APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal by the petitioner, Roy Lane, involves both a delayed appeal from his first degree murder conviction and an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. In the delayed appeal, the petitioner contends that the Cocke County Circuit Court (1) improperly admitted evidence about the petitioner's prior bad acts and (2) gave erroneous jury instructions. In the post-conviction appeal, the petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. As to the petitioner's delayed appeal, we conclude that the trial court did not err and affirm his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. As to his post-conviction petition, we affirm the trial court's finding that the petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel.

The appellants, Ronald Eugene Rickman and William Edward Groseclose, appeal their convictions by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of, respectively, first degree murder and being an accessory before the fact to first degree murder. In this appeal, appellant Groseclose presents the following issues for our consideration: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to sever his trial from that of co-defendant Rickman; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting at trial the former testimony of Barton Wayne Mount; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony by Gary King; and (4) whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilt. Appellant Rickman solely challenges the introduction at trial of Mount's former testimony. Following a careful review of the record and the parties' briefs, we remand this case to the trial court for correction of the judgments to reflect the appellants' receipt of credit for time served in the Tennessee Department of Correction prior to trial. We affirm the judgments in all other respects

The defendant, James D. Newland, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's revoking his probation that was ordered for his guilty plea to rape. The defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and sentencing him to confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to attempted aggravated sexual battery. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Defendant received a four-year sentence, with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve the four-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that he should have received some form of alternative sentencing. Concluding that the record supports the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Robbie Gene Powers, challenges his convictions for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense; driving on a revoked license, third offense; and violation of the implied consent law. The Appellant received an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with six months and five days of incarceration in the county jail. On appeal, the Appellant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside or declare void two prior DUI convictions, which were used for enhancement purposes; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) his sentences were excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the Obion County Circuit Court.

The defendant, Ted Ray Brannan, was found guilty by a Franklin County jury of aggravated burglary and theft of property. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twelve years, ten years as a Range III persistent offender for his aggravated burglary conviction to be served concurrently with his twelve year sentence as a career offender for his theft of property conviction. The defendant appealed his conviction to this Court, and we dismissed the appeal, finding that the appeal was not properly before this Court because the defendant had failed to file a timely motion for new trial or a timely notice of appeal. See State v. Ted Ray Brannan, No. 01C01-9704-CC-00148, 1998 WL 242453, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, May 15, 1998). The defendant then sought post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court found that the defendant was deprived of a direct appeal because his counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion for new trial or a notice of appeal. Accordingly, the post-conviction court granted the defendant a delayed appeal. However, the court found that the defendant's other allegations of error were meritless. The defendant is now before this Court on a delayed appeal challenging the post-conviction court's finding that his other post-conviction issues lacked merit. Although we find that the lower court should have dismissed the post-conviction petition when granting him a delayed appeal, in the interest of judicial economy, we will address the issues pertaining to the post-conviction petition as well as those in his direct appeal. Having found that all the issues in this appeal lack merit, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

The state brings this interlocutory appeal in which it challenges the order of the Rutherford County Circuit Court authorizing the admission into evidence of certain testimony relating to the prior sexual behavior of the alleged rape victim. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The appellants, Tyce Jackson and Larry Simmons, were initially charged with delinquency in a juvenile petition filed in the Juvenile Court for Montgomery County. This petition arose out of two separate car jackings occurring in October of 1997. A hearing was held in the juvenile court upon the State's petition to transfer the appellants to criminal court for trial as adults. Finding that the appellants should be tried as adults, the juvenile court transferred the case to the Montgomery County Criminal Court.

The appellants appealed their transfer by way of a petition for the writ of certiorari filed in the criminal court. The criminal court denied the writ. The appellants were indicted on two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of carjacking, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of illegal weapon possession and one count of aggravated assault. Both appellants ultimately entered guilty pleas in criminal court to one count of aggravated kidnapping and one count of aggravated assault. They each received concurrent sentences of ten and six years respectively. As part of the plea agreement the appellants reserved a certified question of law concerning the standard used by the juvenile court in transferring the appellants for trial as adults. The appellants claim that because proof at the transfer hearing showed them to be "voluntarily committable" to an institution for the developmentally disabled or mentally ill they were not subject to transfer for trial as adults. In addition, Appellant Simmons alleges that the evidence at the transfer hearing failed to adequately identify him as a perpetrator of the offenses.

We find that while Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-134(a)(4)(B) prohibits the transfer to criminal court of juveniles who are "involuntarily committable" to a mental health facility, no such prohibition exists with respect to juveniles whose mental disorders might make them subject to voluntary admission to a mental health facility. In addition, we find that Appellant Simmons has failed to present this Court with a record sufficient to permit review of the issue concerning his identity as a perpetrator of the offenses at issue in this appeal. The judgments, conviction and sentences are therefore affirmed.