had said her condition was work-related. The nurse also testified no other employee had complained of the same problem. -2-
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Originating Judge:Hon. Billy Joe White, Chancellor |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/24/03 | |
State of Tennessee v. Christina B. Jones
M2002-02428-CCA-R3-CD
Defendant, Christina B. Jones, pled guilty to the offense of theft of property over $1,000, a Class D felony. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant received a sentence of two years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve ninety days in confinement and four years on probation. The trial court also ordered Defendant to complete her GED, obtain full-time employment, and pay restitution in the amount of $1,750 to be paid at the rate of fifty dollars per month. In this appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying her request for alternative sentencing and by imposing the same sentence that her co-defendant received. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Originating Judge:Judge Donald P. Harris |
Williamson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/23/03 | |
State of Tennessee v. Christina B. Jones - Dissenting
M2002-02428-CCA-R3-CD
I respectfully disagree with some of the reasoning and the result reached in the majority opinion. I do not believe that the state overcame the presumption that the defendant is a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing. I would hold that she is entitled to a sentence that does not involve time confined in jail. In this respect, I disagree with the view in the majority opinion as to what constitutes an alternative sentence.
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Originating Judge:Judge Donald P. Harris |
Williamson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/23/03 | |
Heather Carey v. Margaret R. Johnson
M2002-00911-COA-R3-CV
An employee of a utility company went to the private residence of a customer to re-connect service which had been disconnected for non-payment where she was violently attacked by the customer who hit her in the jaw with a flashlight, beat her with car keys and threatened to kill her by throwing her off of the mountain and, thereafter, show her dead carcass to her children. The utility employee sued the customer for personal injuries, infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. The trial court granted judgment by default as to liability against the defendant for the defendant's repeated failure to attend her discovery deposition. The trial on damages was conducted without a jury. The trial court awarded compensatory damages and punitive damages. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank Clement, Jr.
Originating Judge:Thomas W. Graham |
Marion County | Court of Appeals | 06/23/03 | |
State of Tennessee v. Marian Esther Cox
E2002-01177-CCA-R3-CD
The Defendant entered a "best interest" guilty plea to arson, a Class C felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to a split confinement sentence of four years, with one year to be served in the Bledsoe County jail and the remainder to be served on probation. The Defendant now challenges the propriety of the sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Originating Judge:Judge Thomas W. Graham |
Bledsoe County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/23/03 | |
Phyllis Patrice Braden v. Nissan North America, Inc.,
M2002-01173-WC-R3-CV
In this case, the employee sustained an elbow injury caused by her repetitive work activities. The trial court found that the employee had suffered a 1% vocational disability to her right arm. In her appeal, the employee argues that the evidence preponderates against a finding of 1% and that the judgment in this matter should be increased to adequately compensate the plaintiff for her loss of employment opportunity. For the reasons stated in this opinion, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: James L. Weatherford, Sr.J.
Originating Judge:Robert E. Corlew, III, Chancellor |
Rutherford County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/23/03 | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Paxton
W2002-00268-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant, Ronald Paxton, was convicted of second degree murder. The trial court imposed a twenty-five year sentence. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the sentence is excessive. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Originating Judge:Judge Joseph B. Dailey |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/20/03 | |
Jennifer Burnett vs. Christopher Burnett
E2002-01614-COA-R3-CV
Jennifer Chante Burnett ("Mother") filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce seeking a divorce from Christopher John Burnett ("Father") and requesting to be designated as the primary residential parent of the parties' minor daughter. Father filed an answer and counterclaim wherein he also sought a divorce and to be the primary residential parent. After a trial, the Trial Court determined it was in the best interests of the minor child for Father to be the primary residential parent, and entered judgment accordingly. Mother appeals, claiming the Trial Court failed to consider all relevant factors when making its custody determination and that the Trial Court's conclusion with regard to custody was intended to punish Mother and reward Father. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Originating Judge:Bill Swann |
Knox County | Court of Appeals | 06/20/03 | |
David Hill vs. Herbert Moncier
E2003-00075-COA-R3-CV
David T. Hill sued Herbert S. Moncier and David S. Wigler ("the Attorneys"), both of whom are attorneys engaged in the practice of law in Knoxville, alleging legal malpractice. According to Hill, the Attorneys represented him in federal court in connection with "criminal charges and criminal and civil forfeitures." He was convicted of conspiracy, conducting an illegal gambling operation, and money laundering, fined $25,000, and received concurrent sentences of 57 months. Forfeiture of property was ordered by the district court. In the instant case, Hill seeks to recover damages allegedly caused by the Attorneys' malpractice. The Attorneys moved for dismissal on two grounds, i.e., (1) the failure of Hill to obtain post-conviction relief, and (2) the bar of the statute of limitations. The trial court dismissed the complaint without reciting its basis for doing so. Hill appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Dale C. Workman |
Knox County | Court of Appeals | 06/20/03 | |
Karen Chelton v. Provident Companies, Inc.,
E2002-2282-COA-R3-CV
Originating Judge:W. Frank Brown, III |
Hamilton County | Court of Appeals | 06/19/03 | |
Jerry Lay v. Scott County Sheriff's Dept
E2002-01731-SC-R3-CV
The primary issue in this workers' compensation appeal is whether the attainment of maximum medical improvement is a necessary factor in determining whether there has been a meaningful return to work under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241. The trial court found that since the pre-injury employer returned the employee to work at a lower wage than his pre-injury wage, Section 50-6-241(a)(1) did not apply, and the trial court set the employee's permanent partial disability award based on 60% to the body as a whole, approximately 4.6 times the employee's 13% impairment rating. We reverse the trial court and find that where an employee has had a meaningful return to work for five months, resigns for reasons unrelated to his injury, and then returns to the same employer a year later at a lower wage, the employee may not take advantage of this statute by arguing that he has not had a meaningful return to work. Thus, Section 50-6-241(a)(1) applies to limit the employee's recovery to two and one-half times his impairment rating, and the employee's award is modified to 32.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole.
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Originating Judge:Billy Joe White |
Scott County | Supreme Court | 06/19/03 | |
In the Matter of: H.E.J and H.E.J
M2002-00539-COA-R3-JV
The trial court terminated the parental rights of a father of twins on multiple grounds, including abandonment and the commission of severe child abuse against the twin's mother while she was a minor child residing in his home. The court also ordered him to pay $14,400 in child support arrearages. We affirm the termination, but we reverse the child support award.
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Originating Judge:Alfred L. Nations |
Williamson County | Court of Appeals | 06/19/03 | |
Kaila Williams Sanders, v. Tracie Traver, All Women's Care, Shelby Shivers, Maryville Anesthesiologists & Blount Memorial Hospital
E2001-02926-SC-R11-CV
In this wrongful death case brought under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, we address the issue of whether Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.01, which provides the computation of time for statutes of limitations, is applicable to actions involving governmental entities. Having determined that the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to actions involving governmental entities in Doyle v. Frost, 49 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Tenn. 2001), and finding that Rule 6.01 defines, rather than extends, the Governmental Tort Liability Act's statute of limitations, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that Rule 6.01 applies to actions brought under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Originating Judge:W. Dale Young |
Blount County | Supreme Court | 06/19/03 | |
Dianna Boarman v. George Jaynes
E2001-01049-SC-R11-CV
Dianna Boarman, the Clerk and Master for the Washington County Chancery Court, filed a complaint on September 30, 1998, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-20-101, et. seq., seeking a pay increase for the three chief deputy clerks working in her office. Boarman later filed a second and third complaint for fiscal years 1999-2000 and 2000-01. Defendant George Jaynes, the Washington County Executive, answered denying that salary increases were necessary to enable Boarman to properly and efficiently conduct the business of her office. Jaynes also filed a counterclaim seeking the elimination of one deputy clerk position in Boarman's office. Boarman's complaints were consolidated, and a hearing was conducted before Chancellor Thomas R. Frierson, II, sitting by interchange. The trial court approved salary increases for the three chief deputy clerks. It denied the defendant's counterclaim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the county executive's counterclaim, but reversed the trial court's judgment increasing the salaries of Boarman's three chief deputy clerks. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which reverses the trial court's judgment approving the position of deputy clerk and increase in compensation. We affirm the Court of Appeals' dismissal of defendant Jaynes counterclaim.
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Originating Judge:Thomas R. Frierson, II |
Washington County | Supreme Court | 06/19/03 | |
State of Tennessee v. Susan Sophia McDaniel
E2002-02469-CCA-R3-CD
In this direct appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict convicting her of theft over $1,000. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Originating Judge:Judge Leon C. Burns, Jr. |
Cumberland County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/19/03 | |
Jerry Lee Harbin vs. Chris Marie Harbin
E2002-01456-COA-R3-CV
Chris Marie Harbin appeals a judgment entered by the Circuit Court for Hamilton County which decreed that the parties were divorced, awarded custody of their three minor children to their father, Jerry Lee Harbin, affirmed a visitation plan proposed by Mr. Harbin, which she signed, and ordered Mr. Harbin to pay token alimony ($1.00 per month) to her. She appeals the judgment of the Court. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Originating Judge:W. Neil Thomas, III |
Hamilton County | Court of Appeals | 06/19/03 | |
State of Tennessee v. Susan Sophia McDaniel - Concurring
E2002-02469-CCA-R3-CD
I believe the issue raised in the footnote in Judge Riley’s opinion bears further elaboration in view of this court’s recent opinion in State v. Brigitte Pauli, No. M2002-01607-CCAR3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, June 5, 2003).
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Originating Judge:Judge Leon C. Burns, Jr. |
Cumberland County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/19/03 | |
State v. Michael Evans
E1997-00325-SC-R11-CD
We granted this appeal primarily to clarify the procedure that governs when a trial court or the Court of Criminal Appeals determines that a criminal defendant was unilaterally deprived of the right to seek second-tier review pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11. We conclude that Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, section (9)(D) has superseded the procedural framework of State v. Pinkston, 668 S.W.2d 676 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). However, the State has raised valid concerns about voids in the procedure, and as a result, we have filed contemporaneously with this opinion an order publishing for public comment a proposed amendment to Rule 28, section (9)(D). The amendment addresses the concerns raised by the State in this case, as well as other procedural issues likely to arise in the delayed appeal context. The Court solicits comments from all interested parties. Although the trial court's order granting a delayed appeal in this case contained inappropriate language purporting to "vacate[] and reinstate[]" the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, the trial court otherwise substantially complied with the procedure set forth in Rule 28, Section (9)(D). Therefore, the defendant's delayed application for permission to appeal was properly filed in this Court. This Court granted the application, and after reviewing the record and considering the issues raised, we conclude that none of the assigned errors warrant reversal. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Originating Judge:E. Eugene Eblen |
Roane County | Supreme Court | 06/19/03 | |
State of Tennessee v. Derek Paul Whytsell
E2002-00345-CCA-R3-CD
A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant of DUI and imposed a $500 fine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the penal farm, which was suspended after service of forty-eight hours. The trial court further ordered the Defendant to perform fifty days of community service, imposed a fine of $510, revoked his license for a year, and required him to attend DUI school. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Originating Judge:Judge Douglas A. Meyer |
Hamilton County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/18/03 |